Decoding the IRA

by Tom Mahon

  In March 1924 Sandow took part in an attack on British soldiers and civilians as they were leaving the British base at Spike Island in Cork harbour. Spike Island was one of the naval bases allotted to the royal navy under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The IRA men were disguised as Free State soldiers and the operation was a failed attempt to destabilise the government. The gardaí immediately suspected Sandow and the IRA had to whisk him off to America.141 As a wanted man, Sandow couldn’t have entered the US legally and so must have been there under an assumed name. He did eventually return to Cork, the date of which I’m uncertain, though it may have been during the Depression when many IRA exiles returned home.

  Therefore when one looks at factors such as name, personality and stature within the IRA there’s very strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that ‘Mr Jones’ was Dan ‘Sandow’ Donovan. A true Irish James Bond!

  The IRA and China

  One of the more bizarre plans of the IRA was to provide political and military support to Chinese nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek.

  By 1926 China was divided into fiefdoms controlled by warlords, while many of the key ports and cities were controlled by foreign powers. Within these treaty ports and their ‘concessions’ foreigners could trade and engage in economic activity protected by unfair treaties forced upon the Chinese. The foreigners thrived on the absence of a strong central Chinese government and were protected by a large army and naval presence. Warships of many nations, including the royal navy, patrolled the seas around China and the great Yangtze river. Britain, followed by Japan, was the largest foreign investor in China and together these two countries accounted for over 50 per cent of foreign investment.142 To protect her interest Britain supported the powerful northern warlord Marshal Wu Peifu.143 America, with a smaller stake in China, adopted a more neutral stance.144

  The city of Canton in the south of the country was the Chinese nationalists’ stronghold. Chiang Kai-shek was the leader of the nationalist party, the Kuomintang, which was allied to the tiny Chinese Communist Party. The Russians believed that a nationalist victory resulting in the defeat of the foreign ‘imperialists’ and their Chinese allies would trigger similar uprisings throughout Asia, including India, and ultimately lead to the collapse of the British empire.145 In addition, victory by the communist–nationalist alliance would help secure the border with Russia and displace the more threatening Japanese. To build up Chiang’s National Revolutionary Army the Soviets provided massive resources and a host of military advisors. The fate of China also played an important role in the struggle for power in Russia, with Stalin supporting the communist alliance with the Kuomintang, while Trotsky called for Soviet support of the communists exclusively.146

  In July 1926 the National Revolutionary Army launched a major campaign to reunify China, called the Northern Expedition. Following a string of military victories by the nationalists, in late 1926 the British began to consider recognising the Kuomintang government.147 The following March the nationalists took the key city of Shanghai, and around the same time the already-strained relations between the communists and nationalists disintegrated into fighting, leading ultimately to the rout of the communists and the Russians by December.148

  So where does the IRA fit into this? There are a number of reasons (none of them very good) why the IRA should have considered supporting the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek. First, any war that threatened Britain and her empire was in the IRA’s interests. Second, it was an opportunity to stir up anti-British propaganda by labelling Britain’s involvement as imperialist. Third, and perhaps most importantly, this was a further service it could perform for the Soviets and particularly Stalin. IRA support consisted of a combination of propaganda and military assistance. However, the Russians may have overestimated the degree of assistance the IRA could have provided the Chinese. In particular the IRA and their partners, Clan na Gael, retained little ability to mobilise American public support – as by 1927 they represented only a small minority within the Irish-American community. This was in stark contrast to Daniel Cohalan’s and the Friends of Irish Freedom’s successful campaign against US senate ratification of the Treaty of Versailles only eight years previously.

  An Phoblacht and the Irish-American newspapers were able to spin the Chinese struggle as a war against British imperialism. In September 1926 the ‘Wanshien massacre’ was given prominent coverage. This incident occurred when troops belonging to Britain’s ally, Marshal Peifu, attempted to commandeer British merchant vessels at the river port of Wanhsien, to cross the Yangtze river. The British took evasive action during which a sampan capsized and several Chinese soldiers were reportedly drowned. Wu’s local commander retaliated by seizing two merchant ships and their crews. A tense standoff ensued as the British brought up their gunboats; finally the royal navy made a surprise attack to retake the boats. The attackers were beaten back but with the loss of several hundred Chinese, including civilians, and seven British fatalities.149 In New York the Irish World proclaimed ‘British butcher 5,000 Chinamen’, who died ‘mostly by British bombardment of the city’.150 In January 1927 An Phoblacht reported: ‘Nationalist China is fighting to drive British brigands and thugs from her shores.’151

  Twomey wrote to Connie Neenan telling him to mobilise Irish-American opinion in support of the Chinese, as it ‘is [a] good opportunity for [the] display of anti-British feeling’. He wanted Neenan to get in touch with ‘agents of the Cantonese [nationalist] government’ and to ‘arrange demonstrations’.152 Neenan contacted the Clan Executive who said they would ‘endeavour to help’ but were limited as they no longer had their own newspaper.153 He also ‘went to [the] Irish World … to give all possible publicity to the Chinese fight for independence. They promised [to support the Chinese] and are getting copy [supplied text] from [the] Chinese representative here.’ Neenan felt that, though ‘labour’ unions and ‘some Irish-American newspapers are pro-Cantonese’, the papers were otherwise ‘completely imperialistic’. There was, however, a shift in the spring as he noticed calls for foreign withdrawal from China.154 In April Neenan was able to report ‘pro-Chinese demonstrations held in Philadelphia [were] well attended’.155 Philadelphia was the hometown of Joe McGarrity and this demonstration was likely the product of McGarrity and Neenan’s efforts. In May the Irish World reported that a demonstration was held outside the British embassy in Washington by the (well-known civil rights group) ‘Hands-off China Conference of Philadelphia’.156

  But the IRA was (on the surface at least) endeavouring to mobilise more than public opinion in support of the Kuomintang. Around January 1927 Mr Tang, an ‘important Chinese representative’, visited Ireland at the invitation of the IRA. Tang was a writer, resident in London, who was associated with the British Independent Labour party (a left-wing group affiliated with the more moderate Labour party) and acted as a Kuomintang representative. In Ireland Tang attended a ‘good pro-Chinese demonstration’ and met with Twomey, Cooney and O’Donnell, who found him ‘a fine type’. Following this meeting Twomey reported that the Chinese ‘would welcome any [IRA] men we may send out. Of course we have none suitable. If any [men] there [in America are] anxious to go they should be encouraged.’157 In February the Army Council passed a resolution that ‘the principle of Volunteers going to China was approved, provided conditions of service, cost of travelling were satisfactory’.158 Whether this was serious or not is difficult to determine; it’s possible it was merely a sop to the Russians and some of the left-wing IRA members such as Peadar O’Donnell. However, at the behest of the Council, O’Donnell prepared a report on the feasibility of this venture which the OC in Britain, George, delivered to Tang.

  In the meantime, the British police suspected Tang of seeking weapons and set up a crude sting operation. He received a phone call to discuss an ‘interesting proposition’ and to attend a meeting with a ‘mysterious man’ in Twickenham. Suspecting an attempt to entrap him, he first sent a registered letter to Scotland Yard stating that
he suspected that the man he was going to see ‘was seeking to involve peaceable citizens in illegal action’ and that he was attending the meeting with a witness solely to ‘expose the undesirable nature of the transaction’. Arriving at the house the man said: ‘I represent a syndicate which has any amount of stuff and is prepared to sell to these Chinese boys. We can give you submarines, field artillery, tanks, rifles, ammunition – anything you want.’

  ‘What about aeroplanes?’ asked Tang.

  ‘Yes, we can supply you with about thirty of them.’ The man finished: ‘My people want to help the boys who are fighting for their freedom against the British. I’ll fight for any country that’s against the damned British. I’ve got a crowd of Irish willing to fight now, if your people will get them to China.’159 This police trap is reminiscent of the more successful Special Branch schemes against the Fenians in the previous century. It would appear that Scotland Yard had some limited information on Tang to act on; perhaps they were just aware of his trip to Ireland, but were unfamiliar with the extent of his contacts with the IRA. Tang already knew how the IRA made contact and who were their representatives, and so this is another example of how the British intelligence forces weren’t well informed on IRA work for the Soviets.

  February was definitely China Month for the IRA, as they undertook two other projects in support of the Chinese nationalists. The OC of the Scottish battalion reported to Twomey: ‘China situation we have been very active, made and placed 200 coal bombs in cargo of [British] admiralty coal transports for China’. Coal bombs are devices made of a chunk of metal, with a hollow centre containing explosives. They are made to resemble coal by coating the surface in a mixture of tar and coal dust. The bombs are placed among a pile of coal, and when fed into the boiler of a ship are supposed to explode. A Confederate secret service officer, who originally came from Belfast, invented the coal bomb during the American Civil War. The Fenians could have learned about the bomb either from ex-Confederate soldiers who joined them or from an anonymous letter published in The Times in 1875, which gave a full description of the bomb. In turn the Scottish IRA was descended from a long Fenian tradition. The IRA plan was that bombs would arrive among the coal in China and be unwittingly shovelled into the boiler of a royal navy ship, most likely one patrolling the Yangtze. Whether the bombs were even placed by the Scottish unit is unlikely and I have found no evidence that one actually exploded. The Scottish OC wasn’t guilty of an overstatement when he said: ‘This job [making the bombs] is a bit dangerous and requires a lot of time to construct.’160 Twomey was ‘glad you took advantage of [the] coal’ but wanted attacks on British ships bringing supplies and weapons to China: ‘Could a ship or ships for China be burned or destroyed by scuttling or other means? Do your utmost on this.’161

  Twomey was now on a roll and he sent a message to the IRA in Liverpool, marked ‘destroy when read’: ‘Your IO [intelligence officer] reports shipments from there to China. If you can do your utmost to destroy any ammunition or other armament or stores being sent. Could you get some time mines or incendiary bombs put on ships or put ships on fire with petrol or other inflammables? Keep this absolutely secret. Do not discuss it. Either carry out the operations or say nothing about it.’ 162

  This is the extent of our information on IRA support for Chiang Kai shek and his nationalist party. Probably the only effect it could have had was to encourage American support for Chinese self-determination, and even on this it probably had a negligible effect. The Americans, not burdened with an imperial past, were already more favourably disposed to China than the European powers and in 1928 signed a trade treaty, returning to China control over her trade with America.163

  THIS IS A SNAPSHOT of the IRA’s relationship with the Soviet Union and her allies in 1926 and 1927. Little of this clandestine association has been suspected, let alone described. The degree of secrecy the IRA maintained is impressive given that many of the participants later resigned from the IRA and in later life frequently talked extensively about their experiences. This may be partially due to the degree of disapproval which association with the Soviets engendered in Ireland from the 1930s on. On the other hand, many in the IRA remained life-long socialists and continued to publicly support the USSR.

  The relationship was controlled by military men in the IRA such as Twomey and Russell and was not driven by ideological interests. Republican socialists in the IRA who would have been sympathetic to the Soviet Union were kept in the background.

  The actual value of the information the IRA acquired for the Soviets is difficult to assess. What is undeniable is that the organisation supplied a steady stream of technical and tactical information from America and Britain to Red Army intelligence. ‘James’, however, was critical of what he received in London: ‘We have got only very few valuable material [sic].’164 This may have been his honest assessment, although in espionage it’s standard to push agents to get better and better information by criticising what’s already been done. General Krivitsky of Red Army intelligence said that ‘for a time he got quite useful information’ from his IRA agents.165

  On the other hand, the IRA believed that it was ‘Mr Jones’ in America that acquired the most important intelligence for the Soviets and not the IRA in Britain. This was information that ‘James’ and Krivitsky probably weren’t privy to.

  ‘Jones’ passed on Fries’ book, Chemical Warfare, which was a freely available publication, but the other military reports he acquired were restricted and would be expected to have been of greater value to the Russians. At the time the Soviets had a covert chemical warfare programme with the Germans, but information on American chemical weapons procedures, including production techniques, would have been complementary. In particular the Americans had expertise with mustard gas and lewisite, two of the gases which the Russians felt were of the most military value. America had also made advances in the development of gas masks. The technical information on airplane engines, machine guns and submarine detection sonar (and even the tractors made by Ford – if it was ever handed over) fit in with the pattern of improvement in Russian military technology and armament which occurred during the inter-war years. And though no one item or report may have been crucial, all in all it may have helped to make Soviet technology and weaponry the formidable resource it was to become.

  Although information on specific and operational details may have been kept to an inner circle, a relatively large number of officers must have known about the alliance. For instance, the agreement was originally made under the leadership of Frank Aiken, and he and Seán Lemass would have been familiar with it, as presumably was de Valera. Members of the IRA headquarters staff and the Army Council should also have known, given the many passing comments that Twomey made in the papers and to officers, including George Gilmore and Frank Kerlin.

  I have found no evidence that the intelligence agencies in Britain, America and the Irish Free State were aware either of the full extent of the IRA’s clandestine and espionage activity or that the IRA and the Soviet Union had a formal agreement. It was fortunate for Britain that the Soviets exercised restraint in not providing significant military support to the IRA.

  As the agreement was so secret it’s difficult to know for certain whether it was ended in the late 1920s or whether it continued maybe in a more limited form. At some time (possibly the late 1920s or early 1930s) George Gilmore and Dave Fitzgerald of the IRA went to Moscow to attend a military training course but returned home when British intelligence found out. In 1930 Seán MacBride met with the leadership of Clan na Gael to tell them of a proposed agreement with the Soviet Union which promised ‘substantial’ aid and the opportunity for twenty-five to thirty IRA officers to train in Russia.166

  One cannot but suspect that there may also be another chapter to be written about the Provisional IRA and the USSR.

  Conclusion

  The decryption of these documents gives a fresh insight into the IRA. It provides an opportunity to make an assess
ment that is independent of both the narratives prepared by the IRA and its veterans for public consumption and those of third-party observers or historians on the outside looking in.

  In writing this, James and I were led by the evidence without knowing where exactly it would lead us. There were many surprises; the extent of the relationship with the Soviet Union and the ability of de Valera to consistently outmanoeuvre the organisation being two examples. The IRA that emerged was divided and ill-disciplined, lacking a unifying ideology or strategy. Though there was no lack of talent in the leadership, there was a complete failure of leadership. Overall this is a picture of incompetence. Having said that, some of the IRA’s security procedures and ability to engage in espionage were truly impressive.

  The papers also reveal an organisation that was largely the sum of its dominant personalities. The prison letters in particular have a very humanising effect and demonstrate the commitment and sincerity of many of its leaders. This is the story of individuals as much as it is of an organisation: of Garda Ward who was pointlessly shot and killed, of the newsboy who was attacked by Fr Barrett, of Jack Keogh the bully who died a miserable death, of Annie O’Mahoney who put a dollar a day aside for the IRA, and of countless others.

  There was no one point at which the ‘old IRA’ of the Anglo-Irish War became what’s regarded as the ‘bad IRA’ of recent times. The tactics used during the struggle with the British were not terribly different to those the IRA tried to use against the Irish Free State. The leaders from the Anglo-Irish War left not so much because of moral indignation but because they were tired of defeat and realised the organisation had no achievable plan. The killing of unarmed gardaí just seemed so pointless and a waste of human life.