The Politically Incorrect Guide to the British Empire

by H. W. Crocker, III

  Matters came to a boil with the breakup of the Federation and Britain’s granting of independence to Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia in 1964. Independent Malawi and Zambia (as these nations became) were considered perfectly respectable members of the British Commonwealth even though both fulfilled Ian Smith’s constant warning that in Africa one man, one vote meant one man, one vote, one time. Malawi immediately became a one-party totalitarian state looted for thirty years by its president-for-life Hastings Banda. Zambia became a one-party (de facto in 1968, de jure in 1972) socialist state and economic flop, governed by Kenneth Kaunda from independence until 1991. To Smith’s dismay, Rhodesia, with its multi-party elections, free press and free judiciary, and economic success was considered unworthy of independence because it did not immediately grant equal voting rights to all black Africans.

  Evolution or Revolution

  “British policy for Africa led to one man one vote—once. Thereafter dictatorship ensued, with the resultant chaos and denial of freedom and justice.... We referred to [the Rhodesian system] as ‘meritocracy’, and tragically we will never know whether it would have succeeded and proved the exception to the rule—evolution in preference to revolution.”

  Ian Smith, The Great Betrayal (Blake Publishing, 1997), p. 108

  Smith—who became the leader of a new party, the Rhodesian Front, in 1964—thought this was rank hypocrisy on the part of the British, who were more interested in appeasing liberal opinion than in doing what was right for the people in their African colonies. The British, in his view, ignored the practical problems—how to accurately register voters when most rural-born black Africans had no birth certificates—and the already clear evidence of the chaos, violence, dictatorship, and economic collapse of most post-colonial African states, an experience white Rhodesians did not want to see repeated in their own country. While seeing white Rhodesia as an outpost of Western civilization, Smith accepted that black Africans did things differently, and supported the tribal chiefs who were the traditional authorities in black African politics. Smith was derided by liberal opinion outside of Rhodesia for upholding the chiefs as a barrier against Communism—which only highlights the blithe ignorance of liberal opinion, for this is precisely what they were and why they were targeted by the Communist-backed nationalist insurgents.

  On 11 November 1965, Prime Minister Ian Smith announced Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), a decision endorsed unanimously by the largest Indaba (political gathering) of chiefs (622) in Rhodesian history, representing, in their headman roles, ninety percent of the black African population. The declaration was consciously modeled, in part, on America’s Declaration of Independence, though the United States government, with black civil rights controversies of its own, was in no position to accept a rebel white-dominated state in Africa—even an explicitly anti-Communist one that was willing to send troops to Vietnam.

  For all the liberal angst over the horrors of white rule in Rhodesia, the country itself was peaceful; Smith had no security detail (his official residence had no staff either); the crime rate, Smith was told, was one of the lowest in the world; and in absolute comparisons of the educational, medical, and other facilities2 available to the black population, black Africans in Rhodesia were far better off than their compatriots anywhere else in sub-Saharan Africa. Smith often said, “We have the happiest Africans in the world,” and while that might sound patronizing, it was an honestly held opinion confirmed by the black Africans he met in his normal rounds and by the statistics his government provided him.3

  The response of the British government, led by Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson, was a mixture of the peevish, the preposterous, and the perverse: refusing to pay the pensions of Britons living in Rhodesia (the Rhodesian government made good the shortfall); sending British RAF units to Zambia (before independence, the superlative Rhodesian armed forces had been integrated with the British military; relations between the forces were extremely fraternal; and the British planes relied on Rhodesian air traffic control, which covered the entire area); and, most important of all, supporting international economic sanctions against what economically was one of the few success stories in Africa. While the British government backed punitive actions (short of violence4) to bring Rhodesia to heel, it also pursued a course of negotiations with Smith to end the embarrassment (to liberal and Commonwealth opinion) of its white-led rebel colony. Smith, however, was not inclined to accept that British embarrassment was sufficient reason to put Rhodesia’s future as a prosperous, free society at risk.

  Blaming Colonialism

  “The failures resorted to the parrot cry that they were in their current predicament because they were exploited by the colonial powers. But Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Rhodesia had gone through the same history, and as a matter of interest, so did [the] USA and South Africa, and they are all glorious success stories. Those who have not made the grade must stop looking for a scapegoat, and look to themselves: their corruption, incompetence, nepotism, external bank accounts and high leisure preference.”

  Ian Smith, The Great Betrayal (Blake Publishing, 1997), p. 120

  In 1970, despite its loyalty to the old ideals of the British Empire, and hence the Crown, Rhodesia became a republic with a new constitution. That same year, a Conservative government was elected in Britain; and an agreement was reached in 1971 between the British and Rhodesian governments establishing a gradual path to majority rule. But the agreement fell to pieces when a British commission judged that black African opinion did not support it, though the head of the African National Council, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who had led opposition to the agreement, backtracked and announced, in 1973, that he now did indeed support it. That was too late for the British. The agreement was not resubmitted.

  In the meantime, in 1972, a decade’s worth of Communist-supported subversion had finally ignited what became the Rhodesian Bush War. The Rhodesian Army faced two main terrorist groups: the Soviet-inspired ZAPU (the Zimbabwean African People’s Union) led by Joshua Nkomo, whose military forces (ZIPRA, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army) operated mostly from bases in Zambia, and the Maoist ZANU (the Zimbabwean African National Union), which was eventually led by Robert Mugabe, whose military forces (ZANLA, the Zimbabwean National Liberation Army) were concentrated in Mozambique, where they were sheltered by Communist forces fighting the Portuguese government. The two terrorist groups also occasionally fought each other, and were divided on tribal lines. The Rhodesian army and air force were extremely effective at counterinsurgency, but with the collapse of Portuguese Africa to the Communists, and South Africa’s decision to try to appease its African neighbors by ending support for Rhodesia, Smith recognized that his country’s isolation had become perilous.

  Books the Anti-Colonialists Don’t Want You to Read

  Two by Peter Godwin: Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1996) and When a Crocodile Eats the Sun: A Memoir of Africa (Little, Brown & Co, 2006). Godwin is of liberal Rhodesian stock. (He even daydreamt of shooting Smith while guarding him as a member of the British South African Police, Rhodesia’s anti-terrorist police force.) But he is nonetheless an honest reporter and an excellent writer. He offers a compelling portrait of Rhodesia as it was and Zimbabwe as it is.

  Smith accepted the principle of majority rule and in 1978 reached an “internal settlement” with Bishop Muzorewa, Chief Chirau of Mashonaland, and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, the former (and more moderate) head of ZANU who had been displaced by Robert Mugabe. Smith argued that these leaders, who had agreed to negotiate with him, represented the views of roughly 85 percent of black Rhodesians. Smith had agreed to a universal franchise, and as a necessary prerequisite to negotiations on the “internal settlement” these black leaders had agreed to an independent judiciary and civil service, a bill of rights to protect property and pension rights in particular, and a military immune from political pressures. The black leaders wanted majority rule, and Smith wante
d to ensure that Rhodesia did not fall prey to the political disasters that were the African norm.

  In April 1979, Rhodesia became Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, and Bishop Abel Muzorewa was elected prime minister (Smith remained in government as a minister without portfolio), but the two major parties supporting terrorism, Nkomo’s ZAPU and Mugabe’s ZANU, boycotted the election and continued their war. Appallingly, neither Britain (in deference to the Commonwealth) nor the United Nations recognized the new democratically elected government; Rhodesia-Zimbabwe would have no international standing until the Communist-backed terrorists participated in an election.

  The British called all parties to negotiations conducted by Lord Carrington at Lancaster House in London. Muzorewa, Mugabe, and Nkomo agreed to a new constitution and new elections, with a British governor (Lord Soames) acting as interim leader of the country as it made its official transition from dependent colony (albeit in rebellion and enduring sanctions) to independent state. Smith attended the Lancaster House negotiations as part of Muzorewa’s delegation, and though he was cast as a lone dissenter, he was the one man who accurately predicted events: that the radical Robert Mugabe would win the election on the basis of intimidation and the fact that he came from the Shona, the tribe of 80 percent of black Rhodesians. Lord Carrington—and most everyone else—assumed that the somewhat more moderate Joshua Nkomo would win or that a coalition government of Nkomo, Muzorewa, and Smith (because of twenty seats reserved for white Rhodesians) would emerge. Smith recognized that Lord Carrington was unable to imagine how African politics actually worked, and he was disgusted at what he saw as British politicians’ appeasement of radical black nationalists who only despised them.

  A Neo-Colonialist Movie the Anti-Colonialists Don’t Want You to See

  The Wild Geese, 1979. A group of mercenaries—led by Richard

  Burton, Richard Harris, Roger Moore, and Hardy Kruger—blow holy hell out of the Cuban-trained army of an African dictatorship, rescue an imprisoned African leader, and escape to Rhodesia. Highly recommended. Based on the novel by Rhodesian Daniel Carney.

  Après Smith le Déluge

  In March 1980, Robert Mugabe became the leader of the new nation of Zimbabwe. The first man he consulted was Ian Smith. The black leader that all the other leaders had considered the most radical and dangerous had won, but he assured Smith that he had no intention of alienating the white Rhodesians who had given the country such a prosperous economy. Doctrinaire Marxism, he assured Smith, would not be the order of the day—and it wasn’t, at first. Mugabe’s public stance was one of conciliation, but the new Zimbabwean broadcast media churned out hours of pro-Communist propaganda. Then Mugabe himself began agitating for a one-party state and urged reprisals against whites who did not support him, threatening to imprison Smith. He also began a vicious war against the Ndebele (Nkomo’s tribe). Mugabe’s notorious North Korean-trained 5th Brigade ravaged Mata-beleland. As a Catholic priest told reporter Peter Godwin, “I have lived through the Second World War in Austria and I have seen the terrible things the Gestapo could do. But let me tell you something, the Gestapo couldn’t teach these Fifth Brigade fellows a damn thing!”5

  The justice system became increasingly corrupted by the Mugabe government; political intimidation and repression became the norm; the economy was pillaged in socialist style and with socialist results; and white farmers were driven from their land by Mugabe-supported mobs. The breadbasket of central Africa became an economic basket case. Smith watched all this with sorrow. He remained a member of Parliament until 1987. Even in his retirement he was often threatened by the Mugabe regime, but he retained too much popularity—especially among black Zimbabweans opposed to the government—for Mugabe to take the political risk of imprisoning him or forcing him into exile. Smith lived to see all his worst predictions come true; had he been able to read his obituaries he would have seen that liberal opinion blamed him for being right.

  Part VI

  MIDDLE AND NEAR EAST

  Chapter 19

  THE LOVE OF DESOLATE PLACES

  In the beginning it was all about India. It was India that made the acquisition of Aden on the Persian Gulf necessary in 1838. It was India that made Egypt and the Suez Canal vital British interests; by the end of the nineteenth century, three out of every four ships through the Canal were on the passage to or from India. British India administered Aden and Mesopotamia, and conducted its own Arabian policy. But there was something else, too. Britons became explorers of Arabia—attracted either by its dangers and religious mysteries (Sir Richard Francis Burton) or by the English love for desolate places (Charles Doughty).

  Within imperial circles there was an entire class of English Arabists who made their careers in the desert and might better be called Anglo-Arabs. As was usual with British imperialists, they favored the “martial races,” in this case, the Bedouin tribesman, who with his “patrician style,” “picturesque appearance,” and love of war (British officers lifted it above a love of booty), “seemed almost a kind of Englishman himself, translated into another idiom.”1 The Bedouins lacked British discipline, but theirs was a proper, conservative, hierarchical society that an Englishman could appreciate. City Arabs, the oily commercial classes, the jabbering nationalists, the vast Egyptian mob—these the Englishman often disdained. But the desert warrior was a worthy ally, and to some English women, a romantic foil.2

  * * *

  Did you know?

  The shortest war in history was fought by the British against the Arab sultan of Zanzibar

  Modern Israel is a creation of the British Empire

  Anti-imperialist dogma put Eisenhower on the side of the Soviet Union and the anti-American Egyptian dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser against the British during the 1956 Suez Crisis

  * * *

  Passport to Suez

  Britain’s first foreign policy goal in Egypt was evicting the French. Napoleon entered the annals of Egypt’s conquerors in 1798 and marched his armies up through Syria, posing as the liberator—as the British later would—of Egyptians and Arabs from Ottoman tyranny. But after Lord Nelson’s smashing naval victory at the Battle of the Nile in 1799 and a resulting Anglo-Ottoman land campaign, Napoleon’s conquests were rolled back in 1801.

  More important was the British-French entanglement over the Suez Canal. The British had built a railway from Alexandria to Suez in the 1850s, but were skeptical of and hostile to the French Suez Canal Company (even fomenting a Bedouin-led revolt against the company’s use of forced labor). But once the Canal was opened in 1869, British ships, eventually more than any others, made use of it. When the Egyptian khedive had to sell his shares to pay off debts in 1875, British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli tapped his friend Lionel de Rothschild for a loan, and Britain became a major shareholder in the Canal, leading to joint British-French control.

  Imperial High Finance

  When Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli needed an immediate grant to buy the khedive’s canal shares, he sent his private secretary Montagu Corry to find Lionel de Rothschild. As Andre Maurois recounts, Corry found Rothschild dining and “told him that Disraeli needed four millions on the following day.

  “Rothschild was eating grapes. He took one, spat out the skin, and said: ‘What is your security?’

  “‘The British government.’

  “‘You shall have it.’”

  As told in Andre Maurois, Disraeli: A Picture of the Victorian Age (The Modern Library, 1955), p. 296

  Disraeli’s financial coup was a boon for the national interest, but it was also—as Disraeli’s Liberal opponent William Gladstone recognized and bemoaned—a looming imperial obligation. It came due on Gladstone’s prime ministerial watch. In 1881, Colonel Ahmed Arabi led a nationalist rebellion against the khedive, who ruled Egypt on behalf of the decrepit Ottoman Empire. For the better part of a century the British had defended the Ottoman Empire as a barrier to Russian expansion (and fought the Crimean War of 1853 to 1856 at the Turks’ side against the Ru
ssians). Gladstone, however, was never a friend of the Turks—seeing them as oppressors, if not slaughterers, of Eastern Christians—and Arabi’s platform was attractive to a liberal frame of mind: not only nationalist, but appealing to British ideals of free government.

  How to Be Posh

  It is often said that “posh” comes from “port out, starboard home”—the preferred shady side of a ship traveling to and from India. Killjoys say there is no evidence to support this explanation, but they have yet to come up with a better one.

  That was all very well, but when Arabi seized power it seemed as though the European population of Egypt—and Anglo-French management of the Canal and of Egyptian finances (to protect European holders of Egyptian debt)—might be at risk. A joint Anglo-French naval task force was sent to intimidate Arabi. The French arrived; mobs rioted; Egyptian batteries took aim at the flotilla; and the French turned tail. The British, however, knew what to do. They bombarded Alexandria (11 July 1882) and then, in September, landed an army under Sir Garnet Wolseley, who knocked Arabi and his rebellion into the desert wastes in what military historian Byron Farwell deemed “the most brilliantly devised and executed campaign of the century,” 3 the highlight of which was the Battle of Tel el-Kebir (13 September 1882). The British restored the khedive, exiled Arabi to Ceylon, and took as their responsibility the military protection and financial management of Egypt.