A Forgotten Empire: Vijayanagar

by eBook creation Robert Sewell; Ken Mattern

  and thence to Diu, where he arrived on February 9, 1521.[227] Another passage farther on in the narrative of Barros also establishes the fact that Ruy de Mello took the lands during Sequeira's absence at the Red Sea.[228]

  Faria y Souza, a Spanish writer, whose work was first published a century after these events, confirms the period, February 1520 to February 1521, as that of Sequeira's absence at the Red Sea, and he writes: --

  "While the governor[229] was in the Red Sea, the King Crisnao Rao of Bisnaga covered the plains and hills and stopped the flow of the rivers[230] with an army of thirty-five thousand horse, seven hundred and thirty-three thousand foot, and five hundred and eighty-six elephants carrying castles with four men in each, and twelve thousand watermen ... and baggage in such quantities that the courtesans alone numbered more than twenty thousand."[231]

  Souza also states, as does Nuniz, that after the defeat of the Adil Shah, Krishna Deva Raya demanded that, as the price of peace, the former should visit him and kiss his foot; and that, taking advantage of the Adil Shah's difficulties, Ruy de Mello seized the mainlands of Goa.[232] It is clear, therefore, that both authors are writing of the same event.

  Osorio, a later writer, confirms the story in most of its details, stating that after the defeat of the Adil Shah, Krishna Raya sent to Ruy de Mello ("Roderigo Melos"), captain of Goa, offering the mainlands, and promising after the return of Sequeira to send a regular embassy to conclude a solemn treaty. De Mello accordingly took the mainlands.

  Lafitau[233] also states that the war took place during Sequeira's absence at the Red Sea, and that the mainlands were taken after the Adil Shah's defeat.[234]

  Turning to Firishtah, I find a difference. He states that the battle of Raichur took place in Hijra 927 (December 22, 1520, to December 1, 1521, A.D.), which, if it was fought in May, as Nuniz declares, makes the date May 1521. That he is speaking of the same affair is obvious from the details given. He mentions, for instance, the vast host constituting the Hindu army, the Shah's force advancing to the river Krishna, the too hasty crossing of the river, the gallant fight of the Muhammadans, their defeat and rout, the fact of the Adil Shah's forces being driven to the river and perishing in large numbers while attempting to re-cross it, the Shah's narrow escape, and his dependence on Asada Khan. All this leaves no room for doubt. The only difference is that, whereas we learn from the other authorities that the fortress of Raichur was in the hands of the Muhammadans, Firishtah states that the war arose because the Adil Shah "made preparations for marching to recover Mudkul and Roijore from the Roy of Beejanuggur," as if the latter were then in possession of those places. As to Firishtah's date, I believe it to be wrong by one year, for the reasons given above. It must be remembered that he wrote many years after the event.

  Having thus, I hope satisfactorily, established the fact that the date given by Nuniz for the battle of Raichur is wrong by two years, and should be 1520, I turn to examine the day and month. It was the new moon day of May, according to Nuniz, and a Saturday. Krishna Deva Raya was ready for battle on the Friday, but postponed his attack to the next day since Friday was considered an unlucky day.

  The moment of the occurrence of new moon in May 120 was 2.27 A.M. on the morning of Thursday, May 17. We do not know whether Nuniz ascertained his facts from native almanacks or the calculations of the astrologers, or whether he spoke from observations made by himself or by some one who was present; but Nuniz was an ordinary person, not a skilled astronomer, so far as we can tell, and he may well have called the day on which the crescent of the new moon first made its appearance just after sunset the "new moon day." This first appearance actually took place on the Saturday following. The first day of the Muhammadan month Jamada' l akhir, corresponding to the heliacal rising of the moon on that occasion, was Saturday, May 19.

  I therefore believe that this great battle took place on Saturday, May 19, A.D. 1520,[235] a date almost synchronous with the of the "Field of the Cloth of Gold."

  The Number of Troops Engaged.

  When we total up the list given by Nuniz of the columns that marched from Vijayanagar for the campaign, the amount is so huge that we pause in natural doubt as to whether the story could by any possibility be true: 703,000 foot, 32,600 horse, and 551 elephants, besides the camp followers, merchants, &c., and "an infinitude of people" who joined him at a place close to Raichur! It certainly demands a large strain on our credulity.

  Let every one form his own opinion. I can only call attention to the fact that large armies seem to have always been the rule in India, and that certainly Krishna Raya had the power to raise immense numbers of troops,[236] though whether so many as is stated is another question. His power to do so lay in his mode of government. Allusion has already been made to this, and Nuniz gives us interesting details. The whole empire was divided into provinces and estates, held by chiefs bound to keep up masses of troops fit for immediate service. It is, of course, natural to suppose that in this great war the king would have put forth all his strength.

  To prove that immense armies were often employed by Indian kings, we have only to refer to a succession of writers. Barros notes the great power of the sovereign of Vijayanagar and his almost incredible richness, and is at pains to give an account of how these enormous forces were raised, "lest his tale should not be believed."

  In the second volume of Scott's "History of the Dekhan," a translation is given of a journal kept by a Bondela officer in the reign of Aurangzib, an officer who served under "Dulput Roy" in A.D. 1690. Writing about Vijayanagar in former days, at the height of its grandeur and importance, he says, "They kept an army of 30,000 horse, a million of infantry, and their wealth was beyond enumeration."

  Conti, who was in India about a century earlier than the war in question, told Bracciolini that the Vijayanagar army consisted of "a million of men and upwards."

  Abdur Razzak (1442 A.D.) tells the same story, putting the number at 1,100,000 with 1000 elephants.

  Twenty years later Nikitin states that the Kulbarga forces marching to attack the Hindus amounted to 900,000 foot, 190,000 horse, and 575 elephants.

  The Sultan himself, independently of his nobles, took the field with 300,000 men, and even when he only went out on a hunting expedition he took with him a train of 10,000 horse, 500,000 foot, and 200 elephants. He states that the Malik ul Tujar alone had an army of 200,000 employed in the siege of one city. The Hindus fought almost nude, and were armed with shield and sword.

  Even so far back as the time of Alexander the Great (about B.C. 320) the army of Magadha was computed by the Greeks as consisting of 600,000 foot. 30,000 cavalry, and 9000 elephants, though Quintus Curtius makes a much more modest estimate.

  Lord Egerton of Tatton states[237] that an army of Hindu confederated states, mustered for the defence of Northern indict against the Muhammadan invasion in 1192 A.D., amounted, "according to the most moderate estimate," to 300,000 horse, 3000 elephants, and a great number of infantry.

  In A.D. 1259 a Mogul embassy was received at Delhi by an escort of 50,000 horse, and was led past lines of infantry numbering as many as 200,000 in their ranks.

  It will be remembered how Muhammad Taghlaq of Delhi[238] raised, according to Firishtah, an army of 370,000 men for the conquest of Persia, and when he wanted to destroy the inhabitants of a certain tract of country, he "ordered out his army as if he were going hunting," surrounded the tract, and then, pressing inwards towards the centre, slaughtered all the inhabitants therein. This implies that he took, when merely hunting, immense numbers of men with him. Shahab-ud-Din, indeed, declared that Muhammad Taghlaq had an army of 900,000 horse;[239] and Nuniz, on the opening page of his chronicle, says that this Sultan invaded the Balaghat with 800,000 horse.[240] This estimate was, of course, only according to the tradition extant in 1535.

  Faria y Souza, writing in the seventeenth century, estimated the forces of Bahadur, king of Cambay, in 1534, as 100,000 horse, 415,000 foot, and 600 elephants.

  As late
as 1762 the Mahrattas are said to have had an army of 100,000 horse.

  Nuniz[241] gives details of the provincial forces of Vijayanagar, compulsorily maintained by eleven out of a total of two hundred nobles amongst whom the empire was divided, and the total of the forces of these eleven amounts to 19,000 horse, 171,700 foot, and 633 elephants.

  Castanheda confirms other writers in this matter, stating that the infantry of Vijayanagar were countless, the country being of large extent and thickly populated, so that the king could call upon a million, or even two millions, of men at will.[242] This writer visited India just at the close of the reign of Krishna Deva Raya. He states that the king kept up at his own cost an establishment of 100,000 horses and 4000 elephants.

  As to all this, I repeat that every one is at liberty to form his own opinion; but at least it seems certain that all the chroniclers believed that the king of Vijayanagar could, if he so desired, put into the field immense masses of armed men. They were probably not all well armed, or well trained, or well disciplined, but as to large numbers there can be little reasonable doubt. A relic of this may be seen every year at modern Haidarabad, the capital city of H.H. the Nizam, where, at the annual festival known as the "Langar," armed irregulars in very large numbers file through the principal streets. They are for the most part a mere mob of men with weapons, and are not maintained as State troops, but they are brought up by the various nobles in separate bodies, each chief mustering for the occasion all his hereditary retainers and forming them into rough regiments and brigades.

  As to the description given by Nuniz of the offensive armour of the elephants, which are stated to have gone into battle with long swords like scythes attached to their trunks, the story is confirmed by many other writers.

  Firishtah's Narrative.

  Firishtah's account of the battle of Raichur is interesting, as it gives a description of the affair from the enemy's point of view. Ismail Adil Shah marched

  "to recover Mudkul and Roijore from the roy of Beejanugger, who, gaining early intelligence of his designs, moved with a great force, and stationed his camp on the bank of the Kistnah, where he was joined by many of his tributaries; so that the army amounted at least to 50,000 horse, besides a vast host of foot. The sultan would now have delayed his expedition, as the enemy possessed all the ferries of the Kistnah, but that his tents were pitched, and it would have been disgraceful to retract from his declarations He therefore marched with 7000 horse, all foreign, and encamped on the bank of the river opposite to the enemy, waiting to prepare floats to cross and attack them.

  "Some days after his arrival, as he was reposing in his tent, he heard one of the courtiers without the skreens reciting this verse: -- 'Rise and fill the golden goblet with the wine of mirth before the cup itself shall be laid in dust.' The sultan, inspired by the verse, called his favourites before him, and spreading the carpet of pleasure, amused himself with music and wine. When the banquet had lasted longer than was reasonable, and the fumes of the wine had exercised their power, a fancy seized the sultan to pass the river and attack the enemy.... Warm with wine he resolved to cross immediately, and mounting his elephant, without making his intentions known, proceeded to the river, as if to reconnoitre, but suddenly gave orders for as many of his troops as could to go upon the rafts, and others to follow him on elephants through the river. The officers represented the folly and danger of precipitation; but the sultan, without reply, plunged his own elephant into the stream, and was followed involuntarily by the amras and their followers; on about 250 elephants.

  "By great good fortune, all reached the opposite shore in safety, and as many troops as could cross on the floats at two embarkations had time to arrive, when the enemy advanced to battle in so great force as excluded every probable hope of escape to the sultan, who had not more than 2000 men ready to oppose 30,000. The heroes of Islaam, animated with one soul, made so gallant a resistance that about a thousand of the infidels fell, among whom was Sunjeet Roy, the chief general of Beejanuggur; but at last, harassed beyond all power of opposition by cannon-shot, musquetry, and rockets, which destroyed near half their numbers, the survivors threw themselves into the river in hopes of escaping, and Nursoo Bahadur and Ibrahim Bey, who rode on the same elephant with Ismaeel Adil Shaw, drove the animal across the stream, but so great was the current, that except the royal elephant and seven soldiers, all the rest were drowned. The sultan's rashness was heavily punished by so great a loss. He took a solemn vow never to indulge in wine till he had revenged his defeat; and then, throwing away despair, busied his mind in repairing this unfortunate miscarriage.

  "As Mirza Jehangeer had fallen in the action, the sultan consulted with Assud Khan on what measures would be best to take in the present crisis of his affairs. Assud Khan replied, that as his loss was great and the troops dispirited, it would be better for the present to retreat to Beejapore. The sultan approving the advice, marched from the Kistnah to Beejapore, and conferring the dignity of Sippeh Sallar[243] on Assud Khan, added several districts to his jaghire, and made him his principal adviser in all important affairs."

  Comparison of Accounts.

  Comparing this account with that given by Nuniz, there can, I think, be little doubt that both stories refer to the same event, though there are of course several discrepancies. The origin of the war is related differently. Firishtah states that on the arrival of the Sultan at the river-bank he found the Hindu army encamped on the opposite side; he crossed, after a few days' delay, with a small force, and was driven into the river. Nuniz says that Krishna Deva Raya heard of Ismail Adil's arrival on the river-bank while he himself was in camp at Raichur, fifteen miles away; and that he advanced and gave battle nine miles from the river, in the end driving the enemy across. But taking the two narratives as a whole, there are too many points of coincidence to leave any doubt in the mind that each chronicler is writing of the same event.

  As to which of the two is more accurate it is impossible now to decide. But considering that Nuniz wrote only fifteen years afterwards, and that there were Portuguese present at the battle, some of whom Nuniz may have personally consulted as to what took place, it would seem more reasonable to trust in him rather than in a Muhammadan historian who did not compile his work till after an interval of sixty years. Moreover, there are some inherent improbabilities in Firishtah's narrative.

  It is worthy of notice, too, that throughout the story of Nuniz at this part of his chronicle there is much that impels the belief that either himself or his informant was present at the Hindu camp while these events were taking place. The narrative of the campaign, in complete contrast to that of the remainder of the history, reads like the account of an eye-witness; especially in the passages describing the fortress of Raichur[244] and the camp -- where the supplies were so great that "you could find everything that you wanted,"[245] where "you saw"[246] the goldsmiths and artisans at work as if in a city, where "you will find"[247] all kinds of precious stones offered for sale, and where "no one who did not understand the meaning of what he saw would ever dream that a war was going on, but would think that he was in a prosperous city." Note also the description given of the extraordinary noise made by the drums, trumpets, and shouts of the men; so that even the birds fell down into the soldiers' hands stricken with terror and "it seemed as if the sky would fall to the earth," and "if you asked anything, you could not hear yourself speak, and you had to ask by signs." Many such instances might be given, but not to be tedious I will invite attention to only three more, viz., the account given by Nuniz of how; when receiving the men of the city after its surrender, the king, "casting his eye on Christovao de Figueiredo, nodded his head, and turned to the people telling them to observe what great things could be effected by one good man;"[248] his description of the behaviour of the defeated citizens when Krishna Deva made his triumphant entry into the city; and his narrative of the ambassador's reception at Vijayanagar by the king after the conclusion of the campaign.[249] It may be remembered that o
ur other chronicler Domingo Paes, was at Vijayanagar with Christovao de Figueiredo some months after the battle, even if he were not personally present in the fighting at Raichur.

  The great interest of Nuniz's narrative lies in the fact that it is the only detailed account extant. Barros related the events in historical fashion, taking his facts from this very chronicle; but he was never in India, and his brief summary is altogether wanting in the power and force contained in the graphic story of Nuniz. The other Portuguese writers pass over the war very lightly. It appears as if it hardly concerned then;, further than that at its close Ruy de Mello seized the mainlands near Goa.

  Political Effects of the Battle.

  And yet it had far-reaching effects. The Hindu victory so weakened the power and prestige of the Adil Shah that he ceased altogether to dream of any present conquest in the south, and turned his attention to cementing alliances with the other Muhammadan sovereigns, his neighbours. The victory also caused all the other Muhammadan Powers in the Dakhan seriously to consider the political condition of the country; and this eventually led to a combination without which nothing was possible, but by the aid of which the Vijayanagar Empire was finally overthrown and the way to the south opened. It furthermore greatly affected the Hindus by raising in them a spirit of pride and arrogance, which added fuel to the fire, caused them to become positively intolerable to their neighbours, and accelerated their own downfall.

  It equally affected the fortunes of the Portuguese on the coast. Goa rose and fell simultaneously with the rise and fall of the second Vijayanagar dynasty; and necessarily so, considering that its entire trade depended on Hindu support; for the king of Portugal was never well disposed towards his hereditary enemies, the "Moors." This is a point frequently left unnoticed by writers, on Portuguese colonial history. The two most recent authors of works on the subject, Mr. Danvers ("The Portuguese in India") and Mr. Whiteway ("The Rise of Portuguese Power in India"), pay very little attention to the internal politics of the great country on the fringe alone of which the Portuguese settled, and on the coast of which their vessels came and went. Mr. Danvers devotes one short paragraph to the battle of Raichur,[250] and another[251] to the destruction of Vijayanagar. Mr. Whiteway does not even allude to the former event, and concludes his history before arriving at the date of the latter. Yet surely it is easy to see that the success or failure of maritime trade on any given coast must depend on the conditions prevailing in the empire for the supply of which that trade was established. When Vijayanagar, with its grandeur, luxury, and love of display, its great wealth and its enormous armies, was at the height of its power, the foreign traders were eminently successful: when Vijayanagar fell, and the city became desolate and depopulated, the foreign traders had no market for their goods, and trade decayed. So that this great Hindu victory at Raichur deserved a better fate than to be passed over by the historians as if it had been an event of small importance.