The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict With Iran
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28. David Isenberg, “The Rapid Deployment Force: The Few, the Futile, the Expendable,” Policy Analysis No. 44, CATO Institute, November 8, 1984, p. 9, www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa044.html, accessed September 20, 2002. The ambassador to Jordan, a career Foreign Service officer named Nicholas Veliotes, secretly concluded an arrangement with the Jordanian king to establish a Jordanian counterpart to the U.S. rapid deployment force that could augment the American effort in the event of a war with the Soviets. The two countries conducted low-level military exercises and Jordan offered use of its bases as marshaling areas for the rapid deployment force. Ambassador Nicholas Veliotes, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, January 29, 1990.
29. Brzezinski memorandum to President Jimmy Carter, July 31, 1979.
30. Harold Brown memorandum to General David Jones, November 10, 1979. Brzezinski’s military aide William Odom later wrote that Carter contemplated just ordering its creation and dictating the command structure, but in the end the president let the Pentagon sort it out.
31. Secretary of Defense memorandum to Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 22, 1979.
32. General Paul X. Kelley, interview with author, May 13, 2009.
33. Two names—Army General Paul Gorman and P. X. Kelley—had been forwarded to Jones as possible commanders of the rapid deployment force. Gorman was well respected in the Pentagon and had the strong backing of the army chief of staff, Edward Meyer. But W. Graham Clayton, Jr., former secretary of the navy and now Brown’s deputy, knew Kelley and liked the marines, and when Gorman’s name came before Clayton, he suggested Kelley as an alternative choice. American Embassy Kabul message to Secretary of State, “Meeting with Soviet Diplomat,” June 25, 1979, p. 3.
34. Robert H. Barrow memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Rapid Deployment Forces,” December 14, 1979, pp. 1–2, Personal Papers of General Robert H. Barrow, U.S. Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA.
35. Bright Star was an annual exercise until 1985, when, due to its size and the number of forces involved, the decision was made to hold it every two years.
36. The main Soviet attacks would come from the Transcaucasus and Turkistan toward Tehran along four main axes with a supporting attack from Turkistan and Afghanistan along the eastern Iranian axis to seize Mashhad and Zahedan.
37. The first was submitted for the Joint Chiefs’ review on July, 31, 1980; it was modified over the coming year and resubmitted on February 13, 1981.
38. RDJTF OPLAN 1001-81, February 15, 1981, Annex C, pp. C1–C13.
39. The first plan was labeled 1001 but quickly three variants (1002, 1003, 1004) emerged, based upon the conditions that precipitated the invasion and if it coincided with a general war in Europe. COMRDJTF message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “OPLAN 1001-81” (170350Z), June 1981, p. 1; CINCRED message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “COMRDJTF OPLAN 1001-81” (132306Z), February 1981, p. 2.
40. The forces allocated to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in 1981 included:
Army
Third U.S. Army
XVIII Airborne Corps
82nd Airborne Division
101st Air Assault Division
24th Infantry Division
6th Cavalry Brigade
Two Ranger Battalions
One Special Forces Group
Air Force
17 tactical fighter squadrons
2 tactical reconnaissance squadrons
19 tactical airlift squadrons
Marine Corps
1st Marine Expeditionary Force
1st Marine Division
1st Marine Wing
1st Marine Forces Service Support Command
Navy
3 carrier battle groups
1 surface action group
Naval Special Warfare Group ONE
41. Joint Chiefs of Staff message to CINCRED, “Planning Guidance for Countering a Soviet Invasion of Iran” (262336Z), September 1980; Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “Planning Guidance for Countering a Soviet Invasion of Iran” (DTG 262336Z), September 1980, pp. 2–3; Department of the Army memorandum, “U.S. Strategy to Counter a Major Soviet Attack into Iran,” April 25, 1981, pp. 3–4. In the various documents produced by the U.S. military and intelligence agencies, the number of Soviet divisions invading Iran varied considerably, ranging from seventeen to thirty.
42. For the Reagan administration, nuclear or strategic planning against the Soviets was an early priority. Iran remained an adjunct of the larger concepts. The new Weinberger Pentagon quickly set out three options for nuclear weapons against the Soviets. The first was designed to deter further Soviet attacks and limited the use of such attacks against Soviet military forces in Iran and Afghanistan only. Should that deterrent fail, the United States would escalate to a “geographical escalation” that entailed vaporizing Soviet military bases in neighboring countries, chiefly Ethiopia and South Yemen. The last escalation would attack Soviet military installations and combat units in the Soviet Transcaucasus districts.
43. The Brookings Institution, “The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project,” www.brookings.edu/projects/archive/nucweapons/madm.aspx, accessed April 4, 2007.
44. Joint Chiefs of Staff message to Chief of Naval Operations, “CINCPAC Rules of Engagement for Patrol of the Arabian Gulf” (030133Z), March 1981.
45. Presidential Directive/NSC-63, “Persian Gulf Security Framework,” January 15, 1981.
CHAPTER 3 BARBED-WIRE BOB
1. Allan Millett and Jack Shulimson, eds., Commandants of the Marine Corps (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004), p. 453.
2. John Poindexter, interview with author, March 8, 2008.
3. Joint Staff memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Facility Requirements in Support of Southwest Asia Strategy,” February 3, 1982.
4. Richard Allen memorandum for Caspar Weinberger, “Iran Hostages and Related Issues,” 1981.
5. Richard Allen memorandum on draft National Security Decision Directive toward Iran, “National Security Council Meeting,” September 29, 1981, Weinberger Papers, Library of Congress, Box I:638, Folder Iran 2.
6. Caspar Weinberger, In the Arena: A Memoir of the 20th Century (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2001), pp. 287–88.
7. Caspar Weinberger, interviews with author, December 15, 1994, May 1, 1996, and September 2000.
8. General Volney Warner letter to Caspar Weinberger, January 20, 1980, Appendix B, Warner Oral History, Volney Warner Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA. Warner also advocated that Readiness Command be given responsibility for deploying forces to operations worldwide, using its subordinate, the rapid deployment force, as its headquarters for the Middle East.
9. Caspar Weinberger interview.
10. Lieutenant General Robert Kingston letter to Caspar Weinberger, November 2, 1982; Lieutenant Colonel Charles Seifert, USAF, memorandum to Weinberger, November 5, 1982, Weinberger Papers, Box I:713, Folder 1982 U.S. Commander Rapid Deployment Force.
11. Ronald Reagan memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, April 29, 1981; Richard Allen memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, “Middle East Command Arrangements,” August 13, 1981; Ronald Reagan memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, May 17, 1982, Weinberger Papers, Box I:713, Folder U.S. Commander RDJTF 2.
12. Senator Stevens objected to the elimination of the global mission for the rapid deployment force and did not like a command solely dedicated to the Middle East. His objections opened the door for the navy to propose that the rapid deployment force should be, rather than a unified command, a “global strike force,” which would not substantially alter its current mission.
13. In a sop to the navy, with the exception of the small flotilla operating in the Persian Gulf, the chiefs allowed the navy to be excluded from the new Middle East command. The Indian Ocean and the ships of the carrier battle groups operating there to support CENTCOM were excluded and remained under the control of the Pacific Fleet in Honolulu. They would be �
�in support” of CENTCOM, a nebulous concept that allowed the navy to remain independent of the new command’s control but still nominally obligated to support its operations. This would cause no end of problems over the coming years. The navy formed a new combined task force, CTF-70, to support CENTCOM, but it operated under the operational control of the commander of the Pacific Fleet.
14. General Volney Warner letter to President Ronald Reagan, July 8, 1981, Appendix F, Warner Oral History.
15. General Volney Warner, USA (Ret.), interview with author, April 7, 2008.
16. The two men even discussed the possibility of a secret alliance between archenemies Israel and Syria to carve up Lebanon.
17. Ronald Reagan memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, April 29, 1981; Richard Allen memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, “Middle East Command Arrangements,” August 13, 1981, Weinberger Papers, Box I:713, Folder U.S. Commander RDJTF 2.
18. Relations between the two countries were also already strained over the Israeli government’s refusal to halt Jewish settlements on the Palestinian West Bank, which President Carter believed Prime Minister Menachem Begin had agreed to with the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not see much utility in using Israel to defend the Persian Gulf, they did advocate using Israel to help maintain control over the western Mediterranean against Soviet submarines.
19. Ronald Reagan memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, May 17, 1982; Caspar Weinberger memorandum to Ronald Reagan, “Unified Command for Southwest Asia,” June 23, 1982; Francis West, Jr., memorandum to Caspar Weinberger, “New Command for Southwest Asia,” May 20, 1982, Weinberger Papers, Box I:713, Folder U.S. Commander RDJTF 2.
20. Henry Cunningham, “Delta Pioneer Dies,” Fayetteville Observer, March 22, 2007.
21. Richard Shultz, Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), p. 89.
22. Kingston had actually hoped to be appointed as the next deputy director of the CIA, which went instead to a civilian, John McMahon.
23. Major Caesar J. Civitella, USA (Ret.), interview with author, March 5, 2010.
24. William Williams and William Handy, interview with author at the reunion for the thirtieth anniversary of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, March 4, 2010, Tampa, Florida.
25. CINCCENT message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Plans to Counter a Soviet Invasion of Iran” (021530), August 1983.
26. While keeping the original plans for a passive introduction of U.S. forces, CENTCOM built two slightly different new plans based upon the degree of basing and the forces prestaged for the invasion, available in nearby countries, designed to defeat Iranian forces first as well as the Red Army. For the first time, the planning reflected the challenges of countering the Soviets in a country fundamentally hostile to the United States. Should U.S. diplomacy fail to secure the Iranians’ support, U.S. forces needed to be positioned in advance, “postured to enter Iran to counter a Soviet invasion, [as] interdicting the Soviet advance will be much more difficult.” The new plans were labeled 1008 and 1009.
27. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Study to Improve U.S. Special Operations Capability,” March 18, 1981, pp. 1–20.
28. Kingston also wanted permission to use his special forces to strike deep into the Soviet Caucasus, even to try working with Muslim opponents of Moscow to foment a guerrilla movement within the Soviet Union. But that was a step too far for the White House, and the permission for other than rudimentary planning never came from the defense secretary.
29. Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (New York: Ballinger, 1989), pp. 61–62; Steven Emerson, Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era (New York: Putnam, 1988); Lieutenant General Philip Gast, USAF, J-3, memorandum for the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Capability,” December 10, 1980, p. 1; “United States Army Intelligence Support Activity, 1987 Historical Report,” U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity, October 23, 1987, pp. 7–9; Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci memorandum to Deputy Undersecretary for Policy, May 26, 1982; “Charter of U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity,” 1983; “Brief History of the Unit,” 1986; National Security Archive, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46, accessed July 4, 2007; www.specwarnet.net/americas/isa.htm.
30. Odom interview.
31. ISA was augmented by the Air Force Special Activities Center at Fort Belvoir and coordinated activities with the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence, which conducted its own separate recruitment effort largely directed at Iranian naval officers.
32. Howard Hart, interview with author, June 26, 2007.
33. Odom interview.
34. Timothy Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p. 124.
CHAPTER 4 A DEN OF SPIES
1. Joseph Persico, Casey: The Lives and Secrets of William J. Casey, from the OSS to the CIA (New York: Viking, 1990), p. 71.
2. Ibid., p. 66.
3. Ibid., p. 83.
4. Hearings on the Nomination of Robert Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence, volume 1, U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, September 16–20, 1991, p. 475.
5. John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 500; Persico, Casey, p. 301.
6. It stated that events in Iran were no longer as chaotic as viewed in 1985, and as Fuller noted in congressional testimony, “Some of our concerns had not been borne out.” Hearings on the Nomination of Robert Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence, Executive Report 102-19, U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, October 19, 1991, pp. 46–48.
7. Jack Devine, interview with author, March 25, 2008.
8. Richard Allen memorandum, “National Security Council Meeting, Draft NSDD on Iran,” September 29, 1981.
9. Robert McFarlane, interview with author, March 23, 2008.
10. “Statement of the Honorable William Casey,” November 21, 1986, in Hearings on the Nomination of Robert Gates to Be Director of Central Intelligence, volume 1, pp. 106–7.
11. Philip Giraldi, interview with author, June 15, 2010.
12. Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007), pp. 425–26; Tim Weiner, telephone interview with author, May 29, 2007; “U.S. Spies’ Statements on CIA Activities,” Tehran Television Service in Persian, November 3, 1989, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), November 7, 1989.
13. Giraldi interview.
14. Nazhatoon Riahi, interview with author, November 20, 2008.
15. Said Zanganeh, interview with author, November 18, 2007.
16. “U.S. Blunder Over Spies,” Iranian News Agency, April 22, 1989, FBIS, April 24, 1989, p. 24; “Information Minister Names CIA Spies,” Iranian News Agency, April 26, 1989, FBIS, April 27, 1989, pp. 43–50; “Text of News Conference,” Tehran Television Service in Persian, April 26, 1989, FBIS, April 27, 1989; Zanganeh interview.
17. This included the captain of the Iranian flagship, the destroyer Babr.
18. Zanganeh interview.
19. Text of news conference by Minister of Intelligence and Security Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri, April 26, 1989, FBIS, April 27, 1989, pp. 44–50.
20. Reza Kahlili, interview with author, July 10, 2010; Muhammad Sahimi, “Iran’s Crumbling Judiciary,” August 15, 2009, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/08/irans-crumbling-judiciary.html, accessed January 29, 2011.
21. “Tehran TV Details Covert Operations of Spies, Top Secret Program,” episode titled “Covert Operations,” Tehran Television Service, May 4, 1989, FBIS, May 8, 1989.
22. Kahlili interview.
23. “CIA Declassifies Oldest Documents in U.S. Government Collection,” April 11, 2011, www.foia.cia.gov, accessed May 12, 2011.
24. Giraldi interview; Robert Wallace and H. Keith
Melton, Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA’s Spytechs from Communism to Al-Qaeda (New York: Dutton, 2008), electronic version.
25. “More on Sermon on Spies,” Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, April 21, 1989, FBIS, NES-89-076; Kahlili interview.
26. Kahlili interview.
27. CIA message to U.S. Embassy Tehran (102330Z), August 1979.
28. As early as August 1979, the CIA took interest in efforts by former Iranian military officers to organize opposition to the clerics in Tehran, with one of the first gatherings occurring in a London hotel room led by former Iranian air force general Hassan Toufanian. The Iranian government learned of the meeting after the embassy takeover, when students painstakingly pieced together the strips of the shredded message describing Toufanian’s gathering. CIA message to U.S. Embassy Tehran (102330Z), August 1979.
29. Kenneth Timmerman, Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iran (New York: Crown Forum, 2005), p. 215.
30. Prados, Safe for Democracy, p. 500; Richelson, U.S. Intelligence Community, pp. 355–56.
31. The 2001 American invasion of Afghanistan was a perfect example of this symbiotic relationship. CIA paramilitary operatives went in first, building upon their twenty-year ties with Afghan tribes, followed a few weeks later by soldiers from the 5th Special Forces Group, backed by the air force’s own special operations forces and airpower. These special operations forces were then layering over the CIA effort, and the U.S. military succeeded in overthrowing al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts weeks before the generals in the Pentagon thought possible. The Reagan administration came to Washington determined to strengthen America’s military, including the elite special operations forces (SOF). The army’s special forces—never popular with the conventional-minded armor and infantry generals—had atrophied after Vietnam. Their numbers were cut in half, their units ignominiously relegated to the national guard and reserves, where officers could receive the coveted “Special Forces” tab on their uniform not by passing a demanding screening process but by simply taking a correspondence course.