A Naval History of World War I

by Paul G. Halpern

  The drifters, by their nature weakly armed, and manned by fishermen rather than regular naval personnel, were also a tempting target, particularly when they became troublesome. On the night of 31 May, little more than a fortnight after U.6 had been caught in the nets, the Austrian destroyers Balaton and Orenjen, along with three torpedo boats and the cruiser Helgoland, raided the drifter line and sank one. Admiral Kerr was alive to the danger and feared a major raid. He wanted four British destroyers to avoid having to rely exclusively on the French or Italians for protection. The destroyers at Brindisi were always liable for diversion to other duties. Unfortunately for Kerr and the drifters, there were no British destroyers available.

  The protection given to the drifters was steadily reduced as a result of losses. The Italian auxiliary cruiser Città di Messina was torpedoed and sunk by the Austrian U.15 20 miles east of Otranto on 23 June. The French destroyer Fourche, which had been accompanying Città di Messina, depth-charged the submarine, observed an oil slick, and incorrectly assumed it had been sunk. The Fourche was then cut in two by a torpedo while rescuing survivors. The Italians ceased to protect the drifter line with a cruiser during daylight hours, employing instead only a section of destroyers. This was not sufficient. On 9 July Linienschiffskapitän Nikolaus Horthy, one of the k.u.k. Kriegsmarine’s most enterprising officers and its future commander, raided the drifter line with the light cruiser Novara, sinking two, damaging two, and taking nine British sailors prisoner. The next day the Italian destroyer Impetuoso was sunk by the Austrian submarine U.17, and the Italians decided they could no longer protect the drifters and the line was moved farther south. The drifter patrol was eventually established on a line from Otranto to just south of Cape Linguetta. The drifter base was moved from Brindisi to Taranto. The drifters were also supplemented by a dozen motor launches, based on Gallipoli, with a subbase at Tricase. The motor launches were also of questionable utility, good only in fine weather.

  The drifters had a close call the night of 22 December, graphically illustrating the difficulties of command and control of a multinational force, particularly at night. Six Austrian destroyers of the older Huszár-class (600 tons) attacked the drifter patrol line, which fought back as best as it could, giving the alarm signal. Fortunately six French destroyers, en route from Brindisi to Taranto to escort transports, were in the vicinity and raced to the rescue. Only one drifter was slightly damaged. Their rescuers fared less well. The destroyer following the Casque, the lead French ship with the senior naval officer, failed to see the signal to turn and only one destroyer followed the Casque into action, only to be momentarily disabled by a hit in the boiler room. The Casque continued the chase alone until a hit reduced her speed to 23 knots. Then disaster struck. Three Italian destroyers, followed by the British light cruiser Gloucester escorted by a pair of Italian destroyers, had also sailed from Brindisi with the object of cutting off the Austrians from Cattaro. In the darkness the French and Italian destroyers literally ran into one another. The lead Italian destroyer Abba rammed the Casque, and a little later the French destroyer Boutefeu rammed the Abba. The Austrians got away, although with little to show for the risk they had run, and the damaged French and Italian destroyers were towed back to Brindisi the following morning.37

  The most damaging attack on the drifters took place on 15 May 1917 and led to the largest action of the war in the Adriatic. The plan for the attack appears to have originated with Captain Horthy of the cruiser Novara, who had already established a reputation for dash and enterprise. Horthy had the Novara’s mainmast removed and replaced with a short steel mast so that from a distance or at night the cruiser would resemble a large British destroyer. The plan was for the Novara, Helgoland, and Saida, the three best Austrian light cruisers that bore the brunt of the war in the Adriatic, to “mop up” the drifters, counting on their altered appearance to cause them to be taken as destroyers and thereby gain time before the alarm was given. The three cruisers led by Horthy would sail at nightfall, separate during the night, and attack different portions of the drifter line at dawn. They would then rendezvous 15 nautical miles west of Cape Linguetta no later than 7:15 A.M. for the dash home. There would be a diversionary action led by Fregattenkapitän Prince von und zu Liechtenstein in the destroyer Csepel accompanied by the destroyer Balaton—a third destroyer had to be dropped because of boiler trouble. The Csepel and Balaton would cruise off the Albanian coast looking for transports and would confuse Italian reports on the movements of the Austrian force. The Austrians also would deploy three submarines: the U.4 off Valona and the U.27 off Brindisi. The most effective submarine, as it turned out, was the German UC.25, which was ordered to lay mines off Brindisi at dawn. Austrian aircraft from Durazzo and the base at Kumbor in the Gulf of Cattaro would support the action, and the armored cruiser Sankt Georg, two destroyers, and several torpedo boats were to be ready to sortie if necessary. The coast-defense battleship Budapest and three torpedo boats were prepared to follow them.

  The Italians had a patrol at sea the night of the raid, well to the north of the drifter line. It consisted of the Italian flotilla leader Mirabello and French destroyers Commandant Rivière, Bisson, and Cimeterre. A fourth destroyer, the Boutefeu, had been forced back to Brindisi by condenser trouble. The Mirabello group was supposed to be in a position to intercept any potential raiders on their return from the drifter line. There was also an Italian submarine south of Cattaro and a French submarine south of Durazzo. That night the small Italian destroyer Borea was also escorting a convoy of three ships proceeding to Valona. The Csepel and Balaton attacked the convoy at approximately 3:24 A.M. The Borea and a munitions ship38 were sunk; another ship was left blazing although later salved.

  The three Austrian cruisers when they passed through the line of drifters between Cape Santa Maria di Leuca and Fano were at first assumed in some places to be friendly and no alarm was given. The attack on the drifters began at approximately 3:30 A.M. and continued until after sunrise. The cruisers were armed with 3.9-inch guns and were able to overwhelm the little drifters, armed with 6-pounders or 57-mm guns. The Austrians at times behaved with considerable chivalry, blowing their sirens and giving the drifter crews time to abandon ship before they opened fire. Some of the drifter men chose to put up a fight, and Skipper J. Watt of the Gowan Lee, which survived in battered condition, was later awarded the Victoria Cross. There had been 47 drifters on the line that night, 14 were sunk and 4 damaged, 3 badly. Seventy-two of the drifter crews were picked up by the Austrians as prisoners.

  The Austrian raiding force was now in a precarious position, for the drifter line was actually 40 miles farther from Cattaro than Brindisi and its sizable Allied forces. The Allies were between the Austrians and safety. Rear Admiral Alfredo Acton, commander of the Italian Scouting Division, was in charge of the pursuit. At approximately 4:35 A.M. he ordered the Mirabello group of destroyers, located north of Durazzo, to turn southward. Acton and his staff embarked in the British light cruiser Dartmouth and ordered the light forces at Brindisi to sea as soon as they were ready. By approximately 6:45 the British light cruisers Dartmouth and Bristol and the Italian destroyers Mosto, Pilo, Schiaffino, Acerbi, and flotilla leader Aquila were racing toward the northeast to cut off the Austrians. Behind them in Brindisi the scout cruiser Marsala, flotilla leader Racchia, and destroyers Insidioso, Indomito, and Impavido were either ready to sail or getting up steam. The Marsala group was ready at least an hour before Acton sent them a wireless message from the Dartmouth to sail at 8:25. Revel later criticized him for this delay.

  The Mirabello group made contact with the Austrian cruisers at approximately 7:00 A.M. They were, however, outgunned, and instead of closing made a wide detour to avoid U.4 and turned north to maintain contact with the three cruisers. The three French destroyers could not sustain the Mirabello’s speed and gradually fell behind. At approximately 7:45 the Dartmouth group made contact with the destroyers Csepel and Balaton. Acton apparently did not realize at first that
they were destroyers and not cruisers, and it was twenty minutes before the faster Aquila and four destroyers closed the Austrians. The two groups of destroyers exchanged fire at high speed until a shot from the Csepel cut a steam pipe and hit one of the Aquila’s boilers at approximately 8:30, disabling the ship. The Csepel and Balaton were able to escape behind the shelter of the Austrian coastal batteries at Durazzo.

  Acton was now between Horthy and Cattaro. The Austrian cruisers were still being followed by the Mirabello group as they raced toward the Allied ships. The Bristol reported smoke astern at approximately 9:00, and the British and Italians turned to meet the Austrian cruisers. The main part of the day’s action now began with the two British cruisers Dartmouth (eight 6-inch guns) and Bristol (two 6-inch and ten 4-inch guns) engaging the Novara, Helgoland, and Saida (nine 3.9-inch guns each). Although the Austrians were outgunned, Acton’s superiority in numbers was soon dissipated. He detached the destroyers Schiaffino and Pilo to protect the disabled Aquila. Astern of Horthy, Mirabello was stopped for a time because of water in her fuel. She was back to her normal speed by 11:00, but at 11:45 the Commandant Rivière broke down with condenser trouble and the Cimeterre and Bisson remained behind to protect her from submarine attack. The Dartmouth gradually drew far ahead of the Bristol, which had been due for docking and whose bottom was foul. The Bristol’s 4-inch guns were soon outranged, which left the burden of the action on the Dartmouth, accompanied by the destroyers Acerbi and Mosto. The visibility that day was very good, and the aircraft of both sides were very active. They undertook reconnaissances, signaled by wireless or lamp, and bombed and strafed. One of the Italian seaplanes was shot down, but none of the ships on either side were disabled or seriously damaged by the bombs. Nevertheless Captain Addison of the Dartmouth found the attacks “most annoying.”

  The Allies and the Austrians now had other forces at sea. The Marsala group, a scout cruiser, flotilla leader, and three destroyers were racing to the scene. Farther to the south, three French destroyers from Corfu were also on their way. Admiral Gauchet, the French commander in chief, had intercepted wireless reports of the action and without receiving any request for assistance sent the destroyers. The Italian admiral at Valona was less enterprising, but received neither direct information nor orders. The forces there, which included a fast flotilla leader, did not intervene. On the Austrian side, the armored cruiser Sankt Georg accompanied by two destroyers and four torpedo boats sortied from Cattaro and headed to Horthy’s rescue.

  The Austrians were suffering from potentially fatal mechanical difficulties. Their safety depended on speed, but the Saida could not make more than 25 knots and held back the other two cruisers, which were capable of 2–3 knots additional speed. After a 6-inch shell from the Dartmouth struck the Novara’s forebridge, killing the first officer, Horthy used a smoke screen to try to close the range to where his 3.9-inch guns would be more effective. The Dartmouth was straddled and hit a few times, once with a shell that would have put the port propeller out of action had it not failed to explode. Horthy was wounded at 10:10 A.M. by a shell splinter and lost consciousness for a time after trying to direct the action while lying on the deck. The Novara’s gunnery officer had to take command. The Dartmouth was now taking the brunt of the action, and at 11:00 Acton ordered her to open the range and eased to 20 knots to allow the Bristol to catch up. The order may have saved the Novara, for the cruiser’s main feed pumps and an auxiliary steam pipe to the starboard turbine had been damaged and she was losing speed.

  The climax of the action was now at hand. Acton apparently turned away at 11:05 in an unsuccessful effort to cut off the straggling Saida. He then spotted smoke on the horizon belonging to the Austrian reinforcements from Cattaro and decided that it would be prudent to turn southward to join the Marsala group from Brindisi. The two groups met at 11:30 and turned back toward the Novara. The interval had been enough to save the Novara, which had been forced to stop while the Saida attempted to take the crippled cruiser under tow and the Helgoland covered them from the approaching Allies. This was a critical moment for the Austrians, and the commander of the Saida was criticized for taking what seemed like an excessive amount of time to complete the maneuver. However, Acton apparently did not realize, at least initially, that the Novara had stopped. He saw smoke on the horizon, indicating potentially heavy reinforcements from Cattaro, and the Sankt Georg, with her pair of 240-mm guns (9.2-inch), outgunned anything in his force. Behind them, the old coast-defense battleship Budapest and three torpedo boats were also at sea. Acton knew the Austrian cruisers apparently had the edge over him in speed, and he did not want to run the risk of being drawn closer to Cattaro and having any of his ships that might be damaged cut off by what he presumed to be superior Austrian forces. Acton turned away. The commander of the Acerbi misread the recall signal, obscured by smoke, for the signal to attack and maneuvered to deliver a torpedo attack. He was unsupported and was driven off by the concentrated fire of the Austrians. The Racchia, Impavido, and later Marsala also approached the Austrians, only to be recalled by Acton. By the time Acton realized the Novara was disabled, the Sankt Georg was closer, and at 12:05 P.M. he ordered a general retirement. The Austrians could never understand why Acton broke off the action; in their opinion the Sankt Georg was still far off and there would have been time to sink the Novara. Captain Addison of the Dartmouth at the time thought Acton’s recall was justified; after the war he admitted he had not realized the Austrian cruisers had stopped, and if he had, he probably would have disobeyed orders.

  The Austrians’ luck held that day. The French submarine Bernouilli fired at the Balaton but missed, and the Balaton and Csepel were able to join the Sankt Georg group with the crippled Novara in tow. They were in turn met by the Budapest and her escorts and were able to return to Cattaro where they were greeted with enthusiastic cheers from the warships stationed there.

  The Allies’ troubles were not over. They returned to Brindisi with the Aquila and Commandant Rivière under tow in different groups, screened by the destroyers, which now included the French ships that had joined from Corfu. The escorts were needed, because the route brought the Dartmouth group within range of UC.25, which had already laid her mines off Brindisi. At 1:30 P.M., UC.25 torpedoed the Dartmouth approximately 36 miles from port. Aggressive depth-charging by French and Italian destroyers kept the submarine from making another attack, but the Dartmouth had to be abandoned for a period, and it was only with great difficulty and the assistance of tugs sent out from Brindisi that the cruiser was able to return to port. Furthermore, the French destroyer Boutefeu immediately put to sea to assist after learning the Dartmouth was torpedoed and struck one of UC.25’s mines a few minutes after clearing the boom. The destroyer quickly sank.

  The Austrians regarded the action of 15 May 1917 as the high point of the war for the k.u.k. Kriegsmarine. They considered the events of the day as a victory in which they had successfully engaged the superior—and potentially far superior, considering that the Pisa-class armored cruisers and another British cruiser had been held in port—forces of three enemy nations and had returned safely after inflicting greater losses than they received. The difficulties of commanding a multinational force once again had been demonstrated, for the Italian signaling had been particularly bad that day, and the Italians had not provided the Allies with the call signs of their ships, thereby reducing the value of intercepted signals. Furthermore, the British realized that until they could provide British destroyers to protect the drifters, the line was likely to be raided again. The destroyers were not available, and the Admiralty therefore ordered the drifters to be withdrawn from the line at night. The drifters now went into various little ports, laying their nets between 5:00 and 10:00 A.M. and taking them up again at 3:00 P.M. The Italians could not provide any protection for the drifters for several weeks and then only on an irregular basis. The question became yet another matter of sharp disagreement between the British and Italians.

  If one
took a broader strategical look, the action of 15 May did not change very much. There had never been any serious thought of the big dreadnoughts of either side going into action. The Allied supply lines in the Mediterranean were threatened, as before, by submarines, not the surface ships of the Austrian navy. There had only been 47 drifters out that night, and it was estimated that a drifter could effectively cover only a half-mile. That meant only 23 to 24 miles of the 40-mile-wide Strait was covered. Horthy had risked the cream of the Austrian navy to make a not very effective blockade even less effective. Was it worth it? And would the Austrian luck hold in the future?39

  ATTEMPTS TO BREAK THE ADRIATIC STALEMATE

  The Italians, as they always pointed out, bore the brunt of the war in the Adriatic. They had to maintain a sufficient force of destroyers and torpedo boats at Venice to hinder Austrian activity on the flank of their army. But they could not exclude the possibility the Austrian fleet would come out for a major battle and had to provide an adequate number of destroyers to work with their fleet in the lower Adriatic. After the beginning of 1916, they also had to protect the lines of communication of the Italian expeditionary corps in Albania. These considerations took priority in their plans and account for what the British and French often considered a selfish and egoistic approach toward providing destroyers and torpedo boats for the defense of the drifter line at Otranto. The Italians invariably wanted assistance, particularly fast light cruisers from the Royal Navy capable of catching the Novara-class cruisers. The British had none of their latest classes to spare from the Grand Fleet, and the French navy did not have any of the type at all.