by David Crist
23. Weinberger Diary, May 17, 1987; Reagan Diaries, p. 497.
24. Crist interview; Schramm interview.
25. Ten men were awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal of Heroism, including both Lieutenant Commander Gajan and Lieutenant Moncrief.
26. Sharp Report, “Opinions,” Item 28.
27. General Crist had been passed a report, not through normal intelligence channels, that the attack was deliberate, in an attempt to draw the United States into the war. But he did not think it had much validity.
28. Lang interview.
29. National Security Policy Implications of United States Operations in the Persian Gulf, p. 81.
30. As Senator Pressler said in a congressional hearing in June, “Prior to that [the Stark incident], nobody was really paying much attention to the situation in the Persian Gulf. It is good that our attention has been drawn to it. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, May 29, June 16, October 23 and 28, 1987, p. 32; also Charles interview.
31. Jacob Lamar, Steven Holmes, and Barrett Seaman, “Escort Service for the Gulf,” Time, June 24, 1987.
32. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “Personal For General Crist” (DTG 222350Z), May 1987, p. 1.
33. “Admiral William Crowe Remarks to NSPG,” undated [May or June 1987].
34. Weinberger Diary, May 22, 1987.
35. General Crist message to Admiral Bernsen, “Plan for Protection of Kuwaiti Shipping” (230130Z), May 1987.
36. Admiral Bernsen message to George Crist, “Increased Readiness in the Persian Gulf” (211510Z), May 1987. Bernsen believed the Stark tragedy was caused by errors made by the captain, not by inadequacies in the rules of engagement.
37. The incorporating of hostile intent into the inherent right of self-defense is always a tricky issue. Only the United States and Israel recognize this and regularly incorporate it into their military forces’ rules of engagement. It defined a hostile act with the following examples: 1) Launching missiles or firing rockets at U.S. forces; 2) Conducting mine-laying operations to obstruct free navigation in international waters; 3) Attacking or interfering with friendly forces engaged in mine countermeasure operations; 4) An enemy aircraft, vessel, or land-based facility displayed hostile intent by threatening the imminent use of force against friendly forces. This would include electronically jamming U.S. forces or intending to lay mines in international waters.
38. Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “Peacetime Rules of Engagement—Northern Arabian Sea/Gulf of Oman/Strait of Hormuz/Persian Gulf” (3002035Z), June 1987.
39. USCINCCENT message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Protection of U.S. Flagged Vessels” (270515Z), May 1987.
40. CINCPACFLT memorandum for Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Status of TLAM/C Mission Planning,” May 24, 1987.
41. Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, “USS Missouri BG in Strait of Hormuz,” April 28, 1987, pp. 14–16; Commanders John Morgan and Harry Ulrich briefing, “Missouri Battleship Battle Group in Response to Provoked Anger,” June 9, 1987.
42. U.S. warships would also monitor two additional frequencies that would not change monthly: a secondary UHF frequency of 243.0 MHz and an emergency VHF set at 121.5 MHz.
43. CINCCENT message, “Personal For Admiral Crowe: Joint Iraqi and United States Proposal for Avoiding Incidents” (DTG 032200Z), June 1987, pp. 1–2.
44. The Iraqi aircraft would respond by turning on its IFF transponder, change its course immediately by 90 degrees, and cease any radar emissions.
45. Admiral William Crowe memorandum to Secretary of Defense, September 3, 1987.
46. CENTCOM, “Weekly Update,” August 30, 1987.
47. There were a few hiccups. In one case an Iraqi pilot’s radio broke and his wingman could not speak English. The American defense attaché did not always receive the American convoy and ship locations in a timely manner. The Iraqi pilots were not always the most attentive. On November 26, 1987, an AWACS picked up three Iraqi Mirages headed south but could not raise them on the radio. The cruiser Richmond K. Turner maneuvered to unmask her weapons, and at twenty-eight miles locked on to the Iraqis with her fire control radar. Apparently unaware that this was from a U.S. warship, the Iraqis tried unsuccessfully to jam the cruiser. The Richmond K. Turner fired off its chaff and prepared to engage with missiles. When the Iraqi planes were only twenty miles from the cruiser, they finally established voice communication and the Iraqi aircraft immediately altered course just seconds before its flight would have come to an abrupt end. General George Crist to Caspar Weinberger, “CENTCOM Update,” September and October 1987; Adam Siegel, “A Chronology of Events Related to Earnest Will Escort Operations,” Center for Naval Analyses, June 1991, p. 30. Iraqi attacks necessitated an additional meeting in February 1988. That month, Baghdad increased the use of the large Soviet-built TC-16 Badger bomber armed with the C-601, the air-launched variant of the Silkworm missile. The existing deconfliction rules centered around the shorter-range Exocet did not suffice, with its range of one hundred kilometers. On February 12, a Badger fired a C-601 that accidentally hit the Danish-flagged tanker Kate Maersk north of Rostam, killing one sailor. Following this attack was another Badger strike that came within nine miles of the USS Chandler (DDG-996), then escorting an inbound convoy. The new procedures negotiated forbade Badgers from crossing south of 28 degrees north without positive communications with U.S. forces. These refinements worked reasonably well, balancing the U.S. desire to safeguard its ships while still allowing the Iraqi air force maximum flexibility to attack Iranian targets and freedom to fly over international waters, both of which the United States wanted to preserve.
48. Admiral Crowe memorandum to Secretary of Defense, “Fourth Endorsement on RADM Sharp Investigation of 12 June 87,” September 3, 1987, p. 1.
49. Crowe interview; Admiral William Crowe, Oral History Interview with Colonel Charles Gross, Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base, July 16, 1991, pp. 16–18.
50. USCINCCENT message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Escort Regime” (27051Z), May 5, 1987, p. 3; USCENTCOM J-2, “Iranian Reactions to U.S. Escort Operations,” May 1987, p. 1; Crist interview.
51. Ibid.
52. Pat Lang did not agree with the prevailing assessment by his organization. He contributed to a national intelligence estimate that was more circumspect about the Iranian mine threat, and the CIA was generally more concerned than other intelligence agencies. Lang interview.
CHAPTER 13 THE INVISIBLE HAND OF GOD
1. Five ships were damaged near the Suez Canal, including the American-owned (Panamanian-registered) Big Orange XII, while two more were attacked down near the Bab el Mandeb.
2. Juan Carlos Gumucio, “Iran Threatens to Block Persian Gulf Entrance,” Washington Post, August 18, 1984, p. A1.
3. By far the most comprehensive account of this operation is Dr. Scott C. Truver, “Mines of August: An International Whodunit,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1985.
4. Ibid., p. 102; comments by Major Rich Barry, USMC, “The Gulf of Suez Mining Crisis: Terrorism at Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Seminar, May 30, 1985, transcribed, p. 21.
5. The operation was code-named Operation Intense Look. Six other nations answered the Saudi and Egyptian request for assistance. The United Kingdom sent five mine-clearing vessels plus a support ship, arriving at the Egyptian port of Adabiyah on August 15. The French sent two mine-clearing vessels to Jeddah in response to Saudi Arabian requests. Later, in September, both the Italians and the Dutch sent two vessels. Ironically, one of the first countries to respond to the crisis was the Soviet Union, which had supplied Libya with the mines in the first place. Three mine-hunter vessels plus the helicopter cruiser Leningrad based in the port of Aden began looking for additional mines around the Bab el Mandeb.
6. Loren Jenkins, “Italian Ships Join Red Sea Mine Hunt,” Washington Post, August 29, 1984, pp. A1, A20.
7. Comments by Dr.
Scott Truver, “The Gulf of Suez Mining Crisis: Terrorism at Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Seminar, May 30, 1985, transcribed, pp. 32–33.
8. In February 1984 the Iranians mined Majnoon Islands, and two years later, in February 1986, the same unit mined the waters off the al-Faw Peninsula to support the Val Fajr VIII offensive. CENTCOM History Office, Command History, 1988, March 27, 1990, p. 76.
9. Quainton interview.
10. Ibid.
11. General Crist message to Admiral Crowe, “Mining in Northern Gulf” (11620Z), June 1987.
12. It comprised: a nine-man EOD detachment; a six-man area point search system team complete with precise navigation transponders and a sophisticated side-scanning sonar; and a three-man assistance team to provide expertise to the Kuwaiti military on countermining operations. The U.S. military operation was called Pneumatic Hammer. In addition to the team sent to Kuwait, on June 16 five RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters along with their crews and maintenance personnel from Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 14 (HM-14) in Norfolk, Virginia, were placed on a seventy-two-hour alert for possible deployment to the Persian Gulf. As their use would amount to a tenfold increase in the U.S. military presence in Kuwait, not to mention an overt and public commitment of U.S./Kuwaiti military cooperation, it remained an unacceptable option to the Kuwaiti government in all but the most dire of situations. Both CENTCOM and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed HM-14 would be sent only if there was evidence of widespread mining throughout the channel. Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 14, Command History, 1987, entry for June 16, 1987; General Herres message to General Crist, “Mining in Northern Persian Gulf: APF/MNM Assistance Team” (DTG 242120Z), June 1987, Earnest Will Activation, p. 1.
13. One mine was found by a Kuwaiti helicopter and subsequently destroyed by Kuwaiti divers. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, “Support of Middle East Force Operations—Sitrep 6,” July 24, 1987, p. 1; Office of Naval Intelligence, “Iranian Mining Threat in the Persian Gulf,” June 11, 1987, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, WB-7 Intelligence Files, Box 1, Series II.
14. Admiral Crowe message to General Crist, “Security of U.S. Military Forces in the Persian Gulf” (172330Z), July 1987.
15. Captain James Brodie, U.S. Coast Guard, memorandum, “Kuwaiti Tanker Reflagging,” February 23, 1987.
16. “Reflagged Kuwaiti Tankers,” Earnest Will Activation, p. 3; Colin Powell memorandum, “Reflagging,” July 10, 1987; American Embassy Kuwait cable, “Confirmation of Reflagging Dates” (081039Z), July 1987. The eleven reflagged ships, their new redesignated names, and dates of reflagging were as follows:
Gas al-Minagish: Gas Prince, July 20, 1987
Al-Rekkah: Bridgeton, July 20, 1987
Umm al-Mardem: Sea Island City, August 6, 1987
Umm Casbah: Ocean City, August 6, 1987
Gas al-Burgan: Gas King, August 6, 1987
Umm Matrabah: Chesapeake City, August 11, 1987
Kaziham: Townsend, August 14, 1987
Gas al-Ahmadi: Gas Princess, August 16, 1987
Gas al-Kuwait: Gas Queen, August 18, 1987
Umm al-Aish: Surf City, August 23, 1987
Al-Funtas: Middleton, September 6, 1987
17. These two meetings were on July 2 and July 14, 1987.
18. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, pp. 410–11.
19. Rear Admiral Joseph Strasser, notebook, entry for July 15, 1987.
20. Quainton interview. The flag raised had been flown over the U.S. Capitol and brought to the Gulf by a congressman from Kentucky who insisted he raise it on the first reflagged tanker. As this would have been completely unacceptable to Kuwait, Quainton defused the embarrassing political situation by raising the flag himself.
21. Quainton interview.
22. Admiral William Crowe message for General Crist, “Threat to Reflagged Ships at Khor Fakkan” (171605Z), July 1987.
23. The air force tanker support for the navy headquarters Strategic Air Command message, “Tanker Support for Earnest Will” (DTG 301804Z), June 1987, p. 2; CINCPAC message, “Earnest Will Tanking” (DTG 100001Z), July 1987, p. 1.
24. The mission was code-named Giant Scale III. This would be the first of four such missions during Earnest Will. Paul F. Crickmore, Lockheed SR-71: The Secret Missions Exposed (London: Osprey Aerospace, 1993), pp. 154–56; Pfister interview; “Giant Scale III/Earnest Will/Giant Express,” Air Mobility Command Document, excerpts from an unspecified command history, undated, p. 2.
25. Alan Cowell, “Navy Enters the Gulf without Incident,” New York Times, July 23, 1987.
26. Bernsen interview; Grieve interview.
27. Interview with Captain Frank C. Seitz, Jr., U.S. Merchant Marine, “SS Bridgeton: The First Convoy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1988, p. 52; COMIDEASTFOR message to CINCCENT, “After Action Report on Earnest Will Escort 770001, 22–24 July 1987” (310500Z), July 1987.
28. Bernsen interview; Strasser interview; Admiral William Crowe letter to the New York Yacht Club, March 27, 1987.
29. Harold Lee Wise, Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), p. 72.
30. Rear Admiral Bernsen message to General Crist, “Iranian Mines” (240824Z), July 1987.
31. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Hashemi-Rafsanjani Political Sermon,” July 24, 1987, Case Concerning Oil Platforms, Counter-memorial and Counter-claim, Exhibit 50, June 23, 1997, p. 2.
32. Alan Cowell, “A Kuwaiti Tanker under U.S. Escort Hits Mine in the Persian Gulf,” New York Times, July 25, 1987.
33. The helicopters would use landing helicopter assault (LHA) and landing platform helicopter (LPH) ships, both designed to carry and launch helicopters. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Daily Schedule, July 24, 1987.
34. Joint Chiefs of Staff message to USCINCCENT, “Kuwaiti Mine Threat and Countermeasures” (14011Z), July 1987.
35. Caspar Weinberger letter to George Shultz, July 27, 1987.
36. Larry Martz et al., “Ollie Takes the Hill,” Newsweek, July 20, 1987, p. 14.
37. Poindexter interview.
38. Ibid.
39. Siegel, “A Chronology of Events,” p. 12; Bernsen interview.
40. Captain Jerry Manley, USN (Ret.), interview with author, August 17, 1996; Captain Robert McCabe, USN, interviews with author, May 10 and August 16, 1995; Grieve interviews; Captain Conway Ziegler, USN (Ret.), interview with author, June 15, 1995.
41. Bernsen interview; Captain Bruce van Belle, USN, interview with author, May 2, 1996.
42. Captain Frank DeMasi, interview with author, August 10, 1995.
43. Commander Steven Nerheim, USN, interview with author, August 11, 1995.
44. Edwin Simmons, “Mining at Wonsan and in the Persian Gulf,” Fortitudine, Summer 1987, pp. 3–7.
45. Tamara Melia, Damn the Torpedoes: A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1991), p. 76.
46. Commander Steven Nerheim, “Enabling the Enabling Force: A Naval Mine Countermeasure Force for the Twenty-First Century,” Marine Corps War College Paper, Marine Corps University, May 1993.
47. Crowe notes; USS Illusive (MSO448), Command History, 1987, Ships History Branch, Naval Historical Center, p. 3. The actual deployment order came from the Joint Staff on August 14. General Robert Herres memorandum for Secretary William Taft, “Deployment of Ocean-Going Minesweepers to the Persian Gulf,” August 20, 1987.
48. The six ships that deployed to the Gulf were:
Atlantic Fleet: Inflict, Fearless, Illusive
Pacific Fleet: Esteem, Conquest, Enhance
49. Manley interview; van Belle interview; Ellis Casteen, interviewed by Paul Stillwell, Unaccessioned Oral Interviews, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, January 15, 1988, p. 12.
50. DeMasi interview; Captain Steven Holmes, interviewed by Paul Stillwell, Unaccessioned Oral Interviews
, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, January 15, 1988.
51. COMIDEASTFOR message, “MCM/AMCM Concept of Operations in Support of Earnest Will” (081315Z), August 1987.
CHAPTER 14 A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
1. Crowe interview.
2. CINCPACFLT message to CINCPAC, “Window of Opportunity for Contingency Operations” (120410Z), August 1987.
3. Weinberger interview; Lyons interview; Armitage interview; Captian Kevin Healy, USN (Ret.), interview with author, 2006.
4. Vistica, Fall from Glory, p. 261.
5. Carlisle Trost, interview with author, December 9, 2006.
6. CINCPACFLT message, “Window of Opportunity for Contingency Operations,” p. 1.
7. Admiral James Lyons letter to Admiral William Crowe, August 7, 1987.
8. Captain Morris Sinor, USN (Ret.), interview with author, May 12, 2007.
9. Lyons interview.
10. Transcript of phone conversation between Admiral Lyons and Vice Admiral Howe, August 5, 1987.
11. Admiral Ronald Hays, USN (Ret.), interview with author, August 6, 1996; Lyons interview; Strasser notebook, entry for August 14, 1987.
12. James Brewer, “Iran Warning as Bridgeton Begins Loading,” Lloyd’s List, August 1, 1987, p. 1.
13. Siegel, “A Chronology of Events,” p. 13.
14. Crowe and Lyons conferred afterward and both supported the decision to jam the Silkworm site: “It is important for the on-scene command to take all prudent steps to defend against a successful Iranian fire of a Silkworm missile at U.S. forces or escorted ships,” Crowe wrote.
15. Kahlili interview.
16. Reza Kahlili, A Time to Betray (New York: Threshold, 2010), pp. 252–53.
17. Strasser notebook.
18. Chief of Naval Operations message, “Persian Gulf Threat Alert” (032242Z), August 1987.
19. Alan Cowell, “Iran Warns It Has Extended Maneuvers in the Gulf,” New York Times, August 7, 1987; Daily notebook of General George Crist, entry for August 7, 1987.