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Scorched Earth

Page 14

by Rosen, Sue;


  Wagonga River: (Max. of 400 tons gross with 8’6” draught including tide on bar.)

  Narooma9 left bank. P.W.D. P.W.D. or Eurobodalla Shire.

  2a Narooma do. Council. Eurobodalla Shire

  3 Long Wharf do. Council. do.

  3 Narooma. Mitchell Bros. Mitchell Bros. Eurobodalla Shire supervise.

  3 Narooma. White Timber Mill. White. do.

  3 Narooma Town left bank. Council. Eurobodalla Shire

  4 Wagonga left bank. Council. do.

  SCHEDULE “B”

  Jetties and wharves being dealt with directly by Army.

  1. Coal Loading Jetty, Bellambi.

  2. Coal Loading Jetty, Bulli.

  3. Jetty, Cabbage Tree Point (Port Hacking opposite Gunnamatta Bay).

  4. Jetty, Taren Point (west of punt).

  5. Jetty, Kurnell.

  6. Jetty, Hungry Point (Opposite Cabbage Tree Point, Pt. Hacking).

  7. Jetty, Bundeena Bay (Port Hacking, cast of Cabbage Tree Point).

  8. Pier, Frenchman’s Bay, La Perouse.

  9. Botany Pier, Botany.

  10. Jetty, Church Point (Ref.289428 Broken Bay, Military Map 1:63,360).

  11. Timber Jetty, Church Pt. (Ref.292424 Broken Bay Military Map 1:63,360, ¼ mile S.E. of 10).

  12. Timber Jetty, Stone Causeway, Church Pt. (Ref.303412 Broken Bay Military Map 1:63,360).

  13. Timber Jetty, Newport (Ref.313411, Broken Bay Military Map 1:63,360).

  14. Timber Jetty, Newport (Ref.413415, Broken Bay, Military Map 1:63,360).

  15. Timber Jetty, Palm Beach (Ref.323484, Broken Bay, Military Map 1:63,360)

  16. Timber Jetty, Barrenjoey (Ref.331504, Broken Bay, Military Map 1:63,360).

  17. Bunnerong Power House Jetty, Botany Bay.

  A mini-sub shortly after its recovery from Taylors Bay, Sydney Harbour.

  Boats would be invaluable to an invading force, enabling it to move troops and materiel up and down the coast or inland via harbours, lakes and rivers. Denying all watercraft to an advancing enemy would be extremely difficult if they were allowed to remain scattered around the state in private hands. New South Wales had roughly 25,000 watercraft, from dinghies to yachts and fishing boats. In accordance with national security regulations passed in early 1942,1 all boats deemed to be nonessential (about 90 per cent of the total) were either beached above high-water mark or assembled at moorings guarded by the Army or Volunteer Defence Corps, which would destroy the craft en masse in the event of an emergency. (At one location in Lake Macquarie, there were more than 2000 boats.)2 Boats that could not be monitored were to be disabled by removing oarlocks, rudders, tillers and engine parts. Where possible, the entire engine was removed for use by the Australian military.

  Watercraft deemed to be essential—such as tugs, ferries, oyster boats and fishing trawlers—needed clearance to change their operating base or leave a harbour, and could not stay at sea for more than two days at a time. These craft were to be burned or scuttled in the face of an approaching enemy.

  Conferences in March and April 1942, with representatives of the Army, Navy, the Department of Fisheries, the Maritime Services Board and the Scorched Earth subcommittee, established a special Watercraft Panel to coordinate the treatment of watercraft and develop an implementation policy.

  DENIAL OF RESOURCES TO THE ENEMY N.S.W. L. of C. AREA.

  WATERCRAFT

  Policy:

  No watercraft must be allowed to fall into enemy hands to be used by him against us either in major coast-wise movements or in infiltrations from sea or river.

  Non-essential craft must be immobilised; essential craft must be controlled and constantly attended.

  Preparation for instant and effective denial must be made for both immobilised and exempted craft in military emergency.

  Authority and Powers:

  The authority will be the Minister for the Navy; or person authorised by him, to wit the Rear-Admiral-in-charge, H.M.A. Naval Establishments, Sydney.

  The powers are contained in National Security Regulation 45D of 26/2/l942.

  Under this Regulation, the authority may “prevent or impede the use of vessels ... in Australian waters”; by removing them upstream or from the water; or otherwise. Contravention is an offence. Authorised constables and Commonwealth officers may enforce.

  Direction of 12/3/42 by the Rear Admiral-in-charge, authorised the removal of vessels, and mooring at places directed - by “the owners”; or, if he cannot be found, by the person authorised - and the “immobilisation, removal from water, or destruction of such vessels”. Vessels in Port Jackson are exempted. Exemption may be granted in respect of vessels elsewhere located.

  Order of l0/3/42 defined and placed destruction (denial or “Scorched Earth”) under the Chief of Naval Staff. It prescribed precautions for unattended vessels, i.e. by removal of vital parts.

  The Regulation, Direction, and Order, assume to the Navy entire authority and responsibility for the immobilisation and denial of watercraft.

  The operations were assigned to Captain Livesay, R.A.N., assisted by Lieutenant Pearson, R.A.N.

  Co-ordination; Army, Navy, and Civi1:

  Conferences of 4th and 6th March, 1942, at the Offices of Maritime Services Board, were attended by:

  Captain Livesay, R.A.N.

  Major Pulling, Victoria Barracks.

  Captain Ross, Victoria Barracks.

  B. Filewood, State Liaison Officer.

  T.C. Roughley, Superintendent of Fisheries.

  J. Bennett, Supervising Inspector of Fisheries.

  H.W. Atkins, Inspector of Fisheries.

  D.N. Peterson, Secretary, Scorched Earth Sub-Committee.

  Conferences of 10th and 13th April were attended by:

  Captain Livesay, R.A.N.

  Lt. Col. Perry, H.Q., V.D.C.

  Major Wilthew, S.O., V.D.C.

  Captain Heather, S.O., V.D.C.

  Captain Garbett, Command Headquarters.

  Captain Holman, Gll (Ops.) Base Headquarters.

  B. Filewood, State Liaison Officer.

  R.S. Westhorp, Maritime Services Board.

  T.C. Roughley, Superintendent of Fisheries.

  J. Bennett, Supervising Inspector of Fisheries.

  R.A. Frith, for Accountant, Fisheries Branch.

  D.W. Peterson, Secretary, Scorched Earth Sub-Committee.

  The operational proposals which follow derive from resolutions of these conferences.

  Watercraft Panel:

  The Conferences established as joint agency for Navy and Army, a Watercraft Panel of the Scorched Earth Sub-Committee of the N.S.W. State War Effort Co-Ordination Committee.

  The personnel of the Watercraft Panel was constituted as follows:

  (i) Maritime Services Board - Mr. R.S. Westhorp.

  (ii) Fisheries Branch, Chief Secretary’s Department - Mr. T. C. Roughley.

  (iii) V.D.C. Officer to be nominated:

  The Chairman of the Scorched Earth Sub-Committee (Mr. Swain) ipso facto became Chairman of the Panel.

  The functions of the Panel were to:

  (i) Organise Scorched Earth Support Squads for Watercraft, the nuclei of which would be officers of the Fisheries Branch, Chief Secretary’s Department, and of the Maritime Services Board.

  (ii) Develop codes for the control of immobilisation and denial.

  (iii) Prepare organising instructions.

  (iv) Generally to supervise the organisation.

  Subject always to the authority and powers under National Security Regulation 45D and to the authorisations necessary to be conveyed to it thereunder.

  Census and Classification of Watercraft:

  A census of watercraft has been undertaken by the Maritime Services Board, and a complete Register is being compiled.

  For the purposes of the operation, watercraft were divided into:

  (i) Non-essential (pleasure &c.) craft.

  (ii) Essential (commercial &c.) craft.

  There were approxim
ately 22,500 craft classified as non-essential. These were located as follows:-

  Hawkesbury and Pittwater 3,000

  Lake Macquarie. 1,800

  Brisbane Water. 750

  Port Stephens. 500

  George’s River 2,500

  Port Hacking. 1,300

  Lake Illawarra. 500

  Coastal Rivers. 4,150

  Port Jackson. 8,000

  Estimated Total. 22,500

  The estimated total value is over £3,000,000; or, excluding those exempted in Port Jackson, approximately £1,000,000.

  Immobilisation of Non-essential Craft:

  It was agreed that non-essential craft outside Port Jackson should be immobilised by removal to selected moorings upstream, craft under 16 feet to be beached above highwater mark; craft 16 feet and over to be moored.

  Essential parts, as specified, to be removed from engines which are not salvaged from immobilised craft.

  Funds were advanced by the Army for collecting, towing and mooring, using boatmen crews supervised by Fisheries Inspectors, Maritime Services Board officers, and by Captain Livesay, R.A.N., and Lieutenant Pearson, R.A.N.

  Record has been kept of the boats so immobilised, detailing owner’s name, type of boat &c. The boats have been marked accordingly.

  This record will be kept at each mooring depot but needs to be entered in the Maritime Services Board Watercraft Register - and copies of the record for each mooring are to be supplied to Maritime Services Board for this purpose.

  The Maritime Services Board will be the valuating authority through the Senior Shipwright Surveyor and staff, and in collaboration with the Fisheries Branch will value each craft at each mooring, recording its valuation against the particular craft in the Maritime Services Board Watercraft Register.

  No Insurance of Immobilised Craft:

  The immobilised craft are uninsurable against “Scorched Earth” if moored.

  Commonwealth Marine War Risks Insurance applies only to war risk; there is no authority to grant cover against destruction to prevent use by the enemy.

  Hurdles under construction for the defence of Fremantle’s beaches. On completion, they were tipped up and floated into position.

  War Damage Insurance covers “Scorched Earth”, but only if the vessels are beached above high water mark. For non-essential boats, owned as private chattels, insurance is voluntary. If the engines are removed, they can be insured against Scorched Earth.

  The Minister for the Navy has under consideration the extension of War Damage Insurance to meet the position.

  The N.S.W. Watercraft Conferences, after considerable discussion, points out that:

  (i) Voluntary insurance could probably not be availed of in the case of one-third of the owners now in the Fighting Forces.

  (ii) Compulsory insurance, after enforced mobilisation of craft over which owners now have no control, would arouse justifiable resentment.

  (iii) Insurance would cover only denial destruction and not natural deterioration

  (iv) It would be equitable to relieve owners of the cost of premiums as an offset against uncovered deterioration.

  The recommendation is that the Commonwealth assume entire liability for the immobilised craft; and that maintenance, salvaging, and guarding be undertaken by the Commonwealth, both to minimise its liability and to conserve a valuable civil asset as a national obligation.

  In the event of denial, the Commonwealth should assume the liability, without demand of premiums in this case.

  Loss and deterioration are inseparable from the operation. (At Berowra, where 1,100 boats were immobilised, abnormal floods destroyed nearly 300 of them).

  The Government obviously has a responsibility to return the craft to the owners in a condition approximating that in which they were taken over, or to compensate them for damage, undue deterioration or destruction.

  Maintenance and Salvage of Immobilised Craft:

  The work should cover all reasonable precautions to prevent foundering, and undue deterioration; and where thought advisable should include the removal of valuable engines to inland storage under Army control.

  Marine, petrol and diesel engines of small horse power are practically unprocurable on the market, and present indications are that this condition will obtain for some considerable time, possibly for the duration of the war.

  Half the value of the boat is in the engine, which will speedily deteriorate if left uncared for.

  For both reasons, salvage of engines is a national obligation.

  The Navy or the Naval Auxiliary Patrol will probably have need for some of these engines during the war. The latter is already finding difficulty in getting spare parts.

  It will be necessary to take power for such salvaging operations.

  It is estimated that, under normal conditions, an expenditure of about 15/- per boat per annum would provide the labour necessary for the maintenance of the pleasure boats now assembled at the various depots. (This excludes Port Jackson where the craft are of larger type and the cost would be somewhat higher).

  It is estimated, therefore, that £11,500 would be required in one year for labour and that a further sum of £3,500 would have to be found for necessary equipment, in particular pumping gear for use in bailing to prevent foundering and engine deterioration from seepage.

  Night watchmen would cost £3,500.

  Removal of the more valuable engines, about 200 in number, at £7 each, would cost £l,400.

  Summarised:

  Non-recurrent:

  Plant and Equipment.

  £3,500

  Removal and Storage of engines.

  £1,400 £4,900

  Annually recurrent:

  Maintenance labour.

  £11,500

  Night Watchmen.

  3,500 £15,000

  Total. £19,900

  It is pointed out that a recurrent expenditure as suggested would be amply repaid in view of the fact that the estimated value of the craft now immobilised is £1,000,000, and that all would be liable to total loss unless properly looked after. The total number of boats involved at present is about 14,500.

  Proposed V.D.C. Maintenance Squads:

  Conference agreed that whilst owners so desiring might be permitted access to their immobilised boats for purpose of maintenance (only) and subject always to the local supervision of the controlling authority or its agency, very few owners could avail themselves of the opportunity, since one-third were absent in the Fighting Forces, the average tow-distance had been 24 miles, and petrol was not available. In many cases also, access would be difficult.

  It recommended, therefore, the establishment of Maintenance Squads of skilled boatmen, of suitable physique, with preference to those whose living had been affected by the immobilisation, e.g. boatshed proprietors.

  These men wore to be offered enlistment in the V.D.C. for the especial purpose of watercraft maintenance. There would be at each depot at least one Corporal or other rank; affording appropriate pay equivalent to award rates.

  Report was to be obtained of the number of men required at each depot, and the possibility of locally enlisting the requisite number.

  The use of such V.D.C. Maintenance Squads would reduce the necessity for direct financial provision to £3,500 for plant and equipment, and reference to the Army for this provision becomes necessary.

  Report was called for also as to the number and types of engines of 10 H.P. and upwards warranting salvage.

  The V.D.C. Maintenance Squads would carry out maintenance and salvaging work as outlined in a code of instruction to be prepared and supervised by the Watercraft Panel, including:

  (i) Removal of the more valuable engines and accessories to inland stores (subject to grant of authority).

  (ii) Labelling all parts removed, giving adequate details for purposes of identification of ownership.

  (iii) Inventory of engines showing make, horsepower, and type (copies to go to Naval Stores Branch and Maritime Services
Board).

  Military Guards:

  It was agreed that the V.D.C. should take over all guard duties. Local V.D.C. commanders would be called upon to advise the varying number of guards required at each mooring depot.

  In the event of the V.D.C. being unable to provide guards at all depots, garrison battalion guards might have to be provided.

  There must be a clearly defined line between the guards and the Maintenance Squads. The duties of the guards would be laid down by the Army.

  Denial for immobilised boats:

  It was determined that the Army should have control of denial preparation and operation, using the V.D.C. Maintenance Squads for preparation, the Guards to combine with the Squads for the denial operation.

  Prior preparation was considered vital to effective last-moment denial. If preparation were complete, reinforcements would probably not be required.

  The local Military Commander would direct the denial, with prior arrangement of lines of communication from headquarters to the Sergeant in charge of the guard.

  Most of the craft now at moorings are in relatively shallow water, so that holing and sinking would not be effective.

  As nearly all of the craft are of wood, the most effective destructive method, whether they be beached or afloat, is firing. This has the one disadvantage of attracting enemy attention.

  Denial preparations should be made at once by having ready stocks of waste or wood shavings and a supply of oil, some axes should be available, and also a small supply of Molotov cocktails for mopping up. The Army will provide supplies.

  Boats not afloat - Fire with help of waste and oil.

  Boats afloat - These are in concentrations. A sufficient number will be filled with inflammable material to act as “fire-ships”, and will be evenly distributed throughout the concentration. The others will have smaller quantities of inflammable material placed on board. When all are fired, the “fire-ships” can be expected to provide such an intense conflagration as to ensure the effectiveness of the smaller fires.

  Scorched Earth crews should be trained in their duties so that the denial operation can be accomplished expeditiously and effectively.

 

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