The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal

by David E. Hoffman

  In 1983, a U.S. intelligence report asserted that low-flying U.S. cruise missiles and advanced bombers “have the potential to render obsolescent billions of rubles in Soviet investment” in air defenses—they could fly right under them.6 In March 1984, the CIA’s annual intelligence estimate on Soviet forces described how Moscow was struggling to improve air defenses, including the effort to build improved “data links” between the new Soviet fighter jets, radars, surface-to-air missiles, and airborne warning and control planes.7

  The conclusions in all these reports came in part from thousands of pages of secret Soviet documents delivered by Tolkachev to the CIA.

  By 1985, the CIA had a precise fix on Soviet capabilities for airborne radar. A 1985 report mentioned five major areas in which the Soviets were taking action “to enhance their air defense capabilities.” Every one of them had been compromised by Tolkachev on his rolls of film and his notes, including the airborne warning and control plane and look-down, shoot-down radar.8

  Separate from the finished intelligence, Tolkachev’s material was also fed directly into U.S. military research and development programs. Often, Tolkachev’s information would be most helpful to the technical wizards who were building black boxes and other advanced technology to defeat Soviet radars and avionics. One such project was a radar jammer. In the late 1970s, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force were collaborating on a jammer for their latest fighter planes. The project was in its early stages when Tolkachev reported on Soviet research into pulse-Doppler radar. For many years, the Soviets had lagged behind the West in the development of pulse-Doppler, which allows radar to effectively look down at very high speeds and discriminate a moving target against the ground clutter of the earth. The U.S. radar jammer, as originally planned, lacked a way to counter a pulse-Doppler radar. After a study by the U.S. Defense Science Board in 1980, the jammer design was modified to include a beam that would confuse pulse-Doppler radars, like the zaslon. This change was made precisely at the time that Tolkachev was providing information about Soviet radars. The Airborne Self-Protection Jammer was an ambitious project, designed to deceive enemy radar to think a plane was at a different location. It might have been an important advantage, had the Cold War ever become hot.9

  Tolkachev delivered to the United States a library of top secret documents about the design and capability of radars deployed on Soviet fighters and interceptors, including the MiG-23 fighter, the MiG-25 high-altitude interceptor, the MiG-31 interceptor, and the MiG-29 and Su-27 multi-role fighters. In particular, Tolkachev compromised several versions of the sapfir radar and the zaslon radar. Tolkachev also carted away Soviet secrets on surface-to-air missiles and the sensitive Soviet project called shtora, or “window blind,” which was designed to conceal surface-to-air missiles from the radars of target aircraft.

  In another intelligence windfall, Tolkachev was the first to alert the United States that the Soviet Union was starting to develop an advanced airborne warning and control system, or AWACS, a flying radar station. Once Tolkachev pointed it out, U.S. spy satellites confirmed it. The twenty-ton radar, named shmel, or “bumblebee,” would be carried on a modified Ilyushin Il-76 military transport jet, with a flying disk for the radar dome, not unlike the advanced U.S. E-3 Sentry system, based on a modified Boeing 707, which was already flying. The new AWACS would be critical to Soviet efforts to deal with the low-altitude gap and the lack of look-down radar capability. A flying radar would provide much greater detection of threats and deliver data and instructions to airborne pilots.10 The Tolkachev documents showed the shmel would have look-down capability. The radar could potentially track fifty or more targets simultaneously over land.11

  Soviet national air defenses were stitched together from thousands of separate units. There were 1,250 ground-based radars, about 25 percent of them supporting ground control centers to direct pilots to their targets; about 1,000 surface-to-air complexes and 12,800 surface-to-air missile launchers; and 3,250 fighters capable of air intercept missions at some ninety airfields.12 For the system to be effective, they would all have to be knitted together—and work. With a strong ethos of centralization, the Soviet Union had in the past relied on ground-controlled intercept, meaning that controllers in radar stations on the ground would give directions to fighters and interceptors—where to fly, when to shoot. Soviet pilots had little autonomy. This was slow and clumsy. Most of the radar operators on the ground couldn’t see beyond their own unit’s coverage. A modernized Soviet AWACS could change all that. Thanks to Tolkachev, the United States had a front-row seat to Soviet AWACS technology. A CIA memo written in 1981 noted that the Soviet AWACS was “still in the early stages of field testing” but said the radar “has detected targets over land as low as 300 meters,” or 984 feet. That would help, but not entirely close the low-altitude radar gap. The U.S. bombers were planning to fly even lower, at 800 feet altitude or less, and cruise missiles would sneak in at just 50 feet above the ground. Moreover, the Soviets knew, and feared, that the cruise missiles were relatively inexpensive and thus the United States could send swarms of them racing to targets, undetected.13 By September 1981, a secret twenty-three-page U.S. defense intelligence estimate on the Soviet AWACS had been prepared. The estimate had the express purpose of helping create countermeasures to the Soviet aircraft and noted that there would be gaps in the Soviet AWACS coverage—gaps that Western planes could sneak through—and that Moscow still faced serious difficulties in spotting cruise missiles and future U.S. stealth bombers.14

  The Tolkachev documents also revealed that the MiG-31 fighter, equipped with the zaslon radar, carried an air-to-air data link that would allow it to function as a mini-AWACS on its own, sharing radar information with other fighters. Previous attempts to break such a data link and “read” it had proven almost impossible for the United States. But now, with Tolkachev’s documents identifying what each bit of information meant, the link could be cracked open, an incredible breakthrough. The United States could intercept Soviet AWACS signals, to detect—and deceive—the pilots who depended on them.15

  The United States was reading the enemy’s mail, in real time.

  Acknowledgments

  Two retired CIA officers, each with decades of experience in the clandestine service, generously contributed time and effort to this project. Burton Gerber, who served as both chief of the Moscow station and Soviet division chief, devoted hours to research into the original cables, with the agency’s approval and clearance of the materials before release to me. He provided invaluable guidance and context for the Tolkachev story. Barry Royden, who authored an internal CIA monograph on the operation in the 1990s, was an early enthusiast for the book and a source of great insight. Both helped to navigate the declassification process and demystify the world of espionage.

  Ron, the chief of the CE division at the CIA when the project began, provided critical support for declassification of the operational files. I also benefited from the recollections of David Forden, Robert Fulton, Sandra Grimes, Gardner “Gus” Hathaway, Thomas Mills, Robert Morris, James Olson, Marti Peterson, William Plunkert, David Rolph, Michael Sellers, Haviland Smith, and Robert Wallace. Catherine Guilsher generously provided recollections of John’s life and times. Karin Hathaway graciously helped with memories of Gus. John Ehrman provided an important link to the agency. My thanks also to several retired intelligence officers who agreed to share their knowledge and recollections without being identified.

  In Moscow, I was assisted by Anna Masterova, who skillfully sifted archives, conducted interviews, and translated. I also am grateful to Irina Ostrovskaya of Memorial International for archival records on the repression of the Kuzmin family. Volodya Alexandrov and Sergei Belyakov were, as always, selfless and ready to help at every turn. Masha Lipman has been a peerless source of wisdom and insight about Russia for two decades, and provided perceptive and detailed comments on the draft manuscript.

  Maryanne Warrick transcribed
interviews and carried out research assignments, and I am grateful for her precision and tireless efforts. Charissa Ford and Julie Tate also contributed research.

  At the Washington Post, I was fortunate to be part of a golden age of journalism built by Don Graham and Katharine Graham, and I am grateful to the executive editors Benjamin C. Bradlee and Leonard Downie for giving me the opportunity to contribute to it. I am particularly thankful for years of advice and support from Philip Bennett, a colleague and friend with whom I shared some of the best years in the newsroom and who gave me an important critique of the manuscript. Robert Kaiser has been a model and mentor, and Joby Warrick a valued friend and adviser. Peter Finn and Michael Birnbaum, talented Moscow bureau chiefs, offered their cooperation and help.

  I am indebted to H. Keith Melton for sharing images from his collection and to Kathy Krantz Fieramosca for permission to reproduce her painting of Adolf Tolkachev. I wish to thank Jack F. Matlock, Dick Combs, and James Schumaker for recollections of the 1977 fire at the Moscow embassy. For insights about radar and air defenses, I am grateful to David Kenneth Ellis, William Andrews, Robin Lee, and Larry Pitts. I also received valuable advice and help from Robert Berls, Benjamin Weiser, Fritz Ermarth, Charles Battaglia, Jerrold Schecter, Robert Monroe, Peter Earnest, George Little, Louis Denes, Matthew Aid, Joshua Pollack, and Jason Saltoun-Ebin. Cathy Cox of the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base fulfilled requests professionally and promptly. I am grateful for access to the collections of the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; the National Archives at College Park, Maryland; the U.S. Naval Institute Oral History Program, Annapolis, Maryland; the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California; and the Russian State Archive of the Economy, Moscow.

  Glenn Frankel has been a mentor on writing for years and once again gave me perceptive and valuable comments on the manuscript. I am also grateful to Svetlana Savranskaya for comments on a draft and sharing her knowledge about how to pry Cold War secrets out of the world’s archives.

  For the second time in a decade, the wise and patient editing of Kris Puopolo steered me from a hazy vision and a box full of loose documents to a finished narrative, and I am deeply appreciative. My thanks, too, to Bill Thomas for believing this book would be worthy of Doubleday. I thank Daniel Meyer for keeping the project on track. I’m grateful to Esther Newberg for being an extraordinary agent. Her first phone call upon reading the draft manuscript, full of enthusiasm, was a moment to cherish.

  My deepest gratitude goes to my wife, Carole, who lovingly guided our own Moscow station, with our sons, Daniel and Benjamin, when I was a correspondent for the Washington Post in the late 1990s. She offered advice and insight at every stage of this project. More importantly, she endured the disruptions and unpredictable twists and turns that come with a life in journalism but never lost a conviction that discovering the world was a voyage worth taking. For as long as I can recall, a small scrap of paper has been fastened to our refrigerator door with a proverb from Saint Augustine: “The world is a book, and those who do not travel, read only a page.” With her steadfast support and participation, the world is, once again, a book.

  Notes

  The Tolkachev story is based, in part, on 944 pages of declassified operational files, primarily cable traffic between CIA headquarters and the Moscow station from 1977 to 1985. The cables are cited individually in the notes below by sender, recipient, date, and time-date stamp. The time-date format is as follows: the first two digits are the date, the next four are the time in GMT that the cable was sent, followed by a Z, such as 131423Z for a cable sent on the thirteenth at 2:23 p.m. GMT. In some cables, this time-date information was redacted; they are identified by date where possible.

  The CIA cables were often written in a clipped, minimalist style, with some words dropped. When quoting directly, the author has preserved this style, verbatim.

  The documents were reviewed by the CIA for information considered sensitive, and that information was redacted prior to release to the author. The CIA placed no restrictions on the author’s use of the documents it released, nor did the agency review the manuscript prior to publication. Selected CIA cables are posted at www.thebilliondollarspy.com.

  The FBI released records on the Howard investigation in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request by the author.

  The book is also based on interviews and additional documents obtained by the author from other sources.

  Prologue

  1. William Plunkert, correspondence with author, March 28, 2014; Moscow station to headquarters, Dec. 8, 1982, 081335Z.

  2. Barry G. Royden, “Tolkachev, a Worthy Successor to Penkovsky,” Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 3 (2003): 22. Also Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton, Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA’s Spytechs from Communism to al-Qaeda, with Henry Robert Schlesinger (New York: Dutton, 2008), 130–31.

  1: Out of the Wilderness

  1. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), 48–49. Also see Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, “Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,” U.S. Senate, 79th Cong., 2nd sess., Report no. 244, July 20, 1946, 257–58. In his memoirs, Truman wrote that he had “often thought that if there had been something like coordination of information in the government it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor.” Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), 56.

  2. Woodrow J. Kuhns, ed., Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1997), 1, 3.

  3. The agency toppled leaders in Iran and Guatemala, carried out the abortive landing at the Bay of Pigs, warned of Soviet missiles in Cuba, and was drawn deeply into the Vietnam War, eventually managing a full-scale ground war in Laos. U.S. Senate, “Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,” 94th Cong., 2nd sess., bk. 1, “Foreign and Military Intelligence,” pt. 6, “History of the Central Intelligence Agency,” April 26, 1976, Report 94-755, 109.

  4. Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, trans. Harold Shukman (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991), 502–24.

  5. David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), ix.

  6. “Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency,” Special Study Group, J. H. Doolittle, chairman, Washington, D.C., Sept. 30, 1954, 7.

  7. Richard Helms, A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency, with William Hood (New York: Random House, 2003), 124.

  8. Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: The Daring Early Years of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 25, 30, 36, 142–52. Also, U.S. Senate, “Final Report,” pt. 6, “History of the Central Intelligence Agency.” Richard Immerman, “A Brief History of the CIA,” in The Central Intelligence Agency: Security Under Scrutiny, ed. Athan Theoharis et al. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2006), 21.

  9. Helms, Look over My Shoulder, 124, 127.

  10. Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, eds., CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947–1991: A Documentary Collection (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001), 35–41.

  11. Kuhns, Assessing the Soviet Threat, 12.

  12. Richard Helms, interview with Robert M. Hathaway, May 30, 1984, released by CIA in 2004. Hathaway is co-author of an internal monograph on Helms as director.

  13. This account of the Popov case is based on five sources. William Hood, Mole: The True Story of the First Russian Intelligence Officer Recruited by the CIA (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), is descriptive. Hood was an operations officer in Vienna at the time, but his account is fuzzy about so
me details. Clarence Ashley, CIA Spymaster (Grenta, La.: Pelican, 2004), is based on recorded interviews with George Kisevalter, and the author is a former CIA analyst. John Limond Hart, The CIA’s Russians (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003) includes a chapter on Popov. More can also be found in Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey, Battleground Berlin. Lastly, for examples of the positive intelligence and its significance, see Joan Bird and John Bird, “CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Forces: The Importance of Clandestine Reporting,” a monograph and document collection, Central Intelligence Agency, Historical Review Program, 2013. On the farm journal, see Hood, Mole, 123.

  14. Intelligence reports based on Popov’s reporting are contained in Bird and Bird, “CIA Analysis.”

  15. He was Edward Ellis Smith, then thirty-two, who had served in Moscow as a military attaché during World War II. He went to Moscow posing as a low-level State Department official. His choices of dead drop sites were deemed unsatisfactory by Popov. See Richard Harris Smith, “The First Moscow Station: An Espionage Footnote to Cold War History,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 3 (1989): 333–46. This article is based on an interview with Edward Smith, who died in an auto accident in 1982, and on his papers. There are conflicting accounts about Smith’s role in the Popov case and whether Popov passed useful intelligence to the CIA while in Moscow. According to Hood in Mole, the CIA decided not to run Popov at all while in Moscow because of the risks. In contrast, Richard Harris Smith says Popov while in Moscow tipped off the CIA to the most momentous political event of the decade, Khrushchev’s secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress denouncing Stalin on February 25, 1956. Ashley reports that Smith never met Popov. That doesn’t preclude operations, however; if he was just servicing dead drops, there would be no need for a meeting. Smith had an affair with his Russian maid, who was working for the KGB and who made surreptitious photographs. The KGB then showed Smith the photographs and tried to blackmail him into working for them. Smith refused and confessed to the U.S. ambassador, Charles “Chip” Bohlen. Smith was recalled to CIA headquarters in July 1956 and fired.