The Mulberry harbour at Arromanches in operation.
A composite aerial photograph and plan of the Mulberry Harbour off Arromanches.
The artificial port of Vierville-sur-Mer/St Laurent-sur-Mer, ‘Mulberry A’ (Omaha Beach) in operation prior to the destructive storm of 19-21 June 1944
By D plus 13 most of the great concrete caissons which were to form the main breakwaters of the artificial harbours were in place off the Normandy coast, and the outer floating breakwaters of “bombardons” had been anchored in position. There were two of the prefabricated “Mulberry” harbours. Both had been built in Great Britain but one was to serve the American sector and one the British sector. The former was placed off St Laurent, in the OMAHA area and the latter off Arromanches in the JUNO area. Although most of the heaviest components of these artificial harbours had been successfully towed to the French coast and placed in position by D plus 13, neither harbour was by any means complete. Pierheads and pier sections were by that time on their way across the Channel. The British “Mulberry” harbour off Arromanches was actually nearer completion than its American counterpart off St Laurent, and the Arromanches harbour was providing considerable shelter, although the discharging of ships still had to be done into lighters, “dumb” barges, DUKW’s ferry craft and “Rhino” barges—the latter being little more than large flat-topped caissons with a freeboard when laden of only a foot or so, on to which vehicles were discharged from the ships.
One of the bravest acts of the build-up concerned one of these “Rhinos,” which was set on fire while it was lying alongside a ship which had already discharged a number of vehicles on to it. The laden vehicles burnt furiously and there was grave danger that the ship alongside which the “Rhino” was lying would also catch fire, in which case the petrol and loads of the vehicles she carried would very soon have made an end of her. The situation was one of great anxiety when a party of Royal Marines of the ferry service boarded the blazing “Rhino,” got the wounded off it, and got it away from the ship’s side. For this act of great bravery two of the Royal Marines were awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.
In addition to the shelter harbours, two real French harbours were playing their part in the build-up. Most important of these was Port-en-Bessin, almost on the dividing line between the British and American Assault Areas. This little port had been captured by the Royal Marine Commandos during the night of D plus 1, and by D plus 8 it was handling an average of more than 1,000 tons a day, which must have been far more than had ever been thought of in peace-time. The other captured French port was Courseulles, in the JUNO area to the east of Arromanches. “On paper” Courseulles should have been able to handle more than Port-en-Bessin, but it did not do so, and by D plus 8 it was averaging a bare thousand tons a day. This was an important help to the landing of men, equipment and stores over the beaches, but it had been hoped to achieve more at Courseulles. That we did not do so was due more to the deterioration of the port owing to its neglect than to damage by enemy sabotage or our own bombardments. It would be difficult to over-estimate the importance of these two tiny captured ports. Small as was their contribution to the immense volume of the build-up, it was a contribution which was not dependent upon the vicissitudes of landing over beaches and was therefore one which was doubly welcome as being free from anxiety.
The anxieties regarding the beaches and their exits were many and varied. In the normal course of events one does not think of a beach “wearing out,” but that is precisely what they threatened to do and what some of them did. Courseulles was, as has been said, in the JUNO area, and Commodore G. N. Oliver, who commanded in the JUNO area, reported that all the beaches in his sector of the coast began to show serious signs of wear after three days of heavy traffic, and that the deterioration setting in, particularly below the half-tide level, made it essential to work out a system whereby sections of the beaches could be “rested.”
Anxieties there were, and of driving relentless hard work, much of it under enemy shell fire, there was certainly no lack, but the build-up was going well. It had fallen slightly behind schedule in the initial stage because of weather and damage to craft, but the leeway had been made up and all was going “according to plan.”
In addition to the Supreme Allied Commander and the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, other distinguished persons had visited the Assault Areas. On 12 June the destroyer HMS Kelvin had brought Mr Winston Churchill, General Smuts; and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Vice-Admiral Nelles of the Royal Canadian Navy visited the area on the same day. Two days later the French-manned “Hunt” class destroyer La Combattante—which was afterwards to fall victim to a German mine in the North Sea—took General de Gaulle to the land for whose freedom he had for so long struggled in exile. Then, on 16 June, His Majesty the King, accompanied by the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Air Staff and the Chief of Combined Operations, visited the Assault Areas in the cruiser HMS Arethusa.
Thirteen is held by the superstitious to be an unlucky number. Certainly D plus 13 was the beginning of a three-day period of great misfortune to the build-up of our invasion forces. On that day there arose in the English Channel a gale the like of which had not been known in those waters in June for forty years. For three days it raged with a ferocity so great that a man could hardly stand against the wind; and it blew from the north-east so that the whole of the Normandy beachhead area was lee shore. Along that lee shore as well as out to sea it left such a trail of destruction and chaos that it came near to breaking the hearts of those who had laboured so long and so faithfully to see that nothing should intervene between the armies and their flow of reinforcements and supplies.
Gales, however, cannot break the heart or the determination of the real seaman. Cornwallis, when driven with sprung masts and split sails from his station off Brest during the terrible gales of December, 1803, was always back on his station as soon as the weather showed the least signs of moderating. So it was with the British and American seamen off Normandy. For a short time they were driven from their stations by the great gale, but as soon as it moderated they returned to their greatly increased tasks with fortitude and a determination which soared above all difficulties. Perhaps the greatest trait which British and Americans have in common is that both are at their greatest when they are “up against it.” It would be difficult, if not impossible, to point to any fundamental difference between Britain after Dunkirk and the United States after Pearl Harbor. Off Normandy after the great gale that had wrecked hopes and plans as well as vessels and harbours the men of the two nations worked under the spur of the common national characteristic.
The great gale which began to blow in the early hours of 19 June got up very suddenly and increased rapidly to its maximum force. Commodore G. N. Oliver, commanding in the JUNO area, logged the fact that the gale sprang up suddenly at 3.30 a.m. on D plus 13. Throughout that day his headquarters ship HMS Hilary rode out the gale, although it took two anchors to hold her. Soon after midday next day (D plus 19), however, even two anchors proved insufficient to hold the ship, which began to drag both anchors.
The American sector “Mulberry” harbour of St Laurent, being incomplete, was vulnerable to the high seas, which could surge over and into the uncovered concrete caissons in a way they were never designed to withstand. The result was that they broke up and great sections of what had been designed as a breakwater sank into the mud of the sea bed. The bombardons of the floating breakwaters broke adrift and drove down upon the wreckage of the artificial harbour, within which the piers were sunk and twisted, and the only pierhead then in position had been utterly smashed by a group of sixteen British LCT’s (Landing Craft, Tank) which had sought shelter only to be driven down out of control on to the pierhead. Where there had been a great harbour nearing completion there remained nothing but wreckage dangerous to navigation, with the steel bones jutting menacingly from the concrete. Even the blockships of the “Gooseberry” harbour in the OMAHA area failed to sta
nd up to the gale. They settled in the mud of the sea bed, being worked into it by the sea, so that the waves could break over them at the abnormally high tides built up by the gale in the corner between the Cotentin Peninsula and the Bay of the Seine coast. These made the shelter harbour within them useless and broke up the upperworks of the ships, so that all that remained was a broken and sunken breakwater of concrete-filled hulls which did nothing to break the surface waves. So great was the destruction among the small vessels in the OMAHA area that a survivors’ camp containing between 500 and 600 officers and men had to be established on the beach.
The destruction at Omaha after the great gale. One theory is that the storm was effectively ‘man-made’. From D-Day to the 19th June the sea in a wider area of the Normandy shores was churned and turned up-side-down with vast surface activity, the transportation of vast quantities of materials from thousands of vessel-trips and towing great concrete structures, further exacerbated by countless explosions. From this churning the sea surface got colder. Sun-warmed water was exchanged with deeper and colder water, while the mid June sun supplied a lot of sun ray to the surrounding land masses. That presumably built the ingredients for the making of a devastating storm which started on 19 June 1944 and lasted for three days by which the ‘Mulberry A’ port at Omaha Beach was so completely wrecked that its further use was abandoned. Luckily the damage at ‘Mulberry B’ could be repaired fairly soon.
The commanding officer of one of the British small craft which sought shelter from the gale in the “Mulberry” harbour off St Laurent described the state of affairs in that harbour in the following words: “The scene inside the Mulberry was one of unutterable chaos. Literally hundreds of landing craft from LCV (Landing Craft, Vehicle) to LST (Landing Ship, Tank) were ashore piled one upon another. The ‘whales’ (caissons on which the pier roadways floated) had vanished. The bombardons were chasing one another madly round the bay The ‘phoenixes’ (the big concrete breakwater caissons) had cracked. Even the blockships were breaking up, and what little sea room remained was packed with wreckage, DUKW’s and more and more landing craft, coasters and barges, dragging their anchors steadily towards the beach.”
The “Mulberry” harbour off Arromanches in the British sector fared much better. Not only was it somewhat nearer completion, at least as far as the breakwaters were concerned, than the St Laurent “Mulberry,” but it received a certain amount of shelter from the off-lying Calvados Rocks. Even so, the outer floating breakwater of “bombardons” broke away and its sections became a total loss. Moreover, the completion of the harbour was greatly delayed. When the gale blew up there were at sea on their way to France a great many sections of the piers and pierheads in tow. Every one of the tows which were at sea on D plus 13 were lost. It was, however, fortunate that the breakwaters of the “Mulberry” held, for within their shelter no fewer than 155 ships and craft weathered the gale. The “Gooseberry” shelter harbours in the eastern area also held. Had they not done so the destruction wrought by the gale would have been infinitely worse, for it would have virtually eliminated the ferry service craft, for which there were no replacements available.
As it was, the losses were bad enough. More than 800 craft of all types were stranded. Of the 650 LCT’s (Landing Craft, Tank) which had been available for the assault and build-up 320 were put out of action by the gale. On all sides there were calls for salvage and repair. On and off the beaches men worked like demons with tugs, bulldozers and tractors and wire hawsers singing with strain and frequently parting, and flying back with the suddenly released strain to the great peril of all in the vicinity. Had it not been for the tireless efforts of all concerned the gale would have inflicted even greater damage, which would have meant an even greater interruption in the build-up. As it was, the effect of the gale on the build-up extended beyond the period of the gale because of the delay in completion of the Arromanches “Mulberry” harbour and the loss and damage among the ferry craft. Thus the average number of arrivals in the Assault Area of ships and major landing craft was considerably lower during the week after the gale than during the week after D-day.
The great gale had, in fact, accomplished more in three days than the enemy had been able to accomplish in a fortnight, including the Assault period, with all his armies, aircraft, mines, U-boats, E-boats and other surface vessels—and more than he was to be able to accomplish in the future with all his “secret weapons” and other destructive devices.
The figures of craft lost and damaged show conclusively that the gale proved to be the more formidable enemy. During the period of D-day to D plus 6 there were 64 losses due to enemy action and only 34 due to weather, while 106 craft were damaged by enemy action and exactly the same number by stress of weather.
Between D plus 7 and D plus 18, however—which period includes the great gale—118 craft were lost by stress of weather as against 27 by enemy action. And in the same period no less than 297 craft were damaged by the weather, while the enemy damaged only 29 craft.
Over the whole of the first month of the invasion, and including the great risks and inevitable losses due to enemy action during the initial assault phase, the enemy only destroyed or damaged a total of 261 craft as against a total of 606 craft lost or damaged as a result of the weather. The figures for loss and damage by the enemy include, of course, casualties caused by the German underwater obstructions.
By good fortune more ships and major landing craft had arrived in the Assault Areas during the two days before the gale than ever before. This; the providential survival of the Arromanches “Mulberry”; and the little ports of Port-en-Bessin and Courseulles; enabled an, all-important trickle of supply to reach the armies even during the height of the gale. This was as well, for on D plus 14 only 57 ships and major landing craft reached the Assault Areas instead of the usual 220-230; while on D plus 15 not a single ship or major landing craft arrived. Even on D plus 16 there were only 81 arrivals.
One can well imagine the anxiety that was caused to those responsible by the sudden and unexpected freak gale. Never can a wild north-easter have been less welcome.
Several boats ran aground on Omaha Beach after the storm; the gateway and dismantled wreck of a man-made beach in front of ‘Mulberry A’.
CHAPTER IX
AFTER THE GALE
Effects of the gale—Salvage and repair—SWORD area abandoned—Gale’s effect on German mining campaign—Making good the loss in the build-up.
The great north-easterly gale of D plus 13 to D plus 16 (19-21 June) produced a situation of extreme difficulty in the organisation of the build-up. The whole of the repetitive schedule had been thrown out of gear. For nearly four days the armies ashore had received only the barest trickle of supplies and reinforcements. It was therefore urgently necessary to increase the rate of the build-up in order to make up for the lost days, and in particular to rush to Normandy during the days immediately following the gale the very maximum of reinforcements, supplies and equipment in order to ensure that the military shortages should not become acute and that the enemy should not be able to profit by the situation by launching counter-attacks against tired and ill-supplied troops. It was, in fact, necessary to think in terms of another D-day and its immediately following period.
It was, however, one thing to think in such terms, and quite another to arrange for the maximum to be taken to Normandy in the minimum of time and without considerations of sparing men or material in the process. The gale had done such damage that the material would have to be studied if there were to be no risk of further breakdown owing to shortage of available ships and craft. Numerically, the LCT’s (Landing Craft, Tank) had been playing the major part in the build-up, but the gale had put out of action, temporarily at least, just over half the total number of LCT’s available. Nor was any useful purpose to be served by rushing larger ships to the Assault Areas when the ferry service, seriously attenuated by loss and damage during the gale, could not compete with the rapid discharge of their cargoes
. Such a policy would have led only to a build-up of laden but idle tonnage in the most dangerous area.
Many different kinds of boats beached on the shore. Omaha Beach after the storm of 19-21 June 1944 that destroyed the ‘Mulberry A’. The black wavy line shows a redaction by the censors.
The problem which faced the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief was one which required a nice blend of organisation and improvisation. On the day before the gale began to blow the British “Mulberry” harbour off Arromanches had handled 1,600 tons of equipment and stores for the army. On 14, 15 and 16 June very few vessels arrived off the Normandy coast, the total arrivals for those three days being 57, nil and 81 respectively. There was, of course, a very large arrival of ships in the Assault Areas on the day after the gale subsided, for ships which had been loaded at British ports but which had not sailed during the bad weather were rushed across the Channel. Thus on that day, 17 June, no less than 281 ships and major landing craft arrived off the Normandy beaches. Arrivals on that scale could not, however, be maintained, and even had that been possible they could not have been unloaded.
The problem on the far shore was complicated by the urgent need to clear the beaches and the waters off them of wrecks and stranded vessels. This was necessary not only in order to clear the beaches and their seaward approaches from obstructions which impeded the unloading of vessels which arrived, but also in order to salvage the craft and get as many of them as might be back into service at the earliest possible moment.
The salvage and repair tasks imposed by the great gale were prodigious. The casualties off the beaches during the assault phase had been far lower than had been anticipated, although a large number of landing craft had been damaged on the beaches or by the enemy’s underwater obstacles. The casualties among ships and craft due to the gale, however, were higher than the expected casualties during the assault, and they placed a tremendous strain upon the salvage and repair organisations. By a great and sustained effort, however, these organisations worked wonders. Of rather more than 800 vessels stranded by the gale about 600 landing craft and a few coasters were temporarily repaired and refloated on the next spring tides, while about a hundred more were temporarily repaired and refloated on the following spring tides a fortnight later.
Operation Neptune Page 27