The bombardment from the air was followed by heavy bombardments from the sea. These were of vital importance to the assault forces. The air bombardment could be relied upon to “soften up” the defences, probably knock out or damage a number of gun batteries and gun positions, and have an adverse effect upon the morale of the defenders. To knock out long-prepared positions in which guns and their crews are protected by many feet thickness of reinforced concrete is, however, a very different thing. It was hoped that the air bombing would achieve something in this direction, but it could certainly not be relied upon to achieve the absolute destruction of the defences of Hitler’s “West Wall” upon which the slave labour of the Todt organisation had spent four years. The most that could be expected was the destruction of a proportion of the enemy’s positions and the temporary silencing of others, either by blocking their ammunition supply arrangements with rubble or by forcing the German guns’ crews to take dazed shelter in their deep dugouts.
This temporary silencing or near-silencing of a great proportion of the German shore batteries and fixed defensive positions was then exploited by the ships of the Royal Navy and the United States Navy. They took advantage of the temporary silencing of many of the German positions to approach within reasonable range of them. Then they in turn bombarded the German positions, adding to the destruction and dislocation achieved by the aerial bombardment and extending the period in which the Germans were forced to “keep their heads down” in their deep shelters.
This object of making the German defenders “keep their heads down,” and the extension of this period during the final approach to the Normandy shore and during the assault of the beaches was, in fact, the keynote of the “fire plan” by which the bombardments were carried out.
The first naval task was to neutralise the heavy gun batteries on each flank of the Assault Area. This was of the greatest importance, for the big-gun batteries of Le Havre and the Cotentin Peninsula would otherwise be able to fire into the area of the approach and the assault. At Le Havre, for instance, there were four 16-inch guns and three 11-inch guns, and altogether thirty-five guns of 6-inch and greater calibre. All these would be within range of the eastern part of the Assault Area. The effect of shell fire of this magnitude upon the thousands of ships and landing craft crowded with closely packed troops would not bear contemplation. In the western area much the same applied, although there were no batteries on the east coast of the Cotentin Peninsula south of Cape Barfleur which approximated in strength and weight of metal to those of Le Havre.
In the initial stages of the invasion of Normandy the naval bombarding forces in the eastern area were all British and those in the western area were all American. This, however, was not a hard and fast arrangement and it was understood from the beginning that one force might have to send ships to reinforce the other. This did not happen in the early stages of the invasion, but later on, after the battleship HMS Warspite had worn out her guns and had had them renewed, she went to the western flank to help in giving deep support fire to the American troops fighting in the Avranches area. Similarly, the force which bombarded Cherbourg before the assault on that fortress was partly American and partly British. Under the leadership of Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay as Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief the two navies acted as one.
The main units of the bombarding force on the western flank were the American battleships Nevada, Texas and Arkansas, with the cruisers Tuscaloosa and Augusta and other ships. The USS Augusta was not, properly, one of the bombarding squadron for she wore the flag of Rear-Admiral Alan G. Kirk, commanding the Western Task Force. Nevertheless, the Augusta did a lot of bombarding, as did the British cruiser Scylla in the eastern area. The Scylla was the flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian, commanding the Eastern Task Force and thus the “opposite number” to the Augusta. The bombarding squadron in the western area was commanded by Rear-Admiral Morton L. Deyo, USN, and that in the western area by Rear-Admiral W. R. Patterson, of the Royal Navy.
USS Nevada was launched in 1914. The Nevada was a leap forward in technology; three of her new features would be included on almost every subsequent US battleship: gun turrets with three guns, oil in place of coal, and the “all or nothing” armour principle making her the first US Navy “super-dreadnought”. She was one of the battleships trapped when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and the only one to get underway during the attack, but she was hit by one torpedo and at least six bombs forcing her to be beached. Subsequently salvaged and modernized at Puget Sound Navy Yard, Nevada served as a convoy escort in the Atlantic and as a fire-support ship in four amphibious assaults: the Normandy Landings and the invasions of Southern France, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.
Rear-Admiral Patterson’s bombarding force was a heterogeneous collection of warships. He flew his flag in the cruiser Mauritius and had with him the battleships Warspite and Ramillies, each with 15-inch guns; the 15-inch gun monitor Roberts, and the cruisers Arethusa, Danae, Dragon and Frobisher. All the ships except the Mauritius had seen service in the last war or been designed during that war. Nor were the ships manned throughout by highly trained crews, for the navy as a whole was feeling the strain of having to provide personnel for such a plethora of special tasks in connection with the invasion. HMS Warspite, for instance, had just returned from the Eastern Fleet and was manned very largely by officers and men who had made up her “passage crew” from personnel of other ships who, for one reason or another, had to return to the United Kingdom. These officers and men deserved and expected leave when they returned to England from service in the Eastern Fleet, which in most cases had been preceded by service in the Mediterranean Fleet during the hard years. The Warspite, however, had to take her place in the bombarding squadron with her “passage crew,” and right well these men discharged every duty which was asked of them.
The British bombarding squadron had been assembled in the Clyde area, where it had received some special bombarding training before sailing south to the invasion. The postponement of D-day owing to the weather was particularly trying to the ships’ companies of this squadron. The ships had to sail from the Clyde three days before the originally selected D-day in order to reach their appointed stations off the Normandy beaches at the correct time. They had therefore been at sea for two days when the postponement signal was received. In order to waste the twenty-four hours and at the same time keep the right distance from Normandy in case the invasion was “laid on” for the following day, the bombarding squadron had to turn north for twelve hours and then turn south again. While it was carrying out these time-wasting manoeuvres it ran into a convoy in a fog, but fortunately there were no mishaps.
The bombarding forces duly reached their correct positions between 5 a.m. and 5.15 a.m. on D-day and the ships opened fire shortly afterwards, using aircraft spotting provided by the specially trained pilots from Lee-on-the-Solent. For this initial phase of the bombardment one ship had been allocated to deal with each big battery. The ships were therefore working on pre-selected targets, but they also had a degree of freedom of action in that alternative targets had been earmarked, and they were also allowed to engage targets of opportunity as these presented themselves.
It very soon became obvious that, apart from being temporarily silenced because their crews were forced to take to their deep shelters, the big batteries at Le Havre were proving themselves virtually untouchable by air or sea bombardment. These batteries gave their attention chiefly to the bombarding ships, and the gunnery officer of one of the bombarding ships afterwards said that the virtual immunity of the Le Havre batteries “gave us deep concern, and seemed to assume a great significance in our lives.”
The truth of the matter was that the batteries had been protected by more and more reinforced concrete and nothing short of a direct hit on the gun barrel or a shell through the opening of the casemate could do them any permanent damage, and both of these eventualities demanded flukes rather than gunnery skill.
The cruiser HMS Belfast bomb
arding German shore positions.
There was another factor which made the tasks of the bombarding ships more difficult. This was that the Germans had moved a great many of their guns after the pre-D-day air bombardments of the coastal defences. The result was that the guns were not where they were expected to be and the accurate bombing before H-hour had not caused as much damage as had been expected, except to the old and abandoned gun positions. It did, however, drive the guns’ crews to cover, and this proved invaluable. Moreover, the German action in moving their guns—which had been done in both the British and American sectors—proved something of a disadvantage to the enemy, for the new emplacements and defences were not complete when we made our assault.
In the circumstances, it was somewhat surprising that, on the whole, the ships were able to keep the German batteries quiet. D-day was, in fact, said by an officer of HMS Mauritius, to have been a “crashing anti-climax.” For a considerable time the ships thought that the Germans were “lying doggo” on purpose and suspected a trap. There was apparently no trap, and for this the bombarding ships and the support squadrons of LCG’s and LCR’s (Landing Craft, Gun, and Landing Craft, Rocket) were grateful, for in the initial stages there was a need to conserve ammunition in order that there should be plenty of seaborne gunfire to meet and break the expected counter-attack by German armoured divisions.
It was very soon after Rear-Admiral Patterson’s eastern bombarding force had reached its bombarding positions to the east of the SWORD area that the enemy delivered the first—and last—attack on our big ships by orthodox surface forces. The incident appears to have been more in the nature of a German mistake than a planned attack.
Our aircraft had laid a smoke screen between the bombarding squadron and the Le Havre batteries. It would not worry the ships during their bombardment because they had aircraft spotting, but would almost certainly give them a high degree of immunity from the Le Havre batteries. It was one of the few deliberate smoke screens laid during the assault, although arrangements had, of course, been made for plenty of these in case they should be needed.
It is not known whether the Germans were making use of this smoke screen to hide their approach to attack the bombarding ships, or whether they were merely investigating it and were taken by surprise when they emerged from it and found themselves close to hostile heavy ships. The tactics and the rather flurried nature of their attack argues the latter.
Be that as it may, three enemy torpedo boats suddenly emerged from the smoke screen at about 5.30 a.m. on D-day. They fired torpedoes and then promptly beat a hasty retreat back into the smoke and towards their base at Le Havre.
Two torpedoes passed between HMS Warspite and HMS Ramillies. Another was seen to be approaching HMS Largs, the headquarters ship of Rear-Admiral A. G. Talbot, who was commanding in the SWORD area. HMS Largs only just avoided being hit by putting her engines to emergency full speed astern. The torpedo passed a few feet ahead of the Largs and stopped and then sank close to the destroyer Virago. A fourth torpedo scored a hit on the Norwegian destroyer Svenner. She was hit in a boiler room. There was a sudden cloud of steam and her funnel fell aft as the whole ship seemed to be lifted out of the water. Then those in the Largs could see the Svenner’s Norwegian crew falling in with perfect discipline on the forecastle and the quarterdeck. A moment or two later they had to jump for their lives as the ship broke her back and sank. Fortunately a large proportion of her ship’s company were saved.
During the early part of the “fire plan” there was considerable anxiety in HMS Arethusa about the progress of a part of the Sixth Airborne Division—an anxiety which was experienced to a lesser extent by HMS Mauritius. Both these ships had as their main tasks the giving of gunfire support to the Sixth Airborne Division which had been dropped east of the River Orne to seize the bridges over the river and the Caen Canal, hold the bridgeheads to the east of these bridges, and neutralise some enemy batteries in that area. For a considerable time the naval supporting craft could get no reliable information which would enable them to give gunfire support to the airborne troops without risk of firing into our own men.
The anxiety caused by this shortage of information was most acute with regard to the Sallesnelles battery. This was a battery of 6-inch howitzers east of the River Orne. The plan was for its capture by airborne troops who were to make crash glider landings in its immediate vicinity. In fact, one glider crash-landed on the battery itself and the battery was duly captured. This, however, was unknown to HMS Arethusa, who was in a position to enfilade the German battery and so facilitate its capture. The trouble was that it was not known whether the battery was in German hands or in the hands of our airborne troops. The fact that the guns of the battery were silent was no criterion, for many of the German batteries had shown inability or disinclination to open fire. The Arethusa was told that she was to open fire at a certain time unless she received orders to the contrary. Then she was told not to open fire until she was certain that the battery was still in German hands. She never was certain and so she did not open fire. It was fortunate, for the battery had been quickly captured by our airborne troops after their crash-landings.
It is of interest in this connection to recollect that the Sixth Airborne Division, who fought so magnificently and successfully for so many days east of the Orne after capturing the river and canal bridges intact, stated positively that they would have been wiped out had it not been for the gunfire support which they received from the Royal Navy—the only artillery support which was available to them.
The batteries to the east of the River Orne fired chiefly at the bombarding ships, and HMS Warspite was straddled by the troublesome battery at Benerville. By 9.30 on the morning of D-day, however, all the main batteries facing the eastern sector of the Assault Area had been silenced, at least temporarily, although the beaches and anchorage in the SWORD area were being subjected to an increasing volume of shell fire from German mobile guns operating in the woods south of Franceville. These mobile guns were exceedingly difficult to locate and engage and they moved as soon as they came under accurate fire.
In the JUNO area the two main batteries were effectively neutralised by naval gunfire during the assault and were subsequently captured by our troops before they had been able to “come to life” sufficiently to interfere.
In the GOLD area Commodore Douglas-Pennant’s headquarters ship HMS Bulolo was engaged and straddled by Longues battery shortly before 6 a.m. HMS Bulolo had to shift berth to avoid being hit, but the battery in question had been effectively silenced by 6.20 a.m. In this area, however, German field batteries of medium calibre continued to engage destroyers and landing craft with intermittent and inaccurate fire from the hill west of Arromanches until about 9.30 a.m.
The deliberate bombardments of enemy batteries and prepared defences by the cruisers and larger warships was only the opening phase of the “fire plan.”
Despite the virtual invulnerability of the bigger batteries and the fact that the enemy had moved many of his gun positions, the combined effect of the air and the first part of the naval bombardment had the effect of silencing, temporarily at least, nearly all the fixed German batteries from the mouth of the Seine to Cape Barfleur. This was done, according to plan, just before the landing ships came within their range. It is true that a certain amount of intermittent trouble was experienced with some batteries, particularly those of Le Havre, but each time they opened fire they were engaged again by the ships with such accuracy that they again lapsed into silence.
As soon as the more formidable of the German coastal defences had been neutralised, the cruisers of the bombarding forces turned their attention to the other German defences, such as pillboxes, redoubts, anti-tank defences, and machine-gun posts, while the heavier ships stood ready to re-engage any heavy German battery which might reopen fire. The cruisers were, of course, able to operate much closer inshore than the heavy ships and could therefore bombard the enemy positions at short range with direct observ
ation from the ships. It was this phase of the naval “fire plan” which saw to it that the troops and tanks of the first waves of the assault were not held up by such obstacles as had been encountered undamaged at Dieppe.
While the cruisers were still engaged on this work, which, of course, further encouraged the German defenders to “keep their heads down,” the landing craft carrying the troops of the assault wave were approaching the beaches. It was time for the third phase of the naval “fire plan” to come into operation.
This was the “drenching” of the beaches and their immediate approaches from landward by the guns of the destroyers and the LCG’s (Landing Craft, Gun). Seventy destroyers mounting 4.7 and 4-inch guns, and a great collection of other craft ranged up and down the beaches, literally “drenching” every square yard of them from water line to vegetation line with high explosive shells. Behind that curtain of fire the landing craft laden with the assault troops made for the beaches.
Accurate timing of the naval “fire plan” was of paramount importance. If the “drenching fire” had begun too early ships might have expended all their ammunition before the assault “touched down” on the beach. As it was one ship—the Hunt class destroyer Tanatside—expended all her ammunition by 8 a.m. on D-day. If the “drenching fire” had been too late the enemy might have been able to “keep his head up” long enough to do terrible execution among the landing craft packed with troops as they approached the beaches.
The timing of the naval “fire plan” on D-day was excellent. That is not to say that the landings were made unopposed. It had never been expected that such could be the case, but it is a fact that they met with far less opposition than had been expected (except in the OMAHA sector), and there is no doubt that this was very largely due to the efficacy and timing of the naval “fire plan.”
Operation Neptune Page 17