Impossible Victories

by Bryan Perrett

  Tel es Saba, however, proved to be a much tougher nut to crack. The feature was 400 yards long, 200 yards deep and rose to a flat summit approximately 1,000 feet high, being protected on the side flanking the Wadi es Saba by almost vertical slopes. The more gradual approaches to the summit were covered by at least two tiers of trenches incorporating carefully concealed machine gun positions.

  At 09:00, concurrently with the 2nd Light Horse Brigade’s attack on Tel es Sakaty, the New Zealand Brigade (Auckland, Canterbury and Wellington Mounted Rifles), covered by the guns of the Somerset Battery RHA firing at 3,000 yards, was using winding wadi beds and dead ground to envelop Tel es Saba from the north and east. Its advance brought it to within 800 yards of the objective. At this point the sheer volume of rifle and machine gun fire compelled the men to dismount and, leaving their horses in good cover, they continued working their way forward on foot. Progress was slow, largely because, for a while, it proved impossible to locate the enemy machine guns and signal their whereabouts to the supporting artillery. By 11:00 the divisional commander, Major-General Sir Edward Chaytor, had become sufficiently concerned to commit first the 3rd (South Australia and Tasmania) Light Horse, followed by the 2nd (Queensland) Light Horse and the Inverness Battery RHA from his reserve brigade, in support of the New Zealanders. At about 13:30 Chauvel, worried by the delay, ordered Major-General Sir Henry Hodgson, commanding the Australian Mounted Division, to make his 3rd Light Horse Brigade available. In the event it was not used although its approach may well have contributed to the ultimate collapse of Turkish resolve. By now the converging attacks by the Australians and New Zealanders were beginning to eat into the defences. The location of the enemy’s machine gun posts had also been spotted and they were being shelled by the two RHA batteries, which had closed the range to within 1,500 and 2,500 yards. At about 15:00 the summit was finally cleared in a series of rushes and the last of the Turkish defenders were fleeing in the direction of Beersheba.

  There then took place one of the most incredible episodes in the entire history of mounted cavalry. Chauvel had watched the battle from the summit of a hill near Khashin Zanna, which gave him a panoramic view of the whole area around Beersheba. The capture of the vital tels and the fact that two of his light horse brigades were now trotting north to complete the isolation of the Beersheba garrison all gave grounds for satisfaction, but he had received specific instructions from Allenby that the town and its wells had to be captured by nightfall and he was deeply worried that only one or two hours of daylight remained. He had, however, spotted a route directly into the town from the south-east, and although air reconnaissance photographs revealed that the way was barred by two lines of trenches, these had not been fronted with barbed wire. Even so, the idea of pitting cavalry against unbroken infantry in trenches when the latter had the support of artillery and machine guns ran contrary to all his professional instincts. Nevertheless, it was now apparent that the town could only be secured in the time available by a full-blooded mounted charge.

  With him were Hodgson, Brigadier-General William Grant, commanding 4th Light Horse Brigade, and Brigadier-General Gerald Fitzgerald, commanding the 5th Mounted Brigade, the latter a yeomanry formation which was equipped with swords and therefore better suited to the work in hand. It was for this reason that when Chauvel pointed out exactly what was required Fitzgerald requested that his men be given the task. Chauvel had always sought to remain even handed between his Australians and the yeomanry, but after a moment’s thought he indicated the gap and ordered Hodgson to ‘Put Grant straight at it!’ Given that time at this juncture was a priceless commodity, the decision was tactically correct since Grant’s brigade was much closer to Beersheba than Fitzgerald’s; later, Chauvel was to comment that he had also been influenced by the wish to give Grant’s regiments a chance, as they had seen very little serious fighting thus far. He also gave Hodgson instructions that when Fitzgerald’s brigade arrived, it was to follow up Grant’s charge without delay, as was the independent 7th Mounted Brigade when it came up.

  Grant’s three regiments, the 4th (Victoria), 11th (Queensland and Western Australia) and 12th (New South Wales) Light Horse, received their orders between 16:00 and 16:15 and took a little time to assemble. The 11th, in fact, were manning an outpost line to the south-west and, it being immediately apparent that it could not rejoin the brigade in time, it was ordered to follow on as quickly as possible. Because of increased enemy air activity during the day the 4th and the 12th, commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Colonels the Honourable Murray Bourchier and Donald Cameron, had been dispersed by troops to reduce possible casualties. While they were being collected by the regimental seconds-in-command, Grant, his brigade major and the two commanding officers rode forward to reconnoitre a concealed route that would bring the brigade to the point from which it would launch its charge.

  At length both regiments were assembled behind a low ridge crossed by a track leading straight into Beersheba from the south-east. About four miles separated them from the town itself, but only one-and-a-half from the forward Turkish trenches. The 4th shook out to the right of the track and the 12th to the left, each regiment being deployed in column of squadrons with 300 yards between squadrons and four yards between each man. Accompanying each regiment was one sub-section of the brigade machine gun squadron, the rest of which had been detailed to cover the left flank from which, correctly, it had been anticipated that some interference with the charge would come from a feature designated Hill 1180. In position to support the attack from a range of 2,500 yards were A Battery The Honourable Artillery Company and the Nottinghamshire Battery RHA. Positioning himself on the track, Grant gave the order for bayonets to be drawn; these were useless weapons with which to fight from the saddle but, being much longer than those in use today, they would give an enemy the impression of a cavalry sword if held forward along the horse’s neck.

  The signal to advance was given and the brigade breasted the shallow ridgeline to find a long, gentle forward slope stretching away towards the Turkish trenches with Beersheba clearly visible in the distance. At that moment the four loneliest men in the world must have been the two ground scouts riding 75 yards ahead of each regiment. In country such as this, where an unsuspected steep-sided wadi could wreck a charge, their presence was essential to provide adequate warning, but few would care to offer odds on their chances of survival. At first the 4th were a little in advance of the 12th and Bourchier held their pace down to a trot until the latter’s squadrons came up and aligned themselves. Then, for about a quarter of a mile the entire brigade maintained a steady canter until breaking into a thunderous gallop that would take it all the way to the enemy trenches and beyond. As the pace increased Grant dropped back through the ranks and finally positioned himself near the two artillery batteries where he could control subsequent events. By now, the 11th had come up and were forming a reserve line. Beyond them, a moving dust cloud indicated the approach of Fitzgerald’s 5th Mounted Brigade while to the southwest the 7th Mounted Brigade could be seen coming up at a canter.

  The charge of Grant’s brigade was witnessed by Trooper Ion Idriess of the 5th (Queensland) Light Horse, who, in his vividly descriptive style, recorded his impressions in his book The Desert Column.

  ‘There, out on the plains, came squadron after squadron, regiment after regiment, all trotting forward in clouds of dust. Guns opened up on them, but they kept moving, the thousands of flying hooves stuttering thunder, going at a rate that frightened a man; an awe-inspiring sight, galloping through the red haze – knee to knee and horse-to-horse – the dying sun glinting on their bayonet points. Machine gun and rifle fire rattled but the 4th Brigade galloped on. We saw shellbursts among them and horses crashed, but the massed squadrons thundered on. We laughed in delight when the shells burst behind them, telling that the gunners couldn’t keep the range, and suddenly men ceased to fall and we knew the Turks, wild with fear and excitement, had forgotten to lower their rifle sights. The last hal
f-mile was a berserk gallop with squadrons in magnificent line, the horses leaping the trenches, the Turkish bayonets thrusting up. One regiment leapt from the saddle and into them; the following regiment galloped on, over another redoubt, and in a roar of cheers and thundering hooves, down the half-mile slope and into the town. Then a mad rush as other troops followed in the gathering dark, mad, mad excitement – terrific explosions in the town – Beersheba had fallen!’

  Idriess’ description is unlikely to be bettered, yet not even his acute powers of observation could absorb all that was happening. Hill 1180 was indeed held by the enemy, who opened a heavy machine gun fire on the left flank of the 12th Regiment. The brigade machine gun squadron went into action at once but when it failed to silence this Grant galloped across to the Nottinghamshire Battery and ordered it to engage the trenches on the feature. As the failing light made it impossible to obtain a reading from the rangefinder, Major Harrison, the battery commander, estimated the range and hit the target with his second shell. The entire battery then opened fire, driving the Turks off the feature.

  The first of the trenches covering Beersheba was found to be shallow, incomplete and held by only a handful of riflemen. The brigade sailed across this and quickly reached the main trench, which was eight to ten feet deep, four feet wide and held in strength. Having jumped the trench, the leading squadrons dismounted and waded into the enemy with their bayonets. It was in this vicious hand-to-hand fighting that the brigade incurred most of its casualties. After between 30 and 40 of the Turks had been killed the rest threw down their weapons; a few who snatched them up again to shoot unwary Australians were given short shrift. Examination of the prisoners’ weapons revealed that their rifle sights had not been lowered from 800 yards and that similar incorrect ranges were set on their automatic weapons and field guns.

  While the deadly struggle was taking place below ground the remaining squadrons, living walls of men and horses travelling at break-neck speed, had jumped the trench and were galloping on into Beersheba. Here took place personal adventures too numerous to detail. Trooper T. O’Leary, one of the 4th’s ground scouts, successfully jumped both trench lines and was probably the first man to reach the town. There he came across a field gun team, limbered up and ready to withdraw, so intimidating the crew that they willingly drove it into a side street and waited patiently with him until the rest of his regiment arrived. Another gun, being brought out of action by a German officer, was captured by Trooper S. Bolton. Having lost his rifle but acquired a revolver, Bolton galloped after the gun, repeatedly firing at but missing the officer. Catching up with the German, he coshed him with the butt, after which the six-man Turkish gun crew meekly gave in.

  As more and more troops streamed through the broken defences, the Turks in Beersheba fled in complete rout. Caught up in this were the engineers responsible for the destruction of the vital wells, who were only able to destroy two and damage two more. Darkness undoubtedly saved many from capture, but over 1,500 prisoners and fourteen guns were taken by the Desert Mounted Corps as a whole; Grant’s 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade alone captured 59 officers and 1,090 other ranks, nine guns, seven ammunition limbers and four machine guns, plus uncounted transport vehicles, pack animals, stores and equipment. The Desert Mounted Corps’ casualties, many of which stemmed from the enemy’s increased air activity, came to 197 of whom 53 were killed; Grant’s amazingly light loss of 32 killed and the same number wounded can be attributed in part to the Turks’ failure to adjust their fire and partly to the sheer speed and aggression with which the charge had been delivered. The charge itself had lasted just ten minutes from start to finish and won its participants one Victoria Cross, six Distinguished Service Orders, four Military Crosses, four Distinguished Conduct Medals and eleven Military Medals.

  The Turkish 27th Division had been all but wiped out. Subsequently, senior Turkish officers sought to explain their defeat by claiming that this formation, containing as it did a large Arab element, was one of the worst in their service and had fought badly. That was not the opinion of their corps commander, Ismet Bey, nor of those who has been forced to fight so hard for Tel es Saba, and in any event the regiment that had opposed Grant’s charge consisted of good quality Anatolian troops with some German officers. Ismet was also criticised for his handling of the battle, despite the fact that throughout the day he had given repeated warnings of the build-up and vainly requested immediate reinforcements. In the event, he made his escape from the doomed town just ten minutes before the Australians entered it.

  Falkenhayn did not reach his new headquarters in Jerusalem until 1 November. While still believing that Gaza was Allenby’s real objective, his Turco-German staff had reacted strongly to the loss of Beersheba and moved two divisions, plus elements of two more, to the eastern flank with the object of recapturing the town. This never came to anything as Chauvel had already pushed troops some miles to the north and, while it meant that some of the horses went without water for 48 hours, no difficulty was experienced in holding the counter-attack. One reason for this was that he had also despatched Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart Newton, Royal Engineers, and 70 camel-mounted troopers on a wide detour deep into the Turkish rear areas with instructions to raise the local Arabs and create the impression that the Desert Mounted Corps was about to launch a cavalry raid along the axis Hebron-Jerusalem. Having brought down no less than six infantry battalions upon itself, and in the process taken the edge off the Turkish counter-attack, Newton’s detachment was surrounded and forced to surrender on 2 November.

  At 23:00 the previous night Allenby had further concentrated Falkenhayn’s thoughts on Gaza by initiating the first phase of his diversionary attack there, on a 6,000 yard front close to the coast. Early next morning the second phase, which included the support of six tanks used in the correct manner, broke through the defences to a depth of 3,000 yards, effectively turning the flank of numerous laboriously prepared positions in the town and on the nearby ridges. XXI Corps sustained the loss of 350 killed, the same number missing and 2,000 wounded; Turkish losses amounted to 1,000 killed, an unknown number wounded, 550 prisoners, three guns and 30 machine guns. While Allenby decided to reinforce this success, Falkenhayn contributed to his own eventual defeat by rushing his reserves to the Gaza sector.

  The great north-westerly wheel by XX Corps and the Desert Mounted Corps was delayed by the heavy fighting north of Beersheba, the difficulties involved in collecting sufficient water, and a strong ‘khamseen’ blowing off the desert. On 6 November, however, it began, steadily rolling up the Turkish line from east to west. Falkenhayn, suddenly aware of the terrible danger in which his armies stood, ordered Gaza to be abandoned during the night while elsewhere along the line the darkness was illuminated by burning Turkish supply dumps. On 7 November XX Corps captured Sheria and Hareira. There were now clear indications that Kressenstein’s Eighth Army was retreating in a northerly direction along the coast, while Fawzi Pasha’s Seventh Army was diverging along a north-easterly axis, thereby opening a gap in the Turkish centre. Through this Allenby decided to launch his mounted troops against Huj, where an adequate water supply was known to exist.

  Throughout the morning of 8 November Major-General Stuart Shea’s 60th Division, now operating under Chauvel’s command, steadily pushed the Turkish rearguard back towards Huj over open, rolling country. Shea himself, scouting ahead in a Rolls-Royce armoured car, could see enemy infantry and guns moving north-eastwards across his front. Anxious to prevent their escape, he hurried his division forward but at about 12:45 the Turkish rearguard, consisting of two infantry battalions, several artillery batteries and a machine gun unit, decided to make a stand about two miles south of Huj, which contained a large supply depot. The British infantry, advancing across ground that provided no cover at all, began to incur heavy casualties. Shea, knowing that two cavalry brigades were operating on his right, drove across with the intention of getting them to mount an attack into the flank of the enemy position.

/>   The two brigades were Fitzgerald’s 5th Mounted Brigade, of which, ironically, Fitzgerald had handed over command to Brigadier-General Philip Kelly that very morning, and the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade, which was still some distance away to the south-east.

  Nominally, the 5th Mounted Brigade consisted of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, the Warwickshire Yeomanry, the Worcestershire Hussars, B Battery the Honourable Artillery Company and the brigade machine gun squadron. Unfortunately, at that precise moment the Gloucesters and all but two guns of the machine gun squadron were watering their horses some miles away, and the artillery battery had fallen far behind the advance. Thus, only the Warwicks and Worcesters were in a position to take decisive action.

  The opportunity sensed by Shea had also been spotted by the Worcesters’ commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Williams, who, recognising how thin on the ground his own brigade was, galloped off to find the headquarters of the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade with a view to suggesting a joint attack, adequately supported by rifle and machine gun fire.

  Shortly after Williams had left, Shea arrived in his armoured car. He spoke to Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Gray-Cheape, commanding the Warwicks, and ordered him to mount a flank attack on the enemy guns, stressing the urgency of the situation. Having few men at his disposal, Gray-Cheape rode over to the Worcesters and asked Major Edgar Wiggin, in temporary command during Williams’ absence, whether he would participate in the attack, receiving an immediate assent.