Operation Husky

by Mark Zuehlke

  Thomas had gone into the attack thinking the orders to see “how far we could get” were pretty vague. “We didn’t get very far ... We just got slaughtered. [The Germans] had a clear view. Every time we moved we were fired on. I was pinned down there the whole day.”26

  AFTER REORGANIZING FROM this poorly planned initial attempt to bounce Leonforte in broad daylight, Brigadier Chris Vokes and Hoffmeister put together a plan for the Seaforths to attack the town under cover of an artillery bombardment at 1630 hours. With ‘C’ Company cut off from the rest of the battalion, ‘D’ Company badly cut up, and part of Bell-Irving’s patrol still pinned down in the ravine, the battalion would go into the attack disorganized and badly depleted.

  At 1530 hours, Hoffmeister convened an ‘O’ Group in a farmyard behind the ridge. All the company commanders, save Captain June Thomas, were present, as were the battalion staff officers. Most of the men were standing on a concrete platform, “which every Sicilian farm seemed to have and which was built and used for the purpose of thrashing grain thereon by driving mules in a circle over it.”27 As Hoffmeister gave the briefing, the opening salvos of artillery fire began falling on Leonforte. When he finished, the party began breaking up, the company commanders heading back to their men. Hoffmeister was standing next to his adjutant, Captain Douglas Haig Strain, “discussing the finer details of the battle” when suddenly the farmyard exploded in flames. Two shells from the medium artillery regiment had struck the edge of the platform, and these were followed almost immediately by two more rounds. Hoffmeister was blown flat on his face, unharmed, “the only person in that whole group who was not killed or seriously wounded.”28 Strain died instantly. Lieutenant James Harry Budd, the pioneer platoon’s commander, succumbed to his injuries within minutes of the medical officer reaching his side.29 Captain Bill Merritt had “his leg practically blown off. He was lying there bleeding badly.”30 (Merritt was the younger brother of Lieutenant Colonel Cecil Merritt, who had won a Victoria Cross for gallantry at the head of the South Saskatchewan Regiment during the Dieppe raid.) Two signallers, Corporal Garth Johnson Carmichael and Private Thomas Fowler Simpson, were killed. Several other men were badly wounded.

  Both a Canadian and a British artillery officer, who were nearby, rushed to their wireless sets and called for an immediate ceasefire to prevent more rounds falling short onto the Seaforth positions. Major Forin, who had moments before been standing close to Hoffmeister, had been knocked flat on his rump by the first blast. He had rolled down a nearby bank into the cover of a sunken roadway and come to his feet facing a Seaforth company advancing along this route towards the ravine. Fearing the men were marching into a zone the artillery had designated as a target, he ordered the company to turn about and return to its forming-up position. Forin then walked back up through the smoke to the farmyard.31

  Captain Howard Mitchell of the Saskatoon Light Infantry was one of the first men on the scene. He looked down upon a “fine young Canadian man, alive, lying on his side on the ground, shocked into immobility for the moment, his hands near his face, his legs and feet together, the only thing that was wrong was that his legs from below his knees to above his ankles were completely gone. Just as clean as could be. His clothes were not damaged and there was very little blood. His boots were even polished.”32

  “It was just an awful schemozzle,” Hoffmeister realized, “so I got Chris Vokes and told him precisely what had happened. There was no way we could carry on with the plan. We would have to delay the action until such time as we could get replacements and get radio sets up and generally reorganize because it was a terrible blow.”

  Vokes came forward to make a personal assessment. When he saw the broken state of the battalion headquarters, the brigadier said to Hoffmeister, “Forget about it. I’ll send the Edmontons.”33

  Standing nearby, Padre Roy Durnford saw that Hoffmeister was “feeling dazed” and “could not feel equal to the attack, for he had lost his Adjutant, and his senior officers also were too badly shaken to lead men with any degree of confidence. The Brigadier called us together and spoke encouragingly of our share in the action up-to-date; he urged us not to lose confidence in our artillery because of faulty shells or a rare mistake. It was essential that we, as officers, should retain at all costs an unswerving loyalty to and a complete trust in our artillery. The demoralization effects upon infantrymen who feared their own artillery could be easily understood.” Durnford agreed with Vokes.34

  Hoffmeister remained badly shaken. “From an emotional point of view, it was a terrible thing for me to have to absorb,” he admitted later. Had the gunners responsible walked up to him at that moment, the lieutenant colonel feared he would have done something violent. “I was so mad. I just wouldn’t have trusted myself.”35

  In one respect, the opening of the bombardment had benefited the Seaforths. Only one battery had been responsible for the friendly fire—the rest had dropped their shot on the German positions in and around Leonforte. With the shells forcing the Germans to ground, Captain Thomas and Corporal Johnnie Cromb both seized the opportunity to lead their men to safety. Cromb brought out two wounded men by having each sit on two Bren guns with arms around the shoulders of the soldiers carrying them.36

  “The men are feeling very blue this evening,” the Seaforth’s war diarist wrote on the evening of July 21. “Many good officers and men were lost. Bloody Hill the men call [the ridge.]”37

  VOKES WASTED NO time ordering the Loyal Edmonton Regiment to take over and attack at 2130 hours. As the battalion had moved during the day to a position a mile southeast of the Seaforths, it was able to go into action on short notice. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Jefferson started getting the Eddies ready, while Vokes arranged for divisional headquarters to back up the infantry with massed artillery support. Simonds pulled out the stops, directing all divisional field regiments along with the 7th Medium Artillery Regiment to drench Leonforte with shells for thirty minutes of fire in what was the heaviest Canadian bombardment since the landing.

  The moment the guns fell silent, the 4.2-inch mortars and heavy Vickers Mark I machine guns of the Saskatoon Light Infantry opened up. With an accuracy range of eleven hundred yards, the Vickers were capable of flinging .303-calibre slugs more than twice that distance if the gunners simply intended to pound an area with indirect fire. Alternatively, the gunners could fire from 60 to 250 rounds a minute, depending on whether a slow or fast rate of fire was wanted.

  In the final minutes of the SLI’s thirty-minute fire program, the mortars switched to smoke rounds that created a screen to conceal the advance of the infantry. “The artillery and mortar concentrations were terrific and accurate,” the 2 CIB war diarist recorded with satisfaction. 38 Divisional intelligence reports estimated that the Germans had side-slipped many Panzer Grenadiers from the east into Leonforte and that there were now at least five hundred ready to make a stand. They predicted that the Edmontons would have to make a determined effort “to dislodge them.”39

  The presence of so many Germans in Leonforte offered a tempting opportunity to cut off their line of retreat. So despite the battered state of the Seaforths, Simonds ordered Lieutenant Colonel Hoffmeister “to send a rifle company to get astride the road north of the town to act as a stop.”40 Once the Edmontons had pushed into the town, sappers from 3rd Field Company, RCE were to bridge the ravine to open the route to tanks and infantry support vehicles.41

  Major Budge Bell-Irving led a strong patrol composed mostly of men from the Seaforths’ ‘B’ Company out to the left of Leonforte to set up the blocking position. As he led the men forward, Bell-Irving realized many were so exhausted they were stumbling on their feet. It quickly became evident that this was going to be “a very unsuccessful sortie” when “a very large proportion of the company... fell sound asleep on the way, climbing the hill. They were very tired indeed.” The major, the lone lieutenant with him, and a handful of men pressed on to the road and tried to seal the German line of escape. Soon they could he
ar the sounds of fierce fighting inside Leonforte and kept watching for the Edmontons to break through to their position. Instead, several hours later, they heard the grinding sounds of German tanks approaching from the north. A short, uneven firefight ensued between tanks and infantry lacking any PIAT guns, which culminated in the Seaforths finally scattering. Bell-Irving, thinking most of his men had been killed, wandered alone cross-country for a long time—before coming upon an equally lost corporal from the Edmontons. The two men passed into the Seaforth lines just before dawn. “I was so ashamed of my performance,” Bell-Irving later wrote, “that I was more or less ready to be killed myself at that moment.” However, as the day wore on, almost every one from the unlucky patrol turned up unharmed.42

  At 2100 hours on July 21, the Edmontons had begun their descent from the ridge under the covering fire of the Saskatoon Light Infantry’s heavy weapons. ‘A’ Company had led on the right with ‘D’ Company to the left. ‘B’ Company was behind the latter company with orders to “mop up the lower [southwestern] portion of the town.” ‘C’ Company “followed in reserve, prepared to form a firm base within the town.” Lieutenant Colonel Jim Jefferson had his battalion headquarters section moving with Major W.T. Cromb’s ‘C’ Company. Once they crossed the streambed on either side of the blown bridge, the two leading companies began working into the town by following the highway up the steep mountain.43

  The artillery and SLI fire had done its job, causing most of the Panzer Grenadiers to fall back to the northern part of the town. Consequently, the battalion met only light resistance during the initial advance. Coming to a fork in the road, ‘A’ Company, under Captain H.D.P. “Pat” Tighe, continued up the highway and slipped deep into the heart of Leonforte. ‘D’ Company followed the other road to the left and was making good progress when, accidentally, its commander, Major Bill Bury, fired a green Very light that was supposed to signal the battalion’s having gained control of the town.44

  This brought an immediate response, as German machine guns mounted on the rooftops of buildings up ahead “raked the streets.” Bury’s company was quickly locked in a desperate fight for survival. Tighe’s ‘A’ Company, meanwhile, slogged right through Leonforte to seize the summit. Along the way it wiped out several strongpoints and killed twenty-four Panzer Grenadiers in exchange for three men killed and another four wounded. Skirting the western edge of the built-up part of Leonforte, ‘B’ Company emerged on the height of ground beyond the town without meeting significant opposition. Behind it, however, a battle raged in the streets. The company commander had no idea where the rest of the battalion was and could not raise anyone on the wireless set.45 With the roar of German tanks warming up their engines audible to the immediate north, he decided his men should fight their way back to the starting point for the attack.46

  Inside Leonforte, fierce “fighting ensued in the dark streets and houses, illuminated only by the lurid lights of battle.” The battalion had quickly become broken up as the companies tried to find routes up the winding streets that would take them to the summit. Some platoons were out of touch with the rest of their companies, and, due to the failure of the wireless sets, Jefferson could exert little influence over anybody but the men within shouting distance.

  When the Panzer Grenadiers counterattacked in strength with the support of tanks and more machine-gun positions established on the rooftops, the Edmontons were thrown into complete disarray. Jefferson’s headquarters section linked up with two platoons from ‘C’ Company and some odds and sods from ‘D’ Company. As the tanks ground towards this group, ‘C’ Company’s Major Cromb “ordered his [men] to break into houses on either side of the lateral street and form a defensive position ... Their PIAT was useless as the man who had the fuses was either wounded or dead. They were therefore unable to engage the German tanks which they saw patrolling the main street.”47 Hoping to call the anti-tank platoon forward to counter the tanks, Jefferson had his signallers climb up on the roofs of several high buildings and attempt to get a wireless transmission through to brigade headquarters. But each foray resulted in nothing more than their picking up bursts of static.48

  By midnight, the Edmontons were in dire straits. ‘B’ Company had fought its way clear and was headed back to where it had started. ‘D’ company was badly scattered, most of its men making their way back to the start point. A few soldiers from this company were among the force of about one hundred, composed mainly of Cromb’s ‘C’ Company and Jefferson’s battalion headquarters section, that was holding in the town centre.

  Tighe’s ‘A’ Company was still slugging its way up the highway towards its exit from the northern outskirts of Leonforte. When several German machine-gun posts in fortified houses halted their advance, a team of PIAT gunners brought the buildings under fire with such devastating effect that “some ... were split from top to bottom.” Fighting on, ‘A’ Company broke out of Leonforte and tried to establish a roadblock on the northern edge of the town. Tighe was hoping the rest of the battalion would come up in support, but in the early morning hours of July 22, he realized the remnants of ‘A’ Company were cut off. Ammunition all but spent, Tighe ordered his men to break out along a ridge leading to some high ground south of the town. In that advance, ‘A’ Company overran several German positions and killed about thirty Panzer Grenadiers before digging in on the heights. Their assault greatly disorganized the enemy forces operating on the right side of Leonforte. For his leadership that day, Tighe earned a Military Cross.49

  From his position on the heights, Tighe could see the engineers of 3rd Field Company working methodically under enemy fire to get a bridge across the streambed. Because the span was forty feet wide, the engineers were forced to install a collapsible steel Bailey bridge of the same length. The division’s chief engineer, Lieutenant Colonel Geoff Walsh, considered the undertaking so important and dangerous he personally supervised the installation. To his knowledge, this was the first time Allied troops had erected a Bailey bridge under enemy fire. He was determined the effort would not fail. 50 Initial preparation work had begun at 2130 hours. Lieutenant H.W. Dickson’s platoon worked under constant mortar and machine-gun fire, which the engineers later described as “slightly high.”51

  In response, 3rd Field Company’s commander, Major Ken Southern, led a small party of two engineers and some Loyal Edmonton infantry into the outskirts of Leonforte with a mind to eliminating some of the German positions firing on his work crew. Southern and the others were soon engaged by a machine-gun position that was covering an advance towards the bridging party by a group of Panzer Grenadiers and two tanks. Despite being seriously outgunned, Southern and his men opened up with such intense small-arms fire that the tanks and infantry pulled back. Southern decided his team would have to hold their ground to prevent a renewed attack, which could easily end up wiping out his engineers and the bridge to boot.

  Fortuitously, the commander of the 90th Canadian Anti-Tank Battery, Major G.A. “Tiger” Welsh, had come forward to assess when it might be possible to get a couple of 6-pound anti-tank guns across the bridge and into Leonforte. Under constant fire, Welsh dashed up the southern slope of the ravine, leading two of his gun teams into the action. His men manhandled the guns across the streambed and up to Southern’s position. Opening fire, they destroyed the German machine-gun position and managed to knock out one of the tanks. For so courageously protecting the engineers, Welsh and Southern were each awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO).52

  Chief engineer Walsh, who also received a DSO for this night’s work, went back at 0200 hours to brigade headquarters and told Vokes the bridge was ready for use. “What’s the use of a bridge?” the brigadier retorted. “The poor Edmontons are decimated!”53 For hours, the only news Vokes had been getting of the fighting in Leonforte was from Edmonton stragglers. “By midnight I felt the despair of failure. I considered that I had lost a fine battalion.”54 Walsh had nothing to offer the disconsolate brigadier, so he shrugged and returne
d to divisional headquarters. The engineers had done their duty, and it was up to Vokes to either find a way to rescue the Edmontons or not. A total of six officers and other ranks in 3rd Field Company would receive medals for their bravery under fire during the construction of the Bailey bridge.55

  After the engineer left, Vokes drove to divisional headquarters to personally report to Major General Simonds his belief that the Edmontons were lost. General staff officer Lieutenant Colonel George Kitching led him to the divisional commander’s caravan. Simonds “listened as Chris told the story; and then to my surprise and delight,” Kitching recorded, he “spoke very quietly to Chris and told him that in his opinion the battalion was probably holed up somewhere in the town and conserving its ammunition as they assumed there would be no re-supply until daylight. He encouraged Chris to think on the bright side and make a plan to get support across the ravine as soon as the bridge across it was completed.”56

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  Daring and Spectacular Actions

  THE EDMONTONS INSIDE Leonforte were, in fact, in a bad way, but they were not yet destroyed. Although the rest of the battalion had by dribs and drabs left the town and were either holding positions outside it or had returned to the start point on the south side of the ravine, Jefferson’s one hundred men were “dodging about from building to building.”1 Surrounded, they fought for survival, giving no thought to surrender. An erroneous report had reached 2 CIB headquarters to the effect that Jefferson had ordered the Edmontons to withdraw, but he had done no such thing. Jefferson had told ‘C’ Company’s Major Cromb emphatically that the embattled group must hold until reinforced.2 He was giving no thought to trying to break out and considered the battalion had established “a firm base” inside Leonforte.3