The Crusader States

by Malcolm Barber

  But the situation quickly turned sour. ‘The king, however, ardently desired to go to Jerusalem to fulfil his vows, and his determination was irrevocable.’ Raymond's welcome turned to hatred and, as William presents it, he determined to injure the king as much as possible, most notably by committing adultery with Eleanor, whom William calls ‘a foolish woman’.68 William was, of course, basing his information on French sources and writing at least twenty years after the king and queen had been divorced, so it is not possible to know if this was true, but John of Salisbury, who was closer to the events in time if not in place, reports strong rumours of the queen's infidelity, which resulted in the king forcing Eleanor to leave, creating what John calls ‘mutual anger’.69 Clearly, after this, any military target in the northern crusader states was out of the question.

  William of Tyre explains that all the leaders of the crusader states had their personal goals, and that each wished to take the opportunity to strike at enemies most threatening to them. Initially, the rulers of Jerusalem had feared that Louis would be diverted by Raymond of Antioch, and were therefore pleased by his estrangement from the king. A lavish welcome, led by Patriarch Fulcher, was arranged, and before the meeting at Palmarea, Louis and his entourage were conducted on a tour of the holy places. William devotes an entire chapter to a record of the great dignitaries present and, even though his list is by no means complete, it was certainly the most impressive gathering ever held in the Latin East. Among the Germans were Otto of Freising, Conrad's half-brother, Henry Jasomirgott, duke of Austria, his brother, and Frederick, duke of Swabia, his nephew. Louis's followers included Robert, count of Perche and Dreux, the king's brother, Henry, count of Troyes, and Thierry of Flanders, now on his second expedition to the East. Both the Germans and the French were accompanied by papal legates. The Jerusalem contingent included King Baldwin, Queen Melisende, the patriarch, seven archbishops and bishops, and the masters of the Temple and the Hospital, as well as all the leading nobles of the kingdom.

  This was such a large gathering that it is unlikely that there could have been a meaningful debate about strategic objectives: William of Tyre lists thirty-nine of the most notable individuals, while acknowledging that many others were also present.70 This lends credibility to Otto of Freising's claim that the decision to attack Damascus was in fact made in April at a much smaller meeting between Conrad, Baldwin, the patriarch, and the Templars, before the arrival of the king of France.71 The Templars may have been instrumental here for Conrad had been staying in the Temple of Solomon, while the order already had the confidence of Louis both for its role in defending the column after the defeat at Cadmus Mountain in January 1148, and for the provision of essential loans needed to keep the king's crusade in being.72 Conrad then travelled to Acre, where he spent the money he had received from the Byzantines for the campaign in Edessa on recruiting more soldiers from the many Latins visiting the Holy Land over the Easter period. At the same time his behaviour strongly suggests that he now saw himself as the head of the hierarchy of Christian princes, emperor in all but name.73

  In the circumstances Damascus was the obvious target. Louis had no intention of helping Raymond of Antioch, while Raymond himself had shown little interest in either saving or regaining Edessa which, in any case, was several weeks’ march away. Raymond II of Tripoli was not present, further weakening the case for a more northerly objective. His absence is unexplained, but it may have been connected to the unexpected death of Alfonso-Jordan, count of Toulouse, who had taken the Cross at Vézelay, but had died at Caesarea on his way to Jerusalem, and in the overheated atmosphere of crusader aristocratic society was rumoured to have been poisoned.74 William of Tyre did not know who the culprit was, but as the son of Raymond of Toulouse, the founder of the county of Tripoli, Alfonso-Jordan might have been seen as a rival of the incumbent, Raymond II. In contrast to the rulers of Antioch and Tripoli, the capture of Damascus could be seen as in the direct interest of the kingdom of Jerusalem and would have compensated Baldwin and the leading nobles involved in the failed campaign into the Hauran the previous year, especially as they now regarded the agreement with Unur as being at an end.75

  The host mustered at Tiberias in mid-July and proceeded as a body to Banyas, crossed Mount Lebanon and then descended into the plain at Darayya, from where they could see Damascus. As William of Tyre describes it, Damascus was set in arid land but it was irrigated by canals from the Barada River, which flowed to the north of the city in a south-easterly direction. This enabled the citizens to cultivate large orchards along the river banks and to the west and north of the city. The orchards were divided by narrow access routes, defended by mud walls, and the Damascenes used these confined spaces to harass the crusaders. Eventually, however, the Latins forced their way in and the defenders fled into the city. They then took control of the river when the troops sent to defend it were overcome by the Germans, whose cavalry dismounted and fought on foot in a manner William thought was characteristically Teutonic. William's informants told him that the city was now almost within their grasp; inside the walls citizens put barriers across the streets so that the invaders would be sufficiently delayed for them to escape from the other side.

  At this point William says that the army was betrayed by certain persons who had been bribed to give false advice. They persuaded the kings to move round the city to the southern and eastern sides where, it was claimed, the defences were poor, with weak walls and no moat. This would obviate the need for siege engines, as well as avoiding the dangers involved in a direct assault. In fact, when they established themselves in the new position they soon discovered they had inadequate supplies and no water. Any chance of moving back to the western side was now blocked by the defenders, whose barricades were heavily manned by archers. Convinced now that they could not take the city and ‘covered in confusion and fear’, the crusaders were obliged to retreat.76

  Ibn al-Qalanisi has a different version of events. He says that the crusaders first approached a site known as Manzil al-'Askir, which lies to the south of the city, but, finding no water, on 24 July moved to the village of al-Mizza on the south-east, where water was available, fought their way into the orchards and took control of the river. He admits that this caused horror and discouragement within the city. The Latins then constructed a series of barricades and enclosures from the trees, but were so fiercely opposed that they were obliged to retreat inside their defences. All the time new Muslim forces were arriving, having responded to the city's call for help, and in three days of fighting the Christians found it difficult to emerge from their stockades. ‘Meanwhile reports reached the Franks from several quarters of the rapid advance of the Islamic armies to engage in the Holy War against them and of their eagerness to exterminate them, and they became convinced of their own destruction and of the imminence of disaster.’ Their main interest thereafter was not to take the city but, like Baldwin's abortive campaign to Bosra, to extricate themselves, and they fled back to Christian territory under fire from clouds of arrows. Thereafter the bodies of men and horses were to be found all along the route and ‘there were stenches from their corpses that almost overcame the birds in the air’.77

  For the Christians this was an appalling and humiliating defeat. Both William of Tyre and Ibn al-Qalanisi say that the attackers had been confident that the city would be taken, which, given the combined strength of the armies, must surely have been likely. Even allowing for the losses in Asia Minor, at no other time in the history of the crusader states in the twelfth century did the Latins have three formidable armies at their disposal, in whose ranks there must have been a high proportion of fighting men, given that, as always, the losses en route must have been disproportionately high among the lower ranks and noncombatants.78

  However, there are considerable discrepancies between the stories told in the two main narratives. William was remote from the action, but depended on eyewitnesses who, judging by Conrad's bitter letter to Wibald of Corvey written in autumn 11
48, firmly believed the version he recorded. Conrad says that, although it was a unanimous decision to attack Damascus, the crusaders had been betrayed, for when they were encamped before the gate, where ‘it was almost certain that the city would be taken’, they were purposely led to another side ‘where there was no water for the army and no obvious access’.79 Ibn al-Qalanisi, who was probably in the city at the time, says nothing about changing position, a move that would not have fitted his overall narrative, since he has the crusader army coming from the south. This would be the expected direction of approach of a force coming from Banyas, which, as William of Tyre says, then reached Darayya, to the south-west of the city, and indeed was the route used by Baldwin II and Fulk of Anjou in the autumn of 1129.80 If this were so, then they would have seen the defences and terrain on the southern side before deciding to hack their way through the orchards on the western side. Even if they had not, it seems scarcely credible that the leaders, with their combined experience, would have shifted so many men and horses and such quantities of baggage without first checking for themselves if the site were suitable.

  One other source, further removed from the events than the others, is Ibn al-Athir. He did not have Ibn al-Qalanisi's knowledge of Damascus, but his association with the Zengids enabled him to offer a different perspective. He says that Unur sent for help from Saif al-Din and Nur al-Din, who assembled their forces at Homs. From here Saif al-Din threatened the besiegers, enabling Unur to use his presence as a bargaining counter. In these circumstances, the eastern Franks convinced Conrad that they would not be strong enough to resist an attack from Saif al-Din, who at the same time would take Damascus for himself.81 This seems quite convincing, even though no direct confrontation with Zengi's sons actually took place.82 Given the scale of the defeat, it may be that the story of treachery was convenient for both the participants and the promoters of the crusade, especially as it appeared to shift the blame onto the local Franks.

  Once the idea of treachery had been established, speculation as to the guilty party was inevitable.83 William of Tyre reports that some believed that Thierry of Flanders was at fault, not because he had betrayed the army himself, but because his ambition to be granted Damascus had angered those who had spent their entire lives in the struggle to defend the Holy Land.84 Others blamed Raymond of Antioch who, in his hatred of Louis VII, had incited some of the nobles to sabotage the siege. A third idea was that some had been bribed, although they were appropriately recompensed when the money turned out to be worthless.85 Michael the Syrian named Baldwin III as the culprit, claiming that the Damascenes had secretly warned him that if the city fell Conrad would take over Jerusalem as well, and that he would be better advised to accept their offer of 200,000 dinars to retreat. However, when they were examined the coins turned out to be no more than copper with a covering of gold.86 None of these theories is very convincing and William is unwilling to draw any conclusions, but the belief in betrayal persisted and accusations continued to be made in the West. The Würzburg annalist, for example, apparently unaware of the role of the order in the original plan to attack Damascus, believed that ‘the abominable deceit of the Templars’ was responsible.87

  Whatever the losses, when the armies returned to the kingdom there were still sufficient men to contemplate further action, which might have helped salvage reputations. Ascalon had remained uncaptured for nearly a quarter of a century after the fall of Tyre, but William says that this, along with other suggestions, was rejected. Conrad, however, claimed that he thought a plan to attack it had been decided upon, only to find that he was the only one to take it seriously. ‘When we reached the agreed spot we found virtually no-one. For eight days we waited there in vain for them all to arrive then went back to our own camp when we realised we had been tricked a second time.’88 Conrad saw no further point in staying in the East and, on 8 September, set sail from Acre. Louis, whose original goal had been pilgrimage, stayed until the following Easter, and it may have been during this time that links were forged that led to the later belief among the eastern Franks that Louis would be prepared to come to their aid again in the future.89

  This preoccupation with the fate of the great armies and their leaders is perhaps natural in the circumstances but the loss of Edessa and the failure before Damascus had an impact upon the local population as well. According to a contemporary Syrian, Mar Simon, in 1148, ‘Jerusalem was filled with no end of poor people and there was want of food and other necessaries’, since the city was teeming with refugees, many of whom had fled from Edessa and the surrounding region. Mar Simon describes how the religious houses were virtually besieged by the indigent and, for a period, struggled to cope. He wrote to praise the efforts of Archbishop Ignatius, who ‘had compassion on all the poor whether of our own community or that of the Franks’.90 The result was a settlement of refugees around the church of Dayr Dakariya, which probably refers to Zakariya, 8 miles north-east of Bait Jibrin.91 The Syrians would not have been the only providers. Every year there was a large-scale distribution of alms at the church of the Holy Sepulchre on the third day after the anniversary of the taking of Jerusalem on 15 July, and in 1148 this must have been particularly important.92

  William of Tyre, like Otto of Freising, drew moral lessons from these events. To him, it was evident that divine favour had been withdrawn because of the unworthiness of the participants, although he admits he could not understand the judgment of the Lord.93 In fact, he treats the equally decisive defeat of Baldwin's expedition to Bosra the year before quite differently, trying to show that, even in adversity, God did not desert his people, saving the army by a series of miracles appropriate for those who were descended from the warriors of the First Crusade.94 ‘No one now living,’ he says, ‘can remember any equally perilous expedition during the period of the Latins in the Orient which did not result in a decisive victory for the enemy.’95

  William felt that he needed to show that God still approved of the Christian establishment in the East despite the obvious blows of 1144 and 1147–8, for he was aware that perceptions of Outremer had been fundamentally changed.96 Whether the charges of treachery were true or not, they all related to the eastern Franks in some way, and many crusaders evidently returned to the West bearing a grudge. ‘Even when permitted to return to their own lands, the memory of the wrongs which they had suffered still rankled, and they regarded with abhorrence the wicked conduct of those nobles. Not only was this true in regard to themselves, but their influence caused others who had not been present there to slacken in love toward the kingdom. As a result, fewer people, and those less fervent in spirit, undertook this pilgrimage thereafter. Moreover, even to the present day, those who do come fear lest they be caught in the same toils and hence make as short a stay as possible.’97 At the same time he thought that the military prestige of the Latins had been seriously undermined. Writing about the defeat of Louis's army at Cadmus Mountain, he says: ‘That day the glorious reputation of the Franks was lost through a misfortune most fatal and disastrous for the Christians; their valor, up to this time formidable to the nations, was crushed to earth. Henceforward it was as a mockery in the eyes of those unclean races to whom formerly it had been a terror.’98

  From this time, William says, the situation of the Latins in the East became ‘manifestly worse’. His gloom was deepened by events in Antioch in the summer of 1149, when Nur al-Din seized the opportunity to invade the southern part of the principality. He was at once challenged by Prince Raymond who, according to William of Tyre, left Antioch in such a hurry he did not wait for the assembly of the main body of his knights. Nur al-Din retreated but, once he realised the relative weakness of the Christian forces, returned to the offensive, reinforced by a contingent of troops from Damascus. Ibn al-Qalanisi says that this gave him an army of 6,000 men. They found the Antiochenes in a camp surrounded by marshes near Inab, which lay on the plain east of the Orontes about 60 miles south-west of Aleppo, and during the night of 28 June encircled them. Both
William of Tyre and Ibn al-Qalanisi say that Raymond's army was outnumbered; even so, Ibn al-Qalanisi gives a figure of 5,000 men, curiously made up of 4,000 horsemen and 1,000 foot soldiers, contradicting William's statement that Raymond had left Antioch without his cavalry. In either case the result was the same. The Franks were slaughtered and when the dust had settled the Muslims found Raymond's body on the battlefield. They hacked off his head and right arm and presented them to Nur al-Din; when the prince's body was later recovered and taken back to Antioch for burial, his men were only able to identify him because of certain known scars. Nur al-Din sent the head and the arm to the caliph and they were passed around the other Turkish leaders of the region.99

  This was a great triumph for Nur al-Din, underlined in the Muslim sources by their emphasis on the formidable character of the man they had overcome. ‘This accursed one,’ says Ibn al-Qalanisi, ‘was amongst the Frankish knights who were famed for their gallantry, valour, power of cunning, and great stature, and had acquired special repute by the dread which he inspired, his great severity, and excessive ferocity.’ For Ibn al-Athir, he was ‘one of the most intransigent of the Franks and one of their great leaders’.100 His death plunged the principality into crisis. Raymond's heir, Bohemond III, was only a small child, and many of Antioch's defenders had lost their lives in the battle. Nur al-Din took immediate advantage, bringing his forces up to the gates of Antioch itself and demanding its surrender, although he was temporarily appeased by gifts and perhaps diverted by the opportunity to take Harim and Apamea. The key figure was the patriarch, Aimery of Limoges, of whom William of Tyre generally has a low opinion, but whom on this occasion he describes as the defender of the region, using his wealth to hire troops.