The White Planet: The Evolution and Future of Our Frozen World

by Jean Jouzel

  COP 3 relied on the assessment presented in the IPCC’s second report, which suggested a discernible influence of human activity on the climate. Even if that phrase is, rightly, very cautious, it has undeniably played a role in the decision taken by the Annex I countries to commit to numeric objectives and a calendar, since they agreed to reduce the carbon equivalent of their emissions by at least 5% over the period 2008–12 compared to that of 1990. The rate of reduction was different for each country: –7% for the United States, maintaining the 1990 level for Russia, +8% for Australia. As for the European Community, the effort of –8% required was, at the beginning, identical for each country. But after an internal discussion it was decided to modulate the effort in Europe country by country. For instance, Germany, which had just been reunified and could a priori easily reduce emissions of the former East Germany, was credited with a reduction rate of –21%. France, which emitted relatively less in the European context because a large part of its electricity is of nuclear origin, was required only to maintain its emissions.

  The Kyoto Protocol specified that the Annex I countries first had to reach their objective through domestic efforts. But three mechanisms of flexibility offering other possibilities were also put into place. The first involved emission trading, which initially was controversial but later more widely accepted; a European system of emission trading was established in 2005. The second involved the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which enabled an Annex I country to use emission reductions achieved thanks to a certified project led in a non–Annex I country and leading to such reductions. Third, joint implementation was a mechanism to finance projects among Annex I countries.

  The protocol was a new type of agreement on an international level, and the smallest details of its implementation were discussed in successive COPs; they were finalized in 2001 in Marrakech during COP 7. But it was still necessary for an essential condition of the protocol to be upheld, that is, that it be ratified by fifty-five countries representing at least 55% of worldwide emissions. The first element posed no problem because the non–Annex I countries, which were signatories but without numeric objectives, ratified it quickly. It was more difficult for the second requirement to be met because the Bush administration refused to propose ratification by the United States, and as long as Russia and a few other countries were not involved, the required 55% was not reached. It was reached in November 2004 when, on the initiative of Vladimir Putin, the Russian Duma became involved. We should note that this country, rich in emission credits (we speak in this case of “hot air”), had a certain interest from a purely economic point of view. Three months later, on February 16, 2005, the Kyoto Protocol was in effect.

  Early on Australia followed the United States, at least until November 24, 2007, a symbolic date in the context of the struggle against climate warming. Kevin Rudd, leader of the workers’ party, then became prime minister, winning the elections that pitted him against John Howard after an electoral campaign based largely on a pledge to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which the latter obstinately refused to do. The following December 12 during the Bali COP Kevin Rudd confirmed Australia’s pledge and received a standing ovation by an audience completely committed to the cause. By contrast, Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper, also elected in 2007, announced his intention to take Canada, a signatory country, out of the protocol. This struggle against warming had undeniably entered fully into the political arena; this could be seen in the United States where many cities and states expressed their disapproval of the Bush administration’s position.

  The last available emission inventories are for 2005. It is very unlikely that the decrease objectives pledged by the developed countries will be reached. The apparently “good students” (those that met their goals) are Russia (close to –30%) and the former countries of the East, such as Romania (–46%). They have benefited from favorable ceilings and from eased improvements at the level of energy efficiency. They also have been in the midst of an economic recession. Large European countries (Germany, England, France) are on the right path (France has reduced its emissions by 1.6%, which it aims to maintain), but others, in particular the countries to the south (Portugal, Italy and Spain) are very behind: Spain has increased its emissions by 53% whereas its objective was to increase by only 15%. Canada was also among the “naughty” countries. As a result, the Annex I signatories of the protocol (which had achieved a reduction of 15%) are collectively on the path of fulfilling their overall objective of –5%, largely thanks to the countries on a transitional path, whereas the European Community taken as a whole is in the red, having diminished by only 1.5% whereas it aimed for an 8% reduction. The situation looks less encouraging if we take into account Australia, which was not a signatory in 2005, and the United States, two countries that have increased their emissions by 26% and 16%, respectively; taken as a whole, the Annex I countries have nevertheless decreased their emissions by around 3%.

  The Kyoto Protocol was only a very first step for two reasons: the modest objective for the developed countries and the extremely rapid increase in emissions of the non–Annex I countries, particularly those of the large emerging countries such as India, Brazil, and China, whose CO2 emissions have multiplied respectively by 2.02, 1.65, and 2.38. If we combine all the greenhouse gases, we note a large increase in emissions between 1990 and 2004—24% on the scale of the entire planet. This increase has continued at an impressive rate. Over the period 2000–2008 CO2 emissions have increased at an annual rate of 3.4% whereas that rate was on average 1% during the 1990s (data provided by the Global Carbon Project including emissions from fossil fuel combustion, cement production, and land use change).2 Instead 2009 has been marked by a decrease of these CO2 emissions (by –1.2%), but this was due to the economic crisis, and emissions increased rapidly the following year with a jump of 5.2% between 2009 and 2010 with total emissions reaching 10 GtC (to get gigatons of CO2 this figure should be multiplied by 3.67). The distribution of these emissions has also greatly changed. Those of the developed countries, which in 1990 had around 60%, no longer represent more than 45%, and the resulting 55% are attributed to emerging countries whose emissions are steadily rising and to developing countries. But it is useful here to recall that these figures would be inversed if the emissions were attributed to the countries who consume goods and not those that produce them. With this type of calculation, whose logic is understandable, the developed countries would be seen as contributing around 55% of all emissions.

  We are convinced that Kyoto was an extremely important step, despite what some people such as the “skeptical ecologist” Bjorn Lomborg think. He asserts that the efforts demanded are useless since in 2100 they will have decreased warming by only 0.15% and will slow it down only by six years.3 Lomborg actually engaged in some sleight-of-hand by relying on a climatic simulation in which two scenarios of carbon dioxide emission are used. In the one used for reference, the annual use of carbon goes from its current value of close to 7 gtC to 20.6 gtC at the end of the century. In the second, the Kyoto agreements are upheld between 2008 and 2012, then emissions continue at the same rate as for the scenario of reference, with 2100 emissions that reach 19.5 gtC. In plain language, Lomborg is right, but he is tricking the reader. Kyoto alone followed by a resumption of emissions at their earlier rates accomplishes nothing or almost nothing. What is necessary in order to be climatically efficient is an ambitious post-Kyoto scenario that puts us on the path to a stabilization of global emissions by around 2015—but their decrease also has to continue.

  The Bali Conference

  Bali, Saturday, December 15, 2007: the closing session of the thirteenth Conference of Parties, the seventh in which one of us, Jean Jouzel, participated as part of the French delegation. This COP was probably the most tense, even though the Nobel Peace Prize had been awarded the preceding Monday to Rajendra Pachauri as an IPCC collective co-laureat and to Al Gore for their involvement in the struggle against climate warming. Both of them then came to B
ali, and Al Gore delivered a speech, brilliant as usual but also extremely virulent against the Bush administration. It was not a last-ditch effort by the COP but the beginning of a process that by 2009 would be made concrete by an agreement that would follow the Kyoto Protocol. The ambiance was charged; early on, the United States, represented by Undersecretary of State Paula Drobriansky, refused to adhere to the decisive project written after long negotiations and then remained alone, completely alone, without their traditional allies in such circumstances: Australia, Japan, and Canada. They then had to make the best of a bad situation. The decision of Bali, which everyone agreed was a minima, was adopted.

  Let’s return to the major issues raised at this conference: for a “post-Kyoto” agreement to be operational by January 2013, everyone agreed that it should be set by 2009 so that it could be ratified by the greatest number of governments between 2010 and 2012. At the COP of Montreal in 2005, everyone was aware of that target date, but some countries, primarily the United States, did not want those negotiations to take place. An escape hatch had nevertheless been identified: it consisted of putting into place a special working group responsible for establishing a dialogue between the different parties involved that would present its report on the possible paths to negotiation two years later in Bali. That working group functioned well and reached some conclusions relying largely on the work of the IPCC—that is, that global emissions of greenhouse gases must reach their peak in the next ten to fifteen years, then by 2050 be reduced to levels located well below half those of 2000. It recognized that to achieve the lowest objective of stabilization it would be necessary that the developed countries decrease their emissions by 25–40% by 2020 relative to those of 1990.

  Discussion focuses on the inclusion, or not, of these numeric data in the Bali proposal. The United States, which was joined by Canada, Japan, and Russia, was firmly opposed. According to the Americans, those levels of reduction were indeed what had to be discussed by 2009. As for Europe, it wanted everything possible done to ensure that warming did not exceed 2°C relative to the preindustrial period. And the developing countries, which rightly saw a self-serving policy by the developed countries as likely to lighten their potential involvement as much as possible, were favorable to it. Furthermore, the United States wanted involvement on the part of the latter countries. The United States wanted the involvement of the developing countries to be formulated in a similar way to that of developed countries, although the developing countries were of course different. And since we had to reach a consensus, each one took a step. The numeric data disappeared from the text, but it was referenced in notes at the bottom of the pages in the IPCC conclusions. We must admit, it was rather ambiguous, but it nevertheless favored scenarios I, II, and III (Table 15.1), the least emitters, as a future basis for discussion. The developing countries then joined the game by accepting the idea that they could put into place actions aimed at limiting their emissions within the framework of durable development in a measurable, reportable, and verifiable way. Those specifications would also relate to transfers of technologies and to financial assistance that the developing countries expected for their part with a view toward facilitating those actions. Of course the French and European negotiators were a bit disappointed, but they were also satisfied that a post-Kyoto agreement henceforth appeared within reach—or almost within reach, since all the countries, including the United States, ratified the fact that it should be finalized during the COP 15 that was to be held two years later in Copenhagen. Nevertheless, everything remained to be negotiated concerning the objectives in sight.

  Can the Challenge Be Met?

  To reach an agreement for limiting emissions beyond 2012 would be a great success; everyone is aware of this. This is especially so if the agreement is ambitious enough to allow for this indispensable division by two of the emissions, at least by 2050 with respect to their 1990 reference level. And it still must be achievable, technologically, economically, and socially. We will not describe here in detail the solutions that could be put into place, but we rely on the conclusions of the IPCC to convince the reader that it is within the realm of possibility.

  According to the IPCC we can reduce the global emission of greenhouse gases during the next decades, and this could compensate for the projected increase in emissions or reduce them below their current level. Those possibilities must be researched in all sectors: energy production, transportation, construction, agriculture, forest management, and waste. In a given sector, no technology alone can provide the solution, but improving energy efficiency and eliminating energy waste are the greatest potential sources of reduction. The building sector can contribute in a huge way and benefit economically. Agricultural practices can also, for a minor cost, provide a significant contribution to the increase of carbon sequestration in the soil as well as a reduction of emissions and the production of biomass for energy use. Renewable energy should play an increasing role, such as the geological storage of CO2 after it is trapped at the exit of thermal centrals using fossil fuels. Nuclear energy can also be used to reduce emissions in the electrical sector. Finally, transportation offers many options, even if they take longer to implement due to the inertia of our transportation systems and to constraints linked to the organization of our societies.

  These possibilities can only be made concrete if the necessary policies are put in place. There is a wide range of measures available to governments, including taxation and regulation and voluntary agreements, as well as exchangeable emission credits and the clean mechanism projects mentioned above. The solution must thus rely on international collaboration but can also benefit from changes in lifestyles and individual behavior.

  The IPCC stresses that all levels of stabilization can be achieved with already available technologies and those that will be commercialized during the next decades. The cost of this on a global scale is far from prohibitive. That cost increases in general as the level of stabilization aimed for decreases. It reaches its maximum value for scenarios I and II with, in 2050, a projected lowering of 5.5% of global GDP or a decrease in its annual rate of progression at scarcely higher than 0.1%.

  The IPCC’s message is clear: stabilizing the greenhouse effect at such an ambitious level is technologically as well as economically possible—only if, however, everything and everyone work together toward that goal.

  From a more general point of view, it is very likely that the impacts of climate change will lead to increased annual costs as the global temperature increases. The IPCC analysis joins that of the Stern report,4 which states that to master greenhouse gas emissions is economically more profitable than to allow them to grow without taking any measures to decrease them. Along the same lines the IEA’s 2011 report, “World Energy Outlook,” notes that “Delaying action is a false economy: for every $1 of investment avoided in the power sector before 2020 an additional $4.3 would need to be spent after 2020 to compensate for the increased emissions.”

  Copenhagen: Failure or Half-Success

  The 2009 Copenhagen conference was a cruel disappointment for many of those who participated in or followed it. At best it was a half-success for those (in the minority) who wanted to remain optimistic. A few months after the conference, which was marked by the presence of around 120 heads of state or government, its outcome was viewed as ambiguous. The relative optimism that had resulted from the meeting in Bali was replaced, in 2010, with moroseness, and the conference was marked with pessimism that was accentuated by the attacks made against the fourth IPCC report and by the impact, largely due to media publicity, of theses developed by the “climate skeptics” for the general public.

  The unusually high level of participation by policymakers reveals at least an awareness of the problems connected to climate warming. It is to Copenhagen’s credit that there were discussions on the sources of innovative financing and on deforestation and biodiversity. That the Copenhagen agreement mentioned a warming limit of 2°C, which was firmly based on the IPCC
report, was also a good sign. It also brought countries such as the United States into the struggle against climate warming that had excluded themselves or, like the large emerging countries, had no constraints on their emissions within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. That this agreement is nonconstraining but based on voluntary involvement is perhaps not as negative as many fear, insofar as the promises made orally in Copenhagen have since been widely confirmed within the Climate Convention.

  Yet we are, as scientists involved in research on the evolution of our climate, extremely disappointed in Copenhagen quite simply because the promises made are in obvious contradiction with the stated objectives. With 2020 on the horizon, we will have at best 5–10% more emissions in relation to the level required to have a good chance of limiting future warming to 2°C. The Copenhagen agreement was a cruel lack of ambition that should lead us to an average warming of at least 3°C by the end of the century. To illustrate the importance and above all the rapidity of this, we recall again that the passage from the Last Glacial Maximum (20,000 years ago) to the current climate, which was marked by an average warming of 5 to 6°C, took thousands of years.