Whilst Bob was away, the Glen ships had moved up the Suez Canal to Kabrit, where the troops disembarked before moving to their camp at Geneifa on the Great Bitter Lake. Evetts arrived there two days later to address the assembled officers on the change of name of the force and on a more general reorganization. Each of the Commandos was now to become a battalion, No.7 as A Battalion, No. 8 as B Battalion and No. 11 as C Battalion. Colvin, Daly and Pedder were all promoted to lieutenant colonel and the seconds-in-command, respectively Ken Wylie, Sudeley and Keyes, were made up to major.
Another unit, to be known as D Battalion was also to be created out of 50 and 52 Commandos, which had been raised in the Middle East. The CO was to be Lieutenant Colonel George Young, who had formed 50 Commando in the summer of 1940, at much the time that the same process was taking place in the UK, out of volunteers from within Middle East Command. In addition, it accepted into its ranks a number of Spaniards who had served on the losing side in the Spanish Civil War. The Commando had initially been based on Crete. It had conducted one operation, the seizure of the Italian island of Castelorizzo, which lay off the Turkish coast some 80 miles to the east of Rhodes. Successful at first, the Commandos were subjected to a counter-attack by the Italians and had to be evacuated, an outcome which had gone down particularly badly with Churchill, but was more the result of a lack of appropriate action by the Royal Navy than any failing by Young’s men. No. 52 Commando had been raised at the same time as 50 and had served briefly against the Italians in Ethiopia, along with 51 Commando, formed largely of Palestinians, both Arab and Jewish, which remained in East Africa. The two Middle East Commandos which were to join Layforce each numbered little more than half the men of their UK-raised equivalents, so the new combined battalion was of similar size. Its traditions were somewhat different from its fellow battalions – the private soldiers, for instance, had been called ‘Raiders’ and had never practised self-billeting – but it was now subject to an identical training regime.
As the Layforce establishment would be not much less than that of an infantry brigade, Evetts recommended that Bob should be promoted to the rank of acting brigadier, but the Military Secretary’s department baulked at this, due to his youth and lack of seniority. The compromise was that he should instead become a full colonel. He was, however, allowed to increase the size of his staff. Campbell returned to B Battalion, with Waugh taking over his role as Intelligence Officer. No officers with the requisite staff qualifications or experience existed in Layforce to take on the role of Brigade Major, so the job went to Major Freddy Graham, a regular soldier serving in Egypt. Captain Brian Franks, a yeomanry officer, became the Signals Officer and Captain E. L. Francis from 11 Commando was transferred to be Staff Captain Q in charge of administration. The HQ establishment now consisted of five officers and twentyfour other ranks, together with the Folbot Section of two officers – Courtney and Lieutenant ‘Tug’ Wilson – and seventeen other ranks. In addition, there was a signals section.
Not long after arriving at Geneifa, Layforce was visited by the C-in-C Middle East, General Sir Archibald Wavell, together with John Dill, the CIGS, and Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, who were in the theatre primarily to visit Greece, to which country it had been decided to render military assistance. Bob asked if they would like to look over one of the Glen ships, and they readily agreed. No boats were immediately available, so Bob signalled to Glengyle to send one to pick them up. Although a landing craft arrived to carry the party to the ship, somehow the message was not received in its entirety and there was no one to greet them. Captain Petrie, when he heard, was horrified that the three distinguished visitors had not been given the reception due to them and bent over backwards to make amends.
For the rest of March and in early April training was carried out for Operation CORDITE,9 the capture of Rhodes. An outline of the town of Rhodes and the coast on either side of it was scratched out to scale in the desert, although other lines were also made just in case enemy reconnaissance planes were able to take photos of it. For this purpose, 6 Division was to consist of 16 Infantry Brigade, 22 Guards Brigade, Layforce and a regiment of tanks, with Layforce tasked to make the initial assault on the town itself. Bob attended numerous conferences in Cairo, and pre-operation leave was granted in batches to all ranks. Bob always stayed at Shepheard’s but frequently enjoyed the hospitality of David Stirling’s brother Peter, who was serving in the British Embassy. He had hoped to see something of his own two brothers, Peter and Michael, but they were with the Sherwood Rangers in Tobruk, where, having lost their horses, they were temporarily acting as gunners.
With CORDITE scheduled for the end of the first week of April, Courtney and Sherwood from the Folbot Section were embarked in HM Submarine Triumph for a reconnaissance mission. On the nights of 30 and 31 March Courtney and Lieutenant Commander Nigel Willmott, an RN navigating officer, paddled their frail craft on to the proposed landing beaches, returning with valuable intelligence which would have prevented disaster.10 Bob attended a final conference for the operation on 1 April and a full scale rehearsal was carried out three days later.
On 6 April CORDITE was postponed and later it was cancelled. The reason was a sudden and significant deterioration in the military situation. In Cyrenaica, where the Italians had been decisively beaten less than two months earlier, a German/Italian force under General Erwin Rommel attacked on 31 March, pushing the occupying divisions into headlong retreat and capturing three British generals, including Bob’s Company Commander at Sandhurst, Richard O’Connor. The Germans swept on to the Egyptian frontier, but failed to capture Tobruk, which was invested instead. On 6 April the Germans simultaneously invaded Yugoslavia and Greece, and 22 Guards Brigade was immediately transferred to the Western Desert, leaving 6 Division with insufficient troops to be sure of success.
It was only the first of many disappointments.
Chapter 10
Bardia
The setback to the British strategic position in the Mediterranean theatre had profound implications for Layforce, which was now put into GHQ Reserve. The four battalions were ordered to move to camps near Alexandria, three of them travelling in the Glen ships and D Battalion proceeding there by train. Layforce HQ was set up alongside A Battalion at Sidi Bishr, between Alexandria and Aboukir Bay, whilst the other battalions went into camp further east at Amiriya. In desperation, Bob drove to Cairo to see Lieutenant General Arthur Smith, Wavell’s Chief of Staff, to propose that Layforce should be used to attack Rommel’s flank on the coast of Cyrenaica, so that the German general could never be sure of the security of his lines of communication. His immediate impression was that the staff at GHQ had adopted a wholly defensive strategy, which they only understood how to implement by fighting stereotyped battles, completely lacking in imagination. Smith, who was disposed to be helpful, made time to come to Amiriya to address the troops, but Bob knew that the only way to assuage their disappointment over the cancellation of CORDITE was a promise of operations in the near future. Encouragingly, two such were now proposed.
On 14 April Bob was summoned to attend a conference chaired by the Naval C-in-C, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, aboard his flaghip, HMS Warspite. Accompanied only by Freddy Graham, Bob found the three Glen ship captains already there. Cunningham immediately asked why he had not brought with him his old friend, Walter Cowan. Bob replied that he had indeed requested Cowan to be present, but it seemed that he had not been informed when the boat was leaving Glenroy for the flagship. The Glen ship captains, who thoroughly disapproved of Cowan, looked smug, only to be discomfited when the old admiral arrived ten minutes later, to be warmly greeted by the C-in-C.1 A second interruption came fifteen minutes later when Waugh was ushered in, looking distinctly scruffy, wearing a beard which he had been trying to cultivate rather unsuccessfully, a pair of shorts several sizes too large and a solar topee. ‘Good God, Evelyn, what brings you here?’ asked Bob. ‘Merely loyalty, Sir,’ came the reply.2
Waugh’s sudden an
d unexpected appearance came as the result of a conversation between him and Bob some days beforehand, when Waugh had asked for a precise definition of the duties of the Brigade Liaison Officer, a position he held concurrently with that of Intelligence Officer. Bob told him that these were laid down in Field Service Regulations, where he could read them for himself, but they might be roughly interpreted as being his shadow. On occasions when Waugh was needed he must materialize without Bob having to send for him. On all other occasions he was to bother Bob as little as possible. Waugh had clearly decided that the conference fell into the first category.
The purpose of the conference was to discuss two operations, both of which were to take place on the following day. The first was for four troops of B Battalion under Sudeley to attack the coast road at Bomba, west of Tobruk between Gazala and Derna. However, although the men embarked in the destroyer HMS Decoy and sailed initially to Tobruk, whence they departed for Bomba, the sea conditions were unfavourable and at one point the destroyer ran aground, so the operation was cancelled.
The second and much larger operation was a raid by Layforce on the small port of Bardia, which was situated close to the Libyan frontier with Egypt and had been recaptured by the Axis forces during their rapid advance. The objectives were to harass the enemy’s lines of communication, inflict the maximum amount of damage and take a number of prisoners for interrogation. The original plan was for two battalions to take part, A in Glengyle and C in Glenearn. The ships duly sailed, but the operation was called off on 16 April when Captain Petrie of the Glengyle, the Senior Naval Officer, decided that the swell at sea and the surf on the beaches were both too high to permit the successful launching, loading and beaching of the LCAs.
With a new forecast of four days of fine weather, GHQ Middle East decided that another attempt should be made, this time by A Battalion alone. Glengyle sailed again on 19 April, accompanied by the anti-aircraft cruiser HMS Coventry and three Australian destroyers. HM Submarine Triumph, carrying Courtney, another member of his section and a folbot, was to provide navigation lights for the approach to the beaches. Bob and two members of his brigade staff, Franks and Waugh, supplemented for the occasion by Cowan and Campbell, accompanied the expedition in order to gain experience of operations. They were not, however, expected to go ashore.
A Battalion was divided into seven detachments of varying sizes, which would be landing on four beaches. Six LCAs and one larger LCM would be carrying four detachments on to Beach A, their tasks being:
No. 1 of 50 men – to secure and hold the beach.
No. 2 of 100 men – to establish a road block, take some prisoners and destroy a bridge
No. 3 of 100 men – to assault and capture a nearby camp
No. 4 of 50 men – to enter Bardia town from the north, destroy all vehicles and take some prisoners
Two LCAs were to land on Beach B, carrying No. 5 Detachment of 70 men, which was to enter Bardia from the south, destroying vehicles and taking prisoners. Two LCAs were to land on Beach C, carrying No. 6 Detachment of 70 men, whose objective was demolish a bridge and a pumping station and to crater the road at two points. A single LCA was to land No. 7 Detachment of 35 men on Beach D, their role being to destroy coast defence and anti-aircraft guns located on a nearby peninsula. Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 6 Detachments were to be accompanied by small parties of men from the Royal Tank Regiment, whose job was to employ and, in due course, to demolish any armoured vehicles which had been captured.
The timetable provided for the first LCA to leave Glengyle at 22.15 and the last to depart from the beaches on the return journey at 02.30 on the following morning, allowing the LSI and her escort to get under way for Alexandria in darkness. Bob announced that he would allow no deviation from the latter.
As Bob was to write later, ‘The operation was a miserable affair from the word “go”.’3 The first setback occurred as Glengyle approached the lowering position, when a green light should have been seen towards the shore. This was to have been placed on a small rocky island off the shore by Courtney. However, his folbot was damaged as he tried to launch it from Triumph and, before he could repair it, the submarine was forced to dive by an air attack.
There followed an altercation between Bob and Petrie concerning the weather, the latter suggesting once again that the swell and the surf were too great, the former, strongly supported by Cowan, disputing this by reminding Petrie that they had trained successfully in much worse conditions. Petrie then contended that the lack of a guiding light meant that the landing craft would be unable to locate the correct beaches. This opinion was countered by a remarkable character who had come along as a guide, Lieutenant Alfred ‘Pedlar’ Palmer, an Australian naval reserve officer who was making his name as the skipper of the schooner Maria Giovanni, running supplies into Tobruk under the noses of the Germans and Italians, and who knew the coast well. Insisting that he would be able to find the right beaches from the leading craft, he provided Bob with the ammunition to overrule Petrie.
The LCAs were all launched satisfactorily, except for one which got caught up in its davits, whilst the quick release mechanism for the LCM became temporarily stuck, causing some delay before it was fixed. The LCAs left for the shore no more than fifteen minutes later than the plan demanded. Palmer was as good as his word, and all the LCAs and the LCM bound for Beach A landed their men satisfactorily. One of the two craft destined for Beach B also landed at Beach A, causing some confusion, whilst the other was the one which had failed to be launched. Of the LCAs heading for Beach C, one arrived late and the other very late due to problems with its steering gear. At Beach D, which proved to be narrow and difficult to land on, the LCA was eventually lashed to a rock so that the men could clamber over the side into waist-high water.
The landing was unopposed, the only enemy being some motorcycle combinations which made off speedily in the other direction to raise the alarm. No. 1 Detachment deployed immediately to protect Beach A. Unfortunately, however, an officer from another detachment, trying to make contact, failed to respond to a sentry’s challenge with the correct password or to show the recognition signal on his torch and was shot and seriously wounded; although evacuated to the ship he died the next day. No. 2 Detachment set up a roadblock, but no vehicles passed by. No. 3 Detachment reached the camp it was intended to attack, only to find it empty, with no signs of recent occupation other than in one building. The detachment did find a stock of motor tyres, which it set alight with incendiary bombs. No. 4 Detachment found Bardia unoccupied and had to return for lack of time before it could make a detailed search. No. 5 Detachment, having landed at the wrong beach, was unable to reach Bardia from the other direction. No. 6 Detachment sent one party to the pumping station, but the directions were poor and, by the time it arrived there, the party was forced to return in accordance with the timetable before it was able to inflict serious damage. The second party found the road impossible to crater satisfactorily and was only able to make the bridge impassable to motor transport. No. 7 Detachment found no trace of mobile guns, but located four old Italian naval guns once used for coast defence. These were missing their firing mechanisms, but, just to be sure, the breeches were blown apart with gelignite.
Bob himself ignored instructions to remain on the ship and went ashore with the members of his staff. Cowan and Waugh wanted to take an active role in the proceedings, but since they were not supposed to be there at all, Bob insisted that they stay with him. Aiming for high ground, where they hoped to watch the action, the group of officers was startled to come across a wadi which was full of dead Italians. Returning later across the wadi, Franks and Campbell leant over the edge to pull up one of the other members of the party, who was having difficulty climbing up. Believing him to be Waugh, they decided to pull him on his belly along the side for a few yards before heaving him over the top. To their dismay, they discovered that they had mishandled a highly indignant Cowan!
All the LCAs except two returned safely to the Glengyle. One had
breached to in the surf and could not be refloated, so was destroyed. The other lost its way but managed to sail along the coast to Tobruk. Its problem appeared to be a faulty compass and, during his return trip, Bob found that the coxswain of his own LCA, trying to keep on the right compass course, was heading towards Tobruk rather than out to sea. It turned out that the compasses on all the landing craft had been affected by the magnetic metal casing around them and were giving totally inaccurate directions. After a certain amount of zigzagging, the ship was reached safely by all the others, but as a result their recovery was completed much later than planned. Glengyle and her accompanying escort nevertheless weighed anchor before dawn and arrived back in Alexandria shortly before midnight.
The biggest upset occurred when a large party of 70 men from No. 3 Detachment took a wrong turning and arrived in a small bay between Beaches A and B. It then made its way across a headland to Beach B, where it hoped to be picked up, only to find no landing craft there. It was by now too late to make for Beach A, so a message was sent for the party to make for Sollum in Egypt, but they were in due course taken prisoner.
The Bardia raid was not so much a failure as a fiasco, caused substantially by the very poor intelligence on which it had been based. This had spoken of a garrison of some 2,000 men and a large number of vehicles and pieces of equipment. Apart from the fact that Rommel diverted a brigade-sized formation to protect against further such raids, it had achieved very little.
Not all was lost, however, as Layforce had learnt a number of lessons which were to prove valuable for the future. Among these were that it should be possible to load the LCAs before the LSI had anchored in order to get them away without any delay. Bob also felt that heaving to four miles offshore was too far out for the LSIs, especially when the landing craft were trying to find the ship on their return from the beaches, and recommended that the distance should be reduced to two and a half miles, which he did not believe would compromise safety. He identified a number of unnecessary delays in clearing the beaches following the landing and suggested that parties arriving on the wrong beach should wait there until the others had left to avoid confusion, alternative plans being made in advance for such situations. The close formations adopted for Europe’s dark nights were now seen to be unnecessarily vulnerable under the much lighter Mediterranean skies. More attention needed to be given to back bearings during the advance from a landing beach, as some of the returning parties, and not only the one which was lost, found it difficult to remember where they were. The Navy beachmasters were not fully familiar with landing procedures and Bob recommended that they should be accompanied by Army liaison officers. Anti-magnetic casings were clearly to be essential in future for the landing craft compasses.
Commando General Page 12