The experiences of A Battalion at Bardia did nothing to improve the overall morale of Layforce. Bob was starting to become seriously concerned, not least because the six months service for which the men had all signed on would shortly be coming to an end. Whilst there was no appreciable indication of officers and men wanting to return to their units, Bob knew that this would become the case if the prospects for action remained slight. Once again he went to see Arthur Smith in Cairo. Smith invited him to set out his concerns in writing and Bob sent him a long letter on 6 May, the key sentiments of which were as follows:
Since our arrival here … we have pursued the heart-breaking course of working up to concert pitch for projects which have eventually been cancelled.
The effect on the troops may be summed up by an inscription written up on a partition in the mess decks of one of the Glen ships (the culprit was never apprehended) which read: ‘Never in the history of human endeavour have so few been b-----ed about by so many.’ Frivolous as this may seem I cannot but sympathise with the sentiments expressed.
I think that we all feel that if the higher authorities consider our useful employment to be problematical then it would be better to disband the Special Service Brigade now rather than to see it deteriorate.
Although all would feel a disappointment at witnessing the disbandment of a force on which they had set their hearts, to which so much time and money has been devoted, and in which we originally felt so much pride, the time is rapidly approaching when all ranks of the Special Service Brigade are beginning to doubt the justification of our existence.4
Disbandment was not to take place yet, however. Instead, Layforce was to be subjected to yet further disappointment and, in the case of two of its battalions, to disaster.
By the time that Bob wrote to Smith, C Battalion had already been removed from Bob’s command and sent to reinforce the garrison of Cyprus, which up to then had consisted of a single infantry battalion and which was thought in the new circumstances to be highly vulnerable. Waugh was later to claim that there was some discontent with Pedder, the CO, ‘whose peculiarities came very near megalomania’,5 but this was certainly the best trained and most committed of all the battalions and it was disappointed to be assigned to a static role.
B Battalion’s morale was particularly low as it had not participated in any actions apart from the abortive raid on Bomba. At the end of April it was decided to send it to Mersa Matruh, from where it would carry out small-scale seaborne operations. These were made much more difficult by all three Glen ships being despatched to Greece to help evacuate the British and Australian troops who had been unable to withstand the German advance through that country. Instead, the battalion was allocated a China river gunboat of Great War vintage, HMS Aphis. This vessel, which mounted two 6” guns and some pompoms for air defence, had a particularly shallow draught but proved otherwise to be totally unsuitable. She was incapable of carrying landing craft, so the troops had to practise paddling ashore in collapsible pontoon punts, into which they could step directly from the ship’s side thanks to her very low freeboard.
On 14 May Bob, with Waugh and the advance party of B Battalion, sailed in Aphis from Alexandria to Mersa Matruh, with the rest travelling there by train. Having heard that his old school friend Peter Fleming had been evacuated from Greece, Bob sent Waugh to pick him up in Cairo and bring him to Mersa Matruh to demonstrate new types of bombs and booby traps. Bob stayed there for a pleasant few days, the only unwelcome incident coming when a party of Australian soldiers fired in his direction whilst he was swimming off the beach, missing him by a few yards. Distinctly irate, he complained to their commanding officer, who brushed it off with ‘Well, if you give them rifles and ammunition, you must expect them to want to do a bit of practising!’6
The objective of the first raid of B Battalion was the airfield at Gazala, about 40 miles west of Tobruk. Under the overall command of Daly, a party of eleven officers and 99 other ranks was selected from Nos. 1, 3, 4, 8 and 10 Troops and included three future SAS officers, Lieutenants Stirling, Jellicoe and Mather. With this contingent on board, Aphis sailed from Mersa Matruh on 20 May. In the words of Mather:
During the course of this operation we spent seven days on this little vessel (there was no room below) under spasmodic and then continuous attack by enemy dive-bombers. One hundred and seventy-two bombs (according to the ship’s log) were aimed at the Aphis, not one of which made a direct hit. But the near misses deluged us in spray and played ducks and drakes around the ship, landing on one side of the ship and exploding on the other. We returned a hot fire at the enemy aircraft with our puny weapons, Bredas, pom-poms and anything we could lay out hands on, LMGs, Tommy guns and rifles, downing several aircraft.7
Naturally they were accompanied by Cowan, who was in his element, firing at the aircraft with his own tommy gun. However, all hope of surprise was lost and the swell was breaking over the deck, so the captain returned to Mersa Matruh on 22 May. After a second abortive voyage three days later, the ship put to sea once more on 26 May but was spotted almost immediately, and this time a bomb put the steering gear out of action. Early on the following morning Aphis made port under a jury steering rig, but this was her last attempt.
Having seen Aphis off on her first sortie, Bob returned to Sidi Bishr and then flew to Cairo for a meeting at GHQ on 22 May to discuss the possibility of converting two of his battalions into four Long Range Desert Groups. The LRDG commander, Major Ralph Bagnold, expressed a strong preference for recruiting from existing AFV regiments and motorized units and, although Bob emphasised the adaptability of his men, the matter was referred to a higher authority.
That evening Bob returned to Sidi Bishr, leaving at 20.00 for Mersa Matruh, where he wanted to be brought up to date on the Gazala raid. He arrived at 04.45 the next morning to find that Aphis was at sea. His visit proved to be ‘an exceedingly brief one, lasting precisely the five minutes it took me to drink a whisky and soda and my driver to refill the car with petrol.’8 Daly was waiting for him with the news that a telephone message had just been received from GHQ , ordering Bob to return to Alexandria as quickly as possible.
Chapter 11
Crete
The reason for Bob’s urgent recall to Alexandria was the sharply deteriorating situation on Crete. Even before the occupation of mainland Greece was complete, Hitler had issued a directive for the seizure of the island for use in air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, a threat which was confirmed by subsequent ULTRA intercepts. Major General Bernard Freyberg, who had led 2 New Zealand Division in Greece, was placed in overall command of the Allied force defending Crete, which comprised two brigades from his own division, a brigade from 7 Australian Division, a British regular brigade, a number of other unattached British and Australian units, the Mobile Naval Base Defence Organization, comprising about 2,000 Royal Marines, who were mostly gunners serving in coast and air defence batteries, and nine weak regiments from the Greek Army.
Crete is over 150 miles long as the crow flies and its northern coast is very much longer, due to its many indentations. Its defence thus presented a considerable problem for Freyberg, who decided to concentrate his strength around the three airfields at Maleme, Rethymno and Heraklion, the port of Canea and the anchorage at Suda Bay. These were linked by a single road which would be very easy to cut. Freyberg had little in the way of transport and few armoured fighting vehicles, and there was thus no possibility of mutual support by his widely dispersed forces.
Following six days of bombing, the German invasion began on the morning of 20 May, with parachute drops near the three airfields by General Student’s XII Fliegerkorps. The assault was extremely costly for the Germans. In spite of their attempts to locate drop zones away from defended areas, they were highly vulnerable before they were able to concentrate and were slaughtered in large numbers. However, one regiment managed to gain control of Maleme airfield by the following morning. The local New Zealand commander withdrew his force
precipitately from the airfield and the high ground dominating it, allowing Student’s reserve battalion to drop successfully. Later on the same day, the first transport aircraft arrived, carrying reinforcements composed of experienced mountain troops. A counter-attack failed to restore the situation.
The capture of Maleme was the key to the battle. Notwithstanding that the defenders were holding on well elsewhere and that the Royal Navy dominated the seas north of Crete by night and was able to sink many of the ships carrying further reinforcements, the capacity of the Germans to build up their forces was now undoubted. A front was formed west of Canea, but it came under severe pressure as the Germans continued to reinforce. On 26 May Freyberg signalled to Wavell that the loss of the island was only a matter of time and, on the following day, the C-in-C ordered its evacuation.
Crete – The Road to Sphakia.
The defenders of Heraklion were embarked satisfactorily on Royal Navy ships, although there were significant casualties from air attacks on the voyage to Alexandria. The Australians at Rethymno, cut off in both directions, were surrounded and captured. The bulk of the Allied troops, however, were in the west of the island and these, British, Australian, New Zealand and Greek, were ordered to make for the small fishing port of Sphakia on the south coast, from the small beach at which the Royal Navy would evacuate them.
Arriving back in Alexandria on the morning of 23 May, Bob was informed by the Area Commander that Layforce, less B Battalion at Mersa Matruh and C Battalion in Cyprus, had been ordered to proceed immediately to Crete as the only available reinforcements. Lieutenant Colonel Colvin, the CO of A Battalion, with his staff and No. 1 Company, embarked on the fast minelayer HMS Abdiel that afternoon and sailed later for Crete, arriving there during the night.
D Battalion and the remainder of A Battalion were put on twelve hours’ notice of departure. Early on the following day, however, they were ordered to embark by 07.00, but there was no road transport available. It was only by Bob going round neighbouring units personally appealing to their COs for help that enough transport was put together to carry the troops to the docks, where they boarded four destroyers, HMS Isis, HMS Decoy, HMS Hero and HMAS Nizam, which sailed at 10.45. What Bob later described as ‘a very untidy prelude’1 to their operations occurred when two men from D Battalion fell overboard just as the ships were leaving harbour and had to be left behind.
The destroyers headed initially for Selino Kastelli on the south-west corner of Crete, in line with a plan to attack Maleme from the south. However, during their passage they were diverted to Porto Loutro, just west of Sphakia, where the troops were to be landed in the ships’ boats and met by motor transport and mules, which would take them over the mountains towards the fighting around Canea. As they approached the island, however, the weather deteriorated and the sea conditions became very rough. Bob spent the night on the bridge of Isis with the captain, but although the men mustered on deck and the crew appeared to be keen to row them to shore, he wholeheartedly agreed that to attempt to land would be to court disaster. Running short of fuel for a prolonged stay, the ships turned back for Alexandria with the intention of returning on the following night.
The men on Isis and Nizam, including Bob and his HQ , were now transferred to Abdiel, which had just returned from her first foray, and the little flotilla sailed again at 23.00 on 25 May, having also taken on board the two men who had fallen into the sea on their previous departure. Abdiel was commanded by Captain Edward Pleydell-Bouverie, the brother of a friend of Bob’s, who told him in confidence that the news from Crete was far worse that Bob had been led to believe, that Maleme had been taken and that the Allied forces were being pushed back. The new destination was Suda Bay, which meant that the flotilla had to run the gauntlet of German bombers in daylight around the eastern end of the island and along the north coast. Abdiel was one of a class reputed to be the fastest in the Royal Navy and, with the two destroyers, made good time, arriving at Suda Bay twenty-four hours later without being spotted. Pleydell-Bouverie told Bob that he would have to engineer a very quick disembarkation into two LCMs which would come out to meet them, in order to allow the ship time to avoid the dangerous waters before daylight; Bob was able to reassure him that his men were the best trained in the Army at doing just that.
Unfortunately, it did not turn out as they had hoped. The LCMs arrived full of wounded, who had to be lifted on to the ship, which took a great deal of time. Moreover, after they had taken the first parties from Layforce ashore, they returned with even more wounded. The situation was compounded by the naval officer in charge being badly shell-shocked, which not only affected his judgement in carrying out the operation, but also spread great concern when he described in graphic terms the state of affairs on land, which he assured everyone he met was close to disaster, strongly recommending a return to Alexandria. Bob told him very curtly that he did not require his advice, and Pleydell-Bouverie threatened to put him under arrest if he did not pipe down.
In the very small hours of 27 May the last men were taken ashore, but because of the need for the ships to sail well before daylight, a great deal of equipment was left behind, including most of the radio sets. The situation in and around Suda was chaotic, with fires and other bomb damage everywhere and parties of soldiers, seemingly detached from their units and with little semblance of discipline, moving in the wrong direction, away from the fighting. Bob was met by a liaison officer from A Battalion, which had established a line just west of Suda, and one from Major General Weston, the Royal Marine officer who had commanded the MNBDO prior to the invasion and who had recently been given responsibility for all those formations and units which had defended Canea, Suda Bay and Maleme. These, it was now confirmed, were in full retreat. Having consulted a small-scale map by torchlight, Bob ordered George Young to move D Battalion to an area east of Suda where, after establishing a defensive position, the men should try to get some much needed sleep; he also ordered Freddy Graham to set up the HQ nearby. He then set off with Waugh to find Weston.
It took about an hour and a half to locate Weston’s HQ , and when Bob arrived he found the general fast asleep in a state of exhaustion. His GSO1 begged Bob and Waugh not to wake him, but Weston did open one eye and, on being informed that Layforce had landed, murmured, ‘Thank God’ and went back to sleep. The GSO1 explained the situation, which was dire. The counter-attack on Maleme had failed, all the Allied fighter aircraft had been destroyed and the Germans now had complete air superiority, on which they were capitalizing by using dive bombers on the retreating troops. He warned that movement by day was highly dangerous. Layforce’s orders were to form a rearguard with the Marines of the MNBDO, covering the withdrawal eastwards to the point where a small secondary road branched off the coast road towards Sphakia.
Bob instantly realized that this was a role for which his men were supremely ill-equipped. Carrying only sub-machine guns, pistols, knives, a limited number of rifles and a handful of Bren guns, with no heavy machine guns, mortars or mines, let alone artillery support, this was the antithesis of the kind of operation for which they had prepared for so many months. Bob determined to take the matter up directly with Freyberg, but before he did so he visited Colvin, who appeared to be greatly relieved to see him. A Battalion had been bombed but had thus far suffered no casualties since landing. Bob gave orders for it to hold a defensive position astride the coast road until D Battalion had moved into position just south of the road junction, upon which it would leapfrog back to another position which it should select itself.
Bob and Waugh, having somehow appropriated for themselves a truck and a Marine driver, then drove on to Freyberg’s HQ. As Bob wrote subsequently:
Later in the morning I found General Freyberg. He confirmed that the battle of Crete was lost, that our own forces in the island were utterly exhausted and that it now only remained to evacuate as many of them as possible. Since Layforce was composed of comparatively fresh troops it was to be used to take the brunt of t
he rearguard fighting necessary to cover this withdrawal. When I suggested that we might be more effective if, for example, we were landed in the rear of the enemy to harass his lines of communication and thus throw his advance into confusion, I was told in no uncertain terms to get on with the job allotted to me without further argument.2
The only comfort was that this was not to be a defence to the last man; the Layforce battalions were to withdraw once they were put under extreme pressure. Bob was later to say that withdrawal was made much easier by the fact that the Germans only operated by day and made no attempt to exploit their success by night. There was, however, an adverse impact on sleep, which was impossible in daytime due both to infantry attacks and, less damaging by way of casualties but much more so in terms of morale, to dive bombing. Bob himself experienced the latter shortly after returning from his meeting with Freyberg. Needing a wash, he had just stripped off and filled his helmet with water when the Stukas arrived. ‘I have never felt more utterly naked in my life,’3 he wrote later.
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