Both the British and United States navies had repair parties ashore in their respective areas; and in the British Assault Area were the two repair ships HMS Adventure and HMS Albatross. The former had been a cruiser minelayer and the latter a seaplane carrier of the Royal Australian Navy. Both had been specially fitted to work as repair ships during the invasion and they had special repair parties on board in addition to their crews.
These two ships and the repair parties on the beaches proved of the utmost value during the critical stages after the gale. In the British Assault Area alone they repaired 553 ships and vessels. Of these, 90 were HM ships and 80 were naval units of the Light Coastal Forces; 27 were unclassified and 13 were merchant ships. The remaining 315 vessels were landing ships, landing craft and barges.
The Albatross alone saved 79 landing craft from probable total loss and restored 132 vessels to fighting service. In order to accomplish this task in the prevailing weather the ship had frequently to go very close inshore in the eastern Assault Area, where she frequently came under heavy shell fire from the German batteries and mobile guns. These scored a few hits on her superstructure, but did no great harm and the Albatross continued to give invaluable service off the Normandy coast until she was seriously damaged by an underwater explosion, which necessitated her return to a dockyard port. It is thought that this underwater explosion was due to a hit by one of the very long range circling torpedoes which the Germans sent into the anchorage during July and August.’
The remnants of ‘Mulberry A’ off Omaha Beach after one of the worst June gales in eighty years.
The repairs carried out to all these craft on the far shore were not, of course, permanent repairs. In the great majority of cases they were temporary repairs only, but they enabled the vessels to continue operating or to make the passage back across the English Channel to a dockyard port where permanent repairs could be carried out. There is no doubt whatever that a large proportion of these vessels would have become total losses had it not been for the work of the naval repair parties and the facilities provided by the repair ships.
Salvage, of course, worked in close conjunction with the repair organisation, particularly in refloating stranded vessels and those which had been temporarily repaired on the beaches. The salvage organisation was also concerned with the dispersal of wrecks which impeded the traffic to and from the beaches and anchorages. When possible such wrecks were moved out of the way in one piece and placed in positions where long-term salvage could be undertaken if desired, but in cases where they could not be moved as a whole they were cut up by divers using underwater oxyacetylene cutters. There were cases in which a decision had to be taken on whether to cut up and dispose of a wreck which, if left, could probably be salvaged in due course. In such cases the necessity of keeping the waters off the beaches clear of wrecks took priority.
When one considers the severity of the gale and the vulnerability, despite the “Gooseberry” shelter harbours and the “Mulberry” harbour off Arromanches, of the great collection of craft off the Normandy beachhead, it seems astonishing that the build-up of the strength of the armies was not even more seriously impeded. Despite the loss and damage to ships and craft and the great artificial harbours, the armies ashore were very soon once more receiving everything that they required, and a progressive increase in their strength.
The gale blew itself out on D plus 16 (22 June), and by 25 June the arrival of ships and major landing craft off the beaches had settled down once more to something approaching what it had been before the gale. In the six days, 25-30 June, the average daily arrivals off Normandy was 171 ships and major landing craft daily, as opposed to an average of 226 arrivals daily during the six days previous to the gale. The lesser number of average daily arrivals after 25 June concerned chiefly LCT’s (Landing Craft, Tank). Whereas 462 LCT’s had arrived off Normandy between 14 and 18 June, only 291 of these craft arrived off the beaches between 19 and 30 June. This was hardly surprising, since no less than 320 of the total force of 650 LCT’s had been put out of action by the gale.
The situation produced by the gale was not the only factor affecting the build-up of the strength of the invasion armies. The enemy’s reactions to our invasion was also having its effect. The German minelaying campaign, and the accumulation of mines in the Assault Areas and their approaches due to the period in which the weather made minesweeping impossible, had forced us to accept narrower swept channels in order to be able to devote more minesweepers to the clearance of the anchorages and their immediate approaches. Moreover, it was found necessary to abandon the eastern SWORD area, in so far as the unloading of merchant ships was concerned. This decision was not forced upon us by the activities of the German E-boats and other less orthodox weapons loosed against that flank. The naval forces on that flank consistently proved themselves more than a match for the worst the enemy could do at sea. The German shell fire in the SWORD area, however, proved consistently and increasingly troublesome, and it was this which made Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay decide to abandon that area for the unloading of ships, since to continue to do so invited losses and casualties on a considerable scale.
This German shell fire came mostly from mobile guns which operated in the Franceville area east of the River Orne. Rear-Admiral Vian mentioned in his official report the troublesome nature of these batteries of mobile guns operating in the woods south of Franceville and said that they were most difficult to locate and engage. They were repeatedly engaged by cruisers and destroyers and LCCU’s (Landing Craft, Gun) and LCS.s (Landing Craft, Support), but although they seemed on several occasions to have been silenced, they always opened fire again from a different place as soon as our bombardment ceased.
It was just as well that Courseulles and Port-en-Bessin, small ports though they were, were in our hands and being rapidly developed, while great efforts were made, working against time, to replace the “Mulberry” pier and pierhead sections which had been lost when the gale broke while they were being towed across the Channel, and to complete the British “Mulberry” harbour off Arromanches. So well did this work go forward that by D plus 34 (10 July) this artificial harbour was handling an average of 6,000 tons of equipment and stores daily. The great artificial harbour—the only one of the two to survive the gale—proved its worth both during and after the gale. It had originally been planned that a “Mulberry” harbour should survive and work for ninety summer days, but that at Arromanches worked on successfully through the worst of the winter, and when it was closed down as a main supply port the reason was not because it failed to stand up to stress of weather.
The reasons for the eventual closing of the Arromanches “Mulberry” harbour were three. The most important of these was that alternative ports had been captured and cleared in the eastern part of the Channel, in Belgium and in Holland which were much nearer to the fighting line and therefore did not necessitate the long haul up the “Red Ball Route” from Normandy to the front in Holland and on the borders of Germany. The other two reasons were more intimately connected with Arromanches itself. One was the deterioration of the roads in the Arromanches district, which had been literally worn away by the weight of traffic which they had had to bear, and the other was the silting up of the harbour with sand built up into banks in some places and scooped out of other places by the tide. This made parts of the artificial harbour too shallow, while hollows formed in other places on the sea bed into which some of the caissons began to topple and settle.
After it ceased to be used as a main supply port the Arromanches “Mulberry” harbour had one further day of glorious life. That was in the following spring, when it was en fête in aid of French prisoners-of-war. It was a fitting end to a project which had demanded the work of many thousands and which had played so tremendous a part in the liberation of France.
The build-up continued steadily after the great interruption caused by the gale. There were, however, other small troubles from time to time. These were mostly caused by the
different ideas and requirements of the navy and the army, and all were overcome by mutual goodwill and appreciation that all were working towards the same goal.
The Naval Commander-in-Chief, for instance, was always concerned that there should be the minimum number of ships lying off the far shore at any given moment, and that all ships arriving there should be completely unloaded at once in order to effect a quick turn round. Their cargoes could be taken to dumps ashore from which the military authorities could draw their requirements as they were needed. Only by working on such a system could full economy in shipping be achieved. The military authorities, however, were prone to take out of the ships on their arrival only the items of cargo which were immediately and urgently required. Thus, they argued, they would save the creation of great dumps ashore, but they did not appreciate at first that they were, in fact, using the ships as dumps and thus impeding their proper use as transport. This army method was given the name of “selective unloading.” It was never allowed to assume serious proportions, but it was constantly threatening, and Rear-Admiral Vian, Commanding the Eastern Task Force, had to signal to the Commander in-Chief that “selective unloading is again rearing its ugly head.”
CHAPTER X
SEEK AND DESTROY
Light coastal forces stop Cherbourg evacuation—Dutch coast actions against German reinforcements—Rendezvous with U-boats and escorts off Brest—Actions off Le Havre.
During the period of the great gale of D plus 13 to D plus 16 there was an inevitable interruption in the series of actions fought by the light coastal forces, for the weather made it impossible for small surface forces to operate. Even after the gale had blown itself out some days passed before sea and swell had gone down sufficiently to allow the light coastal forces to operate successfully. By that time the American army was advancing up the Cotentin Peninsula and closing in on Cherbourg from the south. This had a direct effect upon the actions at sea. The centre of gravity of the coastal force and destroyer activity shifted to the westward, where it was engaged in preventing the Germans from escaping by sea from Cherbourg. Thus there set in on the western flank a period of offensive actions against German escape convoys instead of the offensive-defensive patrol warfare which had preceded the gale.
The first action against one of these convoys seeking to escape from Cherbourg took place early on the morning of 23 June, when a patrol of our light coastal forces under the command of Lieutenant J. R. H. Kirkpatrick, RNVR, encountered a convoy south of Jersey, sank one of the escorting armed trawlers and set one of the supply ships on fire in two brisk gun actions.
Early the following morning our light coastal forces had an even more successful encounter. One of our patrols located a German convoy consisting of seven small supply ships with the usual escort of armed trawlers. A series of attacks were made on this convoy as a result of which two of the ships in convoy were sunk and three more so seriously damaged that they were considered to be total losses. The remnants of this convoy sought shelter under the guns of the Alderney batteries. Our forces suffered a few casualties and some superficial damage.
Three nights later another of our patrol of light coastal forces was in action in the Channel Islands area. This time our patrol, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander T. N. Cartwright, DSC, RNVR, surprised a group of three German armed trawlers and two M-class minesweepers ten miles off the coast of Jersey. Lieutenant-Commander Cartwright at once attacked and considerable damage was seen to be inflicted on the enemy. Then, however, our patrol was illuminated by star shell from the shore batteries and came under such heavy fire from these guns that it was forced to disengage. Shortly afterwards, this force located two M-class minesweepers lying stopped about 5 miles south of St. Helier. Lieutenant-Commander Cartwright approached to within very short range of these vessels and engaged them with gunfire and torpedoes. One torpedo was seen to hit, and the German ship ceased fire as soon as the explosion took place. It was considered that this ship was sunk. Our patrol had two casualties and sustained some slight damage.
Next night the British destroyer Eskimo and the Canadian destroyer Huron found a group of three German armed trawlers in the same area. Two of the German ships were sunk by gunfire, the third succeeding in making good her escape while her consorts were being sunk.
Meanwhile, the war of attrition against German shipping was being relentlessly waged off the Dutch coast whenever the weather permitted. In the early hours of 27 June an offensive patrol of light coastal forces commanded by Lieutenant-Commander K. Gemmell, DSC, RNVR, intercepted a group of four heavily armed German trawlers. The leading German ship was seen to sink as a result of a torpedo hit, and the second ship blew up. Our craft did not receive a scratch.
Some days earlier Lieutenant-Commander Gemmell had sunk a German gun coaster and heavily damaged an ocean-going tug and an armed trawler in a brisk action off the Texel, also without sustaining casualties or damage to his own force.
Early on 5 July there took place off the Dutch coast a series of actions which inflicted very serious loss on the enemy and demonstrated the value of close co-operation between light coastal forces and aircraft.
The first incident was a running fight between one of our patrols and a convoy of German landing craft escorted by armed trawlers. In this action one of the German armed trawlers was blown up; one landing craft was torpedoed and probably sunk; and another landing craft and an armed trawler were damaged by gunfire. Shortly afterwards our patrol located and attacked a very strongly escorted German convoy, but with inconclusive results. Then the patrol encountered a German patrol, which was presumably acting as a covering force for the convoys. Two of the craft in this German force were set on fire and a M-class minesweeper was damaged by gunfire.
By that time dawn was breaking so our light coastal forces withdrew and Beaufighters of Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force went out. They found one large supply ship on fire, surrounded by nine escort vessels, one of which was also on fire. The Beaufighters attacked with torpedoes, rockets, and cannon fire. The big supply ship was again torpedoed and the blaze on board was increased to such proportions that she must have been a total loss, while eight of the nine escort ships were sunk. This series of actions cost us one motor torpedo boat and one Beaufighter.
In the early hours of 6 July a very different type of action took place off Brest. This was the outcome of a daring plan. U-boats were known to leave Brest in groups escorted by armed trawlers, and a group of Canadian destroyers were sent into Brest roads to meet one of these groups.
The Canadian destroyers were the Qu’Appelle, Skeena, Saskatchewan and Restigouche of the Twelfth Escort Group. The Senior officer was Commander A. M. McKillop, DSC, RN in HMCS Qu’Appelle.
It was realised that as soon as they were engaged the U-boats would either dive or return to harbour, and that there would be considerable risk of the destroyers being torpedoed by the U-boats. This risk was accepted, however, in the interests of knocking out more of the Germans’ dwindling supply of armed trawlers for, if U-boats had to enter and leave harbour without surface ship escorts they could be hunted and destroyed with comparative impunity by our patrols. Moreover, another group of destroyers—the Fourteenth Escort Group—was in the offing about twelve miles to seaward waiting to come in and hunt the U-boats if they tried to continue to seaward submerged.
The Canadian destroyers entered the enemy’s water at 25 knots, the speed being carefully worked out and adjusted so that they would be able to approach the expected meeting place with the enemy at 12 knots—at which speed the destroyers would not make high tell-tale bow waves and stern waves.
Let Commander McKillop take up the story in his own words:
“The lighthouse at the southern entrance was working, and it was an eerie feeling taking bearings of a house full of Germans for our safe navigation! Thanks to various navigational aids my position to the nearest twenty yards was never in doubt, and the navigating officer working on the plot was able to keep a careful check a
n our progress and give me corrections to course and speed in order to keep exactly to my time-table. The other ships knew this time-table, so that if anyone lost touch he would know where we were. It became very dark indeed around midnight, and it looked good.
“As I turned up on to a northerly course well inside the Rade de Brest I got the first report of a group of ships in the Channel. Oh boy, what a thrill! The enemy was at the rendezvous!
“Soon afterwards I saw a light in the entrance to Brest harbour, and it looked like bow and steaming lights. It was on the opposite bow to my target and I decided that it was probably a coastal convoy and so left it alone. As it turned out, I was right.
“As soon as I was well up between the trawlers and their base I went on to 30 knots and passed the enemy’s bearing, course and speed to the other ships. When the range was about 3,000 to 4,000 yards the enemy challenged by flashing the letter W. We ‘acted wet’ and made W’s back until the range had been shortened to 2,600 yards. Then I fired my first cluster of rocket flares and the ball opened.
“There were four trawlers in diamond formation with two U-boats in the centre of this diamond-shaped screen. The whole lot, and the land in the vicinity was shown up by our rocket flares.
Operation Neptune Page 28