Commando General

by Richard B Mead

  During 27 May A Battalion held its line from the road west of Suda into the hills on the landward side, with D Battalion and 28 Maori Battalion further back near the road junction close to which Graham had set up Bob’s HQ. As darkness fell, D Battalion fell back to prepare a line further south between Stylos and Babali Hani, leaving a detachment, composed largely of Spanish Republicans, to hold a position just before the junction. However, believing it to be untenable, many of the Spaniards withdrew without orders and rejoined their battalion, whilst those who remained in position were later cut off.

  The last Allied troops passed through A Battalion’s line at about 21.00 and, with patrols still in contact with the enemy, the battalion withdrew at 03.00 towards Stylos. Three troops fell into an ambush, which was beaten off with light casualties. Just before midnight, however, Colvin appeared at Bob’s Rear HQ to say that his line had been outflanked; but shortly after daylight on 28 May his second-in-command, Major Ken Wylie, led a spirited counter-attack on the advancing Germans with some success. During that day the battalion withdrew further through D Battalion’s position five miles south of Stylos. Waugh visited them and asked to see Colvin, finding him under a table from which he only reluctantly emerged after the German dive bombers had left the sky

  On the morning of 28 May, on his way to Brigade HQ with Freddy Graham and supposing that they would be well covered by D Battalion’s positions, Bob found himself in an ambush. German mountain troops had managed to work their way across to the road and were lying in wait. Layforce had unexpectedly been allocated the last three Matilda infantry tanks on the island, two of which had been given instructions to rendezvous nearby but were initially nowhere to be seen. By what Bob later described as ‘an incredibly lucky coincidence’,4 at just that moment the two men saw the tanks under camouflage nets nearby, just off the road.

  Why they and the Germans had not seen each other before I cannot imagine, but be that as it may it did not take Freddie and myself as long as it takes to write this to jump into them and, camouflage nets and all, drive with some satisfaction slap through the German ambush scattering them in all directions. They retreated rapidly towards the west into country over which we could not follow them.5

  Later that day, Bob managed to contact Brigadier Hargest, who now commanded all the New Zealand troops remaining on the island, and was lucky to find with him his Australian counterpart, Brigadier Vasey. He wrote later:

  Their view was that the three of us should co-ordinate the withdrawal without reference to anyone else as it was useless to expect coherent orders from above. They took a poor view of Weston and his staff and said so without mincing their words. Consequently we discussed plans and agreed what lines we should hold and for how long.6

  In the words of the subsequent Inter-Services Committee report on Crete:

  Close collaboration between Brigadier Hargest, commanding the 5th New Zealand Brigade, Vasey, commanding the 19th Australian Brigade, and Colonel Laycock, commanding Layforce, alone enabled the initial part of the withdrawal to be conducted in security.7

  Bob had left A Battalion in what he thought was a very suitable position on some high ground with a fine field of fire, from which he believed the Germans could be held for some time. To his horror, on his way back from inspecting D Battalion’s new position he met several detachments of A Battalion retreating towards him. When he asked what they were doing leaving a defensive position without orders, they assured him that they had received a direct order from their commanding officer. Although a counter-attack led by Captain Jocelyn Nicholls partially restored the situation, the position had been abandoned quite unnecessarily. Colvin, who had clearly completely lost his nerve, was relieved of his command and, although Wylie was appointed his successor, the remnants of the two battalions were now effectively merged under Young.

  D Battalion, together with 2/8 Australian Battalion, bore the brunt of the action on 28 May, with many casualties, and so Bob, accompanied by Waugh as Graham was worn out, set out to visit Young again that evening. Young was not entirely pleased to see them, because he was in a poor position, albeit the best that could be found; also, Bob had discarded his tin helmet and was ‘rather stupidly’,8 as he later admitted, wearing his red banded service dress cap, which Young pointed out was drawing enemy fire. Michael Borwick, Young’s adjutant, whilst agreeing that the hat attracted unwelcome attention, later recorded another view of Bob:

  I went down the road with Bob Laycock for him to see for himself – he was a great morale booster by himself, full of fun and made jokes the whole time. One enemy fighter had a go at us, so we landed in an undignified heap. I cannot remember who was on top.9

  By early afternoon the battalion was engaged in heavy fighting and its HQ was very nearly surrounded before the enemy troops were pushed back with heavy losses. That night, the battalion withdrew a long way further south to Askyphos, where it was joined by A Battalion.

  Bob’s HQ had been in Babali Hani, but it moved during the night of 28/29 May much further south to Ayios Antonios. The staff had not gone 100 yards when five mortar bombs landed on the house. They boarded one of the very few trucks available, but it had to be abandoned when they reached a point in the road where it had been cratered against orders and was being repaired by a party of engineers. The last of the tanks, which had recently proved their worth on a number of occasions, was also left behind, its engine running but with oil and water drained so it would seize up.

  In the plan agreed with the two brigadiers Layforce was due to establish a new line south of Vryses. However, in the light of its casualties and, even more, its exhaustion after two days and nights without sleep, Weston decided that it should be relieved by the New Zealanders and withdraw further south. Brigade HQ was located near Imvros, where Weston’s own HQ was also sited at the time. The two battalions both made their way to Askyphos during 29 May, with D Battalion taking up positions flanking the ravine south of the village through which the road led to Sphakia, whilst A Battalion rested in the ravine itself.

  For the whole of 30 May Layforce remained in these positions, and that evening Bob and Waugh went to find Freyberg, whose HQ was situated in a cave near Sphakia. He gave each of them half a cupful of sherry and a handful of beans, and Bob asked him about the order of embarkation. The reply was simple: ‘You were the last to come so you will be the last to go’.10 Freyberg, however, made it clear that he was referring to the fighting troops, all of whom would have priority over the very many stragglers who had become separated from their units and were now rapidly becoming a rabble. Shortly afterwards he left the island by flying boat. On their return journey, Bob and Waugh found the going too difficult in the dark and spent the night in a little shrine on a hilltop. They found some recreation in completing Times crossword puzzles, a book of which Bob had bought in Egypt.

  On 31 May D Battalion moved further back to a new line to the east of Sphakia covering the final evacuation route to the beach. A Battalion was relieved in its old position by the Maoris and also took up a new position covering the beach itself, with the battalion split into left and right flanks. Early that afternoon Bob and Waugh went to see Weston in the cave formerly occupied by Freyberg. This led to the following entry in the Layforce war diary, which was written up by Waugh well after the events it recorded:

  Final orders from CREFORCE for evacuation (a) LAYFORCE positions not to be held to the last man and last round but only as long as was necessary to cover withdrawal of other fighting forces. (b) No withdrawal before order from H.Q. (c) LAYFORCE to embark after other fighting forces but before stragglers.11

  Weston, according to Bob, was thoroughly despondent, warning that there was a shortage of ammunition and food was in very short supply. Bob replied that his men, having picked up large quantities of abandoned ammunition during the retreat, had more than they could possibly shoot off, and had also been trained to forage for themselves. He was amused later in the day when his soldier servant, Corporal Cook, on being as
ked what was on the menu for dinner, replied, ‘Two roast fowls and a sucking pig. This was a slight exaggeration, for the meal consisted of “an old hen which had obviously run several times round the island and some pieces of pork from a pig of doubtful age”.’12

  That evening Bob received a message from Weston to report to him again without delay. This was a key meeting and Bob recorded it later in his memoirs:

  On arrival at his headquarters I found him looking more utterly dejected than I can describe. He looked at me without appearing to see me for a moment or two and then said very slowly and very quietly: ‘I am now going to say something which, even in my most ghastly nightmare, I never dreamed that I could say to a British officer on the field of battle. Take down this order.’ I turned to Freddy who produced a notebook and pencil. Again in a voice so subdued that we could hardly hear him General Weston started to dictate.

  ‘From GOC Crete to Remnants Creforce. You will provide yourself with a white flag. Tomorrow morning at first light you will seek out the Commander of the German forces and surrender to him.’

  When he had finished, Freddy handed the message to me. I gazed at it for some time before asking Weston whether he would consider it very insubordinate if I flatly refused to obey it. Weston’s reply was not, as might so easily have been the case, that it was not for me to reason why. Instead he told me that it was clearly necessary to find a senior officer to explain the situation formally to the enemy … He told me that he himself had been ordered to leave the island in a flying boat that was due to arrive shortly, that Vasey and Hargest were about to embark and that I, as a full Colonel, would be the senior officer left on the island.

  I pointed out that the Commandos still had plenty of fight left in them. Either I could stay and organize guerrilla warfare in the hills (which some of the Commandos eventually undertook on their own initiative) or, as there were still ships lying off Sphakia, I could evacuate as many of my own men, including my Brigade Staff, as could get down to the beach in time.

  I must admit to being somewhat relieved when Weston, after some thought, gave it as his opinion that the second alternative seemed much more likely to pay a dividend to our future war effort. In coming to this decision he had taken into account that, as the Germans were making no attempt to give us the coup de gras [sic], the responsibility of Layforce to provide a rearguard to a force which was due to surrender in a few hours time had lapsed.

  With regard to finding a senior officer to surrender to the Germans, he agreed that as a full Colonel prepared to continue the war was worth more to our side than a Lt. Colonel who gave every appearance of doing no such thing, it was more appropriate for the latter to undertake the role than the former … I now had his permission to delegate my responsibility and that I was at liberty to evacuate my Brigade Headquarters and as many of my men as possible.

  I left Weston to go out to his seaplane and went in search of my understudy. When I found him I handed over the surrender orders. Poor man, he was very unhappy.13

  Graham’s account of this key episode is very different, although the conclusion is much the same. He wrote later that he was already at Weston’s HQ without Bob, where he identified himself as the Layforce Brigade Major and was ordered directly by Weston to take down the surrender order. He also wrote that Bob had been there earlier and that, when the two met up again shortly afterwards, Bob told him that when Weston had ordered him to make the surrender, a staff officer had ‘intervened to say that Layock still had two Battalions of his Brigade in Egypt. On hearing this Weston changed his mind and ordered Layock to take his Brigade HQ and as many of his force (which was now about 400 all ranks) as he could out that night.’14

  Weston wrote in his own despatches that he sent for Colvin to make the surrender, clear evidence that Bob himself was free to go. Graham confirmed that Colvin was present in Weston’s cave and that one of the three copies of the order was given directly to him, with one retained by Weston and one by Graham.

  The order subsequently appeared in Weston’s despatches and, albeit with one key difference, was later appended by Waugh to the Layforce War Diary. The latter reads as follows:

  From: Major-General Weston.

  To: Lt. Col. Colvin.

  In view of the following facts:

  (a) My orders direct me to give preference in evacuation to fighting troops. This has reduced the active garrison below what is required for resistance.

  (b) As no rations are left this Saturday night most of the troops are too weak owing to shortage of food and heavy strain to organise further resistance

  (c) The wireless will give out in a few hours and the risk of waiting for instructions from Mideast cannot be accepted as this will leave the Officer Commanding without guidance as to his course of action.

  (d) There is no possibility of further evacuation.

  I hereby order you to collect what senior Officers are available before tomorrow and communicate this order to them.

  I further order you to go forward at first light tomorrow and capitulate to the enemy.

  Signed. Weston. Major-General.15

  The last two paragraphs in the version recorded in Weston’s despatches are different:

  I therefore direct you to collect such senior officers as are available in the early hours of tomorrow and transmit these orders to the senior of them.

  These orders direct this officer to make contact with the enemy and to capitulate.16

  In the War Diary Waugh recorded that Weston dictated the surrender order to Graham at 21.00 on 31 May. For 22.00 the entry in the war diary is as follows:

  On finding that entire staff of CREFORCE had withdrawn, Col. Laycock, accompanied by B.M. and I.O. proceeded to SPHAKION to obtain authority for withdrawal.

  On finding that entire staff of CREFORCE had embarked, in view of the fact that all fighting forces were now in position for embarkation and that there was no enemy contact, Col. Laycock, on own authority, issued orders to Lt. Col. Young to lead troops to SPHAKION by route avoiding the crowded main approach to town and to use his own personality to obtain priority laid down in Div. orders.

  LAYFORCE reached SPHAKION in good time for boats but were unable to penetrate rabble; flank dets. were able to reach beach but main body remained ashore.

  Col. LAYCOCK accompanied by B.M. and I.O. embarked H.M.S. KIMBERLEY.

  Total numbers of LAYFORCE evacuated 23 officers, 186 O.Rs.17

  Bob sent Waugh’s batman, Private Tanner, with the orders. After a difficult climb back up the road, Tanner found Young, who said that he would try to comply. In the event it proved impossible for the bulk of Layforce to break through the rabble of stragglers on the main track to the beach. Only A, B, one section of E and G Troops of A Battalion on the left flank managed to catch the last boats, as they found a minor and unimpeded path. The rest of what remained of A and D Battalions were taken prisoner on the following day. The surrender was not made by Colvin, who handed the order to Young, who was his senior, in accordance with Weston’s direction. Young himself was saved from a most distasteful task by the discovery that the CO of 2/7 Australian Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel T. G. Walker, was more senior still. On Bob’s recommendation, Young and Wylie were both awarded the DSO, whilst Tanner, who succeeded in catching the very last boat, was mentioned in despatches.

  Bob’s actions have come in for serious criticism by some historians. He has been both accused of disregarding an order from Weston on the afternoon of 31 May that Layforce should leave after all other fighting forces and censured for leaving himself without the greater part of his command. The first charge is the more difficult to defend, as it relies heavily on Bob’s own account of his last meeting with Weston, according to which Weston overrode the earlier order. The Graham version arrives at the same conclusion, but relies on hearsay. The only other man close to the events in question, albeit not present at that meeting, was Waugh, who wrote subsequently:

  Weston said that we were to cover the withdrawal and
that a message would be sent to us by the embarkation officer on Sphakia beach when we could retire.

  At about 10 o’clock that evening there was no sign of the enemy and the approaches to the beaches were thronged with non-fighting troops. Bob and I and Freddy, with servants, therefore set off to find the beach officer Colonel Healey, and ask authority to withdraw. We pushed our way through the crowds who were too spiritless even to resist what they took to be an unauthorised intrusion and arrived on the beach to find that there was no one in charge, Colonel Healey having left earlier by aeroplane. Bob then took the responsibility of ordering Layforce to fight their way through the rabble and embark.18

  Bob clearly believed that not only did he already have explicit permission to leave with his staff, but also that, in the absence of any authority allocating priorities on the beach, he could take the rest of Layforce with him. In such circumstances, saving what he could from the wreckage of the campaign was the correct military decision. However, it hangs on his recollection of the Weston meeting, for which there is no third-party corroboration other than Graham’s somewhat different hearsay version.

  The second criticism, that he should have remained behind with his troops, presents more of a moral issue. This question would probably not have attracted much attention – after all Freyberg, Weston and Vasey had also left behind large numbers of those they had commanded – had it not been for the publication in 1955 of Waugh’s novel Officers and Gentlemen, the second volume of the Sword of Honour trilogy, in which his own wartime experiences were thinly disguised. The dedication of the book to Bob – ‘To Major General Sir Robert Laycock KCMG CB DSO. That every man in arms would wish to be’ – provoked a telegram from Waugh’s friend, Ann Fleming,19 which the author recorded in his diary: