Wandering Greeks

by Garland, Robert

  Deportees were vulnerable not only to predators, but also to any unscrupulous individual who might want to exploit them. A case in point involves “the thick” as they are called literally, or “men of substance” as we might translate the term, who were expelled from the island of Naxos by their democratic opponents in ca. 500 (Hdt. 5.30). The deportees appealed to Aristagoras, deputy tyrant of Miletus, in the hope that he would support their bid to return home. Sensing an opportunity to advance his own agenda, Aristagoras agreed. He then requested military backing from Persia. The Persian king Darius likewise agreed, and with a similarly self-serving agenda. He calculated that by seizing Naxos he would be able to conquer all the Cyclades and thereby acquire a vital stepping-stone for an invasion of Greece. The Milesians and Persians laid siege to the island, but to no avail, and after four months they departed. The sole benefit that the deportees derived from the expedition was the construction of a wall that their supposed allies built to give them protection.

  Conversely, deportees might sometimes exploit those whom they petitioned for help. One such instance of double-dealing on the part of deportees involves the Colophonians, who, after they had been granted asylum by the Smyrnaeans, plotted to seize control of their city (Hdt. 1.150). When their hosts left the city to celebrate a festival in honor of Dionysus, the Colophonians barred the gates to prevent them from reentering. Luckily for the Smyrnaeans, their neighbors came to their rescue, and eventually an agreement was struck by which the Colophonians were permitted to retain control of the city on condition that they restored their property to the Smyrnaeans. The ousted Smyrnaeans were subsequently dispersed among eleven neighboring cities, where they were accorded full citizen rights.

  Deportees who found accommodation abroad were viewed with suspicion in wartime. The fourth-century military tactician Aeneas Tacticus recommended that every effort should be made to prevent them from communicating with traitors living within the city, viz from becoming what we would call a “fifth column.” He wrote (10.6):

  If there are exiles, issue a pronouncement about what to do in the case of any citizen or foreigner or slave who absconds to them. In addition, anyone who makes contact with any of the exiles or with anyone they send, or who sends a letter to them or who receives a letter from them, should face either danger or a penalty. Both outgoing and incoming letters must be submitted to a board of inspectors before they are delivered (trans. Whitehead 1990, 53).

  Aeneas further advised that the state should “draw up a register of everyone who owns more than one set of arms and armor, and not allow anyone to remove arms [that is from the city] or accept them as security” (10.7). Foreign vagrants, styled talapeirioi (much-suffering ones), were to be expelled at regular intervals (10.10). To thwart any attempt by exiles to repossess the city, a price should be put on the head of any monarch or general or ruler in exile, with the further incentive that if the assassin died in the attempt the money should be paid to his children or next of kin (10.16). Similar suspicions in wartime were directed toward economic migrants who lived permanently abroad, as they have been throughout history.

  Deportations by the Sicilian Tyrants Gelon, Hieron, and Theron

  Mass deportation was a tactic employed by a number of Sicilian tyrants to gain control over territory that they considered vital for their national interests. The Deinomenid tyrant Gelon (r. ca. 491–478/7), who ruled Gela, seized control of Syracuse in 485 at the invitation of some exiles. He then deported the inhabitants of Gela, Camarina, Megara Hyblaea, and Euboea (again not the island but an unlocated town in Sicily) to Syracuse, which even before this development was the greatest city in Sicily. He did so both to consolidate his power base and to counter the rising power of the Carthaginians, who were posing a threat to Greeks in the eastern part of the island.

  The first of these deportations involved “more than half” the population of Gela. Our sources do not tell us which half was deported—it may have been either the rich or the poor, since there are arguments for proposing both. The rich half would have helped Gelon to consolidate his political support, whereas the poor half would have provided him with military assistance. The next to be relocated were the inhabitants of Camarina, who had unsuccessfully tried to rebel against his rule. Instead of massacring the prisoners whom he had captured, as was common practice after a siege (see later in this chapter), however, he gave them Syracusan citizenship. After quelling a revolt by the oligarchs of Megara Hyblaea, he again spared the survivors. On this occasion, however, he awarded Syracusan citizenship only to the oligarchs, even though they had led the revolt, whereas the poor were enslaved, even though they were innocent. He followed the same course with regard to the population of Euboea, granting citizenship to the wealthy but enslaving the poor. In each of these four cases we should probably be thinking of deportation rather than transfer, despite the liberal grants of Syracuse citizenship. Gelon also settled over 10,000 mercenaries in Syracuse (D.S. 11.72.3). As a result of all these relocations the population of Syracuse doubled in size. How he tackled the many problems involved in enlarging the city is unrecorded. Clearly he must have initiated a massive building program to provide housing for the new residents. In addition, he had to introduce measures to increase the food and water supply. All in all, it was an extremely ambitious program. And yet it seems to have succeeded. Herodotus, who was his contemporary, states that Syracuse “immediately grew and flourished” (7.156.2).

  FIGURE 8 Silver litra from Gela, after ca. 425. The obverse depicts a bearded naked horseman carrying a spear and wearing a Phrygian helmet. The reverse, which bears the legend GELAS, depicts the forepart of a man-headed bull, intended to personify the River Gela, for which the city was named. According to tradition settlers from Lindus in Rhodes founded Gela in 689/8 (Thuc. 6.4.3; Hdt. 7.153.1). In 485 Gelon transferred “more than half” its population to Syracuse. It was repopulated in ca. 461 and again became prosperous. The Carthaginians sacked the city in 405, and the survivors took refuge in Syracuse. Gela was resettled by Timoleon (Plu. Tim. 35.1–2; cf. Talbert 1974, 153–55).

  Gelon died in 478 and was succeeded as tyrant of Syracuse by his brother Hieron, who likewise used mass deportation to consolidate his power. Unlike Gelon, however, his primary objective was to settle his mercenaries. To this end he deported the populations of Naxos and Catania to Leontini and then some four years later resettled Catania with 10,000 mercenaries. Half of these were drawn from the Peloponnese and half from Syracuse. (Naxos seems to have remained abandoned.) Hieron then renamed the city Aetna in honor of the eponymous volcano that had erupted the year he had come to the throne. He even pressed into service court poets such as Pindar (Pyth. 1.60–62) and Bacchylides (fr. 20C Campbell) to commemorate the city’s refoundation, and he commissioned Aeschylus to write a play titled the Women of Aetna, which the Athenian playwright duly performed in Sicily (Vit. Aes. 8–11). The unpalatable fact remains that the resettlement of Catania involved the displacement of a large number of the indigenous population, for whom it was little short of a catastrophe. According to Diodorus Siculus, Hieron’s primary motivation was self-interest: he wanted a loyal base of supporters available in an emergency and to be heroized as Aetna’s oikist after his death (11.49.1–3).

  In 466 Hieron was succeeded by his brother Thrasybulus, who was soon forced into exile owing to his unpopularity and ineptitude. Democracy was now restored to all the Greek cities that had been ruled by tyrants. Furthermore an agreement was reached whereby the mercenaries who had taken up residence in these cities should depart with their possessions and settle in Messenia. As Diodorus Siculus (11.76.6) reports, “Stasis and disorder among the cities in Sicily was brought to an end, and the cities, having ejected the forms of government that had been introduced by foreigners, apportioned out their lands in allotments among all their citizens.”

  Gelon’s contemporary Theron of Acragas (r. 489–73) also employed mass deportation. Discovering in 483 that a number of conspirators in Himera were plottin
g against him, he slaughtered the guilty ones and replaced them with settlers from abroad. Diodorus reports that these new settlers henceforth lived amicably with those among the Himerans who had not joined the conspiracy (11.48.6–8, 49.3–4)—aptly characterized as “a remarkable example of peaceful coexistence in a century marked by cruel episodes of ethnic antagonism” (Asheri 1992, 151).

  Deportations during the Peloponnesian War

  Several deportations are known to have taken place during the Peloponnesian War and no doubt many others occurred of which we have no report, since hostilities necessarily intensified the political divisions within individual poleis. On the positive side of the equation, wartime deportees would have had little difficulty in putting their services to good use, so long as they were prepared to take up arms against their homeland, since virtually the entire Greek world was divided into two opposing factions.

  Epidamnus. The deportation of oligarchs from Epidamnus by their democratic opponents that occurred shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War is a classic demonstration of how a localized instance of stasis could spark a major conflagration. Thucydides writes (1.24.3–5; cf. D.S. 12.30.2–5):

  As time went by Epidamnus became a powerful and populous city. Having, however, succumbed for a good number of years to stasis, allegedly as the result of war with the neighboring barbarians, the city became weakened and was deprived of much of its power. Immediately before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the dêmos drove the oligarchs into exile. The deportees joined forces with the barbarians and proceeded to harry those in the city by land and by sea.

  Thucydides omits to tell us how the dêmos gained control of Epidamnus, other than to indicate that it was a consequence of the external pressures of war. Nor does he tell us what tactics the dêmos employed to expel their opponents, though it is a reasonable assumption that the latter must have feared for their lives. Quite possibly some took to their heels before any deportation order was given, whereas others did so only after the order was promulgated. That, of course, is assuming that an order was issued. It may be that the oligarchs voluntarily fled following a riot orchestrated by the most violent elements of the dêmos. It is worth noting that no historian has provided us with a detailed explanation of how any instance of stasis resulted in deportation.

  Fearing the coalition of oligarchs and barbarians that now formed, the democrats sent ambassadors requesting help in resolving the conflict to Corcyra, which, jointly with Corinth, was Epidamnus’s mother-city. The Corcyraeans were loath to become involved, however, so they consulted Delphi as to whether they should hand their city over to Corinth for protection. Having received Delphi’s support for this plan, they now sent an embassy to their other mother-city. The Corinthians agreed to assist and issued an announcement that “anyone who wished” should depart as an oikêtôr (settler) to Epidamnus to supplement the citizen body, which had been depleted by the removal of the oligarchs. They also dispatched some mercenaries to help defend the city against its enemies.

  MAP 4 Stasis in Epidamnus.

  In the meantime, the oligarchs who had been driven into exile made an emotive appeal to the Corcyraeans for help, “pointing out the tombs of their ancestors” to emphasize their common ancestry. Their appeal also succeeded, and the Corcyraeans launched an attack on Epidamnus with the intention of restoring the oligarchs. Corinth then issued a second appeal for volunteer settlers to depart for Epidamnus, promising that they would enjoy political equality (1.24.6–27.1). The conflict between Corcyra and Corinth was a major contributor to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, since Athens took the side of Corcyra, whereas Corinth was a member of the Peloponnesian League. We hear nothing further of the exiles, who, we are bound to note, have ceased to be of any interest to the historian.

  Aegina. Shortly after the outbreak of war the Athenians deported the Aeginetans, along with their wives and children, from their island “on the grounds that they were chiefly responsible for the conflict that had come upon them” (Thuc. 2.27.1). The Spartans permitted the Aeginetans to settle in Thyrea, a region between Laconia and the Argolid, “because the Aeginetans had always sided with Sparta” (4.56.2). The number of deportees who took up the Spartan offer was evidently sufficient to pose a threat to the Athenians, who seized Thyrea in 424 and slaughtered most of its inhabitants. They then deported the survivors to Athens and executed them. Aegina now became an Athenian apoikia, inhabited by Athenians. Meanwhile the Aeginetans who had declined the Spartan offer to settle in Thyrea and thus escaped the massacre were “scattered throughout the Greek world” (2.27.2). At the end of the war they were permitted to return home (Plu. Lys. 14.3).

  Plataea. It was the preemptive attack on Plataea, an ally of Athens, by the Thebans in 431 that directly prompted the outbreak of war. In 429 the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies began besieging the city (Thuc. 2.71–78, 3.20–24, 3.52–68). About 212 Plataeans managed to break out and found refuge in Athens. The rest put up a spirited resistance, but eventually, weakened by hunger, were forced to surrender. Though they appealed to their captors for leniency, the Thebans accused them of war crimes, and the Spartan judges, after asking each of their prisoners in turn if they had done any service to Sparta, determined that all the men, numbering about 200, should be slaughtered and all the women, numbering about 110, should be sold into slavery. All other noncombatants, including slaves and the elderly, had previously been evacuated (Thuc. 2.78.3–4; 3.66 and 68.2; Dem. 59.103). For a year or so, the Spartans permitted some Megarian oligarchs and a few Plataeans who had supported their cause to inhabit the vacant site. In 426, however, they destroyed its walls and no doubt other parts of the city. They used the salvaged wood to build a katagôgeion (hostel) for dignitaries visiting the adjoining sanctuary of Hera, the city’s tutelary goddess (Thuc. 3.68.3).

  In recognition of their long-standing alliance with the Plataeans, the Athenians granted citizenship to all those who had managed to escape (Dem. 59.103–4; Isoc. 12.94). Then, when they captured Scione in Chalcidice in 421, after they had slaughtered the men and enslaved the women—in other words, after they had meted out to the Scionians exactly the same punishment that the Peloponnesians had meted out to the Plataeans—they permitted the Plataeans residing in Athens to settle on the abandoned site (Thuc. 5.32.1). Many of them declined the offer and stayed put, however, evidently because they had become acculturated to Athens (Lys. 23.5–7). Incidentally, Plataea’s walls were rebuilt in 386, this time with the help of the Spartans (Paus. 9.1.6), but they were again destroyed by the Thebans in 373 (Arr. Anab. 1.9.9–10).

  Megara. Some time after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War a democratic coup in Megara led to the deportation of the oligarchs (Thuc. 4.66–74). Initially the oligarchs fled north to Plataea where, as we just saw, they were allowed to reside temporarily (3.68.3). When the Spartans destroyed it a year later, however, the oligarchs returned to the Megarid. They took possession of Pegae, a port on the Corinthian Gulf, from which they made raids into Megarian territory. Since the Athenians were also invading the Megarid twice a year to destroy the crops, conditions inside the city soon became dire. In fact they became so dire that the democratic faction started to wonder aloud whether to reinstate the deportees in order to eliminate at least one of their problems. Seizing the moment, a group whom Thucydides identified as “the friends of the exiles” sought to introduce a proposal permitting the oligarchs to return.

  Alarmed at the prospect of their enemies returning, the democrats hastily entered into negotiations with the Athenians with the intention of betraying their city to them, since this was now seen as the lesser of two evils. Before the Athenians had time to respond, however, a Peloponnesian army appeared in the Megarid. The “friends of the exiles” now seized the initiative and handed over their city to the Pelopon-nesians, whereupon the democratic faction fled to Athens. Those who remained permitted the deported oligarchs to return on condition that they would not exact revenge. Once reinstated, however, th
e oligarchs broke their oath and executed about a hundred democrats, along with the pro-Athenian democrats who had not managed to escape.

  FIGURE 9 Bronze obolos (coin equivalent to one-sixth of a drachma) from Megara, ca. 307–243. The obverse depicts the prow of a warship. The reverse depicts two dolphins circling the legend MEG(ARE). Megara established a number of overseas settlements in the eighth and seventh centuries. Its territory was repeatedly invaded and ravaged during the Peloponnesian War. The rural population had to provision the Peloponnesian army on its way to and from Attica, and then deal with Athens’s vengeance afterward for supporting her enemies. It is unlikely that the entire population of Megara was able to shelter within the city walls, so thousands may well have perished in this period. In ca. 427 a democratic faction exiled the leading oligarchs. In ca. 424, however, the oligarchs returned, executing some democrats and exiling others.

  Leontini. After the Congress of Gela (424), which brought about the departure of the Athenians from Sicily following a vote by the Sicilian Greeks to respect the autonomy of all the cities on the island, the dunatoi (powerful aristocrats) in Leontini, with the help of the Syracusans, deported their democratic opponents just as the latter were about to undertake land redistribution on behalf of newly enrolled citizens (Thuc. 5.4.2–4). Evidently unable to find refuge as a single group, the democrats dispersed “in various directions,” some to Euboea in mainland Greece. Even so, they maintained their collective identity over the years as Leontines in exile, in the hope that they would one day be repatriated.