Book Read Free

Death to Tyrants!

Page 24

by Teegarden, David


  Engelmann and Merkelbach offered an interpretation of the oligarchs’ treatment of the statue that is based on their translation of the phrase (lines 5–6) “νομίζοντες καθόλου τὴν στάσιν | καθ᾿ αὑτῶν εἶναι.” They translate that phrase as follows: “weil sie meinten, der Zwist sei jedenfalls zu ihrem Vorteil.” Engelmann and Merkelbach thus supposed that the oligarchs removed the sword in order to provoke conflict (stasis) between their domestic opponents. Democrats, that is, would attack supporters of tyranny in the belief that they had vandalized the statue of the democratic hero. And members of the tyrannical faction would retaliate. Members of the oligarchic faction might then take advantage of the chaos and seize control of the polis. Thus the conflict (stasis) would be to their benefit (καθ᾿ αὑτῶν).

  Engelmann and Merkelbach’s explanation for the oligarch’s treatment of the statue is not persuasive. To begin with, the preposition κατά (καθ᾿ in the inscription) plus a noun in the genitive case (here, the αὑτῶν) almost always means “against”—not “for the benefit of.”14 Second, the noun stasis (which they translate as “Zwist”), when used in reference to a statue, almost certainly means placement, erection, or stance; and one should note in this regard that the verb ἵστημι (from which the noun stasis is derived) was regularly used—including in Erythrai—in the phrase “to set up a statue.”15 Thus the phrase νομίζοντες καθόλου τὴν στάσιν καθ᾿ αὑτῶν εἶναι should be translated “thinking that the placement [of the statue] is entirely against them.” Engelmann and Merkelbach’s theory thus collapses.

  Josiah Ober’s interpretation of the oligarchs’ manipulation of the statue is predicated on the fact that democrats tended to consider any nondemocratic regime to be a “tyranny.”16 Thus Ober suggests that the Erythraian oligarchs removed the sword but allowed the statue to stand as part of a well-intended attempt to challenge that overly simplified and potentially dangerous bipolar political taxonomy. On the one hand, oligarchs, according to this explanation, agreed with the democrats that tyranny is harmful to the polis: thus they allowed the statue of the tyrant killer to stand. Yet, on the other hand, they asserted that (moderate) oligarchy is not tyranny and is, in fact, beneficial for the polis: thus they took out Philites’s sword aimed entirely “against them” (i.e., against oligarchs and thus oligarchy). The oligarchs’ treatment of the statue would thus be an appeal to the political center in order to end conflict by marginalizing, and thus rendering impotent, all extremists, tyrannical and democratic.

  Ober’s explanation is quite interesting but not entirely convincing. The first weakness is that it is not in sympathy with the basic dynamic of a standard stasis situation in a Greek polis. Generally speaking, one would expect to find the two opposing sides locked in a zero-sum game for control of the polis: thus the losers are killed or exiled by the victor. Such behavior in a stasis situation was on display in chapters 1 (Athens), 2 (Eretria), and 4 (Eresos); and—importantly—the citizens of Erythrai certainly had experience of such behavior.17 It is perhaps best to assume, then, without evidence to the contrary, that significant political actions in a stasis situation are motivated by a desire to dominate, not a desire to reconcile or compromise.18 The second weakness in Ober’s interpretation is that it is too complicated. The simplest—and one would think most probable—interpretation is that the oligarchs were straightforwardly insulting Philites and, by extension, the democrats. That interpretation would avoid the rather sophisticated interpretive move whereby the sword’s symbolic significance is separated from the symbolic significance of the rest of the statue. And one might also note that if the manipulation of the statue were not meant to insult moderate democrats, the oligarchs presumably would not have neglected the statue and allowed it to gather verdigris.

  Philippe Gauthier has offered an interpretation of the oligarchs’ manipulation that is based, in large part, on information provided in the Ilian tyrant-killing law and Lykourgos’s speech Against Leokrates.19 The Ilion law explicitly encourages individuals to kill tyrants or leaders of an oligarchy (19–24); oligarchs and tyrants, that is, were conceptually equivalent. In Lykourgos’s speech, the orator claims (51) that, whereas the Athenians erect statues of tyrant killers and victorious generals in the agora, the citizens of other states erect statues of athletes. Based on those two texts, Gauthier suggests that, upon taking control of the polis, the oligarchs were concerned about the fact that a statue glorifying and encouraging the assassination of nondemocratic leaders stood prominently in the agora. They would have liked to destroy the statue, but concluded that doing so would provoke a democratic uprising. Thus they formulated a subtler, long-term plan. In the dead of night, they took out the sword, thereby transforming the portrait (εἰκών) of Philites the tyrannicide into a generic statue (ἀνδριάς) of an athlete.20 Over time, the oligarchs hoped, the people of Erythrai would forget about the political significance of the statue and thereby evacuate the statue of its “power.”

  Gauthier’s interpretation is, in its details, not entirely convincing. Perhaps the biggest weakness is that it simply would be too difficult to “reinvent” the statue. The statue of Philites, like the statues Harmodios and Aristogeiton in Athens, was clearly very well known to all democrats. Thus they would quickly notice such a large-scale alteration and respond accordingly. Another weakness in Gauthier’s interpretation is that the oligarchs were almost certainly neglecting the statue conspicuously: the oligarchs, presumably, would not let the statue of a heroic athlete gather verdigris. In short, the oligarchs were insulting the statue and, by extension, the democrats.

  The details of his interpretation notwithstanding, Gauthier quite likely identified the oligarchs’ actual intention behind the manipulation of the statue: to change the message that it sent to the people of Erythrai in order to prevent individual democrats from becoming tyrant killers and rising up against the regime. The following comments expand upon that important insight.

  THIS CHAPTER’S INTERPRETATION

  I argue below that both oligarchs and democrats manipulated the statue of Philites in order to affect the ability of the democrats to mobilize in defense of their democracy. The oligarchs did so in order to negatively affect the democrats’ ability; the democrats did so in order to positively affect it. To substantiate that assertion, the following comments examine the oligarchs’ actions first, the democrats’ reaction second.

  MANIPULATION BY THE OLIGARCHS

  By removing the sword from the statue of Philites while allowing the statue itself to stand, the oligarchs widely publicized to all the inhabitants of Erythrai two complementary, negative messages about tyrannicide.21 First, they advertised that tyrannicide, qua rebellion that ushers in democracy, will fail. The symbolism is clear and straightforward: without a sword, Philites (i.e., rebellion) looked impotent, unable to harm anyone, much less overthrow a nondemocratic regime. And it is quite important to note that history “backed up” the statue’s new symbolic significance: the democracy ushered in by Philites did, in fact, fail.

  Second, by removing the sword from the statue, the oligarchs advertised that tyrannicide, qua “going first,” is very costly. The would-be tyrannicide would die, of course: Philites did (presumably). But the oligarchs’ alteration of the statue showed that the would-be tyrant killer would pay an even higher price than death. Indeed, contemplating the image of Philites with a missing sword and gathering verdigris (a sign of neglect) would force an individual to conclude that, should he “go first,” he will die and be remembered forever as a failure, a source of shame to both his ancestors and descendants.

  The manipulation of the statue of Philites thus appears to have been the propaganda component of the oligarchs’ “regime maintenance” strategy. That manipulation generated and maintained common knowledge that “democracy failed and thus resistance is futile.” If people believed that, or even if they thought that others did, they would be less likely to join a
pro-democracy rebellion in its early moments: they would doubt that a sufficient number of people would follow them. And particularly bold individuals would be much less inclined to commit the initial, quite daring act of tyrannicide. Instead, a dynamic like that in Athens during the coup of the Four Hundred would take root: (1) individuals falsify their preference and raise their revolutionary thresholds; (2) an ignorance cascade sweeps through the population; (3) pro-democrats are paralyzed by pluralistic ignorance. And, as chapter 1’s discussion about threshold sequences demonstrated, even slight increases in individuals’ revolutionary thresholds can be devastating: they could transform a pro-mobilization threshold sequence into an anti-mobilization threshold.

  It must be admitted that, for their propaganda campaign to be effective, the oligarchs also must have implemented some sort of intimidation campaign. There is no direct evidence for such a campaign in Erythrai. But one might reasonably infer its presence. To begin with, regimes with only minority support, generally speaking, must both misinform and intimidate the population in order to retain control of the state: (1) if they only punished individuals for publicly defying the regime, those individuals could still discover that they are part of a majority that is ready and willing to rebel; (2) if they relied solely on misinformation—i.e., publicly asserting that the regime enjoys overwhelming popular support—individuals would take the risk to dissent publicly and thus discover whether or not their fellow citizens actually support the regime. In addition, one might suspect that the democrats did not fix the statue earlier because they were afraid to do so. And finally, the oligarchs likely would not insult the democrats so directly unless they had an adequate backup force.22

  MANIPULATION BY THE DEMOCRATS

  By repairing the statue and crowning it at the beginning of every month and at all festivals, the democrats accomplished two complementary, instrumental ends. First, they countered head-on both aspects of the oligarchs’ “anti-tyrannicide” propaganda. On the one hand, by restoring the sword, they proclaimed that tyrannicide, qua rebellion that ushers in democracy, does, in fact, “work”: Philites (i.e., rebellion) is shown as powerful, determined. And, just as when the oligarchs manipulated the statue, recent history corroborated that assertion: not only did the democrats’ most recent rebellion succeed, but, by glorifying Philites after retaking control of the polis, the democrats appear to suggest that the democracy now in power originated in the Philites-led revolution; oligarchy, that is, was merely an unfortunate interlude. On the other hand, by crowning the statue so frequently, the democrats ensured that everybody knew that an act of tyrannicide, qua “going first” and initiating a pro-democracy mobilization, would be greatly rewarded. There is no telling what specific rewards a tyrannicide would receive (other than, presumably, a statue), but they clearly would have been spectacular: Philites was treated as quasi-divine.

  Second, Erythraian pro-democrats generated common knowledge of widespread commitment to support the democracy. The ritual conditions under which the democrats crowned Philites are not known and likely varied according to the particular occasion. However, the democrats of Erythrai almost certainly ceremoniously crowned the statue in front of a large crowd of spectators after announcing why they did so: “We crown Philites because he gave us democracy.” Applause or some sort of sign of mass approval likely followed. Thus everybody in attendance would know the political commitments of his fellow citizens and perhaps those of the larger Erythraian society.23 And it is important to note that such “tyrannicide ceremonies” were repeated presumably well over twelve times a year, thereby ensuring that that sentiment was preserved as common knowledge. As noted at the end of chapter 4, maintenance of such common knowledge would be particularly important for “new” democracies. (One wonders if the oligarchs previously sought to atomize the population by having few festivals—fewer opportunities for democrats to congregate and discover the preferences of their fellow citizens.)

  It is thus reasonably clear that pro-democrats manipulated the statue of Philites in order to increase the likelihood that they would be able to mobilize en masse in response to a coup d’état. The repeated commitment rituals would convince individuals to lower their revolutionary thresholds and participate in a pro-democracy rebellion earlier than they otherwise would have (because they believe that others will follow). And the glorification of Philites would convince particularly brave individuals that it would be worth the risk to strike the first blow and “kill a tyrant.” In short, Erythraian pro-democrats sought to induce a “pro-mobilization” threshold sequence. Challenging their regime would thus be a very risky proposition.

  The previous discussion demonstrated that both the oligarchs and the democrats manipulated the statue of Philites in order to affect the democrats’ ability to mobilize in defense of their democracy. The statue was not simply a static, bronze object. It was a tool—a medium—for generating and maintaining common knowledge about Erythraian (revolutionary) politics.24 The oligarchs used it to send the message that “resistance is futile.” If that were widely believed, resistance would be unlikely. The democrats used it to send the message “resistance will succeed.” If that were believed, large-scale resistance would be more likely. Indeed, to the extent that the ability of the majority to mobilize determined whether or not a polis would be governed democratically, one might make the following conclusion: both oligarchs and democrats considered the manipulation of the statue of Philites—that is, control of its message—to play an important role in determining whether or not there would be democracy in Erythrai.

  Creation and Subsequent Manipulation of the Statue: When?

  Scholars generally agree that the events referred to in the Philites stele occurred in the aftermath of important moments in the early Hellenistic period.25 But they do not agree on which moments. Dittenberger concluded (Syll.3 284) that the events followed Alexander’s conquest of western Asia Minor (i.e., circa 334–332): they would thus follow the implementation of Alexander’s democratization policy discussed in chapter 4.26 Heisserer disagreed with Dittenberger primarily on the grounds that the Philites stele does not mention the name Alexander (as is the case, for example, in Alexander’s “letter to the Chians” [RO 84] and the “anti-tyranny dossier” from Eresos [RO 83]). Heisserer (1979: 291–93), instead, dates the events referred to in the stele to the confusing aftermath of the battle of Ipsos (i.e., post-301), when, as happened in Priene, a tyrant might very well have capitalized on the disorder before Lysimachos solidified his control of the region.27 Engelmann and Merkelbach (I. Erythrai 503), however, suggest—based on the Philites stele’s letterforms—that the relevant events occurred circa 280, just after the battle of Kouroupedion, when Erythrai became part of the Seleukid empire.28

  Dating the relevant events is potentially complicated by Heisserer’s conclusion that the Philites stele is a commemorative text. It might not have been inscribed, that is, immediately following the dēmos’s initial order to repair and clean the statue. Heisserer bases his conclusion on two points. First, the stele’s two decrees have an abbreviated enactment formula. The full formula for Erythrai’s democratically promulgated decrees is “resolved by the council and the dēmos, a motion of the generals, prytanies, and exetastai” (ἔδοξεν τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι· στρατηγῶν, πρυτάνεων, ἐξεταστῶν γνώμη). The enactment formula for both decrees in the Philites stele, however, is “resolved by the council and the dēmos” (ἔδοξεν τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι). Second, the Philites stele does not record historical information: one might expect that the decree would make some mention of important historical circumstances such as the fall of the tyrant or the fall of the oligarchy, for example. Heisserer’s conclusion will be disputed below. But it does open up the (small) possibility that the events referred to in the Philites stele occurred well before the stele itself was inscribed, for which the latest plausible date is the third quarter of the third century.
r />   The following comments argue for the following, lengthy historical sequence. First, the Erythraian democrats erected the statue of Philites following Alexander’s conquest of western Asia Minor (i.e., circa 332). Second, the oligarchs removed the sword from the statue in the aftermath of the battle of Ipsos (i.e., post-301). Third, the democrats repaired the statue after the battle of Kouroupedion (i.e., post-281). That is Dittenberger, Engelmann and Merkelbach, and Heisserer were all partially correct—but incorrect in placing all of the events into a short period of time. However, on the (quite slim) chance that Heisserer’s commemorative text theory is correct, I assess briefly two possible pre-Alexander dates for the events referred to in the Philites stele. If nothing else, the discussion will provide an opportunity to explore additional periods of stasis in Erythrai’s history.

  PRE-ALEXANDER POSSIBILITIES

  The combination of three pieces of evidence might suggest that the events referred to in the Philites stele occurred in the mid-fifth century, while Erythrai was part of the Athenian Empire. The first piece of evidence is the famous Erythrai Decree (ML 40), traditionally dated between the 460s and 450s.29 That decree indicates that the Athenians intervened in Erythraian affairs, almost certainly after an oligarchic coup, and (re)established a democratic regime. Significantly, the decree refers to the domestic opponents of the democracy established by the Athenians as “tyrants” (το[ῖ]ς τυράννοις: line 33). Second, two fragmentary inscriptions (both a part of IG I3 15) suggest that, shortly after the promulgation of the aforementioned Erythrai Decree, the Athenians intervened in Erythraian political affairs once again to support the democracy there: the Erythraian pro-democrats, that is, lost control of their polis once again.30 And the third piece of evidence is the early- to mid-fifth-century Electrum stater from Kyzikos that is stamped with an image of Harmodios and Aristogeiton.31 That coin is important because it suggests that the Erythraians could have known about the Athenian statue of Harmodios in the mid-fifth century, when the events referred to in the aforementioned Erythrai Decree occurred.

 

‹ Prev