Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler

by Robert Gellately

  This language had to impress desperate farmers and people without jobs who wanted to hear their government commit to programs and deadlines. Hitler offered immediate steps, like introducing a labor service and settlement policy for farmers, and gave them the assurances they wanted. The government would take all necessary measures to get the economy moving and to put state finances on a sound footing.

  He also spoke of the public good: “We men of this government feel responsible to German history for the reconciliation of a proper body politic so that we may finally overcome the insanity about class and of class warfare.” Sounding like the kaiser on the eve of the First World War, Hitler said: “We do not recognize classes, but only the German people, its millions of farmers, citizens, and workers who together will either overcome this time of distress or succumb to it.” He ended with the main election appeal: “The Marxist parties and their fellow travelers had fourteen years to prove their abilities. The result is a heap of ruins. Now, German people, give us four years and then judge us.”3

  The speech was not as vacuous as is often suggested, and many who lived through the times found it so effective that they refused to believe Hitler had written it. They thought someone else, perhaps an obscure backer or someone like Papen, must have put it together. Max Domarus, who at the time collected Hitler’s speeches and proclamations, was struck by how often Hitler was underestimated and called it “absurd” to imagine he did not write his own material.4

  Hitler recorded the speech and had it played on the radio as the “Appeal of the Reich Government to the German People.” Within hours of his appointment he was at home among more experienced politicians and statesmen. Far from “forcing his will on a startled Cabinet,” as one account has it, there was a remarkable degree of agreement.5 His colleagues and not just Hitler wanted to eliminate what was left of parliamentary democracy and pursue the Marxists, whose civil and legal rights they were all willing to curtail. Moreover, right from the outset the government had far more backing than is often assumed. The only significant opposition came from the working-class movement, which, thanks to guidance from Moscow to the German Communists, was too divided to be effective.

  ELITE SUPPORT FOR THE NEW CHANCELLOR

  Within a week, social consensus in support of Hitler’s new government was reflected in the officer corps, which was easily won over, despite their conservative Prussian traditions. General Werner von Blomberg, a well-known figure, was made the new minister of defense, chosen by the circle around Hindenburg to look after the interests of the Reichswehr. He was assisted by a new head of the Ministerial Office, Colonel Walther von Reichenau. Although Hitler had nothing to do with these appointments, he could hardly have wished for more. Their support was already a foregone conclusion.6

  Blomberg was smitten when he first met Hitler in August 1930. His predisposition in favor of National Socialism was influenced by his divisional chaplain, Joseph Müller, and his (then) chief of staff, Reichenau. Blomberg concluded that with the support of the people, Hitler could do for the German army what Stalin did for his, namely turn it into a national institution.

  Hitler spoke briefly with Blomberg on January 30, and the two saw eye to eye at once. Blomberg mentioned he had visited the Soviet Union and United States and had become convinced that modern armed forces had to be based on “broad industrial mobilization.” In future, he said, the air force would play the dominant role—even at the cost of the regular army. Reichenau was even more sympathetic to Nazism and had talked earlier with Hitler. Blomberg and Reichenau were reputed to be “the most gifted and modern-thinking senior officers” in the country, and Hitler was quick to see the fruitful prospects of having these two in charge, both interested in transforming the armed forces and sharing his view of a National Socialist future.7

  It was an illusion for Hindenburg to believe that making Blomberg the defense minister would put the Reichswehr in the hands of an “apolitical” officer.8 In fact the old man himself had already been won over, and he vouched for Hitler on February 17 in a meeting with Fritz Schaeffer of the Bavarian People’s Party. Schaeffer was concerned that the new chancellor might try to remove the individual German state’s rights, but was assured the country was in good hands. Hindenburg said that “after initial reservation, he had in Herr Hitler come to know a man of the most honorable national will and he was now quite happy that the leader of this great movement was working with him and the other groups of the right.”9

  The officer corps as a whole responded warmly to Hitler’s appointment. Young officers in particular accepted it either with “satisfaction” or with “enthusiasm.” They were pleased that a “military-friendly” government would be in power and concentrate “all national elements.” Hitler’s political program, from the battle against Marxism to the renewal of Germany as a great power, matched perfectly with the wishes of the armed forces.

  Grand Admiral Erich Raeder thought his own response was typical. He testified after the war: “I welcomed the energetic personality, because he was clearly very intelligent; he had at his disposal incredible willpower, and was a master in leading men. In my opinion he was a great and talented politician in the first years, whose national and social aims were already known for years, and which found an echo in the armed forces as well as among the German people.”10

  The enthusiasm of many younger officers can perhaps be gleaned from an incident in Bamberg, a small Bavarian town, on the evening of January 30, 1933. An enthusiastic parade formed, celebrating the Hitler government, when a young lieutenant in uniform joyfully jumped out in front of the crowd to lead it. He was later mildly reprimanded by his superior officers, but boasted to his comrades “that the great soldiers of the time of the Wars of Liberation [from Napoleon] would have shown more sympathy with such a genuine rising of the people.” The young lieutenant was Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, the man who, as part of the resistance movement eleven years later, tried to assassinate Hitler.11 In January 1933 and well into the Third Reich, however, it was taken as a given that young officers like Stauffenberg supported the new government, including its nonmilitary goals. A distant relative remembered being surprised when she heard of his involvement in the assassination attempt in 1944, since she had considered him “the only real National Socialist in the family.”12

  The senior ranks of the military were somewhat disconcerted by Hitler’s lowly social origins, political style, and violent methods, and his revolutionary aims did not fit with their conservatism. However, they put their reservations aside to have, as they said, a “real chancellor” again. They wanted someone like Hitler to restore what they called a “power state.” Hence the attitude even of many older officers has been described as “positive-friendly, largely uncritical” toward Hitler’s appointment. “National” to the military had meant “standing on the right,” and with an extreme right-winger in power they were bound to be sympathetic. Opinions no doubt varied and changed over time, but through all such differentiations Blomberg’s and Reichenau’s attitudes were quite representative.13

  On February 3, Blomberg briefed a meeting of group and district commanders in the Defense Ministry and mentioned the “frenzy of enthusiasm” (Begeisterungsrausch) engulfing Germany. As he saw it, the cabinet was an “expression of broad national will and the realization of what many people have been seeking for years. Admittedly, it only represents a minority of the nation, but a firmly formed minority counting millions, who are determined to live and, if need be, to die for their idea. Great possibilities result from this if the leading figures show firmness and skill.”14

  At a dinner held that same evening at the home of the commander in chief of the army, General Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord, Hitler spoke for two hours and gave what was in fact an abbreviated sketch of the Third Reich to come. His domestic aim was to “exterminate Marxism root and branch” and create the “tightest authoritarian state leadership.” He yearned to remove “the cancer of democracy.” The people as a whole and
especially youth had to become aware that “only struggle can save us and that everything else must be subordinated to this idea.”

  He wanted to reintroduce a military draft. This he saw as crucial to building up the armed forces, but it also had to be linked with a program of toughening up German culture. He told them the country had to get rid of pacifist, Marxist, Bolshevik ideas that corrupted the spirit of the men even before they were drafted. He was firmly in favor of the army; there would be no fusion with his Party’s SA. He also said they had a choice about how to use the renewed military: either fighting for new possibilities for exports or, better still, making Germany into a “continental great power.” The new military should be used for “the conquest of new lebensraum in the east and its ruthless Germanization.”15

  The idea of “ruthless Germanization” was vague, but it sounded the first note of far-reaching plans for the east. Hitler left Germany’s top generals in no doubt about his agenda, which went well beyond tearing up the Treaty of Versailles. His words suggested that he already wanted a racial war of aggression in the east: What else would “ruthless Germanization” mean?16

  On February 20 he gave another presentation to around twenty-five leading industrialists who had been invited to Göring’s official residence for a chat. This time the focus was on economics and the domestic scene. Industrialists like Gustav Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach of the Krupp steel and coal works went along. Hitler wanted to be clear about where he stood on economic issues: like them, he was for private property, free enterprise, and the role of the “selected” in society, and he shared his guests’ grave concerns about Socialism and especially Bolshevism. He said the turning point in Germany’s history had arrived; the country had to decide whether it was going to support the existing order or go Communist.

  Domestic peace and economic recovery would come about only if Marxism is finished off. Therein lies the decision that we have to face and where the struggle is still so difficult. I put my life into the struggle daily, as do those who stand with me in this struggle. There are only two possibilities: either we drive the enemy [Marxism] back on the basis of the constitution—hence for that reason the current election—or the struggle will have to be fought with other weapons that perhaps will cost more victims. I would really like to see this avoided. Hopefully the German people will recognize the importance of the moment, because they will decide over the next ten, yes, perhaps one hundred years.

  Krupp replied that it was “high time to create clarity on domestic political questions in Germany” and that a strong state would foster the economy. There was no hint of disagreement, and any that did exist would have paled in the face of the mounting concern they all shared about the dangers of Marxism.17

  When Hitler left, Göring asked for financial help for the coming elections. He pointed out that the SA was involved in street fights with the Communists and getting killed and suggested that the industrialists could help out with funds.

  It was a milestone meeting and “the first significant material contribution by organized big business interests to the Nazi cause.” Giving the money may have been less than “wholly voluntary,” but it is an overstatement to suggest it was a “mild foretaste of the political extortion” to come. Their responsibility was hardly “mitigated” because they did not realize a one-party dictatorship was in the plans. In fact, Göring told them the election would be the last for many years.18 Krupp and many other industrialists were comfortable with Hitler on most issues and found ways to work with his regime to their mutual benefit. The Krupp firm began to show profits again, and the rearmament program, a cornerstone of Nazi economic policy, paid handsome dividends for firms that were part of it.19

  Many German princes and other aristocrats supported the Party before and after 1933. A recent study shows the names of 279 members of the high nobility, some of recent vintage, in the Party, and that list is by no means complete. Although after 1945 many came up with exculpatory reasons for their commitment, it was likely the case that they, like Prince Philipp von Hessen, joined up “in an outpouring of idealistic sentiment according to the so-called National Socialist world view—something along the lines of Hitler’s speeches, Hitler’s Mein Kampf,” and other Nazi writings. The ostentatious appearance of so many from high society in Nazi garb likely helped to give the Party and the Third Reich an added air of respectability.20

  THE BROADER PUBLIC

  There was no organized protest and little unorganized resistance to Hitler’s appointment and the beginning of the new regime. Many conservatives were fed up with the old Socialist-inspired system, an economy in shambles, and disorder on the streets, and they looked forward to a more disciplined society. It was certainly true that “many apolitical Germans were relieved that the long-drawn-out government crisis was over, and no doubt greeted its resolution with hopeful expectations.”21

  Middle-class professional groups such as physicians welcomed “the new regime with high hopes, expecting it to redress anomalies left over from the health administration of the Weimar Republic.” The Great Depression badly affected the medical profession, particularly young doctors trying to set up their practices. The Third Reich was going to be race and health conscious, and the doctors guessed they would prosper. Their chances of doing well went up further in 1935, when Jewish physicians were forced out. It was no accident that doctors rushed to join the Nazi Party with greater alacrity than members of any of the other professions.22

  During the election campaign Hitler presented a rosy picture of the future and tried to pump up spirits. On February 11 he addressed the International Automobile and Motorcycle Exhibition in Berlin, the first time anyone as important as a chancellor had opened such an event. He said the automobile industry would, with the airplane, lead the way into the future. His plans to help included giving tax relief, building up Germany’s highway network, and backing motor-sport events. The image he presented here was of the progressive thinker. He said he was not just business-friendly, but had a vision of a technologically based economy that would be good for all.23 He reminded these industrialists about what they owed Germany’s unemployed people and told them he took no salary as head of government. By May 1 he had announced a road-building scheme and by the end of June had put Fritz Todt in charge. He swept aside objections, latched onto plans, and pushed them through. As America showed, the automobile and highways caught the imagination and were enormously popular.24

  He vindicated the support of companies like Daimler-Benz, whose chairman wrote in May 1932: “We have no occasion to diminish the attention which we have until now afforded Herr Hitler and his friends; he will be able to rely on us in the future, as in the past.”25 Hitler had plans for introducing the Volkswagen, the people’s car. If none went into mass production at this time, his grand visions got people hoping again.26

  He continued to hammer away on the theme of fighting and beating Communism. There was a broad anti-Communist consensus among the middle classes, and it extended into rural areas as well.

  Alfred Hugenberg took immediate steps to help farmers, many of them DNVP supporters. Hitler himself had long maintained that a healthy agricultural sector was vital to the well-being of the country. There would be no Bolshevik-style nationalizations here. The landowners’ main interest group, the Reichslandbund (Reich Agrarian League), was already predisposed to Hitler’s Party, and the new regime almost immediately raised import duties on food and helped indebted farmers. That won even more support.27

  The anti-Communist sentiment in the air was embraced by the Catholic faithful, who nevertheless withheld their vote from the Nazi Party in March 1933. There was considerable support for Hitler in the working class, certainly for solving economic problems and curing unemployment. There was near-universal agreement on dealing with the great national issue plaguing the country since 1919, namely the Treaty of Versailles.

  Some people were of two minds, pulled in one way by hope, pushed in another out of fear of what might co
me next. There was no unitary response to Hitler’s regime at the beginning, but a common theme in the diaries and letters of the time was that he should be given a chance.

  The reaction on the radical left was the exact opposite. In Berlin at the conclusion of the triumphal Nazi procession on January 30, there were clashes with the Communists, and one SA leader and a policeman were killed. In other parts of Germany, Communists demonstrated the next day. Sometimes things got out of hand, and outbursts of violence had to be broken up by police. These were isolated acts and not part of a centrally directed campaign.

  “STRUGGLE AGAINST THE RED TERROR”

  On January 31, in a meeting with Goebbels, Hitler laid down guidelines for the “struggle against the Red terror.” In the short term, “we want to avoid direct countermeasures. The Bolshevik attempt at revolution must first flame up. At the appropriate moment we will then strike.” Hitler was biding his time in expectation that Communists, lulled into a false sense of security, would take provocative steps. He would then have the authority to react harshly and would eliminate them and all other “Marxists.” He believed that the same kind of approach had to be taken to any resistance from state and local governments in Germany, as well as the “Jewish press.” Responding to such provocations in the name of law and order would be widely applauded and politically successful.28