by David Crist
12. One that Tom Twetten, the head of CIA’s clandestine service as director of operations, remembered involved establishing a logistics base in the Persian Gulf from which U.S. military transport aircraft would fly over Afghanistan and airdrop military equipment directly to the mujahideen. When challenged with the facts—that the Soviets had a large air force and would likely shoot the transports down, which could lead to World War III—Iklé thought for a moment and remarked, “Well, maybe that wouldn’t be such a bad thing.” Twetten interview; also interview with retired CIA officer.
13. Fred Iklé memorandum for Caspar Weinberger, “Iran-Iraq War and Gulf Threats,” April 10, 1984.
14. Sandy Charles, “Talking Points for Breakfast Meeting with Secretary Shultz, April 11, 1984,” April 10, 1984.
15. These were National Security Decision Directives 139 and 141.
16. General John Vessey memorandum to Weinberger, “Status of DOD Actions from NSDD 139,” May 29, 1984.
17. Major General Samuel Swart, USAF (Ret.), interview with author, May 25, 1995.
18. Major General Donald Penzler, USA (Ret.), interview with author, December 14, 1994. While Penzler removed the deadweight, General Crist focused on building his intelligence capabilities. He tasked his able intelligence director, Army Brigadier General Cloyd Pfister, to build CENTCOM into “the premier source of intelligence” for the Middle East. Pfister worked to develop an independent intelligence capability primarily by bringing all the three-letter intelligence agencies—CIA, NSA, and DIA—into a coordinated “intelligence fusion” effort against both the Soviets and Iran. In June 1986, Crist directed Pfister to put together a closely held study group called the Afghan Fusion Cell. It brought together intelligence from all over the community to examine the Soviet military in Afghanistan with an eye to what this portended about that military should the two superpowers come to blows in Europe or the Middle East. By 1988, the group had produced nine monographs examining all aspects of military operations, including diverse topics ranging from the morale and motivation of the Soviet soldier to nighttime helicopter operations. Only the DIA remained lukewarm to CENTCOM’s initiative. An entrenched bureaucracy resented the growing CENTCOM intelligence directorate and viewed it with suspicion, questioning its analysts’ competence. General Crist, interview for “End of Tour Report,” CENTCOM History Office, 1988, p. 11.
19. In April 1986, Crist wrote to Weinberger a pessimistic assessment of the progress of the war, noting that “more sophisticated operational techniques and brutal population repression are taking their toll on the Mujajedin [mujahideen] resistance.”
20. George Crist interview with Department of Defense media pool, Gallant Eagle 86, August 10, 1986.
21. CENTCOM, “A Brief History of Russian and Soviet Expansion toward the South,” June 30, 1985, p. v.
22. Crist interview; Armitage interview.
23. U.S. Marine Corps, Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War, volume 1, Department of the Navy, 1990, pp. 17–19; Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), pp. 217–18.
24. General Council of British Shipping, Iran/Iraq: The Situation in the Gulf, Guidance Notes for Shipping, February 1988, pp. 70–73.
25. General George Crist message to Admiral William Crowe, “Increased Threat in the Persian Gulf” (242130Z), September 1986.
26. Bernard Gwertzman, “Iran’s Navy Stops U.S. Ship in Search near Persian Gulf,” New York Times, January 13, 1986.; also Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Says Halting of Vessels by Iran May Be Justified,” New York Times, January 14, 1986.
27. Secretary of State message to American Embassy, Bern, “Message to Iran on Naval Seizures” (DTG 012225Z), February 1986, p. 1.
28. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Démarche to Iran,” October 1985, p. 1.
29. USCINCCENT message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “MIDEASTFOR Operating Restrictions” (132130Z), January 1986; Middle East Force, Command History, 1986. Whereas previously two warships came each from the East Coast and West Coast, PACOM would be tasked to exclusively provide the additional combat augmentee. While remaining a part of the Pacific Fleet, this fifth combatant was under the operational control of Middle East Force. The first ship assigned was the USS Jack Williams, commanded by David Grieve. For both the ship and Grieve, this was just the beginning of a long affiliation with the Gulf.
30. CINCPAC message, “Promulgation of Visit and Search” (190432Z), March 1986. The Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance to CENTCOM emphasized that it was to monitor only U.S.-flagged ships and keep track of their locations, but this authority did not constitute an escort of those merchants. If it did, U.S. warships would have had to accompany the merchant ships throughout their transit and would have necessitated additional ships to be dispatched to Middle East Force; this was not well received by the navy, which complained that it was expensive and diverted ships away from the Pacific. Military Sealift Command ships were required to monitor the common U.S. military frequency of the Middle East Force ships; the U.S. commercial merchant ships maintained communication over the international distress frequency, channel 16. John Poindexter memorandum for Major General Colin Powell, “Visit and Search of U.S.-Flagged Vessels in the Persian Gulf,” August 7, 1984.
31. CINCPAC message, “Visit and Search of U.S.-Flagged Vessels in the Persian Gulf” (DTG 290411Z), May 1985, pp. 3–4.
32. CENTCOM briefing, “Invoke Resolve Decision Brief,” February 6, 1987, pp. 3–9.
33. In a somewhat controversial move, Crist recommended they knock out the main gas power plant at Bandar Abbas, which provided the power to run Iran’s military operation, but also served as the main power source for the city.
34. Crist memorandum to Weinberger, “Central Command Update,” undated [February 1986], pp. 1–2.
35. Secretary Weinberger approved the New Splendor initiative. “I applaud your efforts,” he wrote Crist, “to develop campaign plans that also incorporate recent bilateral initiatives with a number of Gulf states and some rather significant intelligence enhancements as well. I wholly agree that each of these concerns is vital to the success and survivability of our CENTCOM forces.” Secretary Weinberger letter to General Crist, February 2, 1987. CENTCOM also quietly obtained important support from most of the Gulf states. In the event of conflict with Iran, Oman granted permission to use their airfields. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman had all agreed to allow CENTCOM to station F-16 attack aircraft in one of their countries should there be a protracted air war with Iran.
36. Crist interview, “End of Tour Report,” p. 4.
37. Major General Cloyd Pfister, USA (Ret.), interview with author, November 22, 1994.
38. Pearson became particularly good friends with the Bahraini defense minister and crown prince, Sheik Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, who was already favorably disposed to the United States.
39. Bahraini and U.S. planners focused on three likely Iranian scenarios: 1) an Iranian air attack on Bahrain proper; 2) naval or Revolutionary Guard attacks on shipping bound for the island; and 3) Iranian threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, in which Bahrain’s primary role would be to provide basing for U.S. aircraft. Both sides hoped to deter Iranian aggression, conducting a number of highly visible joint exercises (the first began in January 1988) and expanded naval and air patrols around the island. A few years later, Pearson had the satisfaction of using Bahraini facilities when, during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Bahraini airfield Sheik Isa served as the main base for the marine air wing. Brigadier General Jeremiah Pearson memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “U.S./Bahraini Military Planning Initiatives,” October 27, 1987; Lieutenant Colonel Edward Robeson memorandum, “Agenda for New Splendor Update Briefing,” June 10, 1987, pp. 1–2; Joint Chiefs of Staff information briefing, “New Splendor Planning Update,” July 8, 1987, pp. 2–13.
40. Penzler interview.
41. Russell
Violett, interview with author, November 13, 2007.
42. Admiral William Crowe, USN (Ret.), interview with author, April 11, 2001.
43. There are a large number of books and articles written about the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (the Goldwater-Nichols Act). The best was written by the chief staff writer of the legislation, James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002). Also James R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1986, pp. 10–16; Gordon Lederman, Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999). The reorganization also established procedures for officer promotion that required a joint assignment before making general or admiral. This forced the services to send their quality officers to joint assignments such as Central Command.
44. Armitage interview.
CHAPTER 10 ARMS FOR THE AYATOLLAH
1. Weinberger interview.
2. McFarlane interview.
3. Soon to be deputy director of the CIA John McMahon noted that the Israelis had raised this to him in early 1980, when during a visit to Israel officials tried to convince McMahon of the advantages of selling weapons to Iran. In May 1982, for example, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon met with Secretary Shultz to discuss Iran and the two countries’ differences over the war. Sharon freely admitted that Israel provided matériel as a means of maintaining its contacts with the Iranian military, as well as of keeping alive the prospect of influencing a post-Khomeini regime and of protecting Iranian Jews. At the same time, he tried to persuade the United States against encouraging arms being sent to Israel’s archfoe Saddam Hussein. Of particular concern, Sharon said, was a recent massive arms sale of Egyptian T-62 tanks to Iraq, with the United States backfilling by providing newer U.S.-built M-60 tanks to Cairo. Following an hour of frank discussions, in the end this meeting, and others similar, concluded inconclusively, with both sides agreeing to disagree. American Embassy Paris message to Secretary of State, “Allegation in French Press of Israeli Sales of U.S. Arms to Iran” (191109Z), August 1983; American Embassy Tel Aviv message to Secretary of State, “Reports of Alleged U.S. Arms Supplies to Iraq via Egypt—Possible Items on the Agenda for MINDEF Sharon’s Visit” (241534), May 1982; U.S. Department of State briefing memorandum, “Your Meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, Tuesday, 25 May,” May 1982; Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, August 9, 1998.
4. Oliver North, “Special Project Re: Iran,” December 5, 1985. John Poindexter said this as well during a meeting in the Oval Office on November 10, 1986.
5. The Reagan administration briefly flirted with the same idea at the beginning of the administration. On July 21, 1981, the State Department proposed encouraging third, other, countries to provide arms to Iran. The idea had originated with Secretary Alexander Haig. His rationale was similar to McFarlane’s logic four years later: encouraging pro-Western states to provide weapons would lessen Iran’s dependency on the Soviets and reduce the opportunity for Moscow to increase its influence. However, the Joint Chiefs stridently opposed the idea. In a memo for the secretary of state’s special assistant, a youthful thirty-nine-year-old L. Paul Bremer, who would later be elevated to the senior U.S. official in Iraq following the invasion in 2003, the chairman wrote: “Rather than adding to the prospects for peace, increased supplies of arms may encourage Iran to intensify its military actions and continue to reject the negotiated settlement option.” The military’s opposition carried the day for the next four years. Lieutenant General Paul Gorman memorandum for L. Paul Bremer, “Arms Transfer Policy toward Iran,” September 3, 1981.
6. CIA message, “Fabricator Notice—Manuchehr (Gorbanifar),” July 25, 1984, pp. 1–3, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/index.htm.
7. Michael Ledeen, Perilous Statecraft: An Insider’s Account of the Iran-Contra Affair (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988), p. 120.
8. McFarlane contacted both Shultz and Weinberger. On Saturday, July 13, he called on a secure telephone to the defense secretary’s home in McLean, Virginia. Weinberger was sitting in his garden going through some papers he had taken home to work on over the weekend. In the first of five phone calls to Weinberger—and one more to Powell—McFarlane relayed the Israeli proposal. Ayatollah Karoubi could attain the release of the seven U.S. citizens held hostage in Lebanon, but he wanted a hundred TOW missiles from Israel so he could show his supporters some positive result from their dealings with the West. Weinberger’s reply to McFarlane remains a mystery, as he later denied any memory of the repeated phone calls from McFarlane. But Shultz, who was traveling to Australia, expressed cautious support for the Israeli proposal. “I agree with you that we should make a tentative show of interest without commitment. I do not think we could justify turning our backs on the prospect of gaining the release of the other seven hostages and perhaps developing an ability to renew ties with Iran under a more sensible regime—especially when presented to us through the prime minister of Israel.” Later Bud McFarlane tried to exaggerate this initial positive response from Shultz as proof that the secretary of state initially supported the arms deal with Iran. In truth, Shultz advocated caution in his message back to McFarlane, but was not going to reject out of hand what might be a promising diplomatic opening, especially when he was halfway around the world in Canberra. But upon his return to Washington and once time afforded a fuller examination of the arms offer proposed by the Israelis, Shultz lined up with Weinberger in vehement opposition to the Iranian arms scheme. While Weinberger denied any knowledge of the calls from McFarlane in his book Fighting for Peace, in 1991 the Office of the Independent Council found a note taken by the secretary mentioning the calls on July 13. See Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, p. 366; Final Report of the Independent Council for Iran/Contra Matters [hereafter referred to as Walsh Report], Part VIII, “Officers of the Department of Defense, U.S. vs. Caspar Weinberger and Related Investigations,” footnote 9; George Shultz message to Robert McFarlane, “Reply to Backchannel No. 3” (142333Z), July 1985; The Iran Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (Washington D.C.: National Security Archive, 1993), p. 261.
9. Robert McFarlane, Special Trust (New York: Cadell and Davies, 1994), p. 27; Walsh Report, Chapter 1.
10. Weinberger interview; Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, pp. 368–69; McFarlane, Special Trust, pp. 32–33.
11. Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Grand Jury, November 20, 1987, p. 83.
12. McFarlane, Special Trust, p. 34.
13. They were delivered by the Pakistani foreign minister, Japanese foreign minister, and the deputy German foreign minister.
14. Poindexter interview.
15. But neither the CIA nor the DIA agreed. Both intelligence agencies concluded that no Soviet plane had overflown Iran. While complete fiction, Ghorbanifar’s falsehood served to stimulate the Soviet suspicions of Casey and others of a similar vein in the administration about Moscow’s intentions in Iran.
16. At the end of October, Ledeen met with Karoubi in Geneva. While multiple versions exist about what was discussed at this meeting, Ghorbanifar clearly reiterated the Iranian government’s willingness to release all the remaining hostages in return for this batch of sophisticated American weaponry. Ledeen back-briefed both North and McFarlane. Oliver North’s handwritten notes of the meeting remarked that Karoubi “wants to be U.S. ally—has support in Tehran.” While Ledeen had become uncomfortable at the arms-for-hostages angle, he urged McFarlane to support the effort as an opening to the Iranian government.
17. Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 118.
18. Clarridge, Spy for All Seasons, p. 309; Clarridge interview.
19. “Remarks Announcing the Resignation of Robert C. McFarlane as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Appointment o
f John M. Poindexter,” December 4, 1985, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: President Ronald Reagan, 1985, p. 1440.
20. Weinberger Diary, December 7, 1985.
21. Instead Reagan decided to send McFarlane and North to London, where North was already meeting with Ghorbanifar and the Israelis. Meeting in a Victorian-era building in London’s West End, McFarlane took an immediate dislike to Ghorbanifar, whom he later described as “kind of a north end of a southbound horse.” “The United States,” McFarlane began, “welcomes discussions with Iran and improvement of relations. We are interested in establishing contact with political figures committed to changing Iranian policy. Whenever you and your colleagues are ready for this, they should say so. But until that time, we have no interest in transferring more arms.” Ghorbanifar exploded. He pounded his fist on a small wooden table. “What are you talking about?! Are you crazy? My contacts want change but they are too weak now for political talk with you. They must get strong and take power. If I take this back to my colleagues they will go mad. They might just say, ‘To hell with the hostages! Let Hezbollah kill them!’” Kimche took a similar, albeit more measured, view. He expressed confidence that this would produce change within the Iranian leadership over time. “I think you’re missing a big opportunity. These movements take time to consolidate; and these people are delivering to us important items, information, and we see signs from our intelligence that they’re making headway.” McFarlane flew back to debrief the president. As one of the principal architects of the arms sales to Iran, he left the London meeting convinced that Ghorbanifar was corrupt and duplicitous. His sole interest lay in acquiring weapons for the Iranian regime.
22. Ronald Reagan, “Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, Concerning Operations Undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency,” January 17, 1986, p. 1.