by Mark Zuehlke
While No. 10 Platoon had been eliminating resistance, the rest of ‘B’ Company had moved unchallenged up a different lane and gained the line next to one of the churches. Here, at 1630 hours, No. 10 Platoon caught up.
‘A’ Company’s fight lasted longer. After clearing the first machinegun position, it ran into another, firing from a house fifty yards farther up the slope. Watson sent a platoon around the left flank of the building and their PIAT man hammered it with several bombs, which the Canadians judged must have “shook the enemy up inside considerably.” One section, after chucking about ten grenades through windows and doors, rushed inside and took ten prisoners. The advance continued, with the company having to root out several more machine-gun positions while dodging sporadic sniper fire. Lieutenant John Stewart Carnegie de Balinhard, the son of a PPCLI officer from the Great War, climbed onto a rooftop to try sighting an enemy position and was hit by a sniper round. Watson, who had come forward to consult him, found the thirty-three-year-old sprawled dead where he had been struck. Not until 1900 hours did ‘A’ Company reach its objective alongside ‘B’ Company, and Agira was declared clear of enemy. The battalion’s casualties were one officer killed and another officer and ten other ranks wounded. German losses “amounted to eighty killed, wounded or prisoners.”7 Three anti-tank guns, about thirty MG 42s, 100,000 rounds of machinegun ammunition, and many mortar bombs were also captured.8
In fact, the 29th Division’s 1st Battalion, 15th Panzer Grenadier had about 125 men taken prisoner and an equal number killed in this action. The estimated 250 remaining members of this battalion joined the mauled 1st Panzer Grenadier Regiment of 15th Division’s withdrawal to the vicinity of Gagliano, where it faced the American advance.9 Extending its flank northward, the Hermann Göring Division assumed responsibility for blocking further advances by the Canadians.10
“So Agira fell, after five days of hard fighting in which practically the whole of the Canadian Division, with the exception of the 3rd Brigade . . . had been engaged,” wrote the army’s official historian. “It was the Division’s biggest battle of the Sicilian campaign and it cost 438 Canadian casualties.” The 231st (Malta) Brigade added about three hundred casualties from its battalions in this protracted engagement.11
AS THE BATTLE for Agira had raged, 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade had been advancing within the Dittaino valley towards a major three-way junction at the town of Catenanuova. On July 23, the brigade had been arrayed on either side of the Dittaino River, about eight miles south of Agira. The Royal 22e Régiment stood close to the Raddusa- Agira Station, the West Nova Scotia Regiment was about three miles southeast at the hamlet of Libertinia, and the Carleton and York Regiment straddled the river’s northern flank guarding the road that led to Agira. With the rest of the division beginning the advance from Leonforte to Agira, 3 CIB was ordered to remain in place to provide a pivot point for the forward-wheeling movement going north of it and also to await the 51st Highland Division coming up on its right-hand flank.12
On the ridges overlooking the valley from both north and south, German troops could be regularly seen moving about. Throughout the day, the West Novas—holding a more easterly position than the other two battalions—were intermittently shelled. Four other ranks were killed and another three wounded by this fire. At 1600 hours, two corporals from the Hermann Göring Division approached under protection of a white flag and informed battalion adjutant Captain C.B. “Clary” Higgins that the West Novas had one hour to surrender or “they would loose the whole force of the Wehrmacht upon us.” Telling them to “go to hell,” Higgins had the two escorted to division for questioning. No attack developed.13
July 23, however, proved disastrous for the Carleton and York Regiment. At 1100 hours, a twenty-eight man patrol from ‘A’ Company set out to check whether a pink house on a nearby hill was occupied. Sergeant Arthur Wallace Eatman’s instructions were to be back by dusk, but the patrol failed to return. The following day a company-strength patrol went out and found five bodies. These were identified as Eatman and Privates Walter James Lapointe, Omar B. Gallagher, William Joseph McCauley, and William Henry Morris. The rest of the patrol was presumed lost as prisoners. Except for one, all were later confirmed as having been captured. Private Arlie William Hanson was designated as missing, presumed dead.
What happened to the patrol was never determined, but it caused great dissension within the regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Dodd Tweedie blamed the company commander, Captain Glen Foster, for giving inadequate orders to the sergeant. Others set the fault with Tweedie for sending a large patrol out under a sergeant’s command, but the lieutenant colonel defended his action on the basis that no officer was available and that Eatman was so experienced he was under consideration for a battlefield commission. Even the patrol’s purpose became subject to debate. Tweedie said it was to check the pink house, but 3 CIB’s Brigade Major G.F.C. Pangman contended it acted on his orders to reconnoitre the area around Monte Scalpello, which lay about six miles east of the Carleton’s position. It also emerged that battalion headquarters had sent an uncoded wireless signal telling the patrol to follow a set path along a height within sight of ‘A’ Company. Many a Carleton believed this breach of security had been intercepted and the patrol walked into a resulting ambush.14
Late on July 24, realizing that the rest of the division was entangled in a protracted struggle for Agira, the Carletons and Van Doos moved eastward along the valley floor to come abreast of the West Novas at Libertinia. The brigade was to begin an eastward advance without waiting for the rest of the division and would draw its artillery and other fire support from the 51st Highland Division. The routes taken had been heavily mined by the Germans, so progress was slow. A Carleton carrier driven by Private Graydon Alexander Taylor blew up on a mine. Taylor was killed and Lance Sergeant T.W. Harrison was seriously wounded.15
Because of the mines, the brigade’s further advance was delayed until July 26. With the 51st Highlanders already well ahead, xxx Corps declared it was now urgent that Brigadier Howard Penhale push his battalions through to Catenanuova—about seven miles to the east. The Van Doos led, Penhale ordering them to cut around the north flank of Monte Scalpello to gain its eastern slope.16
As with the Grizzly position before Agira, the full brigade objective required capturing two mountains—one on either side of the Dittaino valley railway track. Monte Scalpello, a massive “feature whose rocky ridge towered in a long razor-back nearly 3,000 feet above the road,” was on the valley’s southern flank while the nearly eight-hundred-foot Monte Santa Maria lay about two miles to the northeast of the first summit. The Van Doos would have to secure both heights in order to open the way to Catenanuova, which was about a mile beyond Santa Maria.17
‘B’ Company, under Major Gilles Turcot, took point. Its men were using mules to carry water, rations, and ammunition. The company advanced along the right side of the dried-up riverbed, while a short distance farther back Captain Léo Bouchard’s ‘A’ Company trudged up the left side. By nightfall, the two companies were digging in on the slopes in front of the mountains on their respective sides of the riverbed. ‘A’ Company was to attack Monte Santa Maria in the morning and ‘B’ Company, Monte Scalpello.18
By the afternoon of July 26, ‘A’ Company was within 550 yards of Monte Santa Maria. Seeing movement on the round and treeless summit, Bouchard called on the wireless for an artillery concentration on it. The bombardment lasted fifteen minutes. At the end, the artillery laid a smokescreen to cover the Van Doos, who charged up the slope with fixed bayonets. Two platoons, commanded by Lieutenants Guy Robitaille and Côme Simard, led, with Lieutenant François LaFleche’s platoon following in reserve. “Lightning fast and under perfect control, the [company], under heavy machine-gun fire crossed a tilled field about 500 yards across. Once past that field, there remained only a few yards before beginning the climb. The platoons were rapidly reorganized. While one section advanced, the other gave covering fire.”
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p; ‘A’ Company was under “intense fire” from infantry dug in on the summit and was also being heavily mortared with deadly accuracy. Bouchard was killed by a fragment from a mortar round. Seconds later Robitaille was hit in the leg, but continued leading his men forward. Hit again in the stomach and then a third time in his arm, the lieutenant finally collapsed. His actions this day earned a Military Cross. Lieutenant LaFleche was also wounded in the hand. Simard’s platoon, meanwhile, had been pinned down by the fierce fire. Learning Bouchard was dead and Robitaille critically wounded, Simard took command of the company. Slowly the platoons fought their way up the slopes, the sections advancing by bounds, with one moving as the other two covered with supporting fire.19 When Corporal Jean Baptiste Montminy’s Bren gunner was killed, he grabbed the weapon, single-handedly outflanked three enemy positions, and “routed the enemy who were holding up the advance of the entire platoon.” He was awarded the Military Medal for this action.20
Simard led two platoons onto the summit, but saw that No. 9 Platoon had been forced to ground in front of a pillbox bristling with machine guns. Taking No. 8 Platoon—the second one under his command—Simard swung around the right flank of the pillbox and broke through the rear entrance. The ten Germans inside surrendered. Simard reported that ‘A’ Company controlled Monte Santa Maria. He also requested ammunition and water be immediately sent up, but the road was so heavily mined that the battalion quartermaster was unable to get anything to the Van Doos, who were hungry, thirsty, and badly short of ammunition. When the Germans counterattacked in strength at about 2000 hours, Simard had no option but to surrender the hard-won mountain by withdrawing.
‘B’ Company, meanwhile, had attacked at 1500 hours but come under intense 88-millimetre fire when only six hundred yards east of Libertinia. Resorting to fieldcraft, the company slipped forward by way of various gullies and dense thickets to a little hill called Nicolella, northwest of Monte Scalpello. Here they encountered a Sicilian woman who spoke fluent French and gave them good information on the nature of the ground and numbers of German troops ahead. Pressing on through the night, the company easily gained the summit.
Dawn of July 27 found the Van Doos with ‘A’ Company dug in at the base of Monte Santa Maria and ‘B’ Company sitting solid atop Monte Scalpello. When ‘C’ Company joined the latter, the two companies were able to clear the entire feature in a bout of heavy fighting. Major Turcot was wounded in the right foot but continued to command the two companies until the battle ended later in the day.21
Taking advantage of the German fixation on the Van Doos, the West Novas had slipped unobserved around the southern flank of Monte Scalpello to take up a position about two miles southwest of Catenanuova. Although they were well placed to push on to the town, the battalion was ordered to hold in place and await further orders from xxx Corps. Eighth Army was developing a new operational plan and further advances by the Canadians would have to be “woven into the wider design.” For the Van Doos, the past thirty-six hours had proved costly. The three companies committed were entirely exhausted from the constant action. They had also suffered seventy-four casualties including the deaths of one officer and seventeen other ranks.22
CODE-NAMED “HARDGATE,” EIGHTH Army’s wider design had developed during a meeting between General Harold Alexander and his two army commanders at Cassibile on July 21. The plan laid out details for a dual offensive directed on Messina scheduled to begin August 1. Seventh U.S. Army was to advance from the San Stéfano- Nicosia road along two axes—the coastal Highway 113 and a parallel inland route, Highway 120, that ran from Nicosia to Randazzo. Eighth Army, meanwhile, would commit xxx Corps to a main attack directed at breaking the so-called German Etna Line by capturing Adrano, while XIII Corps launched a feint on the Catania plain to hold the enemy there in place.
As part of Hardgate, the rest of 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade was to be committed to active operations for the first time. This brigade, less the Three Rivers Regiment, had landed at Siracusa on July 13-14 and become part of the Eighth Army’s armoured reserve. The fighting teeth of this brigade were provided by its two remaining tank regiments—the Ontario Tank Regiment and Calgary Tank Regiment. On July 23, the brigade had moved to positions four miles northeast of Scordia and just south of the Gornalunga River. Its role, which was set out in instructions issued on July 26, was to patrol a ten-mile gap between XIII Corps and xxx Corps and “destroy all enemy attempting to attack between” their respective flanks.23 The tankers were not alone in this duty. Also closing the gap was the 5th British Infantry Division’s reconnaissance regiment and its 105th Anti-Tank Regiment. The Canadians were expected to become engaged with the enemy only if it became necessary to “fight an armoured battle.”24
Two divisions would be aimed at Adrano—the newly arrived 78th British Infantry Division and 1st Canadian Infantry Division. The former division would advance from Catenanuova northeastward via a road that passed through Centuripe to Adrano, while the Canadians would drive through Regalbuto and then hook northward into the Salso valley for the final approach directly from the west into the town.
As a preliminary to Hardgate, 3rd Brigade came under 78th Division command on July 29 and was given the task of capturing Catenanuova for the British to use as their starting point. Hardgate’s timetable called for 1st Canadian Division to begin its drive towards Regalbuto on the night of July 30-31, with the 78th Division entering operations on the night of August 1-2.
At 2336 hours on July 29, the gunners of the 78th Division fired a heavy artillery barrage in support of 3 CIB’s attack. The Van Doos had two tasks, recapturing Monte Santa Maria and carrying Hill 204 about one thousand yards northeast of it. From their position southeast of Monte Scalpello, the West Novas would drive into Catenanuova after which the Carletons would send a company-sized patrol through to seize a junction of roads running alternately northwest and northeast to Regalbuto and Centuripe, respectively.25
At midnight, the West Novas advanced behind the barrage, which crept forward at the normal bound rate of about one hundred yards every three minutes. ‘A’ and ‘B’ companies were leading, both trying to keep at least two hundred yards back from the exploding shells. Just as the men swept into the Dittaino riverbed, several shells fell short and ‘A’ Company’s Captain S.D. Smith and seven men from ‘B’ Company were wounded. Lieutenant Ross Guy took over ‘A’ Company, and the troops kept moving without missing a beat. The riverbank was extremely wide and overgrown by a sour-smelling coarse grass, so the entire battalion advanced within it for about one hundred yards because of the steep banks on either side. Although this forced them to bunch up dangerously, there was hardly any German fire and no casualties resulted. According to the plan, the two lead companies were to cut through the outskirts of Catenanuova to gain the heights north of the town, while the following companies peeled off to clear the place itself.
Coming to a bend in the river, the West Novas scrambled up the bank facing the town. Beyond was the raised bed of the railway track and behind that a long eight-foot-high concrete wall, which ‘A’ Company headed directly towards. As the company reached the wall, several potato-mashers came over from the opposite side. These grenades had a metal-cased explosive charge attached to a hollow wooden handle. They had a blast radius of twelve to fourteen yards but tended to generate more concussive force than body-slashing shrapnel. True to type, the grenades caused no injuries, and ‘A’ Company was more delayed by the problem of trying to boost men over the wall. Discovering a gap created by the shellfire, the company poured through the opening and entered the railway yard. Having been heavily bombed by Allied aircraft over the preceding couple of days and then singled out for particularly intense shelling, the rail yard was a shambles. Dozens of smashed boxcars, many of which were on fire, had been thrown far off the tracks. Severed high-voltage power lines hung from leaning poles and others sparked and sizzled on the ground. The troops carefully avoided touching them with their bodies and weapons as they passed.<
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Moving into the town’s outskirts, ‘A’ Company dodged forward in the face of sporadic bursts of small-arms fire loosed by pockets of Germans who appeared to be withdrawing rather than seeking a fight. Avoiding the narrow streets with walls or houses pressing close on either side, the platoons climbed over walls to gain one backyard after another.26 Reaching its objective at sunrise on the high ground north of Catenanuova, ‘A’ Company was just starting to hack at the hard-baked ground with picks and shovels when two companies of infantry supported by a self-propelled gun began a counterattack. Caught in the open, the company scattered for the nearby cover of several cactus hedges. Lieutenant Ross Guy and his signaller ended up in a shell hole with the No. 18 wireless set, Guy’s pistol, and four grenades. The Germans were shelling the entire area, while their infantry sprayed it with small-arms fire. From somewhere Guy was unable to see, the SPG was banging away with its 75-millimetre gun. With signaller in tow, Guy moved into this fire. Managing to round up about nineteen of his men, he set up a position behind the cover of a stone wall. Fifty yards from the wall was a cactus grove in which the Germans had concentrated. Facing each other, the two sides traded gunfire.