Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler

by Robert Gellately

  Roosevelt’s opening remarks to the first main gathering paid due respect to the great sacrifice of the Soviets. The Big Three got down to talking about Overlord, which Stalin seemed genuinely to support. Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed about the invasion the previous August at their meeting in Quebec. They favored attacking directly across the English Channel. Thirty-five divisions (sixteen British and nineteen American) would land initially, but before the summer of 1944 the goal was to have a million soldiers in Europe. Stalin wanted to know the timetable for Overlord and who would be the military commander. He was kept waiting on both counts.10

  An important aspect of the conference was how to deal with the post war era. Stalin had harsh things to say about France. At the evening meal on November 28, along with dismembering Germany, he said “the French nation, and particularly its leaders and ruling classes, were rotten and deserved to be punished for their criminal collaboration with Nazi Germany.”11

  He was keen to make Germany pay and came out in favor of a draconian approach. Official American notes mentioned how he

  appeared to regard all measures proposed by either the President or Churchill for the subjugation and for the control of Germany as inadequate. He on various occasions sought to induce the President or the Prime Minister to go further in expressing their views as to the stringency of the measures which should be applied to Germany. He appeared to have no faith in the possibility of the reform of the German people and spoke bitterly of the attitude of the German workers in the war against the Soviet Union.12

  Stalin ventured few of his own opinions, but kept trying to figure out FDR’s and Churchill’s in order to make countermoves. Typical of his style was when Churchill asked about the territorial ambitions of the USSR. Stalin dodged by answering: “There is no need to speak at the present time about any Soviet desires, but when the time comes, we will speak.”13

  Churchill made a fuss about presenting Stalin with a sword of honor between sessions. It was inscribed with the words “To the steel-hearted citizens of Stalingrad, a gift from King George VI as a token of the homage of the British people.” Stalin was touched and even shed a tear, but he kept his eye on the prize. That meant winning the war, getting his allies to do their share, and expanding Soviet control of the postwar world as much as possible.

  He was particularly pleased with Churchill’s view on Poland. The prime minister suggested that after the war Poland “might move westward,” which is to say, give up its eastern border region to the USSR. It would be given a slice of eastern Germany in compensation. Certainly Churchill wanted “an independent and strong Poland,” as he stated in an evening meeting with FDR and Stalin on November 28, but he could accept shifting the borders of the country westward.14 Churchill noted in his memoirs: “This pleased Stalin, and on this note our group parted for the moment.”15

  Roosevelt agreed with this drastic step but, in a private meeting with Stalin in the early afternoon of December 1, asked him to understand that as a politician who would be seeking reelection, he did not wish to have his stance published, lest he lose the Polish-American vote. FDR noted that the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania “had in history and again more recently been a part of Russia and added jokingly that when the Soviet armies re-occupied their areas, he did not intend to go to war with the Soviet Union on this point.” He hoped for a referendum in those states, but Stalin was past master at getting people to express their “free will” to join the USSR. Roosevelt gave him the green light.16

  Back home later FDR confided to New York’s archbishop, Francis Spellman, that besides Poland and the Baltic States, Finland and Bessarabia were already lost to the Soviet Union. “So better give them up gracefully,” because there was nothing the United States could do about it. He asked the disappointed Polish ambassador in Washington: “Do you expect us and Great Britain to declare war on Joe Stalin if they cross your previous frontier? Even if we wanted to, Russia can still field an army twice our combined strength, and we would just have no say in the matter at all.”17

  KEEPING GERMANY DOWN PERMANENTLY

  Dinner on November 29 was hosted by Stalin, and amid many toasts and a vast show of food that ordinary Soviet citizens had not seen in their lifetime, Stalin brought up the issue of how to deal with the Germans. The concept of postwar trials had been suggested by Molotov as far back as October 1942 when he wrote several Eastern European exile governments in London about Moscow’s inclination to try the most prominent leaders of “the criminal Hitlerite government” before a “special international tribunal.”18

  Moscow was upset that Britain was unwilling to try Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s deputy, who had flown to Scotland in 1941. Still, on November 1, 1943, all three Allies issued the Moscow Declaration. It stated that those who had committed crimes would be returned to the localities where these had taken place and be “judged on the spot.”Trial and punishment would follow the laws of each locality, but different treatment would be accorded the major war figures. It was left up in the air precisely what ought to happen to these men and whether they would be tried or summarily executed.19

  Churchill suggested at a cabinet meeting that they might draw up a short list of specific war criminals. The named individuals would become isolated figures in their own country, and dealing with them summarily instead of getting caught up in messy legal entanglements might well shorten the war. He favored a list of fifty to a hundred or so. Once reviewed by a committee of jurists, these men would be declared “outlaws” and considered fair game for anyone who wished to kill them. For Churchill, if there was to be anything like a trial, its job would be to verify the identity of these “outlaws.”20

  There was a remarkable exchange on this topic over dinner on November 29. Stalin worried that “in fifteen or twenty years” Germany could plunge the world into another war. As a preventive step he suggested that “at least 50,000 and perhaps 100,000” of their commanding staff be “physically liquidated.” In addition, “the victorious Allies must retain possession of the important strategic points in the world so that if Germany moved a muscle she could be rapidly stopped.” The same should happen to Japan.21

  Stalin was absolutely serious.22 Churchill took strong exception to “cold-blooded executions of soldiers who had fought for their country.” War criminals should be held responsible for their acts according to the Moscow Declaration of November 1. He “objected vigorously, however, to executions for political purposes.”23 He also said the British parliament and public would never accept such a thing. Roosevelt responded more warmly to Stalin, and when Churchill became upset (or so Churchill recalled), FDR said the Allies should execute not 50,000 but “only 49,000.” Elliott Roosevelt, the president’s son, who happened to be present, chimed in to say he was sure the United States Army “would support it.”24

  The conversation bothered Churchill so much he walked out, but he was chased down by Stalin, who said he was only joking. Churchill allowed himself to be persuaded to return to dinner, but was not “fully convinced that all was chaff and there was no serious intent lurking behind.”25

  Stalin’s point about dividing Germany, which he repeated afterward in a completely different context, was based on his belief that the German national character was such that the country would quickly recover. They “were like sheep,” followed orders faithfully, and were too disciplined. They had to be run into the ground.26

  The issue of whether to execute selected Nazi war criminals or to put them on trial remained unresolved. In the meantime, the Soviets began settling scores their own way.

  One of the points mentioned by Stalin on that memorable evening in Tehran was the need for the Allies to control strategic areas around the globe. He claimed to want to keep an eye on Germany, but he was also thinking in terms of the postwar world, where the Soviets could exercise influence. The other two leaders showed little resolve to oppose Stalin’s ambitions.

  As the Soviets liberated their land in the summer of 1943
, they began carrying out trials, including of their own citizens, for participation in Nazi war crimes. In the first such trial, on July 14-17, 1943, at Krasnodar, the Soviets made public the mass murder of the Jews. There were eight death sentences of Russian and Ukrainian auxiliaries, carried out in the city square in front of tens of thousands.27 More trials followed, including of German captives such as Gestapo officers.

  The Western Allies worried such events might lead to the execution of American and British prisoners of war in German captivity. There was reason for concern. Hitler, incensed at the Soviet proceedings, ordered trials of what he called “English-American war criminals” and especially “Anglo-Saxon terror bombers.”28 Hitler’s orders ultimately came to nothing, given his weakened position to wreak havoc. The U.S. government, urged on by Secretary of War Stimson, decided that judicial proceedings were preferable to summary executions.

  The Big Three, led by America, initially agreed to split Germany into five self-governing units, under international control. Stalin wanted the divisions made permanent, and he coveted (and got) the northern part of East Prussia.29 He said the land would give the USSR an ice-free port, “a small piece of German territory which he felt was deserved.”

  Churchill thought that “with a generation of self-sacrificing, toil and education, something might be done with the German people,” but Stalin dissented and “did not appear satisfied as to the efficacy of any of the measures proposed by Mr. Churchill.”30

  Agreement was reached on the Allied invasion of Western Europe. Stalin said he would join the war against Japan as soon as Germany was defeated. The Big Three also decided to form an international organization, and Roosevelt sketched in rudimentary outline what was to become the United Nations. Stalin thought it could work, but said the United States might have to commit ground troops to Europe or other trouble spots in the future. FDR was not so sure Americans would agree and added that if the United States had not been attacked, “he doubted very much if it would have been possible to send American forces to Europe.”

  Stalin took this sincere admission to mean that he could throw his weight around in Europe without much worry about the United States.31Sergo Beria remembered hearing Stalin say at Tehran: “Now the fate of Europe is settled. We shall do as we like, with the Allies’ consent.”32 The young Beria, the son of the notorious spy chief and personally instructed by Stalin to bug the conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill, was puzzled by FDR’s stance. Churchill tried to warn the president that Stalin was engineering “a Communist replacement for the Polish government.” To Sergo Beria’s surprise, Roosevelt countered by accusing Churchill of trying to prepare an anti-Communist government. Beria recalled thinking at the time: “Why, then, get excited? It was all quite fair. Roosevelt put Churchill and Stalin on the same plane and presented himself as arbiter between them.” That, at any rate, was how he remembered the conversations.33 He also recalled that both Allied leaders knew Stalin’s appetite was not going to stop with Poland.

  Despite his personal brilliance, Churchill was unable to control the flow of events at Tehran. World power had shifted away from Britain to the United States and the USSR. Churchill asked prophetically about Stalin: “Will he become a menace to the free world, another Hitler?”34

  Tehran was a great political victory for Stalin, who got almost everything he wanted. He returned by way of a quick visit to Stalingrad, the city that had changed the course of the war. His destructive urges were hardly sated by Tehran, and no sooner was he back in Moscow, as we have seen, than he urged Beria to get on with the ethnic-cleansing operations already under way.

  WARSAW UPRISING

  The summer and early autumn of 1944 brought another turning point in the war. D-day finally came on June 6, and the long-awaited second front opened in Western Europe. Operation Overlord was the largest amphibious invasion in history. It took another two months to push the Germans back, but their reversal was inevitable. In early July the Soviets launched an attack to coincide with the Normandy invasion. On July 24 they liberated Majdanek, the first extermination camp, and stories about it filled the news around the world.

  Four days before, there was an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Hitler at his headquarters in Rastenburg. Colonel Count Stauffenberg, part of a conspiracy, brought a time bomb into the briefing room just past noon, placed it under the map table, and made his way out. Hitler was magically protected from the blast as he leaned over the heavy table. The conspirators, assuming Hitler’s demise, proceeded with their plan to take over the army, but everything had come to a halt by 6: 30 p.m., when a radio broadcast said he was alive and would speak presently. The plot was foiled.35 Hitler told the nation he had been saved by fate to continue the struggle.

  By this point in the war, support for the regime was beginning to dissipate. Nonetheless, people remained surprisingly steadfast behind Hitler. Although they were fed up, they were resilient, and despite Normandy and one defeat after the next, the surveyors of public opinion at the time found that morale was not collapsing.

  Hitler’s narrow escape on July 20 drew the public to him, and there was outrage that anyone would even try to assassinate him. In addition, the use of V-iflying bombs and V-2 rockets—retaliatory “miracle weapons”—helped renew the public’s faith in a favorable outcome to the war. Opinion reports stated that “almost everywhere the bonding to the führer is deepened and the trust in the leadership strengthened.”36

  Marshal Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, the leader of the Red Army from Byelorussia across Poland, reached the Vistula near Warsaw at the end of July. At least one company of T-34 tanks actually broke through into one of the eastern suburbs on July 31. From an observation post not far away, Rokossovsky could see the city.37

  On July 29, Radio Moscow appealed for help in freeing the city from the Germans: “Warsaw already hears the guns of the battle which will soon bring her liberation…. For Warsaw which did not yield, but fought on, the hour of action has already arrived.”38 On August 1, an attack, encouraged by Allied radio, was launched by the Polish Home Army on German forces inside Warsaw. Contrary to expectations, however, the Red Army did not try to link up with the insurgents in Warsaw. Who was responsible for the tragedy that ensued remains shrouded in controversy, although it was true that Soviet troops were exhausted and could barely hold the bridgeheads they had gained. Rokossov-sky decided to wait, even though by August 2 he could see the battle raging.

  The delay left the Polish Home Army to face the German forces alone. The “Red Army steamroller of two million men,” went a report in the New York Times, had fought for 440 miles and had only 300 left to Berlin. Yet it suddenly stopped outside Warsaw.39

  Stalin spoke bluntly about the future of Poland at Tehran, when Churchill and Roosevelt tried to interest him in linking up with the Polish government in exile in Britain. Stalin’s reply was that the latter was “connected with the Germans and their agents in Poland were killing partisans.” He coveted eastern Poland, but with no Poles left there. To his great satisfaction, FDR had even suggested some “population transfers.”40

  Churchill wrote Stalin on August 4 to say the British were dropping sixty tons of supplies to help Warsaw. He pleaded for the Red Army to offer aid. Stalin responded coldly the next day and played down the significance of the Home Army’s attack. On August 15, Anglo-American aircraft flying in supplies were denied permission to land for refueling on Soviet airfields.41 Churchill kept pressuring the Soviets into helping the Poles, as did the Americans, until August 16, when the Soviet government formally dissociated itself from the “Warsaw adventure.” Stalin was intent on supporting the Polish Communist Committee of National Liberation in Lublin, his puppet government.42

  In Churchill’s words, Stalin aimed “to have the non-Communist Poles destroyed to the full” while keeping alive the myth the Red Army was coming to the rescue. Churchill concluded this sorry chapter of his memoirs with the remark that the Russians ended up ruling Poland, but added b
itterly: “This cannot be the end of the story.” It was not, but the Polish people were going to have to wait more than half a century for their liberation from the Communists.43

  On the ground the situation in Warsaw was a dreadful mess. The war correspondent Alexander Werth, who was sympathetic to the Soviet side, interviewed Rokossovsky on August 26. Werth wondered why the Red Army had stopped, especially as Radio Moscow had called for an uprising. Rokossovsky’s off-the-record answers to Werth’s questions were elusive, but he blamed the Home Army for acting precipitously. He ended the interview with a rhetorical question to Werth: “And do you think that we would not have taken Warsaw if we had been able to?”44Precisely that conclusion has lingered about the tragic events to this day.

  The Red Army waited, and by August 22 Stalin was calling the uprising an attempt by a “handful of power-seeking criminals.” His decision was to let the Germans do his dirty work for him.45 On August 20 Churchill and FDR said something had to be done to save the anti-Nazis fighting for their lives in Warsaw. Stalin refused to lift a finger and let the uprising perish.46

  Zhukov’s memoirs note how, on October 1, he agreed with Rokossovsky to wait outside Warsaw, but by then the uprising had been defeated. Stalin called both men to Moscow for consultations. To Stalin’s question about whether the Red Army should press on through Warsaw, Zhukov replied: “My view is that this offensive will bring nothing but casualties.” The Red Army stayed on the east bank of the Vistula until early January 1945.47