As the landing craft with the first wave of the assault neared the beach and “touched down,” the “drenching fire” was lifted to the vegetation line and just beyond. It was, in fact, a development of the “creeping barrage.” And to the guns there were added the “mattresses” of rockets from the LCR’s (Landing Craft, Rocket). A big LCR could have a most devastating effect upon any defences not built of thick concrete.
Many were the tributes paid by both naval and military authorities to the accuracy and effectiveness of the naval gunfire. Commodore Douglas-Pennant, who commanded in the GOLD area, where the 50th Northumbrian Division delivered the assault, put it on record that: “The accurate fire support given by the cruisers of the Tenth Cruiser Squadron, the Dutch ship Flores, the 50th Destroyer Division and four “Hunt” class destroyers contributed largely to the success of the assault. The determination shown by the close support craft in closing the beach defences to almost point-blank range was one of the decisive factors in this phase.”
It was HMS Ajax which neutralised Longues battery on this sector after Commodore Douglas-Pennant’s headquarters ship had several times been “near-missed” by shells from its guns. The Longues battery was very troublesome and was in a position to do much damage. Its neutralisation by the 6-inch guns of HMS Ajax, which had spoken so decisively at the Battle of the River Plate, was therefore a matter of great importance. It was, moreover, due to some “exhibition” shooting on the part of the Ajax, which will long be quoted as an instance of amazing gunnery by a ship against a shore battery.
The German battery at Longues consisted of four 155 mm guns—roughly equivalent to 6-inch—mounted in reinforced concrete casemates. The Ajax fired 114 rounds at this battery from her 6-inch guns at an average range of 12,000 yards—6 sea miles. When the battery was occupied by our troops it was found that the Ajax’s shooting had had the following results. Number 1 gun was undamaged. The casemate of Number 2 gun had been hit and damaged. Number 3 gun had received a direct hit on the gun itself which had put it completely out of action. Number 4 gun had been completely destroyed by more than one shell which had passed into the casemate between the sides of the aperture and the gun barrel and had burst inside the casemate.
HMS Ajax was launched in 1934 and entered service in 1935. On 13 December 1939 Ajax along with other cruisers Exeter and Achilles engaged the German pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee in the South Atlantic. Ajax was hit seven times by the Germans: X and Y turrets were disabled, structural damage was sustained and there were 12 casualties including 7 killed. The Graf Spee was scuttled off Montevideo on 18 December 1939, the German captain believing he was likely to be up against vastly superior Royal Navy forces.
As part of Force K, Ajax bombarded Gold Beach during the D-Day invasion (The battery at Longues gave some trouble but was silenced by 6-inch shells through the embrasures of two of the four casemates).
HMS Orion, sister ship and squadron mate of the Ajax, was probably the most experienced ship in bombarding in support of invasion. She had distinguished herself off Sicily and off Salerno and Anzio. On D-day off Normandy, however, she did not fire a shot after the completion of the part of the pre-H-hour “fire plan” which had been allotted to her. This was because she was kept in reserve, it being deemed unwise to allow all ships to expend a large proportion of their ammunition in the opening phase of the invasion. Instead of allowing all ships to use a high proportion of their ammunition and so risk running short at the same time, arrangements were made that some ships of each class in each area should fire off all their ammunition before the next ships began firing. This, of course, was a principle rather than an order, for the latter had to be left sufficiently elastic to allow all available ships to take part if the situation demanded. There was only one area in which this became necessary. That was in the American OMAHA area, where the assault troops were held up for many hours by encountering an unexpected German field formation which had just moved into the area for anti-invasion exercise. There all available ships joined in the bombardment without hesitation, and their timely interference proved decisive.
On D-day the bombarding squadron on the eastern flank approached their bombarding position down a swept channel two cables wide to a buoy and then had to steam round and round the buoy while bombarding, as this was the only water then swept clear of mines. On that night the ships anchored as close inshore as possible in SWORD area. This they did because it was fully expected that some of the ships would be sunk, for the Germans were expected to react far more strongly and quickly to the invasion than they actually did, and it was deemed wise to be in as shallow water as possible to facilitate salvage. Moreover, there was the possibility that the guns of a ship sunk in shallow water could still be brought to bear on the enemy.
In retrospect and in the light of the enemy’s comparative impotence this may appear as a somewhat defeatist attitude. In reality it was just the reverse. It demonstrates the risks which were taken and the lengths to which the navy was prepared to go to ensure support for the invasion troops. There was nothing defeatist in anchoring close inshore to facilitate salvage of a ship if she was sunk, for that would be the last thing the Royal Navy would do if it expected a reverse which might lead to the ship becoming readily salvable by the enemy.
By next day the minesweepers had cleared a fairly large pear-shaped area between the eastern limit of SWORD area and Le Havre, which gave the ships of the eastern bombarding squadron more sea room in which to operate; and twenty-four hours later this had been joined to the swept area of SWORD by a broad expanse of mine-free water. The bombarding squadron made good use of the greater freedom of movement accorded to it—though it did on one occasion cut straight across a known minefield in pursuit of some German ships reported to be leaving Le Havre.
The mere fact that the initial phase of the invasion went so perfectly “according to plan” made life in the bombarding squadron somewhat uneventful and tedious after the first few hours. The ships’ companies were always expecting some strong and determined action by the Germans, but they saw very little action apart from their rather dull bombardment routine, for our minesweepers and patrols proved more than a match for the German reactions. Nevertheless, they played a most important part and fired a prodigious amount of ammunition which gave invaluable support to our troops during their assault across the beaches and subsequently as they battled their way far inland. In the first few days of the invasion British warships alone fired more than 72,000 shells from guns ranging in size from the 15-inch guns of the battleships and the monitors to the 4-inch weapons of the “Hunt” class destroyers.
Millions of rounds were also fired from the smaller quick-firing weapons. During the seven months from D-day to the end of the year 1944 Allied warships fired well over 190,000 rounds, varying in calibre from 16-inch to 4-inch, in general support of the invasion armies, while a further 8,000 rounds were fired in special bombardments such as those of Cherbourg, Brest and Walcheren. In the first eighteen days of the invasion United States warships alone fired 44,000 shells varying in calibre from 15-inch to 4-inch, while a further 5,000 shells were fired by British and American warships in their bombardment of Cherbourg. In the centre and on the eastern flank naval bombardment and supporting fire was necessary for a longer period, and here rather more than 97,000 shells varying in calibre from 16-inch to 4-inch were fired by British warships before the break through and the German retirement to the east.
As the Allied troops advanced inland the naval bombardments altered in character. Instead of engaging enemy batteries they were called upon to give supporting fire to our troops, often many miles inland. This they did with great success thanks to the accuracy of their shooting and the efficiency of the specially trained FOB’s (Forward Officers, Bombardment) and BLO’s (Bombardment Liaison Officers) and the aircraft spotting.
Cruisers were able to give “deep support,” as this fire at targets far inland was called, at ranges between 20,000 and 24,000 yards—between 1
0 and 12 sea miles—while battleships supported our troops with gunfire at ranges up to 17 miles. On more than one occasion a German commander assembling his armoured vehicles for a counter attack found his force suddenly shattered by heavy shells coming apparently from nowhere. German prisoners have borne witness to the serious moral effect of this unexpected heavy naval gunfire, with the shells coming over the hills from the sea, and many ships received the special thanks of the military units to which they gave this supporting fire. Among the British ships to receive special congratulations from the Army were the battleships Nelson and Warspite, the monitor Roberts, and the cruisers Orion and Argonaut.
It was an unorthodox form of naval warfare, and many unusual targets were engaged by the ships. Ten per cent of the shells fired in the first month by the big guns, for instance, were fired against enemy infantry, while 28 per cent of the shells fired from medium guns in the same period were fired at enemy tanks and motor transport. It is interesting to note that the ammunition expended on counter-battery fire by the ships amounted in this first month of the invasion to roughly one-fifth of the total rounds fired by heavy, medium and light guns.
Naturally, many ships wore out their guns during the invasion and had to have new guns fitted. Even before the fall of Caen the battleships Warspite and Ramillies and the cruiser Orion, as well as a number of other ships, had to change worn-out guns for new. It was one of the triumphs of the organisation of the invasion that even the big operation of changing the guns of a battleship did not lead to any temporary reduction in the naval fire power available off the Normandy coast. Another triumph of organisation was that of ammunition supply, which was carried out in such a way that no ship was ever delayed for a moment and no ship left the Assault Area with magazines empty or nearly empty without having been replaced by a similar ship with magazines and shell rooms full.
On the eastern flank there remained for a long time the necessity for bombardments other than those giving “deep support” to our troops far inland. The batteries east of the River Orne and the big gun batteries at Le Havre were for ever coming to life and having to be neutralised anew. This could not always be done, particularly in the case of the German mobile batteries east of the River Orne, where the contours of the land were such that they militated against accurate fire from low trajectory naval guns. The result was that the anchorage in the SWORD area had to be abandoned as it was considered that ships lying there would be exposed to unjustifiable risk from enemy shell fire.
The Germans also produced one or two other most annoying innovations. One of the most infuriating of these was a heavy gun on a railway truck mounting. The Germans used to keep this gun in a railway tunnel behind Houlgate, east of the Orne. At intervals they used to trundle it out, fire a round or two into our anchorage, and trundle it back again into the shelter of the tunnel just before our retaliatory shells arrived. This infernal jack-in-the-box was more annoying than harmful, but it was not silenced until our troops had cleared the enemy from the area.
For the most part it was all work and no play for the ships’ companies of the larger bombardment ships, particularly when the troops had advanced well inland. They did not see the enemy or the positions at which they were firing when they were carrying out “blind firing” bombardments or providing “deep support” for the armies, yet they had always to be ready to act within a split second of receiving a message saying “Snap Map Reference such and such.” The lives of many soldiers and the success or failure of some unknown military operation would depend upon the speed and accuracy with which that call for immediate support was answered.
Accuracy as well as speed had to be the watchword of the bombarding ships, and this meant not only accurate setting of the gun sights and accuracy in making allowances for wind, gun wear, temperature, and even the amount which the earth would turn during the time of flight of the shells, but also accuracy of navigation. A navigational error in the position of the ship would, of course, affect the accuracy of the gunfire when firing at map references, to say nothing of the fact that it might take the ship into mine-infested waters.
The accuracy of naval gunfire during the period when it was providing “deep support” at long range for the troops fighting far inland was phenomenal. Over one period in which the results were carefully analysed it was found that the average range at which the bombarding ships had been firing was 17,000 yards—eight and a half sea miles—and that the average distance of the first ranging shot from the target was only 146 yards—an error which was promptly made good by the spotting correction passed to the ship by the Forward Officer, Bombardment, or by aircraft.
This bombarding and provision of deep artillery support called for great endurance on the part of the officers and men of the bombarding ships. When they were in the Assault Area or its vicinity they had to be ready for action at an instant’s notice both day and night. Many of the officers in these ships did not take their clothes off for seventeen days and nights, yet the enemy never tried to profit by their weariness, which he could easily have deduced. It was also very trying to the nerves. Imagine being in a ship which fired one 15-inch or 16-inch gun regularly once a minute, as did the battleships Nelson and Ramillies when they bombarded Caen throughout the night of 12-13 June. They ensured that the Germans got no rest, but the crews of the ships got no rest either.
Above and below: US PT boats crossing the channel, 6 June 1944.
Some of the British Forward Officers, Bombardment, and the American shore fire control parties had a very bad time during the assault. Ensign E. A. Fehlig, USNR, for instance, was one of a shore fire control party attached to an infantry regiment. The whole party had to wade ashore under shell fire and Fehlig was badly wounded. He was lying face down and could not rise because of the weight of his pack, so that he was, although conscious, about to be drowned by the rising tide when somebody noticed his plight and cut his pack off. Without his pack he was able to crawl clear of the water, but the enemy shell fire was so intense that the wounded could not be taken off the beach and had to be collected in the shelter of an overturned landing craft.
Chief Water Tender W. Venable of the American destroyer USS Glennon also had a close call. The Glennon was badly hit by shore batteries and her stern fell away and anchored the ship so that she became a sitting target for the German guns. Her commander, Commander C. A. Johnson, USN, ordered all but fifteen men to abandon the ship. After dark a repair crew of forty men went on board to try to salvage the ship, but at dawn the German 155 mm guns opened fire again and hit the ship, setting her on fire aft. Venable was working below and thought the German shells were the Glennon’s guns firing. Although slightly wounded he went on working, unaware that the order to abandon ship had been given. When he was finally rescued from the burning wreck by a PT boat all he had to say was “We got 600 pounds of steam, let’s get this son of a gun outa here,” and was highly indignant at having to leave the ship.
General Eisenhower on D-Day plus one, on his way to Normandy on HMS Apollo, a fast minelayer, Abdiel class. He is accompanied by Major General Ralph Royce, General Omar Bradley, [unknown], Admiral Bertram Ramsay, and Petty Officer Ames on right.
CHAPTER IV
INTO NORMANDY
The Germans keep their heads down—The first wave goes into the beaches—The Germans come to life—Clearing the obstacles—Casualties and damage—The Battle of OMAHA beach—The Le Hamel strongpoint—Gallantry and determination—Beach commandos.
The initial blow in the invasion of Northern France was, of course, delivered by the air forces of Britain and the United States, and so heavy was this blow in the hours immediately preceding the landing of the first wave of the assault troops that it was estimated that between midnight and breakfast time there were about 31,000 Allied airmen in the air over France, not counting the airborne troops which were dropped east of the Caen Canal and in the Cotentin Peninsula.
The proportion of this air blow which was delivered against the German coast defe
nces, and particularly the heavy gun batteries of Le Havre and the Cape Barfleur neighbourhood, was designed as part of “Operation Neptune.” Apart from the assistance rendered by the air forces to the Allied navies and the shipping in their charge, there was the all-important fighter “umbrella” over the assault area and the convoy routes from Britain. So effective was this that the Luftwaffe made no attempt at daylight attack during the approach or the assault. In fact, Allied fighters ranged as much as 75 miles inland in France without encountering any air opposition.
The two initial successes of “Operation Neptune” were that our great and heavily laden armadas were not bombed in their ports of assembly in Southern England, and that they were not subjected to air attack on their way to the assault area. For both these successes the thanks of the maritime forces and of the troops embarked must go to the Allied air forces.
The troops, particularly in the smaller craft, had good reason to be thankful that they did not have to contend with enemy air attack as well as the weather. Although a distinct improvement on that of the previous day, the weather was such that the smaller types of landing craft had a very wet and uncomfortable passage. The engines of four LCT’s (Landing Craft, Tanks) were swamped on passage. Three of these were successfully got under way again, but one LCT was broached to by the seas, swamped and foundered, and a high proportion of the heavily-equipped troops lost their lives.
Small landing craft going into the beaches. In the background is USS Augusta, flagship of Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk, USN, Commander Western Naval Task Force.
Senior US officers watching operations from the bridge of USS Augusta, 8 June 1944. From left to right: Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk, USN, Commander Western Naval Task Force; Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, US Army, Commanding General, US First Army; Rear Admiral Arthur D. Struble, USN, (with binoculars) Chief of Staff for RAdm. Kirk; and Major General Hugh Keen, US Army.
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