East of Chosin

by Roy Edgar Appleman

  I went there [to Kim's family's home in Pusan] to explain the situation to his family. Much to my surprise and pleasure, I found him there. Wounded, he had remained with the convoy until the end, attempted to fight his way out and was captured when his weapon was out of ammunition. He subsequently escaped to Hagaru-ri, was hospitalized for wounds and frostbite and because of his injuries discharged from the ROK Army, returning to his home in Pusan. When he learned that I was returning to the 32nd he insisted on coming with me. I scrounged an extra set of combat issue and a weapon from the Repo Depot in Pusan and got us both on an aircraft headed north the next day. He remained with me (almost at my side through three more combat unit assignments and two more hospitalizations) until I rotated in August 1951. I took him with me as I passed back to Pusan through rotation channels and unofficially "discharged" him there.6

  The 7th Infantry Division remained in General Almond's X Corps as part of Eighth Army. The X Corps was rushed into combat in early January to stem a North Korean drive down the central mountain corridor toward Pusan that threatened to outflank all of Eighth Army. Only ROK troops defended that area as the New Year began. At first Wonju was the key road and railroad center that was threatened. The 7th Division started moving northward toward this new battle area at the end of December, 195o, while its 31st and 32nd regiments were being reconstituted. The Division's 17th Regiment necessarily took the lead in the advance, with the main mission of protecting the Andong-Chechon MSR in the Taeback Mountain corridor of central Korea. By the end of January, 1951, the 7th Division was concentrated in the area around Chechon, an important road center southeast of Wonju.

  By this time the 31st RCT and the ist Battalion of the 32nd Infantry had been largely reequipped and replacements taken in. Training and integration were being carried on in severe winter weather in difficult terrain -the Taeback range. General Barr left the division on January 26, 1951, rotated back to the United States, and was replaced by Maj. Gen. Claude E. Ferenbaugh.

  On February 18, 1951, Operational Plan Killer called for the 7th Division to pass through the ROK 3rd and 5th divisions on the right of the US and Division and the 187th Airborne RCT, to assume a major role in General Ridgway's offensive to begin on February 22 the drive back north. The units of the 31st RCT, all but destroyed east of Chosin, were back in the war.

  APPENDIX A Some Thoughts on Contrasts in Factors Affecting the 1st Marine Division and the Army 31st RCT at Chosin Reservoir

  It may be useful to set down some thoughts on differences between the Marines and the Army troops who fought at Chosin and their organizations. While hundreds of Marines were killed or wounded in that Siberiantype operation against the Chinese Communists in November and December, 1950, most of the Marines eventually fought their way to the coast and lived to tell the tale. A small, improvised battalion of Army troops was organized from the remnant that survived Chosin and arrived at Hagaru-ri, physically able for further service after they had rested and were reequipped. These Army troops were attached to the 7th Marine Regiment for the breakout fight between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri, the first phase of the breakout to the coast. The comments that follow do not deal with the fighting march from Hagaru-ri to the sea at Hungnam but relate to the troops, the conditions, and the factors that surrounded them in the previous battles at the Chosin Reservoir.

  There was inevitable criticism from some quarters contrasting the decimation and destruction of the Army troops east of Chosin with the successful battles of the ist Marine Division in reaching the coast, though with very heavy casualties. The Marines, as usual, received plaudits and were canonized in the public press-the Army troops were denigrated. Why could not the Army troops do what the Marines had done at Chosin?

  That there is rivalry between the Marine Corps and the US Army in their respective versions of combat operations in which they mutually participate is known to everyone who has served in one or the other of the services. I have been present in two such campaigns, one at Okinawa in World War II, and the other in Korea, and I have heard much partisan talk about both campaigns. Now, after as careful a study of the operations east of Chosin as could be made from the evidence still available, and a similar study of the Marine operations at Chosin Reservoir, I venture certain observations.

  First, let us recognize some differences between the Marine troops and their organization at the reservoir and the Army troops of the 31st RCT of the 7th Infantry Division. The 1st Marine Division was overstrength, with an aggregate of about 25,000 men. These men were regulars of the Marine Corps or were from the Marine Active Reserve. Nearly every one of them had had extensive training and combat experience either in World War II or previously in the Korean War. Compared with the Army forces in Korea, all of which were in a pursuit formation in November, 1950, scattered over most of North Korea, the Marine force was well concentrated. This was an extreme contrast to the quickly organized ad hoc small force of about 3,000 men of the 7th Division who were hurriedly loaded into trucks, most of them nearly loo miles from their assigned Chosin Reservoir destination. They had no chance to plan the movement or to provide adequate supplies. The intent was to provide a regiment-size force, a decision hastily arrived at by X Corps Headquarters, to protect the right flank of the 1st Marine Division in its projected attack toward the North Korean border. The Army troops were to come from the 7th Infantry Division, but that division was already so widely scattered over northeastern North Korea that the division could not commit any one of its three regiments to the mission. The two infantry battalions that did reach the east side of Chosin Reservoir were from different regiments and had not worked together as a combat force. The officers and men of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, for instance, did not even know the officers and men of the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, or those of the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, when they joined together at the inlet perimeter.

  Had it been possible for the whole 32nd Infantry with its regular supporting artillery, the 48th Field Artillery Battalion, and its regular tank company to have been sent to the Chosin Reservoir, together with its usual regimental supporting units, there is little doubt that it would have given a better account of itself than did the heterogeneous force that was instead assembled there. And the same thing would probably have been true if the full 31st Infantry Regiment had been there.

  Another contrast between the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division elements east of Chosin was that the Marines did not have any South Koreans or KATUSA among its combat units; in the 7th Division units about one-fourth of the members were KATUSA. It was the almost universal opinion of the officers and noncommissioned officers of the 7th Division elements at Chosin that these recently impressed, relatively untrained KATUSA were unreliable and caused more trouble than they were worth in a combat situation. As always, there were individual exceptions to this generalization.

  When the CCF struck the troops east of Chosin Reservoir in their surprise attack on the night of November 27, the 31st RCT force was scattered in seven different groups between Hagaru-ri and the forward position of the ist Battalion, 32nd Infantry. In addition, one infantry battalion intended for the 31st RCT, the 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry, was 40 miles away on the road leading up from the coast and never reached the reservoir. In contrast, the 1st Marine Division had two infantry regiments, the 5th and 7th Marines, and most of its artillery regiment (the 11th Marines) concentrated at Yudam-ni, on the west side of the reservoir. The other Marine infantry regiment (the 1st Marines) was in three battalion-size perimeters from the southern end of the reservoir in strong points extending southward guarding the main supply route to the coast-at Hagaru-ri, Koto-ri, and at Chinhungni-with supporting arms. Only one Marine tank had reached Yudam-ni. The main tank force had been unable to cross Toktong Pass because of ice on the steep road. The Marines had been able to stockpile considerable ammunition at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri, and the battalion strongpoints southward on the road before the CCF attack. The Army units had not been able to stockpi
le ammunition, gasoline, or food supplies.

  And another difference must be noted. Throughout the Chosin combat the ist Marine Division had good communications among its units and with higher headquarters. The 31st RCT, on the east side of Chosin, had poor or nonexistent communications among its units and none with higher headquarters, except for tank-radio communication between Hagaru-ri and the 31st Rear at Hudong-ni. Communication is of the highest importance in battle.

  Not to be overlooked in contrasting the two forces is that the 1st Marine Division had the magnificent 1st Marine Air Wing in close air support, with its related ground TACP units with each infantry battalion. True, one Marine TACP helped the 31st RCT east of the reservoir. The Fifth Air Force TACP with the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, was destroyed the first night of the battle, November 27-28, at the inlet perimeter. Many of the Army soldiers openly said that without the remaining Marine Anglico TACP led by Captain Stamford, attached to the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, they could not have lasted beyond the second day. Stamford did an outstanding job in handling close air support and airdrops of supplies, but the 31st RCT did not have the continuing massive close air support that buttressed the 1st Marine Divison troops at Chosin.

  The 7th Infantry Division units that fought east of Chosin were from a division with a strength of about 16,ooo men, contrasted with the 1st Marine Division, with a strength of 25,000 men, and the 7th Division rifle companies had a strength at Chosin averaging about 140 to 150 men as compared with a Marine rifle company of 225 men. It must also be accepted by an objective observer that on average the Army troops at Chosin were by no means the equals of the Marines in training and combat experience. Exceptions to this were many of the Army officers and some of the noncommissioned officers. They were generally of high caliber. Most of them were either killed or wounded while carrying out their duties. Most of the combatexperienced noncommissioned officers and trained riflemen had been taken from the 7th Division during the summer months as replacements for the other Army divisions in Eighth Army fighting in Korea.

  Most of the enlisted men left in the 7th Division had no combat experience, and their training was not of the highest caliber, according to many observers, though a training program was in progress in Japan in 1949 and the first part of 1950. Because of limited training areas most of the training was on company or battalion level. The replacements that were taken in at this time came from the United States and had no combat experience. Before going into Korea in September, 1950, for the Inchon Landing, the 7th Division received some officers and noncommissioned officers from the Inactive Reserve who had World War II experience. The training and battle experience of the 7th Division during the Inchon Landing and the subsequent battle for Seoul was relatively minor and in no way made of the men the kinds of veterans needed at Chosin. At the time many thought the Army should have followed the Marine Corps example and called up its trained and experienced Reserves.

  It has already been mentioned that the 6,ooo almost entirely untrained KATUSA in the 7th Division and spread through all its units, including the rifle companies, were a source of weakness and a handicap rather than a help in combat. The only KATUSA in the 1st Marine Division were a relatively small number who acted as interpreters and some who served as intelligence agents. In any fair analysis the facts of combat allow one to say of the 7th Division east of Chosin that most of its noncommissioned officers were dedicated soldiers, that many an enlisted man turned out to be a hero, and that many, many in all ranks died in performance of their duty. But with the depletion in combat of their leadership, the officers and the senior noncommissioned officers, the Army units east of Chosin lost cohesion and disciplined action more quickly than did the Marines, which in fact never suffered the loss of leadership in killed and wounded to the same degree as did the Army units.

  I believe that the ist Marine Division in the Chosin Reservoir Campaign was one of the most magnificent fighting organizations that ever served in the United States Armed Forces. It had to be to do what it did, to fight to a standstill the Chinese forces at every point and then to carry out a fighting retreat southward against an enemy roadblock and fire block that extended all the way from Yudam-ni to the area below Chinhung-ni, a distance of about 4o road miles. This was done in the midst of extremely adverse weather conditions. The Marines never had a brighter moment in their long history than in the Chosin Reservoir Campaign. Their officers and noncommissioned officers gave often heroic example and leadership, and the rank and file performed with disciplined professionalism. Their commanding general, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith, was a model of coolness, caution, and tactical and planning abilities. All the regimental commanders were outstanding and competent, even though one of them, Lt. Col. Raymond L. Murray, was relatively young. When the Marines had to leave accumulated dead behind, they buried them at Yudam-ni and at Koto-ri. The bodies were retrieved after the armistice in 1953. Inevitably some severely wounded men were left behind when the enemy held the ground that was being fought over, but the Marines brought out most of their wounded. Chosin will deservedly remain a moment of glory in US Marines' history.

  APPENDIX B 3rst Regimental Combat Team Organization Chart, 27 November 19So

  Adapted from Maj. Robert M. Coombs, "Changjin Reservoir, Korea, 1950" thesis, Command and General Staff College, 1975.

  APPENDIX D Strength o fist Battalion, 32nd Infantry, Hagaruri, 4 December i9fo

  Source: From Maj. Robert E. Jones's report to Maj. William R. Lynch, 7th Division, G-3 Section, December 4, ig5o, prepared at Hagaru-ri, Korea.

  APPENDIX E Number of Enlisted Men of Units for Duty, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, 7th Infantry Division, before and after Action against Chinese 8oth Division East of Chosin Reservoir November-December, i9fo

  *Approximately So KATUSA were also missing from each company. Source: ist Lt. Martin Blumenson, notes, based on Official Morning Reports.

  APPENDIX F 31st Regimental Combat Team, 7th Infantry Division, Cbosin Reservoir Operation, Command and Staff List, November 27, 1gso.

  Note: The list of the principal staff officers is not complete as there were in the official records no roster lists of the units involved.

  Chapter r

  i. Lt. Col. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (JuneNovember, r9So): United States Army in the Korean War, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1961), pp. 686-88, 741-45, (hereafter cited as Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu); Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, Diary, Nov. 30, 195o, copy in author's possession (hereafter cited as Almond, Diary); Lt. Gen. William J. McCaffrey, USA, Ret., review comments on "East of Chosin" MS, Feb. 25, 1981.

  2. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 764, citing author's interview with Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, Aug. 27, 1951; Lt. Col. William J. McCaffrey, X Corps deputy CS, 19So, memorandum to Gen. Almond, Dec. 1, 1954, copy provided to author by Gen. Almond; McCaffrey, review comments on "East of Chosin" MS.

  3. X Corps, War Diary, Monthly Summary, Nov. 1-30, 1950, pp. 5-6 (National Archives, Federal Records Center, Record Group 407), lists the events, actions, and operational orders concerning the corps's changing mission.

  4. GHQ, X Corps, Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, Nov. 27 to Dec. 1o, 195o; X Corps, Plans and Orders; X Corps, War Diary, Nov. 25, 195o, Annex A to Periodic Operations Report No. 6o, Operations Order No. 7.

  5. Lt. Gen. William J. McCaffrey, USA, Ret., letter to author, Dec. 11, 1976.

  6. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, Ret., letter to author, Mar. 6, 1978.

  Chapter 2

  1. Comments based on study of 195o map, 1916 data, scale 1:50,000, lent to author by Col. Robert E. Drake, USA, Ret. (CO, 31st Tank Co., 195o, then captain), and carried by him in the Chosin operation; study of subsequent maps, scale 1:50,000; and study of the latest-edition map, 1969-71 data, scale 1:50,000.

  2. X Corps, Special Report on Chosin Reservoir Campaign; X Corps, War Diary, Nov. 26, 195o Summ
ary.

  3. Lt. Col. Edward L. Rowny, X Corps engineer, GHQ, X Corps, Statement, May 28, 1951, copy in author's possession.

  4. Capt. Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC, interview with author, 1955. Canzona was platoon leader, ist Plat., A Co., 1st Eng. Bn., and was with A Co. at Sasu in November, 195o. The Marine Eng. Co. was recalled to Hagaru-ri on Nov. 29, 195o, to buttress the marine defenses and help defend East Hill. For withdrawal of A Co., ist Eng., from Sasu and action at East Hill, see Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona, The Chosin Campaign, vol. 3 in U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, rgfo S3 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1962), pp. 211-20.

  S. Lt. Col. Crosby P. Miller, "Chosin Reservoir, Nov-Dec 195o," October, 1953 (typescript MS, 25 pp., with marked map of east side of Chosin Reservoir; hereafter cited as Miller, MS). If Miller's reference to the battalion position" means the forward defense position, then his reference to the bridge at the Paegamni-gang as the only concrete bridge is in error, since the bridge over the Pungnyuri-gang at the inlet was also concrete. Contemporary photographs clearly show that the pillars of this bridge were concrete. But Miller is correct if he meant, as he probably did, the first position of the 1st Bn., 32nd Inf., at Twiggae and Hill 1221. See also note 8, below.

  6. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 732-38; Col. Carl G. Witte, lecture given to EOC, June 19, 1953, in which he describes some 31st Inf. action in the Fusen Reservoir area in November, 1950, copy lent to author by Col. Witte as attachment to his letter to author, Nov. 5-20, 195o; Map of Korea, Sinhung Sheet, K52T, L551, 1950, scale 1:250,000.