East of Chosin

by Roy Edgar Appleman

  Faith's new perimeter included both the road and railroad where they ran near the edge of the inlet. Of the two the road was closer to the inlet; the railroad was just above the road. The road made a sharp bend to the left when it entered on the bridge; the railroad continued on eastward up the valley of the Pungnyuri-gang. The railroad for most of the distance through the perimeter was on a slightly raised embankment above low ground on both sides and gave some protection to troops behind it. In other places the railroad made cuts 3 to 6 feet deep and 20 to 30 feet long in the irregular ground.

  In his task-force reorganization at the inlet, Faith had his ad hoc CP and three battalion CPs. Major Miller commanded the ist Battalion; Maj. Harvey H. Storms led the 3rd Battalion; and Maj. Robert J. Jolly, S-3 Of the 57th FA, took command of that battalion. Faith's old battalion staff continued to serve him as task-force commander. It was an informal arrangement, and there never was time to institutionalize it. All units continued to function along their traditional lines for the two days the arrangement existed, except that everyone recognized Faith as task-force commander.47

  Captain Stamford, in his radio contacts with Corsair pilots, told them that the troops were short of ammunition and all kinds of supplies and needed airdrops. Major Robbins, as the newly appointed task-force S-4, began collecting all the supplies in the perimeter to make an equal distribution. Stamford's request for airdrops brought results at 3:00 in the afternoon. Two C-119s ("flying boxcars") came overhead and after two trial runs dropped their cargoes of ammunition and rations. One of the parachutes failed to open, and the heavy package dropped like a stone. It hit a group of ROK soldiers about 20 feet from Robbins, killing one of them. After that, when a drop was pending, a warning was given, and everyone watched the sky for falling cargo.

  Not all the drops landed inside the perimeter; many fell outside and went to the Chinese. Stamford was not pleased with the equipment supplied in the drops. He said that it was "standard emergency equipment which included unnecessary items such as castor oil [these emergency drops were prepackaged in Japan]. We never got enough bandages, morphine, or ammunition in sufficiently varied types. The most noted shortage was in 40 mm ammunition for a dual self-propelled gun we had which would have been most useful for the next couple of days."48

  An hour after the airdrops a helicopter sent by General Hodes, who was at Hagaru-ri, landed at the inlet. He had been able to get this Marine air evacuation mission sent to the inlet to evacuate wounded. It took out two men, Lieutenant Colonel Reilly, 3rd Battalion commander; and Lieutenant Colonel Embree, 57th Field Artillery Battalion commander. It returned a second time, taking out two more unidentified wounded, but that was all-four men-before darkness fell. Hodes made an effort to get the helicopter the next day, but his request was denied because there was a higher priority for its use, presumably evacuation of critically wounded Marines at Yudam-ni.

  The failure of the airdrops to deliver the right ammunition and supplies to the intended area had serious results. Captain McClymont's dual-4o guns did not receive a single resupply shell during the entire time they were in the Chosin Reservoir battles.49 From his position at Hudong-ni, four miles south of the inlet, Captain Drake could see cargo planes fly over them and the mountain on the north to make drops at the inlet. Cargo drops for resupply of the 31st Tank Company and the 31st Infantry Rear were received. There were mixups, however: a large drop of 40-mm ammunition, intended for the dual-4os at the inlet, landed instead at Hudong-ni. In turn, Drake did not receive Io5-mm and 76-mm shells he needed for his tank company. Drake blew up the large stack of 40-mm shells the next day shortly before his armor withdrew to Hagaru-ri.50 If this 40-mm ammunition had been available to the dual-4os, it might have made the difference between success and failure in achieving a breakout of Task Force Faith to Hagaru-ri.

  It is appalling that there was no communication between Task Force Faith at the inlet and Drake's tank company and the 31st Infantry Rear, only 4 road miles apart. One reason was the high mountain mass of Ko-bong and Chokpo-dong between the two positions. The radios in both positions were World War II models, rebuilt in Japan, that functioned poorly in mountainous country. Also, these infantry radios could not net with Drake's tanks at Hudong-ni. Neither of Drake's two attacks toward the inlet from Hudong-ni was known at the inlet. Nor did the 31st Rear or Drake know of the destruction within the 3rd Battalion and artillery perimeter. Infor mation coming from Corsair radio to Captain Stamford's TACP that tanks were making an effort to reach them led many to believe that General Hodes was organizing a Marine tank-led force at Hagaru-ri to reach them.f'

  The weather remained an overriding factor in the battle situation. Temperatures were always below zero at night and occasionally dropped to - 30° F. The strong winds out of Manchuria added to the cold. During the daytime the weather was tolerable, sometimes rising above 200 F, but at night it was almost unbearable. Automatic weapons had to be fired every 15 to 20 minutes to keep them operable. One night, Captain Kitz said, of nine Browning automatic rifles (BARs) in K Company not one would fire on automatic.

  From time to time during the day targets of opportunity on the hills around the perimeter came into view, and the dual-4os hit them with deadly effect. When night approached on the 29th, McClymont told all his gun crews to be very alert. The Chinese knew their locations and would try hard to destroy them. He and Lieutenant Chapman dug a big foxhole on a little ridge in front of them facing the reservoir. Then he had the driver of the only M19 personnel carrier drive the vehicle over the foxhole. The full-track covered his D Battery CP.

  Wen Faith reorganized the new inlet perimeter late in the afternoon of November 2q and prepared for another night of battle, he did not know that during the day Drake had tried to join them at the inlet but could not get past Hill 1221. After his return to Hudong-ni on the 28th, Drake spent the evening and part of the night preparing for a second try the next day with infantry support. He planned to leave the same number of tanks at Hudong-ni for protection of the 31st Rear CP and to take the rest up the road to the Chinese position. Because he had lost 4 tanks the day before at Hill 1221, Drake had only ii tanks with 76-mm guns and a command tank with a 105-mm howitzer. He counted on the infantry troops to make a difference. Unless they could help control Hill 1221, Drake realized, his attack would go nowhere because one of his tanks now effectively blocked the road, and there was no alternate route to the inlet. He did not consider using the narrow-gauge rail track.

  Lieutenant Colonel Anderson and Major Witte had few troops of any kind to send with Drake. They apparently did not draw on the approximately ioo troops of Service Battery, 57th Field Artillery, who had joined them on the 28th. This left only part of the 31st Infantry Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company, an engineer platoon, a detachment of the Heavy Mortar Company, a detachment of the Medical Company, and some attached South Koreans (KATUSA).

  The exact number and makeup of the foot force is not known. Captain Drake said that there were "about 5o to 75 men who assaulted the ridge with tank fire support on 29 November." Nearly 30 years later Ma jor Witte, the 31st Infantry S-2 (and Acting S-3) at Hudong-ni, recalled that there were about 3 officers and 3o enlisted men from the service troops.'

  Maj. (later Brig. Gen.) William R. Lynch (left) and Capt. (Chaplain) Martin C. Hoehn. Photograph courtesy of Brigadier General Lynch.

  On the 29th the tank and "infantry" force left Hudong-ni about 8:oo A.M., with good visibility and advanced the short distance north to the turn of the road and Hill 1221. This time Drake directed his entire attack against the south face and crest of Hill 1221. The tanks again tried to climb the slope in support of the makeshift infantry force, but again they slipped and could not get traction. He had only one mortar, with which he tried to reach the CCF positions just over the crest of Hill 1221, but he had no artillery support. The air support he had asked Hodes to arrange arrived, but there was no FAC with Drake, so the necessary information and directions for effective air attack co
uld not be given to the Corsair pilots. As a result, when they made their strikes, their fire hit among the Americans as well as the Chinese.

  At the height of the effort to get to the top of Hill 1221 the chaplain, Capt. Martin C. Hoehn, accompanying the foot soldiers in their attack, became so incensed at the Chinese, who fired on the tankers whenever they dismounted, that he took a submachine gun from a soldier and fired clip after clip as he moved forward with the others, all the time asking God for forgiveness. An officer at X Corps who knew Hoehn remarked that in the Middle Ages he would have been a Knight Templar and a great threat to the Saracens. The fight at Hill 1221 lasted about four hours, but in the end the attack failed. The CCF held all their positions, and the tank-infantry force withdrew to Hudong-ni.2

  No tanks were lost on November 29. No precise figure can be given for casualties in the composite body of foot soldiers, but Captain Drake said that "they were heavy-not many killed, but many wounded. They were not well trained-there were KATUSA along also. We lost track of the latter."; A 7th Division document said that 20 men were lost in this attack.

  This was the last effort armor made to join with the 31st Infantry at Chosin. Captain Drake's tanks remained at Hudong-ni one more day, until November 30, when they were ordered to withdraw to Hagaru-ri. There never was any Marine effort from Hagaru-ri, either with infantry or with armor, to assist the 31st Regimental Combat Team or Task Force Faith east of Chosin. The Marines at Hagaru-ri were fully occupied holding their own precarious perimeter.

  At this point in the story of Task Force Faith at the inlet, the story of the 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry, which Colonel MacLean anxiously awaited at Chosin Reservoir to complete the infantry element of his RCT, should be told. His expectations in this respect were a significant factor in his wounding and capture by the Chinese on November 29. The Marines' situation at Hagaru-ri and General Hodes's efforts to help Faith should be also noted.

  When MacLean passed through Hamhung on the way to Chosin, he understood from X Corps that the 2nd Battalion of his regiment would follow rapidly behind the 3rd Battalion and that it might arrive at the reservoir the night of November 27-28 or the next morning. It never reached Chosin Reservoir, so the 31st RCT there never reached regimental strength.

  Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Reidy, commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion, received orders on November 27 at Pukchong, the 7th Division Rear CP, to take his battalion, less E Company, to the Chosin Reservoir to join MacLean. The battalion left Pukchong for Hamhung by train in open railway cars on November 28, its vehicles going by road. The battalion reached Hamhung that evening and awaited further orders.

  The next day, Colonel Millburn, G-3 Section, X Corps, ordered them to proceed by train to Majon-dong (or Santong), 22 miles north of Hamhung, where X Corps trucks would provide transportation. The battalion's own trucks would follow and join it later. Reidy and his command group went forward by jeep and arrived at Majon-dong at 9:00 A.M., November 29. The other troops arrived there by train in two increments at 9:3o and 10:15 A.M. But no trucks were available there for the battalion's march north. Major Fairbanks, of the G-4 Section, X Corps, went up the MSR to find the trucks allotted for the battalion. The 2nd Battalion's own trucks arrived during the morning, but they could not be used without a change in X Corps orders. The 2nd Battalion went into a perimeter defense at Majondong and remained there overnight on November 29-30! Major Fairbanks learned that the X Corps trucks were not at Majon-dong to carry the 2nd Battalion forward because they had reached Majon-dong earlier on the 29th loaded with ammunition and had continued north with it.

  According to Reidy's version of events, when the trucks arrived that moming, they were ordered off the road. There is no doubt that military traffic northbound was heavy and difficult to control. The Chinese were causing havoc among all the units at the reservoir, and there were priority demands from the Marine and Army troops at Chosin and elsewhere below the plateau for reinforcements and supplies.

  The confusion in the 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry, at Majon-dong during the 29th was unraveled that evening by new X Corps orders: the battalion would leave for the reservoir the next morning, November 30. At 6:45 A.M., loaded on its organic transportation and trucks from X Corps, it started north once again, reaching the foot of Funchilin Pass without incident.

  Beyond Chinhung-ni, about a mile into the pass, the enemy brought the battalion column under fire at 10:00 A.M., destroying two lead jeeps. Soon two 21/z-ton trucks were also destroyed. Troops deployed and returned enemy fire, forcing the Chinese back. But the enemy threatened to envelope the column on the east. Chinese forces holding high ground north and northwest of the column were held in check by 57-mm and 75-mm recoillessrifle fire. The battalion sent an officer back to report to X Corps that the pass was not secure. A battalion TACP joined the troops at noon and called for two air strikes. One came late in the afternoon. Lieutenant Colonel Reidy ordered an all-around defense where the battalion was stalled and prepared to stay there during the night. The battalion was about three miles from Koto-ri, one mile from the top of Funchilin Pass.

  During the afternoon of November 30, Marine air reconnaissance reported to Hagaru-ri that the 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry, was pinned down partway up the pass, that several of its vehicles were wrecked on the road, and that it was making little or no effort to move forward. At this time, General Almond, X Corps commander, was in Hagaru-ri in a conference that he had called with his commanders, Generals Smith and Barr.

  General Almond reacted violently to this news. His diary entry for No vember 30 tells the substance of what happened: "By telephone CG X Corps ordered Chief of Staff X Corps to send an immediate message to Lt. Col. Reidy, commanding the battalion enroute to Koto-ri to join Col. Puller immediately at Koto-ri." Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner knew exactly what Almond meant. He immediately chose Maj. Joseph I. Gurfein, X Corps Headquarters, G-3 Air, to go as a personal messenger up the road with Almond's orders to Reidy and see that they were executed.

  Gurfein arrived at Reidy's stalled position at 5:30 P.M. He gave Reidy Almond's orders-to move out at once, attack the enemy if necessary, and join his regiment north of Hagaru-ri.z Reidy then issued a battalion order to his company commanders at 7:00 P.M., but the attack, with F Company leading, did not start forward until an hour before midnight. A heavy snow had begun falling, reducing visibility. The battalion in close formation encountered a booby-trapped roadblock. Major Gurfein, who was present throughout, has the best account of what happened:

  Colonel Reidy collected his staff and company commanders at once, and by 1915 had issued orders for the movement. The time for the movement was 2100. The battalion moved out at 2330. At approximately 2345 a booby trap on a bridge in front of the column exploded, wounding one (i) man. The leading company started rumors that it was an antitank gun, that it was the enemy shooting, that the Chinese were coming, and they were ordered to move to the rear. Within io seconds a near rout had started with the tail and lead companies turning to the rear and starting to overrun the battalion command group. Jeep drivers turned their jeeps around and headed to the rear. The driver of a ;/a ton truck started to unhitch his trailer to turn around. Not an NCO nor junior officer raised his voice to stop the rout. The battalion commander, pushed aside by the troops, stood there silently. I had to personally step in and stop the men, order them to halt, and turn them around. That started their moving forward again. By this time the battalion commander was moving back with the column. To the best of my knowledge he did nothing to stop the rout, or to control his men. During this commotion not a single shot had been fired by the enemy or us.;

  About 1:30 A.M. on December 1, as the 2nd Battalion column neared the top of the pass, Chinese attacked and split it in two. According to the battalion report, made up later by a few of the officers, most of the front troops of the column abandoned their vehicles about two miles south of Koto-ri and made their way on foot to the lines of the 1st Marine Regiment at Koto-ri. The first
of them arrived there about 2:30 A.M. Throughout the night other survivors came into Koto-ri, the last, from the rear part of the battalion, arriving about 9:00 A.M. on December I. Gurfein, who saw it all, gives a different version of what took place when the Chinese opened fire near the top of the pass:

  At 0130 on i December the enemy commenced firing on the tail of the 2nd Battalion, 31st, as it moved up the road. The company in the rear of the column immediately returned the fire, the lead company continued to move on down the road, the next company dispersed, and the following company abandoned its vehicles and left the road. The battalion commander, near the head of the column, continued on down the road. I again had to personally come back on the road, collect the men, and move them off in an orderly fashion. The firing stopped within a half hour. The company who had set up the machine gun dug in defensive positions and stayed there the remainder of the night, instead of continuing up the road, as was their mission. This group attacked up the road the following morning.4

  Asked whether the vehicles abandoned by one company were later recovered, Gurfein replied that "a tank force went back and did get some of them," but others were still there five days later. Asked about the reaction of the junior officers and noncommissioned officers when the rout started after the booby trap exploded at the bridge, he said, "Neither the junior officers or noncommissioned officers said a word, nor took part, except to obey my orders." The battalion staff did not assist Gurfein at the time. Gurfein made an oral report of the episode to Lt. Col. John H. Chiles, the X Corps G-3, and to Lieutenant Colonel McCaffrey, deputy chief of staff, X Corps. Subsequently he submitted a written report to Chiles.s

  Upon his arrival at Koto-ri, Reidy reported to Col. Lewis B. Puller, commander of the ist Marine Regiment. Puller informed Reidy that he and his battalion were attached to the ist Marine Regiment and were given a sector of the Koto-ri perimeter. Puller also directed that the battalion assume control of all Army personnel, about i,8oo men from 44 different units who had piled up there, unable to go farther. The 2nd Battalion remained at Koto-ri as part of Puller's command until the Marines and Army troops withdrew to Hamhung, closing there on December 12 in midafternoon.6