Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Second Edition

by Ahmed Rashid

  Saudi Arabia, it appears, has proved incapable of evolving a rational foreign policy which suits its national interests rather than merely appeasing its domestic Wahabbi lobby. It took Mullah Omar to personally insult the House of Saud before the Saudis pulled away from the Taliban. The Saudi export of Wahabbism has now boomeranged back home and is increasingly undermining the authority of the Royal Family. Osama Bin Laden's critique of the corruption and mismanagement of the regime is not falling upon deaf ears amongst the Saudi population. And unless Afghanistan moves towards peace, dozens more Bin Ladens are ready and waiting to take his place from their bases inside Afghanistan.

  For Muslims everywhere Saudi support for the Taliban is deeply embarrassing, because the Taliban's interpretation of Islam is so negative and destructive. Increasingly, Western popular perception equates Islam with the Taliban and Bin Laden-style terrorism. Many Western commentators do not particularize the Taliban, but condemn Islam wholesale for being intolerant and anti-modern. The Taliban, like so many Islamic fundamentalist groups today, divest Islam of all its legacies except theology Islamic philosophy, science, arts, aesthetics and mysticism are ignored. Thus the rich diversity of Islam and the essential message of the Koran to build a civil society that is just and equitable in which rulers are responsible for their citizens – is forgotten.

  The genius of early Muslim-Arab civilization was its multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-ethnic diversity. The stunning and numerous state failures that abound in the Muslim world today are because that original path, that intention and inspiration, has been abandoned either in favour of brute dictatorship or a narrow interpretation of theology. Muslim history has been a cycle of conquest, renewal and defeat. ‘Perhaps it has been the destiny of Islam to attract and use the primitive peoples who surround or cross its territory, but then to fall prey to their violent power. Ultimately order is restored and wounds are healed. The successful primitive warrior is tamed by the all-powerful urban life of Islam,’ wrote Ferdinand Braudel.8

  Following this Muslim tradition, could the Taliban also change or moderate their policies and absorb Afghanistan's rich ethnic and cultural diversity to become the country's legitimate rulers? In their present form that is unlikely. The Taliban are essentially caught between a tribal society which they try to ignore and the need for a state structure which they refuse to establish. Tribal fragmentation amongst the Pashtuns is already coming back to haunt them as they fail to satisfy even the local demands of power-sharing, while they ignore the non-Pashtuns. This was never the case in the past. ‘Despite the seeming dominance of the Pashtuns, the actual process of state-building entailed the participation of the elite of all the ethnic groups and a prominent role played by non-Pastuns in both the bureaucracy and the military,’ writes Afghan scholar Ashraf Ghani.9The Taliban are bucking the entire trend of Afghan history because they have no understanding of it.

  At the same time, the Taliban refuse to define the Afghan state they want to constitute and rule over, largely because they have no idea what they want. The lack of a central authority, state organizations, a methodology for command and control and mechanisms which can reflect some level of popular participatation (Loya Jirga or Islamic Shura or parliament), make it impossible for many Afghans to accept the Taliban or for the outside world to recognize a Taliban government. There can be no effective government unless there is a common, acceptable definition of what kind of state is now required to heal the wounds of war. But the Kandahari group around Mullah Omar brooks no outsiders and no advice. Divisions within the Taliban are multiplying fast and it is not unlikely that more moderate Taliban may mount a coup against Mullah Omar and the Kandahari ulema.

  No warlord faction has ever felt itself responsible for the civilian population, but the Taliban are incapable of carrying out even the minimum of developmental work because they believe that Islam will take care of everyone. This has raised fundamental questions for the UN and the NGO community that humanitarian aid is in fact prolonging the civil war because foreign aid keeps the population alive, absolving the warlords of the responsibility of having to provide for the people and allowing them to channel all their resources into the war effort. This dilemma is now common for the UN and aid agencies in other failed states such as Sudan and Somalia and presents the greatest challenge to the international humanitarian community in the future.

  It seems that the only effective Afghan NGO is based on organized smuggling and the drugs trade. Thus the limited reconstruction which the Taliban has undertaken so far is entirely related to improving the efficiency of smuggling and drugs trafficking, such as repairing roads, setting up petrol pumps and inviting US businessmen to set up a mobile telephone network which will qualitatively speed up the movement of drugs and illicit trade. The benefits of this reconstruction all accrue to the transport and drugs mafia. No warlord is building schools, hospitals, water supply systems or anything remotely related to civic development.

  In their present form, the Taliban cannot hope to rule Afghanistan and be recognized by the international community. Even if they were to conquer the north, it would not bring stability, only continuing guerrilla war by the non-Pashtuns, but this time from bases in Central Asia and Iran which would further destabilize the region. Yet in the Pashtun belt of Afghanistan, the only alternative to the Taliban is further disorder and chaos. ‘The majority of Afghans south of Kabul would most probably agree that the Taliban, although not as popular today as when they came, are better for the people, their security and welfare, compared to what was there before them and that there is no real alternative but anarchy.’10The Taliban cannot be wished away, but a more likely scenario is that the Taliban will form factions with separate and rival Taliban fiefdoms in Kabul, Kandahar and possibly Herat.

  The anti-Taliban alliance is incapable of conquering or ruling over the southern Pashtun region. So far Masud has proved unable to galvanize enough Pashtuns who reject the Taliban and who would give him some national legitimacy. The opposition's only chance for survival depends on winning over sections of the Pashtuns, which will doubtless prolong the war, but also weaken the Taliban and offer the possibility that both sides could then negotiate. The anti-Taliban alliance has also failed to set up minimum state structures or a representative leadership which absorbs even all the non-Pashtuns. Their bickering, internal differences and leadership power struggles have decimated them in the eyes of many Afghans, who may loathe the Taliban but have no faith in the anti-Taliban alliance either.

  The fear of fragmentation is ever present and the lines have been well drawn since 1996 – a Pashtun south under the Taliban and a non-Pashtun north divided by the Hindu Kush mountains, leaving Kabul contested by the two sides. With the devastating massacres, sectarian pogroms and ethnic cleansing in so many areas, the chances of fragmentation appear extremely high. Fortunately there is no Slobodan Milosevic or Saddam Hussein amongst the warlords, who would be prepared to preserve power and their fiefdoms at the expense of partition of the country. Despite their interference, fragmentation suits none of Afghanistan's neighbours because it would open a Pandora's box of ethnicity that would rapidly spill across Afghanistan's borders, create massive refugee influxes and further spread the culture of drugs, weapons and Islamic fundamentalism in their already fragile states. Formal fragamentation and even partition of the Afghan state is still possible, but so far none of the players desire it. That is the one positive hope for the future of the peace process.

  Peace-making by the UN has so far failed to yield any dividends, but not for lack of trying. The reason is simply that as long as outside powers fuel the warlords with money and weapons, the civil war does not have a likelihood of winding down. A possible solution might lie in a process which would have to begin from outside Afghanistan. All the regional states would first have to agree to an arms embargo on Afghanistan, implement it sincerely and allow it to be monitored by the UN effectively. The regional states would have to accept limited areas of influence i
n Afghanistan rather than continuing to push for their proxies to rule the entire country. An Iran-Pakistan dialogue would be essential in which Pakistan would accept limiting its influence to the Pashtun belt, while Iran accept the same in western and central Afghanistan with guarantees for the Shia minority.

  In short, each neighbouring state would have to recognize not only its own national security needs, but also those of its neighbours. Outside influence cannot now be eliminated in Afghanistan, but it must be contained and limited with mutual agreement to acceptable levels. No neighbouring country can presume to undermine the acknowledged security interests of its neighbours. Negotiating such agreements would be extremely tricky because they would involve not just diplomats, but the military and intelligence officials of each state. The UN and the international community would also have to guarantee that such agreements would not be furthering the future disintegration of Afghanistan or interfering with the process of government formation inside Afghanistan.

  Afghanistan's internal settlement can no longer be achieved by what is euphemistically called ‘a broad-based government.’ There is no possibility that Mullah Omar and Masud are going to be able to agree to sit down in Kabul and rule together. Instead, what is needed is a cease-fire, a weak central government for an initial period, the agreed demilitarization of Kabul and a high degree of autonomy in the regions controlled by the factions. All the factions would have to agree to build up a strengthened central government in the long term, while maintaining their own autonomy in the short term. In this way, they would retain their independent military units, but would also contribute to a central policing force in Kabul.

  The factions would receive outside aid for reconstruction on an independent basis, but work together through the central government to rebuild the country's shattered infrastructure. This would in turn generate greater confidence and understanding between them. All the factions would then have to agree to set in motion some form of legitimizing process through elected or chosen representative bodies in their regions, which ultimately could lead to a central Jirga or Shura in Kabul.

  It cannot be underestimated how difficult it would be to negotiate such agreements, given that at present there is no will among the belligerents to negotiate. One lure could be a substantial reconstruction package put together by international donors, the World Bank or large private charities, which would not be disbursed until there was a minimum agreement. This would essentially be a bribe for the warlords and an incentive for the Afghan people to pressurize them to accept an agreement. Any serious peace process would need much greater commitment to peace-making in Afghanistan from the international community than it has shown so far.

  Peace in Afghanistan would pay enormous dividends across the entire region. Pakistan would benefit economically from the reconstruction in Afghanistan and it could begin to tackle the leftovers of the Afghan war on its own soil the proliferation of weapons, drugs, terrorism, sectarianism and the black economy. Pakistan's diplomatic isolation in the region would end and it could reintegrate itself into the Central Asian network of communication links, offering as it does the shortest route to the sea. Iran would return to its position in the world community and its role as a great trading state at the centre of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Turkey would have links and commercial ties to Turkic peoples in Afghanistan with whom it has a historical connection.

  China would feel more secure and be able to carry out a more effective economic development programme in its deprived Muslim province of Xinjiang. Russia could build a more realistic relationship with Central and South Asia based on economic realities rather than false hegemonic ambitions, while laying its Afghan ghosts to rest. Oil and gas pipelines crossing Afghanistan would link the country into the region and speed up foreign assistance for its reconstruction. The USA could evolve a more realistic Central Asian policy, access the region's energy in a securer environment and deal with the threat of terrorism.

  But if the war in Afghanistan continues to be ignored we can only expect the worst. Pakistan will face a Taliban-style Islamic revolution which will further destabilize it and the entire region. Iran will remain on the periphery of the world community and its eastern borders will continue to be wracked by instability. The Central Asian states will not be able to deliver their energy and mineral exports by the shortest routes and as their economies crash, they will face an Islamic upsurge and instability. Russia will continue to bristle with hegemonic aims in Central Asia even as its own society and economy crumbles. The stakes are extremely high.

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  THE TALIBAN RESURGENT

  2000-2009

  When the 19 suicide bombers rammed their planes into the buildings in Washington, DC, and New York City on 11 September 2001, it was the end of an era for the West. The innocence of the post-Cold War period – the belief that global political threats had now subsided and we could all get on with our lives – came to an abrupt end. Terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists, Westerners discovered, did not just take place in distant lands against unknown people; they threatened the heartland of the West. In Central and South Asia, however, the Western retaliation to the attacks brought the hope that the Taliban regime would be overthrown, finally bringing an end to the long-running wars in Afghanistan that had begun with the Soviet invasion in 1979. The war against the Taliban ushered in the promise of peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan and across the region.

  The brutal deterioration of the social and economic conditions in Afghanistan under the sway of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the 18 months before 11 September should have signalled to the world that enormous dangers were lurking there as Afghanistan became a terrorist sanctuary for Osama Bin Laden and some 2,500 of his fighters. Extremists from South and Central Asia, the Middle East, the Far East, Africa and even Europe poured into Al Qaeda camps to receive training in battlefield tactics, bomb making and making poisons.

  In the nine months before September 2001 the international community had tried to tighten restrictions on the Taliban, but the measures were insufficient to control the regime or its Al Qaeda allies. On 19 January the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1333, which imposed sanctions on the Taliban that included a complete arms ban and the seizure of Taliban assets outside Afghanistan. The Taliban were furious, as there was no similar arms ban on the Taliban's opposition, the United Front (now called the Northern Alliance or NA). Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence defied the ban by continuing to provide the Taliban with weapons, and the UN was forced to pass another resolution in July putting greater pressure on Islamabad to stop supplying them with arms.

  As a result of these sanctions both Pakistan and the Taliban became more isolated from the world community, but the sanctions themselves seemed to have little other effect. Pakistan's military regime, led by President Pervez Musharraf, mobilized national Islamic parties to hold anti-American and anti-UN rallies, while it continued to support the Taliban, which was now also being helped by Al Qaeda.

  As pressure mounted on the Taliban, the moderate wing within its leadership – who despised the Arabs, was opposed to international terrorism, and was secretly willing to negotiate with the United Nations and others – suffered a major setback when their leader, Mullah Mohammed Rabbani, died of cancer in a Karachi hospital on 16 April. Rabbani was the de facto second in command of the Taliban and had strongly opposed the growing influence of the Arabs on the movement. With Rabbani gone, Al Qaeda persuaded Mullah Mohammed Omar to issue extreme edicts imposing mandates that were unrelated to Afghan culture and tradition. Over a few weeks the Taliban ordered the closing down of foreign hospitals, declared that all Afghan Hindus would have to wear yellow badges, banned the Internet, put eight Western humanitarian workers on trial and forced the UN's World Food Programme to shut down its bakeries, which had provided affordable bread to millions of hungry people.

  With the support of some 2,500 Arab fighters the Taliban also attempted to seize the last slivers of te
rritory held by the NA and its leader, Ahmad Shah Masud. The Taliban first conquered the Hazarajat in central Afghanistan and, as punishment to the resisting Hazaras, who were Shia Muslims, Mullah Omar ordered the destruction of the two enormous statues of the Buddha in Bamiyan that had stood for 1,800 years. They were blown up by dynamite and tank fire on 10 March, causing international outrage. As the Hazaras fed their homeland, the drought and the war intensified, turning more than a million Afghans into refugees within their own country. Many Afghans were reduced to eating grass, rodents and animal fodder, and Afghan girls were sold to buy food.

  On the eve of 11 September it was self-evident to the few international actors who paid attention to Afghanistan that with Al Qaeda firmly ensconced in the country, a hopelessly inept Taliban regime in charge of it, and drought, civil war, mass migrations and drug trafficking ravaging it the stage had been set for a major international crisis.

  Al Qaeda had prepared for the 11 September attacks well. Two days earlier Ahmad Shah Masud had been assassinated. Two young Moroccans pretending to be journalists who had been recruited by Al Qaeda in Belgium had blown him up with a suicide bomb packed into a television camera. Al Qaeda had planned the assassination for several weeks earlier, which would have allowed the Taliban time to defeat the NA, leaving them in control of the entire country when the 11 September attacks occurred. This would have left any invading force bereft of allies on the ground. The murder of Masud was to be Osama Bin Laden's gift to Mullah Omar and a guarantee of Al Qaeda's continued safe sanctuary in Afghanistan despite the inevitable US retaliation.