Weapons of the Weak- Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance

by James C Scott

  The rather favorable ecological and social conditions in the Muda area make it apparent that it has hardly been singled out as a promising site for the more dramatic forms of class conflict. Here one finds poverty but not great misery, inequalities but not stark polarization, burdensome rents and taxes but not crushing exactions. The last hundred years of Kedah’s history are filled with the [Page 64] One advantage of studying class conflict in such a setting is precisely that it is something of a hard case. If we encounter a rich domain of class-based resistance even in a region where a majority of the rural population is probably better off than it was a decade ago, then it is reasonable to suppose that the unwritten history of resistance in other rice-growing areas of Southeast Asia might be correspondingly richer.

  Despite the blessings of good soil, a favorable climate, and relative prosperity, other aspects of the social structure and economy of the Kedah Plain were troubling. If the soil was suitable for paddy, it was not suitable for much else and the result was an increasing pattern of monoculture, with its attendant vulnerabilities. If the average farm size was substantial (4.0 acres, or 5.6 relong), most of the region’s farmers worked smaller plots, which left them well below the poverty line and provoked an annual stream of migrants to towns and plantations where work was available during the off-season. If yields were above average, so was the rate of tenancy (35 percent), which meant that many farmers had only a tenuous hold on the means of their subsistence.30 If nearly half of the paddy households owned the land they worked, their numbers had been steadily diminishing over the past six decades as the cycle of debt and crop failures pried the land from many hands.31

  The Muda Irrigation Project, begun in 1966 and in full operation by 1973, was intended to solve some, if not all, of these problems. Basically, it consisted of two large dams, headworks, main and secondary canals, together with the institutional infrastructure to make possible the double-cropping of rice on some 260,000 acres. As elsewhere, the “green revolution” in Muda was coupled with the introduction of new fast-growing, high-yielding strains of rice, intensified fertilizer use, new technology and mechanization, credit facilities, and new milling and marketing channels. Nearly all the official principals involved—the [Page 65] World Bank, the Malaysian government, and the officials of the scheme itselfwere convinced by 1974 of its success. Double-cropping had been achieved in 92 percent of the project area, new varieties of rice had been nearly universally adopted, and the new impetus to production had placed self-sufficiency in rice within reach. The glowing report card issued by the World Bank, the major financial backer, was widely quoted.

  The project has resulted in an approximate doubling of average farm incomes, both for owners and tenants…. Paddy production which was 268,000 tons in 1965 increased to 678,000 tons in 1974 and is expected to reach 718,000 tons by 1980… the rise in employment resulting from the project has been of great benefit to landless labourers and other unemployed groups…. The economic rate of return is now 18 percent compared with the 10 percent estimated at appraisal.32

  From the vantage point of 1974, the project seemed a nearly unqualified success. A number of major studies documented that success in terms of production, technology, employment, and incomes.33 From the vantage point of 1980, the evaluation of the project, especially in terms of employment and income, is far less clear-cut, although there is no doubt that without the project the Muda peasantry would be far worse off both relatively and absolutely.

  What follows is essentially an attempt to establish the nature and degree of the major shifts in land tenure, employment, income, and institutions that have been brought about, directly or indirectly, by the “green revolution” in Muda. These changes can, and have been, documented. Once the basic contours have been sketched, they can serve as the raw material with which the human agents in this small drama must somehow come to grips.

  Many of the dramatic changes in the Muda region since double-cropping began in 1970 are visually apparent to anyone familiar with rural Kedah earlier. Quite a few of these changes are attributable not to double-cropping but to the government’s concerted political effort to supply amenities to rural Malays—mosques, prayer houses, electricity, roads, schools, clinics. Others stem more directly from the increases in average incomes that double-cropping has made possible. Once sleepy crossroads towns now bristle with new shops and crowded [Page 66] markets.34 The roads themselves, once nearly deserted, are alive with lorries, buses, automobiles, taxis, and above all Honda 70 motorcycles—the functional equivalent of the Model T—now as common as bicycles.35 Many houses that once had attap roofs and siding now have corrugated tin roofs and plank siding.36 Within those houses are an increasing number of sewing machines, radios, television sets, store-brought furniture, and kerosene stoves.37

  The visual transformation of the Muda region, striking though it may be, is surpassed by a series of changes that are far less apparent. They can in fact be described as beneficial absences, as catastrophic events that were once common and are now rare. Before double-cropping, for example, one-third of the farm households in the region rarely grew enough rice for the annual subsistence needs of the family. If they were unable to earn the cash necessary to purchase rice on the market, they were reduced to subsisting on tapioca, maize, and cassava (ubi kayu) at least until the next harvest was in. Following a crop disaster in the region—and there were many (1919, 1921, 1925, 1929, 1930, 1946, 1947, 1949, 1959, 1964)—most of the rural population found itself in the same boat. Double-cropping in this respect has been a great boon. Even smallholding tenants with a single relong (.71 acre) can now grow enough rice at least to feed a family, though they may be desperately short of cash. It is a rare peasant these days who does not eat rice twice a day.38 The provision of irrigation water and the use of fertilizer not only raised yields somewhat but has also made those yields more reliable, season by season. The new agricultural regime is hardly invulnerable, as witnessed by the cancellation of the irrigated season in 1978 [Page 67] due to a shortage of water, which gave Muda’s peasantry a painful reminder of the old days. Nevertheless, the prospect of going without rice has been largely removed from the fears of even poor villagers.

  The closely related scourge of malnutrition and its inevitable toll in human, especially children’s, lives appears from sketchy data to have been sharply reduced, though not eliminated. Figures for the incidence of nutrition-related diseases and for infant and toddler mortality from such causes show a marked decline that correlates well with the progress of double-cropping.39 Between 1970 and 1976 the rate of infant mortality in the Muda region was cut by nearly half, from a figure that was above the rates for the nation and for Kedah as a whole to a level below both. It is ironic testimony to “progress” on the rice plain that anemia and malnutrition, the seventh most common cause of death in 1970, had disappeared from the top ten by 1976, while motor vehicle accidents had moved from sixth to second place.

  Another beneficial absence that can be largely attributed to double-cropping was the decline in out-migration during the off-season. Both temporary and permanent migration were systematic features of the regional economy before 1970. This was reflected in the fact that the population within Muda grew at only half the rate of natural increase, and the rates of out-migration seemed to be highest in the paddy districts.40 It was, moreover, a rare smallholder or tenant family that did not have to send someone out, at least temporarily, to raid the cash economy between rice seasons. The beginning of double-cropping in Muda brought temporary relief and fostered a process that might be called “repeasantization.” Many villagers, for the first time, were afforded the luxury of remaining at home the entire year. Small farms that were inadequate for subsistence with only a single crop now became viable enterprises. It was not just a matter of reaping two harvests from the same plot but also the opportunities for wage labor that two seasons provided. Adding to the good fortune of wage laborers were the restriction of Thai migrant laborers in 1969 and a tobacco bo
om in the poor, labor-exporting state of Kelantan, which reduced dramatically the competition for employment. As we shall see, however, this welcome respite was only temporary. Combine-harvesters had by 1978 eliminated much of the new work that irrigation had made possible and laborers from the land-poor classes in Muda were once again on the road.

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  If the boon of staying at home was to prove brief, the effect of double-cropping on landholding appears far more durable. Two harvests, steadier yields, and paddy prices that no longer fluctuated wildly over the crop season served in most cases to break the cycle of indebtedness which, following a bad season, might mean the loss of land to creditors. Seasonal credit from shopkeepers and pawnbrokers is still the rule for much of the Muda peasantry, but such loans are typically cleared with each harvest and only rarely take the form of jual janji, which jeopardizes future ownership. The effect has been to stabilize the class of smallholders and to slow the process of proletarianization in the countryside.41’

  The changes noted thus far—in amenities, consumer goods, rice supply, nutrition, employment, and household solvency—might be appropriately termed the good news of the past decade in Muda. There is, however, other news too—news that can only be termed ambiguous, inasmuch as its evaluation depends a great deal on one’s class position. Here again, the effort is to convey merely the basic documented facts, leaving the social interpretation to chapter 5. In dealing with the entire Muda region, resort to some statistical presentation should be helpful before we move to the village level (“foreground”), where such data acquire flesh and blood.

  Land Ownership

  The first fact that one would wish to know about any agrarian setting is how the ownership of the principal means of production—land—is distributed.42 In Muda the land is distributed quite unequally (Gini coefficient of 0.538), although this is not a latifundia situation where a few massive holdings dominate most of the landscape. There is, furthermore, no evidence that the distribution [Page 69] of paddy-land ownership has become any more unequal or concentrated since the initiation of double-cropping. The basic situation is summarized in table 3.1.43 It must be kept in mind that the figures in table 3.1 cover only owners of paddy land and therefore exclude nearly 14,600 pure tenant and 8,000 landless labor households (37 percent of paddy sector households). Even then, the disparity is striking. Large holdings above 7 acres (10 relong) account for only 11 percent of the holdings but occupy 42 percent of the total paddy land. It is this strata of relatively well-to-do owners who, together with some largescale tenants, from the core of the commercial farming class in Muda, selling perhaps three-quarters of all the paddy marketed in the region.44 At the other end of the scale stand the great majority (61.8 percent) of owners with holdings below what is required for a poverty-line income. Fully 40 percent, in fact, own less than 1.42 acres (half the paddy land necessary for a subsistence-level income) and are insignificant as sellers of paddy.

  TABLE 3.1 • Size Distribution of Paddy—Land Holdings, Muda Irrigation Scheme, 1975–1976

  Along with double-cropping has come a roughly fivefold leap in paddy-land prices, far outdistancing the rise of the consumer price index or paddy incomes and fraught with implications for future social mobility. Before 1970 it was possible, though rare, for an industrious and thrifty tenant to buy a small plot of land, thereby improving his situation. With the prevailing land prices, it has become virtually impossible for anyone but the richest owners to expand their [Page 70] holdings. A traditional, if limited, avenue of upward mobility has been all but definitely closed.

  Farm Size

  The distribution of operated farm size is a good indication of access (whether by ownership or rental) to the primary factor of production. Comparative figures for before and after double-cropping are given in table 3.2.45 Inequalities in actual farm size, while not as marked as in the case of ownership, are nonetheless apparent. Small farms, nearly half of Muda’s households, cultivate a mere 17 percent of the paddy land, but large farms, only 14 percent of households, claim virtually 40 percent of the rice land. Between these two classes is a large middle peasantry cultivating modest farms. The most striking trend in the past decade is the growth in the proportion of small farms coupled with no appreciable change in their share of land resources, such that the mean small farm size has been driven down to a historic low of 1.4 acres.

  TABLE 3.2 • Size Distribution of Farms, 1966 and 1975–76

  Tenure

  It is above all in the social arrangements for cultivation that the most dramatic transformations have taken place. Land tenure in Muda is both complex and flexible: It is not uncommon, for example, to encounter farmers who farm some of their own land, rent out a small plot, rent in another, and even harvest others’ land for wages occasionally. Nevertheless it is possible to identify three major tenure categories: owner-operators who farm their own land, pure tenants who rent all the paddy land they cultivate, and owner-tenants who farm land that is both rented and owned.46 The precipitous decline in the proportion of pure tenants is the most striking feature of land tenure patterns since 1966, as shown in Table 3.3. There is some evidence that this trend was observable even before double-cropping, but there is no doubt that it has accelerated greatly since [Page 71] 1970.47 Pure tenants, who were in 1955 the dominant tenure category in Muda, had by 1976 become less than one-fourth of the farmers and cultivated less than one—fourth of the land. The evidence suggests that we are witnessing the notso-gradual liquidation of Muda’s pure tenant class. The overall picture from farm size and tenure data is one of gradual polarization-an increase in the proportion of small farms (mostly owner-operated) that produce a bare subsistence income, an across-the-board decline in tenancy, and a growing class of larger-scale commercial farms. This is very much in keeping with the results of the green revolution elsewhere in monsoon Asia.48

  TABLE 3.3 • Land Tenure in Muda, 1966 and 1975–1976

  The explanation for these structural changes, which have produced a numerous, marginal, poverty-sharing class of small farmers at the bottom of the heap, a robust class of capitalist farmers at the top, and a still significant middle peasantry in between, is complex. Double-cropping, higher yields, and mechanization have made it increasingly profitable and feasible for landlords to resume cultivation. This would help account for the displacement of tenants and the growing share of owner-operators in both small and large farm categories. Demography has also played a role. Despite steady out-migration from Muda, the population grew by nearly 30 percent between 1957 and 1976. In the decade ending in 1980, Muda’s population grew by more than 18 percent to 539,000. Given the nearly static area of paddy land over this period, population growth has encouraged owners to take back tenanted land for their children and to divide among their heirs land they previously farmed alone. This would also help account for the proliferation of small farms and the dismissal of tenants.

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  There is every reason to believe that these trends, solidly documented until 1976, have continued and probably intensified since then. More important, changes in technology, costs of production, and rice prices since 1976 provide further incentives to displace small tenants. Combine-harvesters, by reducing supervision costs and by gathering the off-season harvest quickly, favor owner cultivation of larger farms. The provision of free fertilizer since the off-season of 1979 and a 30 percent increase in the farm-gate paddy price in late 1980 have also, given the “stickiness” of rents in Muda,49 made self-cultivation more attractive than ever. What recent evidence is available supports this contention.50

  Two other notable changes have taken place in the form of tenancy since 1966, both of which tend to favor large-scale tenants with capital-in particular, owner-tenants—at the expense of small-scale tenants. The first concerns when and how the rent is paid each season. In 1955 more than three-quarters of Muda’s tenants paid their rents after the harvest was in and paid that rent in the form of a fixed quantity of paddy51 or its ca
sh equivalent. Cash rents (sewa [Page 73] tunai) unrelated to an amount of paddy were rare, amounting to only 12 percent of all rental arrangements. By 1966 cash rents had become nearly as common as paddy rents, and by 1975 three-fourths of all tenancies were for cash rents, a reversal of the pattern twenty years earlier. While paddy rents may be paid out of the proceeds of the harvest and were therefore often negotiable depending on the size of the crop, cash rents require that the tenant raise the capital before the season opens and are not negotiable. At the moment the landlord moves to cash rent, the tenant is therefore subject to a one-time-only double rent, one for the past season and one for the coming season. No study has ever been made of the consequences of this shift, but there is no doubt that a good many poor tenants who were unable to raise the cash required were replaced by those who could.52 Except for land rented from parents by children, most tenancy in Muda has now become pure rentier tenancy in which all the risks of cultivation are borne exclusively by the cultivator, who pays an invariable cash rent before the season opens.

  A more momentous shift in tenancy relations is the increasing resort to pajak, or leasehold, tenancy in recent years. Pajak tenancy is the long-term rental of land over at least two seasons and may in fact extend to as many as ten or twelve seasons. The entire rent is paid in a lump sum and is in most cases covered by a written, notarized contract. As a form of tenancy, pajak has existed for a long time and was often a means by which farmers of modest means raised a substantial sum for such purposes as an important marriage, a new house, a pilgrimage to Mecca, or paying off an outstanding debt. The pressing need of the family renting out the land was usually reflected in rental rates that worked out to be well below the current market rents for seasonal tenancy. Now, however, pajak tenancy is increasingly at, or above,53 market rents and is often resorted to by wealthy landowners seeking to raise cash for investment purposes.