Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler

by Robert Gellately

  FIRST “NATIONAL OPERATION”

  By 1938 harassment had caused many Jews to leave, but approximately 360,000 remained. The SD (Security Service) estimated that “reincorporation” of Austria in the so-called Anschluss in March meant the gain of “around 200,000 Religion-Jews” and brought Germany’s new total back to what it was in 1933. The SD said there were really many more, but they were concealed because they had converted to other religions.25 In Austria, anti-Semitic persecution, which was brutal from the start, dramatically accelerated. By late March, Viennese Jews were driven to such despair that more than eighty committed suicide.

  The anti-Semitic violence in Austria “started before the Wehrmacht crossed the border; despite official efforts to curb its most chaotic and mob-like aspects, it lasted several weeks.” Public humiliation of Jews became a popular sport, and many people enriched themselves through theft and extortion.26

  In Germany, Aryanization of Jewish business moved forward inexorably. By the summer of 1938 an estimated 75 to 80 percent of all businesses that had been Jewish as of 1933 had been liquidated.27 Firms were ruined when customers began to avoid them. Moreover, any misstep by a Jewish firm brought home its precarious legal position. But it was the regime itself that opened the door to the robbery by providing a “legal basis.”28

  In Austria the process was put into high gear immediately. For example, of thirty-three thousand or so Jewish businesses in Vienna in March, all had been either “Aryanized” or “liquidated in an orderly way” by May. Anti-Semitism was more popular in Austria than in Germany, according to police accounts. The notorious Adolf Eichmann was in Vienna on March 16, only four days after the Wehrmacht walked into Austria. His task was to take charge of Jewish affairs. Soon, however, as David Cesarani shows, “Viennese Jewish leaders came up with the idea for a centralized emigration office, and they provided the staff to make it work. It was the first example of a ‘Jewish council’ operating under Nazi control which at its extreme fringes appeared more like collaboration.”29

  Many Jews were plundered of everything they owned and had neither the funds nor the wherewithal to get out. They needed help to leave, and to obtain it they had to work with people like Eichmann. By August the Nazis had created the Central Office for Jewish Emigration, and by the time Eichmann left Vienna in May 1939, he bragged that he had deported a hundred thousand or more. To facilitate matters, sometime in October 1938, Himmler had ordered all Austrian Jews to be concentrated in Vienna.30 Eichmann’s forced deportations now became the model of the moment for solving the “Jewish question.”

  The United States responded to the growing refugee problem by convening a conference in Évian, France. It met July 6–14, 1938, but the assistance offered Jews by the world community was almost insignificant. Not only America but countries like Canada and Australia showed little compassion. The unwillingness to do much was played up cynically in the German press. Far from shaming the Nazis into relenting, the Évian conference encouraged them to continue their exclusionary policies.31

  Celebrations in Germany about taking Austria sometimes degenerated into anti-Semitic violence, even in places known to be reserved about Nazism. In April and May “individual actions” against Jews were reported “in almost all parts of the Reich.”32

  On April 26, 1938, a decree forced all Jews (and their non-Jewish spouses for those in mixed marriages) to register their worldly wealth. Into the summer, violence and aggression aimed at Jews increased noticeably. The security authorities said that “actions against the Jews” and local boycotts were common, even when officially forbidden. Businesses were taken away, and sympathizers with the Jews were sometimes attacked by a mob and had to be rescued.33

  The Socialist underground reporters held on to their conviction that most citizens did not support what the Nazis were doing, but admitted that “as a result of the long anti-Semitic campaign many people had themselves become anti-Semitic.”34

  Hitler added fuel to the fire in another speech at the Nuremberg Party rally in September. Although international tensions were rising and the issue of the German minority in Czechoslovakia dominated his main address, he made a point of mentioning the Jews. The world complained that Germany “was trying to get rid of its Jews,” but when the international community had a chance to open its doors, it would not. He said that Germany was overcrowded, but the “democratic empires”—presumably Britain and the United States—had no space for Jews. He did not call for violence, but gave every sign he wanted Jews out.35

  A national SD report for that month alleged that some Jews were being “rude in public” in hopes of fueling international tensions as a way to focus the world’s attention on their plight. Most Jews, however, worried that in the event of war they would “be placed in concentration camps or in some other way finished off” (unschädlich gemacht). The national SD report for October noted the deteriorating economic position of the Jews through “Aryanization” and the “increasingly anti-Jewish stance of the population.” It was a backlash whose “strongest expression” took the form of “actions.” The events were fostered by the Party or the SA and “in the south and southwest of the Reich took on the character of a pogrom.”36

  Germany was handed the western part of Czechoslovakia (the Sudetenland) at Munich in September 1938, and it took the rest of the country in short order (March 14–15, 1939). It thereby acquired yet another Jewish community of ancient standing. According to the criteria of the Nuremberg Laws, there were 118,310 Jews in the newly proclaimed Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Here, too, emigration—or forced deportation—became the favorite option for solving the “Jewish question.”

  In this context, note should be taken not only of what Eichmann was doing in Vienna but also of the German decision to deport Jews of Polish nationality. Some Polish Jews had been living for decades in Germany. Many of them were born there but not allowed to become citizens. The Polish parliament passed a law on March 31, 1938, to withdraw citizenship of many of the Poles living in Germany (nearly half of whom were Jewish) by November 1. The German government responded to the “provocation” by organizing a forced deportation.37

  German authorities sent home all male Jews of Polish nationality. The total number forced out in three days (October 27–29) was estimated at seventeen thousand. Himmler thought the women would follow the men of their own accord. The SD expected that a total of seventy-five thousand Jewish Poles in Germany would be affected. Those who were shoved over the border were caught in a no-man’s-land, driven back and forth before being allowed into Poland. Some were permitted to return briefly to Germany to sell off their property.38

  The SD followed the reaction in cities where the Polish Jews were assembled before deportation. In Düsseldorf around three thousand were sent back. Jews of other nationalities regarded the action as a “trial balloon” for the German government to see how foreign countries would react. Families were torn apart when fathers were compelled to leave.39 This event was the first major “action” that forced Jews out of Germany. It was the closest thing yet to one of the “national actions” being carried out at about the same time in the Soviet Union.

  POGROM

  Given the violent attacks on the Jews through the summer and into the fall of 1938, as well as what was happening in Austria and Czechoslovakia, the smell of a pogrom was in the air by October. Observers in the Socialist underground began their long reports with the chilling phrase “The campaign of annihilation of the German Jews is by all appearances entering its final stage.”40

  The attack on the Jews, labeled sarcastically at the time by persons unknown as the “night of broken glass,” took place November 9–10. Kristallnacht began when seventeen-year-old Herschel Grynszpan fatally shot a minor official (Ernst vom Rath) in the German embassy in Paris on November 7. Grynszpan’s parents were among the Polish Jews recently deported from Germany. On November 8, when he heard of the shooting in Paris, Goebbels noted: “If only we could unleash the wrath of the p
eople!” Attacks on the Jews were in fact already under way in some places (like Hessen), as he noted in his diary. As word of the assassination reached other localities, violence erupted.

  Late on November 8, Goebbels was with Hitler to celebrate the anniversary of the attempted putsch of 1923. All the Nazi bigwigs were in Munich for the annual commemoration of the “fallen.”41 On the evening of November 9, Hitler was due at a reception. Vom Rath died in the afternoon, and Hitler was informed immediately. When he entered the reception, he spoke briefly with Goebbels and left. This was stage-managing to make it look as though Hitler were rushing off after having just heard the news. Goebbels only then announced vom Rath’s death, but Hitler had already decided the demonstrations under way should “be allowed to continue.”

  Hitler felt a pogrom could be politically useful, noting to Goebbels that “the Jews should for once feel the anger of the people.” Goebbels gave the orders to those at the meeting. He told them that Hitler wanted up to thirty thousand arrested. He beamed with delight as reports streamed in that synagogues were burning all over Germany and that the property of the Jews was being destroyed. In his diary he wrote triumphantly, “Bravo! Bravo!” to it all.42

  Although they decided to stop the pogrom on November 10, Goebbels said Hitler’s view was “completely radical and aggressive.” The Jews were to put their businesses in order again (at their own expense), and then be forced to sell them. The insurance companies were not to be asked to cover the damages.

  The pogrom was the first major violent event experienced by the Jews in Germany in centuries. The riots swept cities and the smallest villages, and there were various reactions. Many people were actively or passively involved in the persecution. But local citizens did not always turn on their longtime neighbors, and some hid Jews or helped them.43

  About thirty thousand were arrested and more than a hundred killed.44 Out of despair and as a last gasp of resistance, between three and five hundred committed suicide.45 Around ten thousand Jews were sent to the camps at Dachau, Buchenwald, and Sachsenhausen. Most were released within weeks.46

  On November 12, Göring chaired a meeting to deal with the follow-up to Kristallnacht. In keeping with Hitler’s wishes, a collective fine was levied on the Jews to pay for the damages. Reinhard Heydrich said that Eichmann (also at the meeting) had achieved considerable success in Vienna by forcing the emigration of fifty thousand Jews. In the same period only ten thousand left “old” Germany. Heydrich now wanted to employ the “Vienna model.”47

  POPULAR REACTIONS

  In a lengthy report of December 7, 1938, the SD Main Office said the pogrom was carried out by the SA, the SS, and the Nazi Party. It stated that plundering took place, but was kept to a minimum. Some 360 synagogues were destroyed and thirty-one department stores burned down or demolished.

  According to the report, the population initially agreed with the action but changed their minds once they saw the damage. People wanted something done about the murder of vom Rath but believed it wrong to destroy businesses and homes. Mainly Catholic areas were especially opposed to the attacks on “the houses of God.” Elsewhere, caustic remarks were directed at collectors for Nazi charities. Some ostentatiously showed sympathy for the Jews by shopping at the Jewish stores still operating. In the Ruhr a leaflet circulated proclaiming that those responsible should be stood against a wall.

  The SD report concluded that the pogrom and series of restrictions sent out by all branches of government “aimed at the complete exclusion of the Jews from all areas of life, with the final goal [Endziel] their removal from the area of the Reich by all means and in the shortest possible time.”48

  In countless other reports the pogrom was said to be “regarded with satisfaction” or even with the “greatest satisfaction.”49 Reading between the lines, however, one can see that public opinion was ambivalent and divided. The mayor of Bielefeld, for example, stated that “understanding existed for the struggle against the Jews and that in general it was taken as obvious that if the Jews were to be rendered harmless, very sharp measures would have to be used.” Nevertheless, he said what was “generally not understood” was the wanton destruction of property.50

  Many Germans evidently began to feel sorry for Jews. The mayor of one small town commented, “The population had mostly not understood the action, or better, they did not want to understand it. The Jews were also pitied, particularly because of the damage inflicted on their worldly possessions and because the male Jews were led off to a concentration camp. This attitude of the population was perhaps not widespread, but I estimate that here at least 60 percent of the population so thought.”51

  In Kochem, the Catholic clergy and population “in many cases expressed pity for the Jews.” A small town in Baden summed up the “general” reaction with the statement “The poor Jews!!!” Even in places that supposedly welcomed the uproar, the population “for the most part pitied the Jews.” One town was said to agree with the arrest of male Jews when it heard news of the Paris murder. “However, as the numerous rumors about the mistreatments that followed leaked back, particularly from places outside the locality, and as the public transport of the more or less miserable-looking figures followed, the sympathy of the population no longer favored the action. The population was serious and depressed. Here and there were clear signs of pity.” Some said the event was inconsistent with Germany’s reputation in the world.52

  Although some reports “applauded,” many reveal only silence on the topic. “Seldom did anyone give an opinion,” and many felt ashamed, ran some accounts. There were those who thought the vandalism and arrests “were still too mild.” However, the “far greater majority” considered the destruction of property wrong and believed that those responsible should be held to account.53

  The SD-West’s annual report for 1938 pointed to the mixed reactions as well. The Rhine-Ruhr stated that the population rejected the pogrom, although many people agreed the “Jewish question” had to be solved. Even the supposedly “reliable” part of the population, which wanted Jews out of the economy, did not agree, and there was almost universal condemnation. The reasons varied from religious to humanitarian concerns. Opinions were divided in the east as well, where the SD-Elbe said some workers and the lower middle class accepted the pogrom but did not like the destruction of goods. “Educated” people condemned the whole episode. The general conclusion was that the pogrom, “like the boycott of the Jews” in April 1933, was a “tactical mistake.” The Jews themselves, as everywhere in Germany, were devastated, not only materially, but psychologically.54

  The SD report from the north was even more negative. The attitude of the population in the Stettin area “left much to be desired” on anti-Semitism: “In the rejection of the measures against the Jews, everyone was united, only the basis for this attitude varied somewhat.”55

  The national report registered condemnations from across the political spectrum. Liberals described the action as “barbaric” and “devoid of culture” and the destruction of synagogues as “irresponsible.” The phrase quoted was of “the poor repressed Jews.” The movement on the right “unanimously” said the measure was “unjustified and unworthy of a people of culture.” The Socialists condemned it in different ways. Some said that the persecution of Christians would follow.56

  There were relatively few objections to what happened as a matter of principle. Germans did not generally object to anti-Semitism as such. They did not say much about how despicable it was for the regime to be persecuting the Jews. Some historians have taken the general failure of the populace to address such issues as indicating that most Germans were more concerned about property than about the Jewish people.57At the same time, recently published documents show far more sympathy for Jews than is often supposed. There is plenty of evidence in the private diaries of non-Nazis that the riots and the arrests were highly disturbing to many Germans.58 The Socialists insisted that the overwhelming majority “abhorred” the excesses of November
and the “continuous pogrom” since then.59

  It has been argued that at the time it would have been highly imprudent for ordinary Germans to criticize the regime on the central issue of anti-Semitism and that some, if not many, people were indirectly expressing their displeasure at the pogrom through their criticisms of the wastefulness.60

  The mass of Germans broadly agreed with significantly reducing the number of Jews in prominent positions, and many accepted the Nazi strategy of eliminating their civil rights. That does not mean people did not pity individual Jews or have empathy with them as human beings. But as Jews, they were in effect consigned to the fate that awaited them.

  The Socialist underground was convinced that Nazi policy aimed at mass murder. Their report of February 1939 even brought up the comparison with the slaughter of the Armenians carried out by the Turks during the Great War.61

  PROPHECY OF DOOM

  Hitler’s first speech after the pogrom occurred on January 30, 1939, the anniversary of his appointment as chancellor. He began by talking about the international situation and said that the German people had nothing against England, America, or France. He then turned to the Jews as the real “world enemy.” He charged them with wanting to bring the nations of the world to war. They had been “overcome” in Germany, he said, and they would also go down to defeat everywhere. He noted that other nations might pity the Jews, but no one would take them in. At this time he thought it might be possible for the European powers to clear up the “Jewish question” through negotiations. He suggested that there was enough space in the world for the Jews, but he wanted an end to what he called the belief that they had a God-given right to “exploit” the productive work of other nations.

  Having set this scene, Hitler issued what became a notorious threat: