by Mark Zuehlke
Suddenly there was a flurry of gunfire from within the grove, and the Germans bolted into the open. Guy and his men ripped into them with deadly fire, and from the grove more guns joined in. When there were no more targets to fire at, Guy spotted some West Novas signalling from the grove. They were his two platoon commanders, Lieutenants E.N. Doane and C.C. Reeves, who had gathered their men and attacked the grove from the rear. Enemy casualties in this action were estimated at about thirty-five in exchange for twelve ‘A’ Company men killed or wounded.
Guy got on the wireless and asked Lieutenant Colonel Pat Bogert to immediately send reinforcements, ammunition, and artillery support to break up the counterattacks. Bogert told him the heavy artillery fire the Germans were directing at the brigade area was hampering efforts by the engineers of 4th Field Company to clear mines and create a crossing over the riverbed that would allow transport trucks to reach the forward positions. There would be no ammunition or reinforcement likely for the rest of the day. But he had artillery on call if Guy could provide target references. Like most junior officers, however, Guy had received no training in directing artillery fire. Bogert proceeded to calmly talk the lieutenant through the process, and after a few shots were fired and corrections made, he was soon ranging the guns onto various targets, which convinced the Germans to keep their distance. Guy’s work earned a Military Cross.27
‘B’ Company had been more fortunate in its advance, encountering only a machine gun on the edge of the town, which was quickly silenced. By 0230 hours, it was on the objective astride the Catenanuova-Regalbuto Road. The Germans appeared unaware that this company had cut the road, for a truck soon came roaring out of town towards it. A Bren gunner from No. 12 Platoon ripped a burst through the windshield that severely wounded the two Germans aboard, and the truck was quickly moved to the side of the road. Over the next hour, two more trucks met the same fate.28
As planned, the battalion’s other two companies had entered Catenanuova proper to clear any German forces there. ‘C’ Company met no opposition and was soon dug in on the heights, while ‘D’ Company eliminated two machine-gun positions in its assigned sector before joining the rest of the battalion on the town’s northern edge. The company from the Carleton and York Regiment also met no opposition and easily reached its objective. It soon became clear that the 923rd Fortress Battalion, tasked with Catenanuova’s defence, had largely bolted to escape the barrage. A German report on the failure to defend the town stated that the “battalion fled in the direction of Centuripe in a shameful manner without enemy pressure. The immediate dissolution of the battalion has been ordered. [Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm] Keitel has initiated Court Martial proceedings against the Officer Commanding and the guilty officers.”29
Troops from 3rd Paratroop Regiment, attached to the Hermann Göring Division, had attempted to repair the damage by mounting the counterattack against ‘A’ Company. More such attacks followed as July 30 wore on. “The nature of the landscape, all hills and folds, slashed by gullies and studded with cactus and olive groves, made it possible for their assault groups to approach and appear without warning, but it also confused their direction and the result was a queer disjointed battle which raged for several hours,” observed the West Nova Scotia’s regimental historian.30
On the battalion’s left flank, ‘C’ Company faced Monte Santa Maria and Hill 204, which the Royal 22e Régiment was attacking. The company was approached by a two-platoon-strong force that shouted, “Van Doos, Van Doos.” Bad accents betrayed them as Germans, who quickly melted away under heavy fire. Sounds of digging indicated that the Germans were setting up a position in a gully next to the West Novas, so Captain G.L.F. McNeil led his men in “a spirited bayonet charge.” Several Germans were killed and the remaining twenty-one taken prisoner in this action, which earned the captain a Military Cross.31
At times, small packets of paratroops tried to infiltrate Catenanuova but were driven out by West Nova patrols. By day’s end, the situation was stabilized. The entire Carleton and York Regiment had arrived, and the engineers had cleared a route of mines and then constructed a rough road along it so that supplies could be brought forward. The West Novas counted eight men wounded in this action and the Carletons, six men wounded. It had been a costly task for 4th Field Company, as the work was carried out under intensive mortar and artillery fire. One platoon commander, Lieutenant G.E. Atkinson, had both arms mutilated when an exploding shell sprayed him with shrapnel. He continued directing his men until the work was completed, earning a Military Cross. At 1900 hours, the track was declared open, at a cost of one officer and seven other ranks wounded.32
In an attempt to provide covering fire for the engineers, a troop of tanks from the Three Rivers Regiment’s ‘B’ Squadron had worked its way past Regalbuto and along the road to within a mile of Catenanuova. As the tankers had gained a ridge overlooking the town, “they found that they were, upon any movement, immediately subjected to terrific mortar and [high-explosive] barrages from the enemy.” An 88-millimetre shell scored a direct hit on the cupola of the Sherman commanded by Corporal Charles Willoughby, who was killed instantly. A few seconds after the rest of the crew evacuated the tank, a German mortar round “landed dead centre through the turret hatch...and exploded inside.” The blast blew off the turret and tossed it more than twenty feet from the hull. Realizing their mission was hopeless, the troop returned to ‘B’ Squadron’s harbour area near Agira.33
THE COUP DE GRCE that finally ended German attempts to regain Catenanuova was the Royal 22e Régiment’s successful attacks on Monte Santa Maria and Hill 204. Their attack had gone in later than that of the West Nova Scotia Regiment because the forming-up position in the riverbed was found to be riddled with mines, which had to be lifted by the engineers. Consequently, it was not until 0300 hours on July 30 that ‘C’ Company, under Major Charles Bellavance, assaulted Monte Santa Maria. Once Bellavance reported success, ‘D’ Company would slip around the flank of the mountain and strike northward to Hill 204.
‘C’ Company went forward with its Nos. 13 and 14 platoons out front. Having been thrown off this summit previously, the Van Doos expected a hard fight. But they reached the top without meeting resistance and found it occupied “only by the dead.” German artillery and mortar fire, however, was unrelenting. Bellavance had his ankle broken by a shell fragment while trying to send a wireless transmission reporting the objective taken. He found he was unable to raise ‘D’ Company.
Captain Bernard Guimond was meanwhile standing in the riverbed staring impotently at his company’s No. 18 wireless, which had broken down. Finally deciding he could wait no longer for some sign that ‘C’ Company had taken Monte Santa Maria, Guimond led ‘D’ Company forward. The company was still marching along the riverbed with No. 17 Platoon under Lieutenant André Langlais out front when day broke and they were fired on by two machine guns. Quick work with a PIAT gun and the 2-inch mortar dispersed the paratroops manning the gun positions. The advance resumed.34 Reaching the base of the hill at 0745 hours, ‘D’ Company came under heavy small-arms fire and also shelling by a couple of 88-millimetre guns firing from positions left of the hill. Detailing Langlais to attack the enemy position, Guimond led the other two platoons up the slope and quickly secured the objective.
Working its way forward, No. 17 Platoon identified one position inside a stone house, which the Germans had knocked a wall out of to get the gun inside. With one section providing covering fire, a second under Sergeant René Drapeau closed to within fifteen feet of the house and showered it with grenades. Inside they found a single dead German, the rest having abandoned the gun. Looking southward, Drapeau and Lance Corporal Gérard Gagnon spotted a 105-millimetre gun also concealed in a stone house about one hundred yards away. For a few minutes they tried wrestling the 88-millimetre around to bring the other gun under fire, but the task proved impossible. Despite heavy fire, the two men advanced to within fifty yards of the 105-millimetre gun and attempted to kill the
crew with grenades, only to be forced to flee when they were fired on by friendly artillery.
When the British guns ceased firing, Lance Corporal Gagnon and Privates Lachance and Grégoire returned to the stone house and decided to try for the 105-millimetre gun one more time. With Grégoire providing covering fire, the other two men went forward by bounds from one abandoned German entrenchment to another. They were within one hundred feet of the gun position when a paratrooper emerged waving a white flag. When Gagnon stepped into the open to accept the surrender, the paratrooper dropped the flag, and the other Germans in the building shot the French Canadian down. Lachance ran to Gagnon but saw he was dead. The private spotted the Germans fleeing in the opposite direction.
The silencing of this gun concluded the Royal 22e Régiment’s fight for Monte Santa Maria and Hill 204. For his part in No. 17 Platoon’s assault on the two guns, Drapeau was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal. Gagnon, whose brother, Private Jules Alphonse, had been killed while serving with the South Saskatchewan Regiment at Dieppe, was unsuccessfully put in for a Victoria Cross and received not even a Mention in Despatches. The Van Doos suffered surprisingly few casualties despite heated fighting—five killed and eight wounded.35
With the successful seizure of these summits, 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade concluded its task to secure the start point for the 78th British Infantry Division’s role in Hardgate. That night, two battalions of the division’s 11th Brigade passed through the West Novas and advanced about two miles northeastward from Catenanuova along the road to Centuripe. To enable the British to concentrate on their advance, however, 3 CIB would remain in the area for three more days to guard the division’s flank. With a series of cross-country moves north of the Catenanuova-Centuripe-Adrano road, they would secure several hills that might provide observation or gun positions for the Germans.
Monte Peloso, a rocky summit halfway between Catenanuova and Regalbuto, was taken without incident by the West Novas on July 31. The next day, the battalion marched three miles northeast to seize the nearly two-thousand-foot crag of Monte Criscina, midway between Centuripe and Regalbuto. Halfway to the objective, the battalion was ordered to halt and take up position on a ridge next to the tiny hamlet of Rosamarina. Here the Carleton and York Regiment came up on the right flank, while the Van Doos moved forward on the left. As the first two battalions sent out patrols to test the strength of the enemy’s hold on Monte Criscina, the Van Doos prepared to advance up the road towards Regalbuto to link up with the rest of 1st Canadian Infantry Division, which was advancing eastward from Agira.36
At first light on August 2, a West Nova patrol reported no signs of the enemy on Monte Criscina. Captain A.W. Rogers immediately led ‘D’ Company towards the mountain. They were about halfway there when Germans on the lower slopes opened up with heavy machinegun fire. ‘A’ Company advanced on the right to try and strengthen the attack, but Lieutenant Ross Guy and his men were pinned on the foot of the slope “by the German bullet storm.” The British artillery officer moving with ‘A’ Company vanished, leaving behind his plotting board, and the No. 18 wireless set was irreparably damaged. Guy lost contact with battalion headquarters. ‘D’ Company was also unable to communicate with the rear.37
The fighting became terribly confused, and platoon commanders were able to maintain little control over their sections. This meant that often individual gallantry dictated whether men lived or died. When all the Bren gunners in one section were killed or wounded, Private Thomas Martell retrieved the weapon and all the ammunition the crew had carried. He then dashed back across a hundred yards of ground, through a continuous hail of fire, “to his section, who were in an advanced position and isolated without an automatic weapon,” read his Distinguished Conduct Medal citation.38
Private Gerald Joseph Doucette also scooped up a fallen Bren gun and charged, firing from the hip, towards German positions up the hill. Pausing to reload, the twenty-year-old from Belliveau Cove, Nova Scotia, was shot down and killed. While trying to carry a message to Lieutenant Charles Reeves, Private Frederick William Keyes was also shot dead. Reeves died soon after while trying to organize his platoon for a charge.
From the ridge behind, the other company commanders could see the predicament the two companies were in and began directing artillery fire against the enemy positions. This enabled the two embattled companies to disengage and fall back some distance to reorganize.39 With nightfall, the attack was broken off. In the morning it was found that, with Centuripe and Regalbuto both threatened, the Germans had abandoned the hill. The abortive assault on Monte Criscina yielded the most costly day the West Novas faced in Sicily. One officer and eighteen other ranks were killed and another officer and twenty-six other ranks wounded.40
After this, 3 CIB ended its time of exile from the rest of 1st Canadian Infantry Division by moving north on August 4 to return to the fold.
[21]
Roughest Country Yet
WHILE 3RD CANADIAN Infantry Brigade had been concluding its Dittaino valley operations, 1st Canadian Infantry Division had kicked off Hardgate with the 231st (Malta) Brigade advancing on Highway 121 from Agira towards Adrano. Both 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade and 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade were exhausted from their five-day drive from Leonforte to Agira. Accordingly, they were stood down for a brief rest, while the British brigade was tasked with pushing through to Regalbuto.
“The order of the day,” wrote the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment’s war diarist on July 29, “consisted of cleaning up, eating large quantities of food and resting, an order which was conscientiously adhered to by the troops.”1 There was also time for pomp and ceremony. On the evening of July 30, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada’s band formed in Agira’s main plaza to play the retreat. CBC reporter Peter Stursberg and his sound engineer Paul Johnson had reached the front the day before with recording equipment loaded aboard an ammunition truck.
Hearing what the Seaforths planned, Stursberg determined to record the performance. Transferring the equipment to a Jeep, the two drove to the town square and set up beside the steps of Agira’s main cathedral. The recording was to be done directly to a vinyl disk via a turntable and Johnson had only one disk, so there could be no retakes. Everyone had to perform flawlessly the first time. Stursberg explained this to the pipe major, who promised his band could be relied upon to give a flawless performance. The situation was then explained to the priests “in their shabby black robes who were going to ring the church bells . . . when I gave the signal.”
With the pipers waiting their cue to begin lustily playing, Stursberg recorded a broadcast that was soon transmitted around the world on the BBC. “I am standing on the steps of the ancient church in the main square of Agira,” the reporter intoned. “Directly in front of me is the pipe band of the Seaforth Highlanders which is going to give a concert ... Besides hundreds of townspeople there are scores of Canadian soldiers perched on the top of carriers and trucks parked near the church ... At the end of the street, over there, you can look across the yellow sunburned valley and see the hills where the Germans are. You can see the smoke of battle as well, and hear the rumble of the guns. The bells of the old church are going to ring out before the pipers begin playing . . . And there they are ringing now, the church bells of Agira ... And now the band under Pipe Major Edmund Essen of Vancouver” began playing. The recording was perfect, and Stursberg made radio history—providing the first recorded broadcast from inside conquered territory. Stursberg would later write, a bit smugly but truthfully, “This was the first sound of liberation, and the poor, government-financed CBC had bested the wealthy U.S. networks.”2
The night before the Seaforths’ performance in Agira, the British brigade’s 1st Hampshire and 1st Dorsetshire battalions had advanced, with the Three Rivers ‘A’ Squadron providing tank support. The brigade was also backed by the 25-pounders of 3rd Canadian Field Regiment and the British 165th Field Regiment. As the Canadians had learned during the advance on Agira, the
country bordering Highway 121 favoured the German defenders in every way. “There was the same succession of rocky ridges crossing the road at right angles, each one a potential site for a German rearguard action. In this broken and mountainous terrain, much of it covered by thick olive and almond groves, it was practically impossible for reconnaissance to detect the enemy’s whereabouts, and frequently an advancing body of company strength or less might suddenly find itself committed against a defensive force too firmly entrenched to be successfully engaged by anything less than a battalion with supporting arms,” the Canadian Army’s official historian observed.
Initially, despite the terrain, the advance went well for the Hampshires—they gained about six miles without meeting serious resistance. With night falling, Brigadier Robert Urquhart ordered them to attack a long parallel-trending ridge south of the highway. As the battalion formed for the assault, it came under heavy Nebelwerfer fire from the ridge. The multibarrelled mortars had such a rapid rate of fire that dozens of rounds exploded among the British troops before they could seek cover. Almost every man in one platoon was killed or wounded. Quickly reorganizing, the Hampshires pressed bravely up the slope, only to be caught in a vicious machine-gun crossfire. It became clear that the ridge was strongly held by the Hermann Göring Armoured Engineer Battalion, and with casualties mounting rapidly, the Hampshires broke off the attack.3
The engineer battalion had been ordered to defend Regalbuto and not to retire until 15th Panzer Grenadier Division to its north was first forced back to the east of the town. Backing up the battalion was at least a company of tanks, the 4th Battery of the Hermann Göring Artillery Regiment, and a company of 3rd Parachute Regiment paratroops. In a general order to his troops, the battalion commander made it “absolutely clear that the present position must be held at all costs. Any instructions for withdrawal are preparatory. There must be no doubt about this point. The abandonment of the present position and a fighting withdrawal to the bridgehead position will only be carried out on express orders from division.”4 These instructions accorded with those given to the Hermann Göring Division’s commander, Generalmajor Paul Conrath, by XIV Panzer Corps’s General der Panzertruppen Hans Valentin Hube, who feared that Regalbuto’s fall would force a premature withdrawal to the Adrano-Randazzo line. The engineers must prevent this from happening.5