A Naval History of World War I

by Paul G. Halpern

  The Argus was the most interesting and potentially the most useful of the carriers under construction in the summer of 1918. She was originally laid down in June 1914 as the Lloyd Sabaudo liner Conte Rosso, but construction halted after the beginning of the war. The ship was acquired by the Admiralty in 1916 for conversion into a seaplane carrier. The work went slowly, hampered by repeated design changes in what was still a very experimental field. The Argus was eventually completed with a flush deck unobstructed by superstructure or funnels as well as a pilothouse charthouse that could be lowered during flying operations. She did not commission until September 1918, but soon completed a series of successful takeoffs and landings with Sopwith 11/2 Strutters. She was capable of carrying 20–21 aircraft. In October she embarked a squadron of Sopwith T.1 Cuckoo torpedo planes that were to be used to attack the High Sea Fleet in Wilhelmshaven. The squadron pilots were still gaining experience in carrier operations when the war ended a few weeks later.119

  The carrier operations actually carried out in the summer of 1918 were far more modest than Beatty had wanted, although they are not without interest. The Furious played a prominent role. The carrier would proceed to the edge of the Helgoland Bight minefields and launch reconnaissance aircraft. The British hoped to trap a Zeppelin, and on one occasion, 17 June, she was bombed twice by German seaplanes. The Furious launched two Sopwith Camels, but they failed to catch the first attackers and had to ditch. The Furious launched another pair of Camels to counter a second German attack, and a German seaplane was forced down. The British decided to attack the Zeppelins in their base at Tondern, and at dawn on 19 July, after earlier attacks had been aborted because of weather, the Furious launched two flights of Sopwith Camels—seven aircraft—each carrying two 50-pound bombs. The Furious was screened by the First Light Cruiser Squadron, with a division of the First Battle Squadron and the Seventh Light Cruiser Squadron out in support. She was approximately 80 miles northwest of the German base. The British succeeded in destroying one of the sheds, along with Zeppelins L.54 and L.60. One Camel had been forced down by engine trouble before reaching the target, three had to land in Denmark, one pilot was drowned, and two made it back to their ships to be picked up by a destroyer after ditching. The raid was the first conducted by land planes flown off a carrier and was the most successful carrier launched operation of the war.120

  The Grand Fleet and Harwich Force carried aircraft for defensive purposes, particularly against Zeppelins, which shadowed British squadrons on their sweeps. Naturally the pilots would have to ditch after each operation. In the North Sea on 21 August 1917 the light cruiser Yarmouth launched a Sopwith Pup flown by Lieutenant B. A. Smart, who shot down Zeppelin L.23. This success led to a number of light cruisers being fitted with flying-off platforms on their turrets. There was another variation: destroyers towed lighters carrying flying boats and then experimented with land planes. On 11 August 1918, a Sopwith Camel took off from a lighter towed by the destroyer Redoubt of the Harwich Force, and the pilot, Lieutenant S. D. Culley, succeeded in shooting down Zeppelin L.53 off Terschelling.121

  Culley’s victory occurred shortly after a stunning success by German seaplanes during the same operation. Tyrwhitt with four light cruisers and thirteen destroyers of the Harwich Force was on a reconnaissance sweep of the southwestern exits of the Helgoland Bight minefields. Three of the destroyers towed lighters carrying flying boats, and two towed lighters with aircraft, one of them Culley’s. When the British reached a point approximately 25 miles northwest of the island of Vlieland, six shallow-draft coastal motorboats armed with torpedoes were detached to cross the minefields and proceed to the mouth of the Ems with orders to attack any German minesweepers or their supporting forces they encountered. The CMBs should have had air cover, but there was no wind that morning, and the flying boats were unable to take off.

  The CMBs kept about a mile outside of Dutch territorial waters and had just passed Terschelling when they were attacked by six, later increased to eight (German sources say nine), German aircraft of the Kampstaffel V and Kampstaffel I from the Borkum naval air station. A running battle developed as the flotilla closed up to concentrate the fire of their Lewis guns and continued eastward at 30 knots for about half an hour, the airplanes dropping a few bombs but relying mostly on their machine guns. The Germans gained the advantage when the CMBs turned to the west to rejoin the Harwich Force when they were abeam of Ameland lighthouse. The German aircraft now had the sun behind them. Four (German sources say five) more German aircraft from Kampfstaffel Norderney joined the fight, and the CMBs were riddled as they ran out of ammunition or their guns jammed. The German aircraft were all seaplanes, either the older Friedrichshafen FF.49C or the more modern Brandenburg W.12 and W.29. The CMBs managed to shoot down one of the Brandenburg W.29s, but eventually all but CMB.41 were dead in the water. Three CMBs were sunk, CMB.41 managed to reach the Dutch shore, and two others, crippled, drifted into Dutch territorial waters and were towed to port by a Dutch torpedo boat.122

  An entire naval force had been eliminated by aircraft the same morning that a reconnaissance Zeppelin had been destroyed by a plane launched by a naval force. The actions on 11 August gave a striking demonstration of the new dimension in naval warfare. At the same time, the Argus was nearing completion and there were plans for an air attack on the German fleet. The carrier-launched attack never took place before the war ended, but the development of the Argus along with the events of 11 August pointed the way toward the future course of naval warfare to those who paid attention.

  DER TAG: THE END OF THE WAR

  By the beginning of autumn, the Allied armies were advancing steadily in France and Flanders, and the end of the war was much closer than those engaged in the daily routine of naval operations probably realized. Despite all the emphasis on submarines and aircraft, the war might well have ended with a classic naval action, the same type of action that had been anticipated at the beginning in 1914. The Germans evacuated their Flanders bases between 29 September and 3 October. Eleven destroyers, 13 torpedo boats, 7 submarines, and 33 seaplanes escaped to German waters. Those ships that were not ready for sea or could not make the journey were blown up or scuttled. They included 5 destroyers, 3 submarines, and 12 torpedo boats. Tyrwhitt had been standing by to intercept and believed the Admiralty had been “caught napping” and had not expected the Germans to break out so soon. Consequently, the Harwich Force put to sea five hours behind the Germans and was further slowed when its destroyers could not keep up in a full gale. The Germans also benefited from the moonless nights and their ability to slip out at high water through the channels in the sand banks off the Scheldt, which kept the British flotillas from closing.123

  On 29 September the news that Germany’s ally Bulgaria had concluded an armistice led the German high command to advise the kaiser to seek an immediate armistice. On 3 October Prince Max von Baden became German chancellor and immediately appealed to President Wilson for an armistice. Wilson’s terms included the evacuation of enemy soil by German armies and the end of submarine attacks on passenger vessels. On 20 October Prince Max accepted Wilson’s demands that submarine attacks on passenger ships cease. Scheer had been opposed to this while fighting was still in progress, for it would be tantamount to ending the submarine campaign. Nevertheless, on 21 October the U-boats were recalled. The German naval leaders, however, were not willing to end the war quietly. In Scheer’s eyes the end of the submarine campaign released the U-boats for service with the High Sea Fleet. The navy could not remain inactive while fighting continued on the front, and a success at sea would obtain more favorable peace terms. The High Sea Fleet would choose its point of attack wisely, and even if it suffered losses, the enemy losses would be in proportion and the Germans would still have sufficient strength to protect the submarine campaign in the North Sea should it have to be resumed. On 21 October Scheer’s chief of staff Captain von Levetzow secretly brought the order to Hipper: “The forces of the High Sea Fleet are to b
e made ready for attack and battle with the English Fleet.” Scheer apparently did not inform either the kaiser or the chancellor.124

  Hipper was well aware he might receive such an order. He had discussed the possibility of a final battle with his staff earlier in the month, and on 10 October his own chief of staff, Rear Admiral von Trotha, had given him the draft of a plan for a bombardment of the British coast, the interruption of the supply lines between Britain and the Continent, and a battle with the British fleet. The objective was to relieve pressure on the right flank of the German army. The element of “honor” was also not lacking. As Trotha’s memorandum presented it: “As to a battle for the honor of the fleet in this war, even if it were a death battle, it would be the foundation for a new German fleet of the future if our people were not altogether defeated; such a fleet would be out of the question in the event of a dishonorable peace.”125

  This point has been widely cited, although a recent biographer of Hipper argues this motivation was one of many and not necessarily decisive in planning the operation. The German plan was more than just a suicide mission into the jaws of the Grand Fleet. There was some military rationale behind it, possibly even some chance of success, and Hipper insisted on some leeway in choosing the moment for its execution. Certainly Hipper was also well aware that with the exception of the destroyers and U-boats, the German crews were now unreliable, and that the fleet had been weakened by the widespread disappearance of experienced middle rank officers.126

  Hipper’s plans for the sortie of the High Sea Fleet were contained in Operations Plan No. 19 of 24 October. The High Sea Fleet would leave the Bight by day and remain out of sight of the Dutch coast. The fleet would proceed into the Hoofden—the southern part of the North Sea—and attack the Flanders coast and Thames estuary at daylight on the second day of the operation. The commander of destroyers with 3 cruisers and the Second Destroyer Flotilla (10 destroyers) would attack the Flanders coast, and the commander of the Second Scouting Group with 4 cruisers and the Second Destroyer Half-Flotilla (5 destroyers) would attack the mouth of the Thames. The High Sea Fleet (18 dreadnoughts) would cover the Flanders attack; the 5 battle cruisers of the First Scouting Group would cover the attack on the Thames estuary. The retirement of the German fleet would be arranged so as to arrive at the most advantageous place to give battle off Terschelling one or two hours before dark on the evening of the second day. The commander of the Fourth Scouting Group (6 light cruisers), reinforced by the cruiser-minelayer Arkona, the auxiliary cruiser Möwe, and the Eighth Destroyer Flotilla (10 destroyers), would be responsible for mining the routes by which the Grand Fleet might be expected to approach. In case there had been no encounter with the British by the night of the second to third day, the commander of the flotillas would execute an offensive sweep in the direction of the Firth of Forth with the destroyers starting from Terschelling light vessel.

  The Germans intended to use, if possible, 7 Zeppelins for reconnaissance. Submarines were an even more important part of the plan. There would be approximately 25 U-boats deployed in six lines on British approach routes from the east coast of Scotland to Terschelling to cover the retirement of the High Sea Fleet and attack British forces before and after the battle. The U-boats had orders to concentrate on warships, refrain from attacks on cargo ships, make use of even unfavorable firing opportunities, and in the case of battleships and battle cruisers as far as possible fire salvoes of three torpedoes. They were not to economize on the expenditure of torpedoes. The operational orders were issued on 27 October with the operation to take place on the 30th. The submarines left for their designated positions the next day; the High Sea Fleet would concentrate in Schillig Roads on the 29th under the usual cover that “exercises” were scheduled for the 30th.127

  The debate over the Flottenvorstoss has usually become involved with controversy over Scheer’s and the navy’s underhanded behavior and refusal to submit to civilian control, and the plan is usually seen in the light of the mutiny it provoked. The social and political repercussions are well known. The question here might be framed in narrower terms. Did the plan make sense and was there any chance of success? The British were alert to the possibility of some German action before the end of the war. They were also aware the Germans might seek to decoy the Grand Fleet to the south, and the concern the Germans might try to draw them over a line of submarines or mines had been a source of worry throughout the war. The wireless interception and directional-finding stations also were able to ascertain an apparent concentration of six U-boats off the Firth of Forth. There also was evidence of unusual activity in the Bight, particularly minesweeping, always the signal for an operation. The Admiralty did not, however, expect the Germans to strike during armistice negotiations. They anticipated the blow might fall after the armistice terms had been settled.128 The Germans might therefore have achieved at least some surprise.

  It is also probable that Beatty had abandoned the cautious strategy evident at the beginning of the year. With the convoy system a success, he could afford to take more chances. He was chagrined that the war might end before the Grand Fleet had a chance to come to grips with the High Sea Fleet. “It is terrible to think that it is possible after all these weary months of waiting, we shall not have an opportunity of striking a blow,” he wrote to his wife on 22 September.129 It seems certain he would have rushed to meet Scheer.130 The results of such an action will never be known. Would the submarines have inflicted losses on the dreadnoughts, moving at high speed and screened by destroyers? What of mines? Air reconnaissance? The weather? The Germans might have inflicted some losses. Light craft, patrols, and cargo ships in the southern part of the North Sea might all have suffered. What if the Grand Fleet had met the Germans off Terschelling? What of the lessons of Jutland? Fire control? British shells? The weather and conditions of light? There are simply too many variables to give definite answers. Certainly the British and Americans would have suffered losses, but surely the Grand Fleet would not have been eliminated as an effective fighting force. What would have happened to the German fleet? It might have suffered as many or perhaps more losses, but probably not annihilation. What of German difficulties in moving through their own minefields? British submarines? The list of unanswerable questions grows. The problem is well suited for war gamers with their computers, but of course those games can only say what might have happened, not what would have happened.

  On a far broader scale, would it really have mattered by this date? The American army was now in France in great numbers. The convoys were moving vast quantities of supplies with relative safety to the British Isles and France. The German army was in full retreat. What if traffic in the southern North Sea and Dover Strait was temporarily disrupted, or a few British or American warships were lost? The tide would not have turned, and the German sailors would have lost their lives in vain. Undoubtedly they sensed this, and without entering into detail a mutiny in various degrees took place, mostly in the large German ships. Ratings refused to rejoin their ships or weigh anchor, demonstrated for peace, and cheered President Wilson. Hipper was forced to cancel the operation, and he then dispersed the fleet, the First Squadron to the Elbe, the Third to Kiel, and the Fourth to Wilhelmshaven. This served only to spread the disorders to the naval ports. The kaiser’s brother Prince Heinrich fled from Kiel on 5 November, reportedly in a truck flying the red flag. The disorders spread, and on 9 November Scheer advised the kaiser that the navy could no longer be relied on. The kaiser uttered the bitter words, “I have no longer a Navy,” the last words Scheer ever heard from his emperor.131 The kaiser abdicated the same day and left for exile in the Netherlands. The Germans signed the armistice on 11 November. There would be a different Der Tag than many had anticipated at the beginning of the war.

  The discussions among the Allies over the Armistice terms had been acrimonious. The Admiralty at first had no idea how deeply the rot had spread in the German fleet. Beatty had been anxious for the surrender of all but eight or nin
e capital ships—the latter number equivalent to the British capital ships he anticipated losing should there have been a general engagement. This would have meant the surrender of two of the three German battle squadrons and all battle cruisers. The British naval proposals were opposed by the politicians and some of the Allied military. They did not want to push the Germans too hard, and few really wanted to face a fifth winter of renewed war. There is no space here to enter into the detail of these negotiations, but in the end the British naval proposals were watered down. The American naval representative in the Allied Naval Council, the reportedly anglophobe Admiral Benson, was against the surrender as opposed to mere internment of the German fleet, suspecting the British would eventually get their hands on most of the German ships. The German ships would not be surrendered but merely interned, their eventual disposition left to a peace conference.

  It is not without significance that it was the First Sea Lord, Admiral Wemyss, who represented the Allied navies alongside Marshal Foch, representing the Allied armies, at the signature of the armistice in the railway car near Compiègne on 11 November. The naval terms of the armistice specified that 10 German dreadnoughts; all 6 battle cruisers; 8 light cruisers, including 2 minelayers; and 50 of the most modern destroyers would be interned under care and maintenance parties at a designated Allied port. In December the Germans also had to agree to substitute the fleet flagship Baden for the battle cruiser Mackensen, whose construction was not sufficiently advanced to permit her to put to sea or be towed. All submarines would be surrendered, all Russian warships captured in the Black Sea would be returned, and the blockade would remain in force until the signature of a peace treaty.132

  There was no neutral nation willing to accept the interned German fleet, and the Allied Naval Council quickly accepted the British proposal of Scapa Flow as a suitable location. On the evening of 15 November, the light cruiser Königsberg arrived off May Island in the Firth of Forth with Rear Admiral Meurer, Hipper’s representative, to discuss the details of the internment. In a series of coldly correct, if not frigid, meetings that evening and the following day with Beatty and his officers in the flagship Queen Elizabeth, it was arranged that the submarines would surrender to Admiral Tyrwhitt at Harwich, and the surface ships would surrender to Beatty in the Firth of Forth and later proceed to Scapa Flow for internment until their final fate was decided by the peace treaty.133