Pep Guardiola: Another Way of Winning: The Biography

by Balague, Guillem

  ‘You are going to be able to find and create space here and here. Right here. This is where the game can be won and lost. Keep an eye on the two v ones that are going to pop up here, here and here. In midfield we will be four against three, we’ll have superiority in numbers in these central areas. Here is where you are going to win the game for me. Because I have seen it, I have analysed it and I know this is where we will win it.’

  So, it wasn’t the simple instructions that Cruyff gave his Barcelona players at Wembley twenty years earlier, no ‘go out and enjoy yourself’. The message was ‘yes, we have to enjoy this match, but we have to suffer for it too’.

  Javier Mascherano cannot help being a fan of Pep, of the delivery and timing of his speeches, of the quality of the message: ‘I’ve heard more than one player say: “Son of a bitch, he’s nailed it!” That speech at Wembley was one that made the greatest impression on me. While he was talking, it wasn’t as if he was referring to a game that we were about to take part in, it was as if we were actually playing it right there. He was up and down, side to side in front of the board, gesticulating; and if you shut your eyes and listened to him, you were already out there in the middle of the action. Everything that he said would happen, happened as he said it would. During the match I was thinking; I’ve seen this already, I’ve already heard all about it – because Pep has already told me about it ...’

  There was one more moment of inspiration. A few words that would send Mascherano, for one, out on to the pitch with a tear in his eye.

  Just after the players had warmed up, minutes before the match was about to kick off, completely unplanned, Pep decided to appeal to the players’ human instincts. As the referee was trying to usher them out and into the tunnel leading on to the pitch, Pep quickly grabbed hold of them and gathering them around said, with pure determination in his voice:

  ‘Listen, lads, we’re going to do this for Abidal! He has made it here and is with us, we cannot let him down.’

  Scouting report: Champions League Final Wembley 2011

  First half:

  Abidal was in the line-up.

  Pep received a report from a friend in England that explained Manchester United had been training with a 4-3-3 but that finally they were going to play with their more usual 4-2-3-1: a formation that could convert into 4-4-1-1. ‘Are you sure?’ Pep had to ask till he was convinced. Barcelona came out with their classical 4-3-3.

  The report from his friend was spot-on.

  In the first ten minutes, Manchester United applied lots of pressure and intensity with man-to-man marking in midfield. Rooney stuck close to Busquets to prevent Barcelona building from the back, through him. Giggs was all over Xavi. Barcelona struggled as they couldn’t find superiority in any part of the pitch and the game was in the hands of United.

  After ten minutes, the first of two key moves of that final took place.

  Xavi dropped a little deeper, to receive the ball in line with where Busquets would normally start. It meant that Barcelona effectively switched to a 4-2-3-1. United didn’t feel brave enough to send any player to mark Xavi that high upfield – and if they did, they reacted too late. It enabled Xavi to see more of the ball, in space – allowing him to play with his head up, under little pressure, pick his passes and start dictating the game from deep. It was a good move; but it did mean that Barcelona’s superiority was taking place a little deeper than they might have wished.

  And then another tactical move changed everything.

  Messi started to see more of the ball in midfield. He moved from his position higher up, in between the lines, to a midfield area where neither Vidić nor Ferdinand followed for fear of straying too far from their centre-back positions.

  It effectively meant that the midfield was shaping up as Busquets, Xavi, Iniesta and Messi against Rooney, Carrick and Giggs.

  From that moment on, Barcelona had control of the game. They scored in the twenty-seventh minute to make it 1-0. Rooney, however, pulled United level five minutes later and in the following few minutes Barcelona appeared to be reeling from the sucker punch. However, they soon regained composure and control.

  The Catalan team was brave in their pressing high upfield, too. One passage of play highlights how high Barcelona pressed: United rushed twelve passes together with none of them crossing the halfway line, so suffocated were they by the pressure of the Barcelona players in their own half.

  Half-time:

  The United players didn’t quite stick to the plan and received a dressing down from their backroom staff. Instructions were forgotten: like failing to get the ball into the Barcelona box from deadball situations. One player came in for special criticism from Ferguson’s assistants: Wayne Rooney, who failed to track Busquets as the manager had instructed him. Yet, as a sign of what some members of the United staff took as a reluctant acceptance of Barcelona’s superiority, Sir Alex was uncharacteristically subdued.

  Second half:

  Manchester United sporadically pressed high up, with Chicharito and Rooney running after the ball when it was passed back to Valdés, but the second line (Giggs, Carrick) didn’t follow up the pressure. So Barcelona were building from the back quite easily and found Busquets often, who would then start the attack.

  United did not have a solution, they didn’t even take a corner all game. Barcelona continued in the same fashion and it was in that vein that Messi received a pass in midfield, unmarked, turned round and fired home a shot that made it 2-1 for Barcelona.

  Messi’s performance illustrates the difficulties that rivals have when they face Barcelona. Even though Ferguson admitted that they never controlled Messi, he ended up making ninety-seven runs, but 85 per cent of his moves were ‘low-intensity’. His choosing of his runs was game-changing.

  Barcelona were so accomplished at the basics, knowing their system and personnel so well, that Guardiola could respond to anything United threw at them. Their attack involved constant positional permutations between the front five, with the full backs often involved as well. A neverending display of ball and player circulation.

  The United wingers started joining in, in midfield, making the centre of the park quite congested, so Barcelona started attacking down the more open flanks; especially down the right with Alvés.

  The game was under Barcelona control when Villa scored Barcelona’s third goal after seventy minutes. One minute earlier, Nani had replaced Fabio, injured, and on seventy-six minutes Scholes replaced Carrick. Now trailing by two goals, United went fully on the attack, Barcelona relaxed a bit and the game took a dangerous turn for Barcelona. Pep reacted by taking off a winger and bringing on Keita to regain control – and it stayed that way until the end of the match.

  Essentially, Barcelona looked far more like the Barcelona side we will remember than they did in 2009. The attacking wide players (Pedro and Villa) were more involved than Henry and Eto’o (who were in reality strikers) were two years earlier. Busquets saw more of the ball despite the efforts of Rooney, and enjoyed relative freedom when Xavi and Messi dropped deeper. Barcelona were superior.

  The final word: The lifting of the cup, the managers

  Somewhat surprisingly, Carles Puyol was left out of Guardiola’s line-up at the very last minute. Once the game was resolved, the coach introduced him for the final moments so that he could participate in the final and receive the trophy. But the Barcelona captain insisted that Abidal lift the silverware. ‘This trophy is yours; go and get it!’ Puyi told his team-mate. The French left back felt his ‘second family’ had given him his life back. Although he did not know it yet, his illness was to return with even more serious repercussions; but that day the recuperating star had done more to inspire his team-mates with his determination and resilience on the road to recovery than, perhaps, he ever realised at the time.

  Ferguson, despite his competitive nature and instinctive desire to defend his own team, admitted that night to his closest assistants that it was impossible to compete with their current
European nemesis. He could not but admire the fact that they had achieved such high standards with such an extraordinary contribution from the club’s academy set-up (seven of them in the line-up), the ultimate ideal in football. Rio Ferdinand and Wayne Rooney were in agreement with their manager.

  And the competitive nature of Barcelona was undisputed. Before Wembley, Pep had lost only one final, the Spanish Cup against Madrid. In fact, in his four years as a Barcelona manager all the other finals played (eleven) were won.

  Pep Guardiola: We were lucky at Wembley because in the semi-final against Inter we had to go by bus because of the volcano and the threat of another ash cloud meant we had to go to London earlier. This gave us four days on our own, calm days, which was incredibly rare for us. We were away from Barcelona and the pressure of the people, friends and family. We were happy at Arsenal’s ground and we had time to prepare well for the final. We could think about what we had to do to, and we prepared everything, every single bit. We didn’t miss anything and in the final you can see that we played well, we were the better team. The first final, in Rome, was a lot more equal, but in the second, at Wembley, we were better prepared.

  Sir Alex Ferguson: At Wembley, we had to decide how to play tactically against Barcelona because of Villa and Pedro and the way they penetrated, and the fact they had no central striker made it hard to plan.

  PG: Our preparation for that game was crucial. Things like that tend to get overlooked by analysts and pundits after the match but they make the difference in big games.

  SAF: In that final we were well beaten. We were playing a more mature Barcelona, the team had evolved and formed a complete unit. Piqué and Messi had matured, Xavi and Iniesta performed like the players they are.

  PG: It’s important to remember that finals are usually very close games, which is what made our performance against Manchester United stand out even more. There have been other games when we’ve played really well, but it’s always more difficult to do that in a final because of the emotional factors that come into it and the quality of the opposition.

  SAF: At Wembley, the two wide players were big improvements on Henry and Eto’o in 2009, in terms of penetration. This is probably because Henry and Eto’o were centre forwards rather than wide players. I remember contemplating a change of tactics and going against Messi – I toyed with the idea at half-time. But after the restart they got in front and although we took a gamble in moving Valencia to right back and Nani to wide right, Barcelona always had control of that game in 2011.

  PG: In that second final my team knew each other more. We had spent a few years together and I think that we played the game being more aware of our style and United’s strengths and weaknesses.

  Sir Alex: I don’t regret anything we did at Wembley because they were the better side. The first two goals were entirely avoidable and maybe with a bit of luck we could have won the game, but when the other team’s that bit better than you, then there’s not much you can do about it. You accept it.

  PG: The United players said it, ‘What they have done to us today, that has never happened before.’ They understood it, they congratulated us on it, they recognised it – something that doesn’t usually happen in football. Those ‘wars’ against our domestic rivals are perhaps more difficult to understand for a foreign audience but I also think it is a cultural thing. English football culture is different, they’ve been playing longer than us, there is a respect towards not only the coaches but also the players that we don’t have here.

  Sir Alex: People have asked if Pep and I spoke after the final, and the truth is we didn’t. It’s very difficult after a final – one team is celebrating and the other is mourning, trying to come to terms with the defeat. And then you have to deal with the media and attend press conferences, so there’s not an area or time when you can have a glass of wine or talk to each other because of that divide – one is winning and the other one is losing. Sometimes you have to accept it, move to one side and acknowledge that somebody else has been better.

  After the hugs and the celebrations, the dancing and the fireworks; away from the noise, in a quiet moment in the Wembley dressing room, Pep took Estiarte to one side, looked into his eyes and said, ‘Manel, I will never forgive myself. I have failed.’

  Manel was stunned. He would never forget how, in the immediate aftermath of such an incredible achievement, when the most natural thing in the world would have been simply to relish that moment, to bathe in its glory, Pep Guardiola was still capable of feeling that he had let everybody down. Pep explained to Manel that he felt he could have done things better. And Manel told him that, yes, it could have been a bit different, maybe; but they had won. That was what mattered. But not for Pep: his quest for perfection, for improvement, meant that as everyone around him could abandon themselves to feelings of absolute joy, he could never be truly satisfied with himself.

  5

  PEP AND HIS PLAYERS

  The former player becomes a manager

  As the leader of a group of professional footballers, Pep Guardiola had to reconcile two natural impulses: on the one hand he had to learn to restrain his instinct to act and celebrate as a player; on the other, he had to learn, as a recently retired footballer, to make the biggest number of right decisions – become a manager, basically, learn the trade. Those were the challenges. On many occasions he felt jealous of his players cocooned in a little world centred on the needs of one person, and he realised very early on that his job consisted of looking after these small bubbles of isolation, caressing the egos of his pupils and constantly directing their intentions and efforts to the benefit of the group.

  Announcing his retirement on the radio didn’t completely shut down the part of him that was still a footballer. Guardiola had only hung up his boots seven months before Barcelona contracted him to be the coach of the B team, but when he walked into the Mini Estadi to face the Barcelona youngsters he knew a part of him had to be put firmly in the past: he was not going to work as a former player but as a new coach. And he had to construct a barrier that separated both worlds.

  After the fulfilling experience in the B team, the first team was another kettle of fish. One player experienced Guardiola’s transition from player to manager up close: his move from a small world to a complex network of worlds. Xavi Hernández had been his teammate in the late nineties and he easily envisaged Pep’s transition into his new role, but was very aware that an ability to read a match is just one of the assets a manager requires. Xavi and Pep conversed at length during the Rijkaard regime about the team’s shortfalls and the difficulties of dealing with players who had forgotten how to behave professionally. The midfielder also told him he would make a great manager – in fact, he wanted Pep and his values and his ideas returned to the Barcelona team.

  After those talks Xavi was convinced that a dose of Guardiola’s medicine was what the group needed. And Pep himself knew that it wasn’t Xavi (or Iniesta, or Valdés, or Puyol) whom he had to convince from the moment he entered the dressing room, but those who didn’t know too much about him. He was convinced that he could.

  In order to win them over, Pep had to act without looking as if he was learning on the job: he had clear ideas of what to do and trusted his instinct and his experience as a player would help him along the way, but there were going to be unexpected turns and new lessons to be learnt. In the dressing room, though, where the player is testing the manager continuously, it was essential that he looked, at all times, as if he knew exactly what he was doing right from day one.

  The decision to get rid of Ronaldinho and Deco won Pep instant authority, but it was in the day to day where he could really leave his mark. And for that, the first meeting, the first chat, was crucial. He asked Xavi Hernández to come to the office very early on and although the tone was similar to previous conversations the two had had in the past, there was something that had inevitably changed: a touch of humility in the voice of Xavi, the subtle bow of his head. Pep was the boss no
w.

  The midfielder had just come back from winning the European Championship with Spain and there were stories in the papers about his possible transfer. It had been a difficult period in his career and he was quickly falling out of love with football: not only because of the lack of titles in the previous two seasons, but the disappointment of seeing talented players go to waste, the lack of synergy at the club, the number of years spent in an institution with huge demands. A dangerous cocktail.

  Xavi needed to hear what Pep’s plans were; he had no intention of leaving but if he had to, he would look at the possibility of testing himself in the Premier League. Manchester United were sniffing around.

  The conversation between player and coach took place in the first days of training together.

  Xavi: I won’t beat around the bush, Pep, I have one question for you: do you count on me?

  Pep: I don’t see this team without you in it. I just don’t see this working without you.

  With that, Pep Guardiola had reignited Xavi’s spark.

  But the work to recover the midfielder mentally didn’t end there. In the rare instances of a defeat or a bad performance, Xavi would carry his negative feelings to the training ground the next day. After the sessions, while performing stretches, Pep would often sit next to him, chatting about general stuff, about the weather, plans for that evening: the kind of idle talk that passes between colleagues. Guardiola would then suddenly switch into the role of manager in gesture and tone: he would switch the conversation to the next game; about what he wanted from the player; about what he had been doing right, about what could be improved. Xavi’s wounds left by the defeat would heal and the mood would change – there was another target.