Death to Tyrants!
Page 14
47 Knoepfler (2001b: 218) also suggests that this provision was intended to prevent individuals from meeting with exiles. As an additional possibility, he suggests that it could have been intended to prevent individuals from fleeing the city in the event of a coup.
48 For comments on the Eretrian council and prytaneia, see Knoepfler (2002: 157–61). The council likely had either 240 or 300 members (i.e., either 40 or 50 from each of the six tribes). The prytaneia likely performed a function similar to the prytaneis in Athens (i.e., preside over the council).
49 Based on these provisions, one can reconstruct (speculatively) the steps of a coup feared by the Eretrian democrats. First, conspirators travel abroad to coordinate a plan (with Philip, his representatives, or exiles). Second, the conspirators return and use the power of their office to implement the plan. Third, in a meeting of the assembly they successfully move that the Eretrians change their regime. Fourth, they call in foreign troops (who are waiting) and use their own partisans to protect the new “legal” regime. Compare this speculation with the conspiracy headed by Perillos and Ptoiodoros in Megara (Dem. 19.295).
50 It should be noted that line 17 contains the law’s only extant asyndeton (ἐάν τις). Knoepfler (2001b: 214–15) argues that that asyndeton marks the beginning of the law’s second part: the first part of the law focused on protection of the democratic regime; the second part focused on the means to reestablish a democratic regime after a coup.
51 For φέρειν to mean “vote,” see Xen. Hell. 2.4.9 (φέρειν τὴν ψῆφον).
52 It is interesting to compare this provision with a mid-fifth-century law from Erythrai (I. Erythrai 2c). The law from Erythrai lists punishments for any individual who “does not come when the prytaneis issue a public order” (ὃς ἂμ μὴ ἔλθηι ἐπ[α]νγγελάντων τῶν πρυτάνεων) (lines 11–15). As the editors note (pp. 31–32), the law quite likely refers to situations where the polis is threatened. What happens, however, if the prytaneis are unable to issue an order? The provision in the Eretrian tyrant-killing law addresses that possibility: Eretrians are to fight even without having received orders from officials.
53 Knoepfler (2002: 176–77). He cites as precedent: Hdt. 1.150 (eighth-century Smyrna) and Aen. Tact. 17.1–4 (Argos in 417).
54 Resistance movement against Ploutarchos: Schol. Dem. 5.5. Resistance movement against Kleitarchos: Dem. 9.57–58.
55 This date is suggested by Knoepfler (2004: 409–11). In his editio princeps for the Eretrian tyrant-killing law (2001b: 207), however, Knoepfler suggests that RO 73 was promulgated up to six years after the anti-tyranny law. In RO, the inscription is dated circa 340.
56 It is also worth pointing out as potential evidence in support of this section’s argument that the Eretrians likely fought against Macedon at Chaironeia. The only evidence for their possible participation is found in a passage in Demosthenes (18.237) wherein the orator boasts about the success he had in making alliances with many powers that fought at Chaironeia. Included among those powers are “the Euboians.” Sealey (1993: 197–98) suggests that the Euboian contingent at Chaironeia might have been considerable because of the Athenian liberation of Eretria and Oreos and subsequent formation of the Euboian League. That is certainly plausible; but the size—or even existence—of the Eretrian contingent is unknowable. It is certainly reasonable to assume, however, that the Eretrians did fight against Philip at Chaironeia. Thus the situation was quite different than it was a couple of years earlier when Eretria was, according to Demosthenes (18.71), Philip’s “base of operations from which to attack Attica.”
57 There are perhaps four inscriptions that both date to the reign of Alexander and demonstrate that the dēmos controlled Eretria. The first inscription is Knoepfler’s Décrets érétriens no. 1: a decree, dated circa 335, honoring a man [Krates?] from Sikyon. Although the enactment formula reads “it seems best to the ekklesia” and [Krates] is praised for being a good man to the polis (i.e., not the dēmos) of Eretria (lines 5–7), the decree was proposed by Exekestos the son of Diodoros, a prominent democrat (he proposed, for example, the aforementioned lex sacra [RO 73]). The second inscription is IG XII, 9, 197: a decree of the dēmos, dated circa 323, honoring two of Alexander’s men, who might have assisted Eretria during the Lamian war (Eretria did not join the Athenians in that war). For that inscription, see Knoepfler (2001a: 170–74). The third inscription is IG XII, 9, 222: a decree of the dēmos, dated 335–330, honoring Philoxenos, a high-ranking official for Alexander. For that inscription, see Knoepfler (2001a: 97–104). And the fourth possible inscription is the lex sacra (RO 73) discussed above. It could date to as late as 334.
58 Such a scenario would entail four steps: (1) an anti-democratic coup after Chaironeia; (2) the sanctioning of the new non-democratic regime by Philip and the Korinthian League (see the introduction to chapter 3); (3) a successful counter-coup by pro-democrats almost immediately after the death of Philip; (4) Alexander sanctioning that new democratic regime. This is possible, but by no means probable: one might expect some indication in the sources of such events; one might suspect that Alexander would not sanction a regime on the Greek mainland whose members overthrew a regime recently sanctioned by his father.
59 Solid evidence exists for coups in Akarnania (Diod. Sic. 17.3; RO 77) and Troizen (Hyp. Athenogenes 29–36). The later coup is rather fascinating. Immediately after Chaironeia, the Athenians requested assistance from Troizen (Lykourg. Leok. 42). But Athenogenes, who had just fled Athens, and Mnesias of Argos staged an anti-democratic coup before the city could send aid. The exiled Troizenians fled to Athens and were granted citizenship. On Philip’s postvictory arrangements, see Roebuck (1948). He suggests that pro-Macedonians also staged coups in Megara and the islands of Korkyra, Leukas, and Kephallenia. Philip directly intervened in Thebes: he established a garrison (Diod. Sic. 16.87.3) and formed a council of 300 from returned exiles (Justin 9.4.6–10). Philip also placed a garrison in Ambrakia (Diod. Sic. 17.3) and, perhaps, in Korinth.
60 Note that one cannot attribute Eretria’s stability to the Athenian invasion alone: they invaded Eretria before (e.g., 357), and the democracy in that city subsequently failed. Something else was at work after the Athenian invasion of 341: the tyrant-killing law. Note, however, that Dössel (2007) has argued that the Eretrian tyrant-killing law is actually a composite text, containing three separate laws: the first (and oldest) is contained in the old fragment; the second (and second oldest) began sometime before the extant lines of the new fragment and concluded in line 17 of the new fragment, just after the curse; the third begins with the asyndeton in line 17 and continues to the end of the new fragment. Her arguments are cogent, and her conclusion should be taken seriously. But I still conclude that the stele recorded a single law, one that established a well-thought-out “defense in depth” (supra) strategy to defend the democracy.
61 Key to Philip’s economic strength was control of the Krenidean mining communities (later renamed Philippoi) in 356. See Ellis (1976: 68–70) and Worthington (2008: 45–47). The mines produced 1,000 talents per annum.
62 See [Dem.] 10.4 for a clear articulation of that fear: “Philip’s faction, those who hanker after tyrannies and oligarchies have everywhere gained supremacy, and I doubt whether of all the states there is any stable democracy (πόλις δημοκρατουμένη βεβαίως) left except our own.”
3
The Law of Eukrates
Introduction
In early August 338, Philip II defeated an Athenian-led coalition in the battle of Chaironeia. The Athenians and their allies—the most important of whom were the Thebans—could not have expected a better chance for victory. They had, first of all, a large number of infantry and cavalry: as many, if not more, than Philip’s 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Second, their position, a lone line stretching across the river plain, was strong, superior to Philip’s: they could both prevent Philip’s forces from marching southward down the valley a
nd, since they held the important Kerata pass, conduct a safe retreat if needed. But they lost badly. Of the 6,000 Athenian participants, 1,000 died and 2,000 were taken prisoner. The allies fared no better. The Athenians and their allies were simply no match for the well-drilled, well-armed, and well-led Macedonian phalanx. And with there being no plausible hope of fighting Philip under more favorable circumstances, the significance of the battle was clear: Philip was indisputably the master of the Greek mainland.1
Philip was conspicuously lenient to the defeated Athenians. It is true that he forced them to join the Korinthian League—an institution by means of which he maintained his control of the conquered Greek poleis.2 And it is also true that he forced them to disband their (at that time anemic) naval confederacy. But, on the other hand, he returned the ashes of their dead soldiers with dignity (sending Alexander and Antipater as escorts); he returned their captured soldiers without ransom (indeed, he gave them new clothing); he allowed the Athenians to maintain control of the important islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Skyros, and Samos; and, most importantly, he did not make any overt move (or support any such move) to dissolve their democracy.3
Nevertheless, in the spring (or summer) of 336 an Athenian named Eukrates successfully proposed a law against tyranny and subversion of the Athenian democracy. A nearly perfectly preserved stone stele engraved with that law was found in Athens in May of 1952. Its vivid articulation (both pictorially and verbally) of Athenian democratic ideology has made it one of the most famous inscriptions from classical Athens.4
ΣΤΟΙΧ. 36
ἐπὶ Φρυνίχου ἄρχοντος· ἐπὶ τῆς Λεωντίδος ἐν-
άτης πρυτανείας· ἧι Χαιρέστρατος Ἀμεινίου
Ἀχαρνεὺς ἐγραμμάτευεν· τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψή-
φιζεν Μενέστρατος Αἰξωνεύς. Εὐκράτης Ἀρισ-
5
τοτίμου Πειραιεὺς εἶπεν· ἀγαθῆι τύχηι τοῦ δ-
ήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων, δεδόχθαι τοῖς νομοθέται-
ς· ἐάν τις ἐπαναστῆι τῶι δήμωι ἐπὶ τυραννίδι
ἢ τὴν τυραννίδα συνκαταστήσηι ἢ τὸν δῆμον τ-
ὸν Ἀθηναίων ἢ τὴν δημοκρατίαν τὴν Ἀθήνησιν
10
καταλύσηι, ὃς ἂν τὸν τούτων τι ποιήσαντα ἀπο-
κ〈τ〉είνηι ὅσιος ἔστω. μὴ ἐξεῖναι δὲ τῶν βουλευ-
τῶν τῶν τῆς Βουλῆς τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου Πάγου καταλ-
ελυμένου τοῦ δήμου ἢ τῆς δημοκρατίας τῆς Ἀθ-
ήνησιν ἀνιέναι εἰς Ἄρείον Πάγον μηδὲ συνκα-
15
θίζειν ἐν τῶι συνεδρίωι μηδὲ βουλεύειν μη-
δὲ περὶ ἑνός· ἐὰν δέ τις τοῦ δήμου ἢ τῆς δημοκρ-
ατίας καταλελυμένων τῶν Ἀθήνησιν ἀνίηι τῶ-
ν βουλευτῶν τῶν ἐξ Ἀρείου Πάγου εἰς Ἄρειον Π-
άγον ἢ συνκαθίζηι ἐν τῶι συνεδρίωι ἢ βολεύη-
20
ι περί τινος, ἄτιμος ἔστω καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ γένος
τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἡ οὐσία δημοσία ἔστω αὐτοῦ
καὶ τῆς θεοῦ τὸ ἐπιδέκατον. ἀναγράψαι δὲ τόν-
δε τὸν νόμον ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις δυοῖν τὸν γ-
ραμματέα τῆς βουλῆς καὶ στῆσαι τὴμ μὲν ἐπὶ τ-
25
ῆς εἰσόδου τῆς εἰς Ἄρειον Πάγον τῆς εἰς τὸ βο-
υλευτήριον εἰσιόντι, τὴν δὲ ἐν τῆι ἐκκλησία-
ι. εἰς δὲ τὴν ἀναγραφὴν τῶν στηλῶν τὸν ταμίαν
δοῦναι τοῦ δήμου : ΔΔ : δραχμὰς ἐκ τῶν κατὰ ψη-
φίσματα ἀναλισκομένων τῶι δήμωι. vacat
In the archonship of Phrynichos; in the ninth prytany of Leontis; to which Chairestratos son of Ameinias of Acharnai was secretary; of the proedroi Menestratos of Aixone was putting to the vote. Eukrates son of Aristotimos of Piraeus proposed: For the good fortune of the dēmos of Athens, be it resolved by the nomothetai: If any one rises up against the dēmos for a tyranny or joins in setting up the tyranny or overthrows the dēmos of Athens or the democracy at Athens, whoever kills the man who has done any of these things shall be undefiled. And it shall not be permitted to any of the councilors of the council of the Areopagos, if the dēmos or the democracy at Athens is overthrown, to go up to the Areopagos or to sit together in the meeting or to deliberate about anything at all; and if—when the dēmos or the democracy at Athens has been overthrown—any of the councilors of the Areopagos does go up to the Areopagos or sit together in the meeting or deliberate about anything, he shall be without rights, both himself and his descendants, and his property shall be made public and the tithe given to the Goddess. This law shall be written up on two stone stelai by the secretary of the council, and placed one at the entrance to the Areopagos as you enter the council-house and the other in the assembly; for the writing-up of the stelai the treasurer of the dēmos shall give 20 drachmas from the dēmos’s fund for expenditure on decrees.5
Two peculiar aspects of Eukrates’s law are noticeable more or less immediately. The first such aspect is the date of its promulgation: the ninth prytany in the archonship of Phrynichos (spring/summer 336). It would make sense, for example, if the Athenians promulgated a tyrant-killing law during the run-up to the battle of Chaironeia: at that time, Philip was subverting democracies and installing “tyrants” in various poleis; and Demosthenes repeatedly warned his fellow citizens that some Athenians were Philip’s agents and actively working to overthrow their own democracy.6 It also would be understandable if the Athenians promulgated a tyrant-killing law immediately after the battle of Chaironeia. Those were chaotic and desperate times. And it would have been reasonable for Athenian democrats to fear that pro-Macedonians would take advantage of the uncertainty and, perhaps in coordination with outside forces, orchestrate a coup d’état.7 Eukrates, however, did not propose his law in one of those two periods. Instead, he made his legislative proposal nearly two years (twenty-two months) after the battle of Chaironeia, by which time it must have been clear that Philip’s celebrated postvictory leniency was genuine.8
The second peculiar aspect of Eukrates’s tyrant-killing law is its focus on the council of the Areopagos.9 If the Athenian democracy is overthrown, the Areopagites are forbidden from ascending the hill of Ares, sitting in session, and deliberating about anything whatsoever. And if an Areopagite did engage in such activities, both he and his offspring (genos) would be declared atimos (i.e., without political rights or privileges).10 One should compare those provisions with the decree of Demophantos, the clear model for Eukrates’s law.11 The earlier decree does not focus on a particular political institution. Instead, it prohibits all magistrates from serving during a coup; and should a magistrate act contrarily, he is declared a polemios (enemy), his assassination is encouraged, and his property is to be confiscated.
This chapter has two related objectives, each of which addresses (inter alia) one of the two aforementioned peculiar aspects of Eukrates’s tyrant-killing law. The first objective is to identify the tyrannical threat that the Athenians faced in the spring of 336. As we will see, the nature of the threat largely accounts for the fact that Eukrates proposed his law later than one might have expected. This chapter’s second objective is to explain how the p
romulgation of Eukrates’s law would neutralize the tyrannical threat that confronted the Athenians. As would be expected, the law’s sharp focus on the council of the Areopagos played an important role. But so too did the process by which Eukrates’s law was ratified and the placement of the two stelai upon which it was inscribed.
The Tyrannical Threat
In order to identify the tyrannical threat facing the Athenians in 336, it is first necessary to appreciate this fundamental, strategic fact: in the years immediately following the battle of Chaironeia, Athenian security was, to a large extent, in Macedonian hands. It is true that Philip could not easily conquer the city of Athens: it was well fortified and the Athenians still had a large navy. But Philip had the most powerful army in the Greek world and was a master at siege warfare; and it is almost certain that other poleis would not have come to Athens’s defense. In any event, Philip was in a position to cause the Athenians great harm. The Athenians were in no real position to cause Philip such harm.