Commando General

by Richard B Mead

  When Marnham rang later that night, Bob immediately asked him if he would like to leave his job and take on another, with promotion to major. Marnham said that he would be delighted. Bob then told him that there was a potential snag: he needed to be on a ship to Egypt less than forty-eight hours later. Far from protesting, Marnham was highly enthusiastic, saying that any posting which would get him out of his current job would be welcome and, moreover, that his wife was in Africa and he had been desperate to get closer to her; this was, in fact, manna from Heaven as far as he was concerned! On the following day Marnham appeared in Clarke’s office and the problem had been solved.

  Bob was later to question the element of luck in his career, but if it ever played a role it was at this time. The delay in his posting to the Middle East, which caused him to be with his regiment when the appeal for volunteers arrived, the fact that Sergison-Brooke already regarded him highly enough to support his application, the presence of Niven as Clarke’s GSO2 and, most of all, the availability and willingness of Marnham to take his place at short notice, were the factors which combined to see him through. However, the result would not have been achieved without Bob’s refusal to accept defeat when the odds seemed to be stacked against him.

  On 7 July 1940 Bob was duly appointed to raise and command No. 8 Commando and promoted to acting lieutenant colonel. He immediately set about choosing his officers, who would in turn select their men. The Commando was to consist of a headquarters, with himself, a major as second-in-command, an adjutant, an administrative officer, a medical officer and three liaison officers. There would then be ten troops of fifty men, each commanded by a captain, who was himself assisted by a Troop Sergeant, and divided into two sections, comprising one subaltern and twenty-three other ranks.

  Bob’s first move was to appoint his second-in-command and, after consulting Clarke, he turned to the officer who had been rejected in his favour, Major Walter Curtis of the Somerset Light Infantry. Eight years older than Bob, Curtis was a highly experienced regimental officer, who was to do an excellent job before leaving to command a battalion six months later. Bob had not known him previously, but with many of his other officers he worked on the principle that if he had to go to war, he might as well do it amongst friends, and this was very evident in the process which now took place.

  Bob and Curtis needed a location at which to conduct their interviews. A myth has grown up that the officers were all recruited in the bar of White’s, the club from which Bob had resigned in late 1939, only to join again in 1940.9 Whilst he is likely to have met some would-be officers there during the process, and whilst the club network probably spread the word amongst the so-called ‘smart set’, the formal interviews were in fact all conducted on the ground floor of 32 Cadogan Square over the week following his own appointment. This was the residence of the sister of Richard, Lord Sudeley, always known as ‘Bones’, whom Bob had managed to get released from the Blues as a Troop Leader against the initial opposition of Forester. His first recruit for the HQ other than Curtis was Harry Stavordale as Adjutant, a job for which he turned out to be poorly equipped, although he was excellent in his other role, which was to keep everyone at HQ happy. Yet another member of the Blues, Philip Dunne, became the senior liaison officer. Robin Campbell, the son of Sir Ronald Campbell, who had been British Ambassador to France until that country’s capitulation, after which he was posted to Portugal, and Bill Barkworth were recruited as the other two liaison officers, both of them fluent German speakers. James Gilroy became the Medical Officer and a Major Gardner the Administrative Officer. The latter had established something of a reputation as the Town Major of Brest during the evacuation from France of the remnants of the BEF and was the only officer to be selected by the War Office. He was inclined to drink too much and did not get on well with Curtis. Many weeks later, Bob wrote to Angie: ‘All here greatly amused by a battle between my very GS Line Infantry 2 i/c and my fat and drunken Administration Officer who has chosen to be wilfully incompetentfi’10

  Last, but in Bob’s view not least on his HQ staff, was his soldier servant and runner, Trooper Cook. Cook had served in Bob’s machine gun troop in the early 1930s, before leaving the Blues at the end of his term of service. He had rejoined from the reserves at the beginning of the War and was quick to volunteer for the Commandos. When he arrived, Cook informed Bob that it would be unseemly for his batman to be a mere trooper and had himself promoted to corporal!

  By mid-July Bob had selected most of his officers, who now had to choose their men. He had decided very early on that each troop should be recruited from a single regiment serving in Eastern Command or London District, the intention being to promote a healthy rivalry between them, but this turned out to be much more difficult than he had expected. It was pointed out to him that the Royal Horse Guards and the Life Guards could hardly be expected to find fifty men each, and he was compelled to form a Household Cavalry troop from both, commanded by Sudeley, with two scions of newspaper publishing empires, Gavin Astor from the Life Guards and Julian Berry from the Blues,11 as his subalterns. The Foot Guards turned out to be even more troublesome. The commanding officers of each of the battalions concerned had been instructed to submit returns of volunteers by 20 July, but Bob encountered serious resistance from them and most actively discouraged their best men from volunteering whilst allowing applications from those they wished to be rid of, who rarely proved to be suitable.

  In desperation, Bob appealed to Sergison-Brooke. He discovered that the GOC’s views had not changed, but Brooke conceded that since he had personally recommended Bob, it was only reasonable that he should have some soldiers. He suggested that Bob should see the Regimental Lieutenant Colonels of the five regiments, to which Bob replied that he had met two of them and been sent away with a flea in his ear. Brooke promised to speak to all of them and suggested that Bob should try again two days later. This time they were much more cooperative, as a result of which Bob was able to form one troop each from the Grenadier, Coldstream and Scots Guards and a combined one from the Irish and Welsh Guards, which had fewer peacetime battalions.

  By the end of the first week of August, 8 Commando was substantially up to strength, with No. 1 Troop (Household Cavalry) under Captain Lord Sudeley, No. 2 Troop (Grenadier Guards) under Captain Kenneth Tufnell, No. 3 Troop (Coldstream Guards) under Captain Mervyn Griffith-Jones,12 No. 4 Troop (Scots Guards) under Captain Dermot Daly, succeeded in January 1941 by Captain Frank Usher, No. 5 Troop (Irish and Welsh Guards) under Captain Eddie Fitzclarence, No. 6 Troop (other units in London District and Eastern Command and known as ‘the Buffaloes’) under Captain Toby Milbanke, succeeded in December 1940 by Captain the Viscount Milton, No. 7 Troop (Somerset Light Infantry) under Captain Geoffrey Lance, No. 8 Troop (Line Cavalry) under Captain Godfrey Nicholson and No. 10 Troop (Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers and Royal Marines) under Captain George Smyth-Osbourne. No. 9 Troop was formed much later as another composite troop under Captain Pat Ness.

  The presence of Royal Marines in No. 10 Troop was the result of an initiative on Bob’s part whose outcome was far less successful than he hoped. He recalled that, following his appointment:

  I immediately asked if I could have a high percentage of Royal Marines contending that at least half the unit should come from the Corps whose tradition so obviously fitted them for the business of sea-borne raiding. Dudley said that he thought I might find some difficulty in getting agreement to this but suggested that I should go and plead my case with the Admiralty. At the Royal Marines Office I had little success. For reasons which I shall never understand, the Commandant General – or Adjutant General as he was called in those days – set his face against Commandos. Logically the Royal Marines should have taken over the whole Commando organisation on its conception. They should have scrapped the Royal Marine Division and never allowed the Army to usurp their traditional role.

  After considerable argument I was eventually allowed to recruit one officer and twelve Royal Marines
, the first and only from the Corps to join the Special Service Brigade until the formation, later on, first of No. 40 and then of No. 41 Royal Marine Commandos. Later still in 1943, in conformity with my original ideas, the R.M. Division was disbanded and Nos. 42–48 Commandos were formed from it.13

  This disappointment aside, Bob was immensely proud of the unit which he had raised. He had certainly attracted a number of officers who would go on to have remarkable wartime careers. Many would be decorated for leadership or bravery, the most notable amongst them being a tall, gangling and seemingly rather idle subaltern in No. 4 Troop, David Stirling, who had already built up a reputation as a mountaineer. He would in due course go on to form the Special Air Service Regiment, together with Jock Lewes, an Australian in No. 5 Troop, who was emphatically not one of the ‘smart set’, but who had led Oxford to victory in the 1937 Boat Race. Carol Mather, Stirling’s fellow subaltern, was also to join the SAS, as was George Jellicoe of No. 3 Troop, the former later becoming one of Field Marshal Montgomery’s longest serving personal liaison officers, the latter better known as the daring leader of the Special Boat Squadron. A fifth member of 8 Commando to join the SAS in its early days was Gordon Alston, a young gunner subaltern in No. 6. Troop. In contrast to all these warriors, No. 8 Troop’s Randolph Churchill, the son of the Prime Minister, was never really cut out to be a soldier and was distinctly poor at commanding others, but he was certainly a most entertaining companion and, in his way, a brave man. He would also spend a short time with the SAS, which at least had the considerable benefit of raising the Regiment’s profile with his father.

  Recruiting ceased on 22 August, by which time 8 Commando had concentrated at Burnham-on-Crouch in Essex.

  Chapter 8

  Training

  The Conditions of Service of those joining the newly formed Commandos were quite different from those of the rest of the British Army. Since all the men were volunteers, they were free to apply to return to their units, whose cap badges they continued to wear, after any operation. However, they could also be returned to their units at any time at the absolute discretion of their Commanding Officer, without any reason being given and without any right of appeal. In practice, being RTU’d was regarded as shameful, and this had a beneficial impact on both discipline and professional expertise.

  The officers and men did not live in barracks or camps, but were instead required to find their own accommodation and make their own arrangements for food and drink. They also paid their travelling expenses, other than when they were posted to a new station. For all such expenses the other ranks received a special allowance of 6/8d per day and the officers 13/4d, the latter also covering the costs of their soldier servants. The purpose was to encourage self-reliance and initiative, in accordance with Dudley Clarke’s vision. Thus, as the troops of 8 Commando arrived one by one at Burnham during August 1940, the first task of everyone was to find lodgings for themselves and to make arrangements with their hosts to be fed and watered. This did not prove to be a problem, as most of the town’s landladies were only too pleased to have another source of income.

  The officers were billeted out like the men, but they decided to mess together and were delighted to be offered facilities at the Royal Burnham Yacht Club, whose members were keen to show appreciation for their services. A private sitting room and dining room were made available, as well as the club bar, and one of the members lent the Commando a 30-ton ketch, which was used for sail training up and down the Crouch and out to sea as far as the boom defences. In the words of Carol Mather, ‘The mess bore a resemblance to the effortless ease and nonchalance of a London Club.’1

  If any of the members of 8 Commando thought that their essentially informal living arrangements, far removed from the rigid Army procedures to which they had been accustomed, would be reflected in their training, they were to be in for a surprise. In the Training Instructions which Bob issued on 12 August, the immediate emphasis was on discipline. Not only that, but discipline in the first instance meant drill, with at least two drill parades per week required of each troop. However, he also laid down:

  It cannot be too firmly impressed upon all ranks that drill is merely a means to an end and that the movement of men in formed bodies or in regular formation will NEVER be employed by personnel of No. 8 Commando EXCEPT on drill parades which will be regarded as completely separate and distinct from all other forms of training.2

  For a unit which comprised to a substantial extent members of the Household Brigade, drill was never likely to be a problem, but the next essential of training, the development of what Bob called ‘A Special Technique’, was quite another matter. Bob defined the characteristics of this as:

  Physical fitness.

  Mental alertness.

  The offensive spirit.

  Complete disregard of danger.

  The instinct of the hunter.

  The lightning, destructive and ruthless methods of the gangster.

  Absolute self-reliance.

  A knowledge of various tricks, ruses and devices.

  And, above all, the ability to move and act at night fearlessly and noiselessly and to regard the blackest darkness as an aid rather than as a hindrance to the attainment of a difficult and hazardous objective.3

  Bob also emphasised esprit de corps, not only in the individual troops with their regimental traditions, but in the Commando as a whole, and security, which he insisted must become a fetish with every man.

  Weapons training focused on personal weapons, which would be the tools of the trade. Most of these – rifles, pistols, sub-machine guns, grenades, even the 2” mortar – were familiar to every man, but few would have contemplated also being taught to use knives in hand-to-hand combat or to improvise bombs. A number of the general training subjects were also unfamiliar, notably boat handling, climbing, demolitions, sabotage and even ‘thuggery’! It was quickly evident to all that this was to be a different type of soldiering from that to which they had previously been accustomed. After three very hard weeks, each troop had a week off; there were few, if any, drop-outs.

  In addition to the training at Burnham, small parties of officers and senior NCOs were sent up to complete a course at the Special Training Centre at Lochailort in north-west Scotland, not only to develop their skills, but also so that they could become instructors themselves. The STC pre-dated the founding of the Commandos, having been set up in May 1940 on the initiative of Bill Stirling, David’s brother, and Brian Mayfield, who with four others had formed part of a team established to go to Norway, only to be frustrated by the collapse of the campaign there. They persuaded the War Office to let them start up a school for special forces, teaching fieldcraft, climbing, weapons training, demolitions and close-quarter fighting, with Mayfield as Commandant and Stirling as Chief Instructor.

  Stirling recruited his cousin, Lord Lovat,4 as Fieldcraft Instructor, and the other instructors included ‘Mad Mike’ Calvert, who subsequently found fame with the Chindits, Freddy Spencer Chapman, who formed a ‘stay behind party’ after the Japanese conquest of Malaya and was later in Force 136, and two rather elderly former Shanghai police officers, Captains Fairbairn and Sykes, who taught every known method of killing or disabling an enemy at close quarters. They also designed the eponymous knife, which was later issued to all in the Commandos and incorporated into the design of their shoulder badges. Bob’s old school friend Peter Fleming ran the Signals wing for a time, and students from outside the Commandos included David Niven and Fitzroy Maclean. Some of the officers, including David Stirling and Robin Campbell, had already completed the course prior to joining 8 Commando, and most of the others did so during August and September, but Randolph Churchill was ignominiously returned after only a few days, following an acrimonious argument with a sergeant instructor.

  Back at Burnham, personal training was complemented by collective training, which escalated from sub-section to section to troop and then to the Commando as a whole. Schemes and exercises were mounted,
in one of which the nearest Home Forces formation, 46 Brigade, played the role of the enemy. The brigade was deployed in Harwich against what was seen to be the likelihood of an imminent German invasion, and the exercise was designed to determine how it would react to being attacked not from the obvious direction, the sea, but from the landward side by a force of parachutists. Having been warned of this possibility, the brigade established positions on the outskirts of the town facing inland, as well as on the waterfront. In mid-morning 8 Commando suddenly manifested itself in the town itself, taking 46 Brigade completely by surprise. It had achieved this by stopping a train to Harwich some miles away from its destination, the men concealing themselves on the floor amongst the initially startled, but later highly amused passengers, and then alighting with alacrity in the middle of the town in order to overcome all the defences from behind. The brigade commander was delighted, writing later to Bob: ‘The tonic, which your trained and unorthodox methods provide, is just what my units need to smarten them up and develop initiative and quickness.’5

  On 17 July Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes had succeeded Bourne as Director of Combined Operations. He was a hero of the Great War, in which he had led the Zeebrugge Raid, which was still regarded as a model of amphibious warfare in spite of being only partially successful. Once Keyes had set up Combined Operations Headquarters (‘COHQ’) in Richmond Terrace, he assumed responsibility for all the Commandos, of which there were initially ten.6 Bob had met him socially before the War and greatly admired his aggressive spirit.