Web Of Deceit: Britain's Real Foreign Policy

by Mark Curtis

  With reputed direct access to the Emir and the Prime Minister, opposition groups have accused Henderson of ‘masterminding a ruthless campaign of repression’.41

  Henderson’s CID and SSD ‘have for many years been responsible for gross human rights violations’, especially torture under interrogation, according to Amnesty International. Methods at the security service HQ apparently included pulling off fingernails, using dogs to attack prisoners and sexual assault. One prisoner said that ‘they trussed me up like a chicken for fifteen minutes. The take you and bend you double and handcuff you. They insert a wooden rod and they suspend you’.42

  A Channel 4 news story suggested that Henderson had been personally involved in torture sessions. One pro-democracy activist, Hashem Redha, said that Henderson ‘tortured me one time. He kicked me and shook me two times. He said “if you like to be hit, we can hit you more than that”’. Another torture victim now in exile claims that Henderson repeatedly visited him while he was a prisoner in the 1980s. He says of his tortures that:

  They hit me with cables all over my body. They put a rope on my legs and hung me, and put cloth in my mouth so I couldn’t cry out. A British man came in and advised me to cooperate. I thought that everything would stop because he was British. I told him they were torturing me, but he just sat and watched what they were doing. He ordered the torture.

  His torturers later told him the Briton was Henderson.43

  The Labour government has deliberately allowed Henderson to escape justice. Under a 1998 law, the government can arrest in Britain anyone involved in torture anywhere in the world. Henderson was allowed, however, to take a new year holiday at his home in Devon in December 1999. As Amnesty International has said:

  The UK government, under international law, has an obligation to conduct in inquiry into Henderson’s role in the use of torture in Bahrain. A superior who knew or who should have known subordinates were committing human rights violations and took no steps to ensure punishment of those responsible and stop the abuse, is criminally responsible. Also under international law torture is a crime against humanity when committed on a widespread or systematic basis.44

  Henderson has consistently denied that he had been involved in torture and told the Independent that the allegations were ‘laughable’ and that the charges against him were made up by opposition groups from Bahrain to attract media attention.45

  After a joint Independent/Channel 4 investigation, the then Home Secretary Jack Straw announced that an investigation had begun into Henderson by the Metropolitan Police, who were in receipt of papers alleging torture. At the time of writing, the investigation is pending. The history of Conservative and Labour governments’ acquiescence in repression presided over by Britons for nearly four decades provides little optimism that justice will really be sought.

  12

  THE FORGOTTEN PAST IN THE MIDDLE EAST

  The Political Resident has recommended that the three villages concerned … should be warned that unless they surrender the ringleaders of the revolt they will be destroyed one by one by bombing.

  Foreign Office memorandum on Oman, 1957

  WESTERN MILITARY INTERVENTION in the Middle East is the current subject of huge media coverage; but the relevant background is not. There is an extraordinary record of British military and covert intervention in the region that has been forgotten and consigned to the memory hole. This past puts into perspective the current government’s claims to be defending the highest principles in the region. The chances are that if this past were better known the public would simply fall about laughing when a British prime minister now invokes democracy, human rights and international law when speaking of British intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan.

  As noted in the previous chapter, Britain’s primary concern is to defend the autocratic rulers of the Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East against any external or internal opposition, however liberal or democratic, to ensure that pliant regimes are in charge. The major reason is to secure control over the region’s oil, which in turn helps ensure that the global economy functions under effective Western supervision.

  I came across a story at the Public Record Office (PRO) showing the extraordinary lengths to which British planners have been prepared to go to defend favoured regimes, to which I turn first.

  Kuwait – Defence of a regime

  The 1991 Gulf War against Iraq was not the first time Britain had conducted a military intervention in support of Kuwait; Britain also intervened in Kuwait thirty years before. Then, Britain was desperate to protect its oil business interests, and to solidify its relations with the Kuwaiti regime. The formerly secret files suggest that British planners engaged in a giant conspiracy – by deliberately fabricating an Iraqi threat to Kuwait to get the Kuwaiti regime to ‘ask’ Britain for ‘protection’.

  Business interests were extensive. Kuwait was then the world’s third most important oil-producing country, with around one quarter of the world’s known reserves. British Petroleum (BP) had a 50 per cent interest in the Kuwait Oil Company while Shell, in which the British government had a 40 per cent interest, had been granted a Kuwait concession in January 1961.

  Britain was also the largest state investor in Kuwaiti oil, which provided around 40 per cent of Britain’s oil supplies. Furthermore, Kuwait’s sterling reserves accounted for about one third of total British sterling reserves and by 1961 Kuwait had invested £300 million in British banks, providing a very significant lever over the British economy.1

  British planners recognised the ‘vital importance of Kuwait to our Middle East oil interests’ and ‘the advantages to this country, both in supplies and in the balance of payments, which flow from the operations of the British companies in an independent, affluent and friendly Kuwait and from Kuwait’s readiness to accept and hold sterling’.2

  Indeed, according to 1958 US documents, the UK’s ‘financial stability would be seriously threatened’ if Kuwaiti and Gulf oil were not available to Britain ‘on reasonable terms’, if Britain were ‘deprived of the large investments made by that area in the UK’ and if sterling were ‘deprived of the support provided by Persian Gulf oil’.3

  On 20 June 1961, Kuwait achieved nominal independence from Britain but with agreement that Britain would come to Kuwait’s defence if the latter requested it. That the Kuwaitis agreed to this defence commitment after independence was a success for the British government. A year earlier, under pressure from growing Arab nationalist sentiment throughout the Middle East, the Emir had indicated a desire to end completely British protection of Kuwait. During the independence negotiations, leading Kuwaiti figures had also supported ending British guarantees after independence.

  In fact, after the 1958 coup in Iraq – in which a repressive British-backed monarchical regime was overthrown by Arab nationalist forces – Britain ‘advised’ the Kuwaiti Emir to ‘request’ military assistance, but the ‘offer’ was rejected. With independence, therefore, Britain had secured a formal protection agreement but its real solidity was questionable.4

  British fears were expressed in secret files two months before independence:

  It is clear that, as the international personality of Kuwait grows, she will wish in various ways to show that she is no longer dependent upon us. But we must continue to use the opportunities which our protective role will afford to ensure so far as we can that Kuwait does not materially upset the existing financial arrangements or cease to be a good holder of sterling.5

  Events then proceeded as follows. On 25 June, five days after the announcement of Kuwait’s independence, Iraqi leader Abdul Karim Qasim publicly claimed Kuwait as part of Iraq. Five days after this, at 8 am on 30 June, the Emir, after receiving information that Iraq might invade Kuwait, formally requested British military intervention. At midday Britain acceded to the ‘request’ and on the morning of 1 July British forces landed, eventually numbering around 7,000.

  But the alleged Iraqi threat to Kuwait never materialised, as the
files show.

  On 26 June – one day after Iraq had claimed Kuwait – the Foreign Office noted that ‘Qasim’s decision appears to have been taken on the spur of the moment’ and ‘on present indicators it seems on the whole unlikely that Qasim will resort to military action’. The following day the British embassy in Washington reported that the US State Department viewed Qasim’s claim as a ‘postural move’ only – ‘They do not (repeat not) believe that he intends further action’. David Lees, the Commander of the British air force in the Middle East in 1961, later wrote that the British government ‘did not contemplate aggression by Iraq very seriously’.6

  On 28 June, the British embassy in Kuwait discounted ‘the possibility of an Iraqi engineered internal coup in Kuwait’. Equally, the consulate in Basra near the Kuwait border noted that ‘no (repeat no) reliable informant has seen or heard any unusual troop movements’.7

  But then, also on 28 June, Britain’s ambassador in Baghdad, who had not previously reported any unusual troop movements or war preparations, cabled London: ‘My most recent information reveals Qasim’s intentions to build up in Basra a striking force suitable for an attack on Kuwait.’8

  On 29 June the Foreign Office changed its tune. It noted that ‘there are now indications, still somewhat tenuous but pointing unmistakeably at preparations by Qasim to reinforce his troops near Basra with a tank regiment’. ‘The latest information shows Qasim to be making preparations which would enable him to make a very early military attack.’9

  The ambassador in Baghdad did not state the source of the ‘most recent information’. And how could the Foreign Office’s ‘indications, still somewhat tenuous’, point ‘unmistakeably’ to war preparations? The key is that the information purporting to indicate an Iraqi threat came exclusively from the British embassy in Baghdad. Its assessment was based on alleging the movement of a tank regiment from Baghdad to Basra, near the border with Kuwait. However, the PRO files also contain reports from the British consulate in Basra, which give a different assessment.

  Earlier on the same day that the Foreign Office reported the movement of this tank regiment, the consulate in Basra stated that ‘in the last 48 hours there have been no (repeat no) further clear indications of intended aggressive action’. Security patrols were normal and Iraqi civilian aircraft were continuing to fly to Kuwait. Furthermore, even on 1 July – that is, after the Kuwaiti request for intervention and the British decision to intervene – the Basra consulate reported that ‘evidence so far available in Basra area does not (repeat not) indicate that an attack on Kuwait has been under preparation’.10

  In fact, eleven days after the British intervention a Ministry of Defence report stated that it was ‘unlikely’ that any tanks had been moved to Basra between 29 June and 4 July. On the contrary, Qasim had ordered a reduction of military activities to a minimum, precisely to avoid any misinterpretation of Iraqi intentions.11

  Belief in an Iraqi threat might simply be put down to an intelligence failure, but this appears infeasible. At the time, RAF photo-reconnaissance squadrons based in Bahrain could provide detailed analysis of troop movements. British assessments of Iraqi troop movements in the Basra area had taken place on an almost regular basis before. Moreover, there is evidence that the instructions given to commanders leading the British intervention were not geared to responding to any real Iraqi aggression. Also, the size of Britain’s initial intervention force was unlikely to have been able to defend Kuwait from any Iraqi attack.12

  The evidence suggests that the Emir was simply duped into ‘requesting’ intervention by the British. His information on the supposed threat came almost exclusively from British sources. London was certainly eager to intervene. The Foreign Office noted on 29 June that ‘we are taking a number of preparatory measures to place ourselves at the highest state of readiness in case it becomes necessary for us to introduce forces, at the Ruler’s request, into Kuwait’. It also instructed the embassy in Kuwait to inform the Emir of preparations against an Iraqi attack and that ‘in order to enable our forces to move quickly enough if and when the danger appears imminent we need to have a formal request from the government of Kuwait’.13

  ‘The moment has come’ for the Emir to request our assistance, the Foreign Secretary stated. ‘We think the ruler should make this request forthwith’, the Foreign Office informed the Kuwait embassy. By the morning of 30 June, the Foreign Office declared that it needed the request ‘as soon as possible’. Finally, it was Lord Home who asked the Emir to make a formal request for British assistance.14

  Britain’s ‘political agent’ (i.e. ambassador) in the Gulf, John Richmond, was not impressed with London’s instruction that he ‘encourage’ the Emir to request assistance. He thought the intelligence reports were ‘too shallow and unclear’ and took no account of the fact that ‘the Iraqis might verbally threaten Kuwait but they will not invade’. Richmond was rebuked by his bosses in London and told to ‘keep quiet’, while the Foreign Office and MI6 thought that military action would ‘enhance Britain’s position in the region’.15

  Former Defence Secretary Denis Healey provides the official version of the intervention in his autobiography, saying simply that: ‘in 1961 our intervention in Kuwait had saved oil facilities vital to the West from falling into the hands of General Kassim, the half-crazed military dictator of Iraq – with no loss of life’.16

  In reality, the files strongly suggest that Britain knew there was no Iraqi threat but had already decided to move troops into the area. The threat was deliberately fabricated to achieve this end. Intervention could reassure friendly Middle Eastern regimes that were key to maintaining the British position in the world’s most important region. The Prime Minister’s foreign policy adviser said that letting go of Kuwait would mean that ‘the other oil sheikhdoms (which are getting richer) will not rely on us any longer’.17 Most important, the intervention reaffirmed the Kuwaiti regime’s reliance on British protection, preserving the close relationship vital to London due to its commercial interests in the country.

  Oman – supporting the depths of repression

  Britain’s closest ally in the Gulf has traditionally been Oman. In the war in Afghanistan, it provided crucial logistics and base facilities for British forces, which at the time had just been conducting military exercises with the Omani armed forces. British officers commanded the Omani military forces until the mid-1980s and there remains all kinds of close military cooperation. The current sheikh, Qaboos, owes his fortunes to the British, who installed him in a coup that overthrew his father in 1970.

  The recent history of British support for Omani elites is not at all widely known. But it throws further important light on how Britain has been prepared to support the most vile regimes if its interests are protected. Let us take two British interventions in Oman – one beginning in 1957, the other in 1964.

  In 1957, British forces were despatched to Oman to defend the extremely repressive Sultan’s regime, which had been in power with constant British backing since 1932. The Sultan had several thousand slaves, used as bodyguards, who were forbidden all contact with the native population. There was no pretence of any political openness and neither was there any economic development to speak of, except for the Sultan’s entourage. The main city did not even have a public electricity supply until 1971 when a small power station began to function. There were hardly any schools, while diseases were rampant, contributing to an extremely high number of child deaths.

  This regime was in effect run by the British. It was as closely controlled by Britain as any formal colony, with Britons serving as commanders of the armed forces, Secretaries for Financial Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Petroleum Affairs in the government, and Director of Intelligence. Britain was therefore responsible for the repression. The feudal justice system imprisoned opponents in barbaric conditions, subjecting prisoners to torture, starvation and inhumane treatment while British advisers stood by.

  Resources were in the correct hands. A Briti
sh bank had held a monopoly in Oman since 1948 and the management of Oman’s oil company – Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd (PDO) – was British, the managing director being probably the most powerful man in the country after the Sultan. PDO was managed by Shell, which had an 85 per cent interest in Omani oil. With almost all Oman’s income deriving from this source, ‘the oil revenues were paid into the Sultan’s account, and he in turn released a proportion to the exchequer’, Oman analyst John Townsend notes.18

  The British intervened to quell a revolt in the north of the country by the Omani Liberation Army, which was backed by an unusual alliance of King Saud of Saudi Arabia, US oil company Aramco and Egypt’s nationalist president Nasser. The SAS fought a covert guerilla war while the Royal Air Force engaged in systematic bombing and shelling of rebel villages and strongholds, attacks against the civilian population in the areas under rebel control, and the destruction of livestock and crops.

  At the beginning of the operations in 1957, Britain’s Political Resident in Bahrain recommended bombing in support of the Sultan ‘to show the population the power of weapons at our disposal’. This would help ‘to inflict the maximum inconvenience on the population so that out of discomfort and boredom they will turn against the rebel minority’. There would be no ground troops at this stage and the rebels would be ‘impotent against aircraft’; they could be bombed free of reprisal.19

  After the rebels had eventually been pushed back to three villages on the Jebel mountain the Foreign Office noted that ‘the Political Resident has recommended that the three villages concerned … should be warned that unless they surrender the ringleaders of the revolt they will be destroyed one by one by bombing’.20