Eleven Days in August
Page 20
According to Nordling, after over an hour of discussion von Choltitz recognised the new French authorities; that is, he recognised Parodi, the official representative of the Free French government, and not the Resistance or the people who were actually doing the fighting. Furthermore, the German commander offered to negotiate with these authorities and to cease all action against occupied buildings and against the FFI, as long as there was no firing against German troops.101 As a test of the good faith of the Resistance, there would be a thirty-five-minute cease-fire, beginning shortly after 21:00.
After the war, von Choltitz unequivocally and repeatedly stated that he made no cease-fire agreement of any sort; he merely discussed the matter with Nordling in order to come to a ‘modus vivendi’. He even suggested that Bender might have provided Nordling with fake documents indicating that he had made a formal agreement.102 It seems certain that the ‘cease-fire’ was in fact nothing more than the informal outcome of a series of discussions between Nordling and von Choltitz. None of the participants recalls having seen any written agreement, and no detailed account of any of the conversations has ever been published. Over a quarter of a century after the events, Parodi wondered whether Nordling had not cleverly told the Germans that the cease-fire was asked for by the Resistance, and vice versa.103
Whatever the case, and whatever Bender’s exact role and motives, the outcome was that a cease-fire came into operation that evening. Inside the Préfecture, the negotiations had been followed by a small group that included Charles Luizet, Edgard Pisani and Roland Pré – all Free French appointees.104 Rol might have formal control of all Resistance fighters in the Paris region, but with the help of Nordling and Bender, and with the agreement of Parodi, this informal group – which did not include a single member of the left wing of the Resistance – had managed to divert the course of the insurrection.
As the negotiations concluded, Nordling telephoned the Préfecture to say that if the cease-fire held overnight it might be extended the next day. Léo Hamon realised that there was an advantage to be gained and immediately made plans for his men to occupy the Hôtel de Ville as soon as possible. This would bring the main symbol of Paris’s revolutionary past under the control of the non-communist wing of the Resistance, but under the terms of the apparent agreement with von Choltitz, the occupiers would be safe from German attack.105
Although Nordling and the Free French were undoubtedly satisfied with the cease-fire, the mood inside the Préfecture was not so good. Claude Roy was in the building when the order to stop firing was given around 21:00: ‘Nobody understands. The order is given to cease fire. The men protest. An extraordinary and moving silence falls on the massive building where, throughout the day, the courtyards, the long corridors, the metal staircases have echoed to the noise of cannon fire, the crackling of automatic weapons fire and the harsh snapping of rifles and carbines.’106
*
That night there was yet another massive thunderstorm. Mixed in with the sound of thunder there was the dull noise of explosions as the Germans blew up the flour mills by the canal at Pantin, and an important part of the capital’s flour stock went up in flames. At around 03:00, Odette Lainville was suddenly woken by a terrible smell of burning. Convinced that her building was on fire, she eventually discovered that the electricity had come back on in the night, and that a pan of precious potatoes had boiled dry.107
Two Parisians at different ends of the age spectrum summarised the day’s events. Victor Veau, seventy-three-years old, wrote: ‘Not far off there is the sound of machine-gun fire. Revolution is in the air, dogs are barking, there is the sound of whistles blowing.’108 For 17-year-old Micheline Bood, the events promised a great future: ‘We don’t want to go at walking pace any more, we want to advance by leaps and bounds; there is electricity in the air – everything is going to explode!’109
9
Sunday 20 August: Cease-fire
Jean Galtier-Boissière writes in his diary: ‘The public seem to be giving marks to the performances of the résistants and applauding their exploits; they also show a mixture of passionate curiosity and an unbelievable lack of thought, interspersed with sudden bursts of fear. At first, passers-by seem naïvely to believe that they are in no danger because they are spectators and not actors; all it takes is for a bullet to whizz by or for a man to fall to the ground for them to realise the risks. Groups of people dissolve, hide in doorways or scatter. In the blink of an eye, the boulevard is empty. Five minutes later, propelled by the demon of curiosity, the passers-by come out again, to risk life and limb once more.’1
Léo Hamon stirred in the Préfecture office where he had grabbed a couple of hours’ sleep. It was 05:00 and he could just make out the pale form of Roland Pré, clad only in a pair of underpants, stretched out on the floor. The plan was to occupy the Hôtel de Ville at dawn, while the Germans were still obeying the cease-fire, so at 06:00 a small group of men left the Préfecture in the cold, quiet morning and gingerly walked the short distance across the Seine, the streets still damp from the night’s thunderstorm. One participant recalled the group ‘looked like gangsters’ but felt that was appropriate – they were involved in an insurrection, after all.2 They were led by Hamon and Pré and included Roger Stéphane, who had been wounded in the previous day’s fighting and had his arm in a sling. A few days earlier, Hamon’s verdict on Stéphane, written in the privacy of his diary, had been vicious: ‘an ambitious little queer . . . unbearable . . . a nasty little Jew’.3 Now they were working together, about to seize one of the most important buildings in the capital.
After some confusion – a number of doors in the Hôtel de Ville were locked and the group got lost in the labyrinth of corridors and stairways – they found their way into the offices of the Prefect of the Seine, Bouffet, where they were greeted by a number of civil servants, including Yves Cazaux. There was a long silence as Bouffet took his time coming from his official apartment. Hamon eventually ran out of patience, thumped his fist on the prefect’s desk and took possession of the building ‘in the name of the Comité Parisien de la Libération and the Provisional Government’. When Bouffet finally arrived, Hamon repeated his declaration.
Bouffet stared at him and asked: ‘Who are you?’
‘Hamon, member of the CPL,’ came the reply.
‘Your papers, please,’ said the Prefect.
‘We’ve got out of the habit of carrying papers,’ said Hamon.
Bouffet was then arrested and the Hôtel de Ville was in the hands of the Resistance.4 Shortly afterwards, Taittinger was summoned into the prefect’s office and Roger Stéphane arrested him. Stéphane made a powerful impression on the collaborator, as Taittinger subsequently recalled: ‘I have rarely seen such a disturbing and tormented physiognomy. The head expressed hatred, with its deep-set eyes, its slanting grin that was just the right shape for a cigarette butt, its swarthy complexion. As to the body, it was like a formless and unhealthy maggot. You felt that a well-placed punch would put paid to the Commander in Chief of the troops of the Hôtel de Ville . . .’5
Whatever Taittinger’s feelings, the Resistance was now in command of the building with probably the greatest political symbolism in the city, the building that five times had been the focus of major events – the great revolution of 1789–92, the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, the declaration of the Republic in 1870 and the Paris Commune of 1871. All of the popular images of revolutionary Paris, filtered through art, song and stories, had the Hôtel de Ville at their centre.6 Now it was at the heart of the Parisian insurrection of 1944.
*
Far off in the west, the German breakout from the rapidly closing Falaise pocket began at first light. It had been planned to take place the previous evening, but there were so many wrecked vehicles lying about that it was impossible to get through in the dark. In early morning fog, thousands of German troops and hundreds of armoured vehicles began to move eastwards.7 At around 07:00 the Allies unleashed a firestorm of artillery shells on th
e retreating columns. General Freiherr von Lüttwitz described the situation of his 2nd Panzer Division: ‘New pillars of fire arose incessantly into the sky from fuel tanks. Ammunition exploded, driver-less horses rushed about, some severely wounded. The crossing over the Dives bridge was particularly horrible. There, dead men, destroyed vehicles and other equipment were dumped into the Dives, forming a gruesome tangle.’8 It took most of the German troops at least five hours to reach safety; nearly 4000 men were killed and another 35,000 were wounded or captured in the process.9 Lieutenant-General Elfeldt commanded a shrinking group of men and tanks that tried to break through near Saint-Lambert-sur-Dives shortly after dawn. Leading from the front, with most of his men wounded, Elfeldt eventually had to acknowledge the overwhelming superiority of the Allies. He made the only sensible choice and surrendered: ‘I was compelled, literally after firing the last round, to abandon a struggle which had become senseless,’ he wrote.10
Visiting the scene a few days later, General Eisenhower was shocked by the scale of the devastation: ‘Roads, highways, and fields were so choked with destroyed equipment and with dead men and animals that passage through the area was extremely difficult . . . It was literally possible to walk for hundreds of yards at a time, stepping on nothing but dead and decaying flesh.’11 For the Americans, the day was marked by macabre glee, as artillerymen were faced with ‘a gunner’s dream’, firing over and over again into the German ranks.12 By evening, the Germans had evacuated up to 30,000 men and hundreds of armoured vehicles across the Dives river.13 However, virtually none of these forces represented intact fighting units. The structure of the Army had broken down, and those thousands of men were shattered, demoralised and exhausted.14 By refusing to allow his men to make an orderly retreat from a hopeless situation, Hitler had fatally weakened the very armies he was counting upon.15 These scattered forces now had to cross the Seine. That was going to prove difficult – the Allies had established a firm bridgehead at Mantes and were already moving men and machines across the river.16 It looked like the Germans’ best choice would be to head for Paris.
*
On opposite sides of the country, the two figureheads of wartime France were journeying in opposite directions. At 08:00, General Charles de Gaulle’s plane finally touched down on French soil, after a long journey from Algiers via Gibraltar. De Gaulle would not leave the country again before the whole of France was liberated.17 Before going on a celebratory visit to Cherbourg, de Gaulle went to see General Eisenhower at his field headquarters. De Gaulle pressed the Allied leader to explain why the Leclerc Division had not been sent towards Paris, as had been agreed before D-Day. Embarrassed, Eisenhower replied that the Allies were going to bypass Paris to avoid damage to the city and the threat of civilian deaths. De Gaulle pointed out that the insurrection had begun and that it was unacceptable to leave the Resistance to fight alone, to which Eisenhower replied that the insurrection had been launched ‘too early’. ‘Why is it too early?’ asked de Gaulle, ‘After all, you have crossed the Seine now.’ With Eisenhower vaguely promising that the Leclerc Division would be sent to Paris ‘soon’, de Gaulle took his leave, warning that he was prepared to order Leclerc to move on the capital if the Allies delayed much more.18
At the same time as de Gaulle landed in France, Marshal Pétain was being taken from Vichy by the SS. After days of argument, and faced with Pétain’s persistent refusal to leave, the Germans’ patience finally expired. The old man was removed by force from the Hôtel du Parc, having first been allowed to write a letter of protest to Hitler. In torrential rain, and to the sound of the ‘Marseillaise’ sung by a handful of hangers-on, a cavalcade of cars and motorcycle outriders headed east, taking Pétain first to Belfort and then to Germany. The poisonous masquerade of Vichy France was over.19
*
While these events were taking place, Colonel Rol discovered that a cease-fire had been negotiated behind his back. He immediately alerted COMAC, the military leadership of the Resistance, informing them that Chaban had ordered Colonel de Marguerittes (‘Lizé’) of the FFI to cease firing.20 Furious at Chaban’s interference in the line of command, Rol ordered the FFI to continue the insurrection and seize control of the city.21 While Rol was trying to pursue the fighting, an unofficial group composed of Roland Pré and Léo Hamon, accompanied by the socialist Ribière and the communist trade unionist Besse, was in Nordling’s office discussing how to prolong the cease-fire.22 Pré and Hamon were motivated by a mixture of genuine concern about the military position of the insurrection and a determination to keep control of events. Above all, they wanted to keep the city calm until the Allies arrived. The day before, Parodi had given Rol full control of all the Resistance forces in the Paris region, but now de Gaulle’s delegate did nothing to ensure that the FFI leader was involved in the cease-fire discussions, or was even told they were taking place. Parodi later claimed that everything was very hurried and that it was impossible to get hold of Rol; it seems far more likely that this was a deliberate move by the Gaullists to create a fait accompli.23
After less than an hour’s discussion, a declaration was agreed that was soon pasted onto walls and broadcast by loudspeaker cars, accompanied by German troops, uniformed policemen wearing FFI armbands, and FFI fighters:24 ‘The German command has promised not to attack the public buildings occupied by French patriots, and to treat prisoners according to the laws of war. As a result, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Conseil National de la Résistance and the Comité Parisien de la Libération call on you to stop firing on the Germans until the promised evacuation of Paris.’25 To sugar the pill, Nordling emphasised that the agreement did not prevent the Resistance from attacking German troops outside the city. What Nordling did not say was that the cease-fire would allow von Choltitz to consolidate his garrison, potentially reinforcing it with elements from the retreating German Army. Nor did Nordling explain when the ‘evacuation’ was supposed to take place, or under what terms. Amazingly, no one seems to have asked. Furthermore, no German officer was named in the agreement, which merely referred to ‘the German command’. The Resistance was being asked to take everything on trust.
Pré urged the other members of the group to accept the agreement there and then, but Hamon said that he did not have the authority, and that the cease-fire would have to be approved by the CPL and the CNR.26 In parallel, Nordling submitted the agreement to von Choltitz, who insisted on amending it slightly. He was concerned that Berlin might think that he had made some kind of deal with the Resistance, so ‘until the promised evacuation’ had to be replaced with ‘until the total evacuation’.27 These changes meant that the Resistance was effectively handing von Choltitz peace on the streets of Paris for an indefinite period. What they would gain in return was unclear. As US military historian Martin Blumenson has put it, the cease-fire agreement was ‘nebulous’.28
The CNR met at 09:00, and all the tensions that had run through the Resistance since D-Day, and even before, came to the surface in a dramatic confrontation.29 As there was not a quorum for a session of the full CNR, the meeting turned into a sitting of the CNR Bureau. However, even this was not strictly according to the rules, as only four members of the Bureau were present.30 To add to the confusion, another eight people were in the meeting, and they could speak although they did not have a vote. There were two ordinary members of the CNR as well as six observers: Parodi, Chaban and Pré for the Gaullist Delegation, Hamon for the CPL, and Tollet and General Dassault for the Front National.
The proceedings of the meeting were as confused as its composition. Wild claims were made: Chaban stated that three German divisions were about to pass through Paris and that 200 aeroplanes were ready to bombard the city (neither of these things were true), while Parodi declared that the agreement showed that von Choltitz accepted that the Resistance had liberated the city and CNR President Bidault said that it constituted a capitulation by the Germans (neither of these things were true, either).31 General Dassault
said he could see no problem with the cease-fire, because the FFI could easily harass the enemy outside Paris. He did not seem to appreciate the strategic importance for the Germans of keeping open the route through Paris as part of the retreat from the west.32 By agreeing to the cease-fire, the Resistance was guaranteeing passage through Paris of the very troops that Chaban said were threatening the city. They were also ignoring a central instruction that de Gaulle had issued eight days earlier: ‘Under all circumstances prevent the retreating enemy from withdrawing men and equipment.’33
Unsurprisingly, the two communists, Villon and Tollet, were profoundly hostile to the cease-fire, even though it had been negotiated with the naïve support of their comrade Besse. Villon predicted the agreement would undermine the morale of the FFI fighters, but his only alternative was to evacuate those buildings that were at risk of being overrun and then continue the street fighting. The result was inevitable: Villon voted against the cease-fire, while the three other CNR Bureau members voted in favour.34 For the first time in its history, and at its most crucial moment, the CNR had decided something by a vote – up until this point, all its decisions had been unanimous. Even more importantly, for the first time in its history the Resistance was openly split.
The consequences were immediate. Straight after the CNR meeting, General Dassault explained the situation to the FFI regional command and got a hostile response. All of the staff officers were against the cease-fire, arguing that the enemy’s willingness to stop fighting was a sign of weakness; they felt that this was the moment to press home the advantage.35 And so they simply ignored the decision of the CNR Bureau. While the loudspeaker cars were touring Paris announcing the cease-fire, Rol and Lizé plastered the walls of the city with a declaration in French and German proclaiming that no cease-fire had been agreed upon. This declaration also repeated Luizet’s statement to Nordling made the day before: the lives of German prisoners – including wounded men – would be forfeit if there were any further violence against the Parisian population.36