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America at War: Concise Histories of U.S. Military Conflicts From Lexingtonto Afghanistan

Page 13

by Terence T. Finn


  Such was the disagreement that when General Linares did give up, Shafter chose not to invite Sampson to the surrender ceremony. Their dispute was a failure in command. Neither man rose to the occasion, although the ultimate blame rests with President McKinley. He chose not to appoint an overall commander. Franklin Roosevelt would make the same mistake in 1942.

  Santiago surrendered on July 17, but only after much discussion that entailed proposals and counterproposals. When Linares did capitulate, he turned over not only the troops in Santiago, but also the soldiers in all of eastern Cuba, some 22,700 men. In essence, the fighting on the island was over.

  Five days before the surrender, eight thousand American soldiers and tons of supplies arrived in Cuba. The troops were under the command of Major General Nelson A. Miles. He was the U.S. Army’s senior officer, its commanding general. Miles participated in the negotiations with Linares, but he wished to lead troops in combat. He got his wish when the president approved his plans for the invasion of Puerto Rico. The landings began on July 25 and eventually involved eighteen thousand soldiers. There were several battles, all on the small scale, and all in which Miles and his men acquitted themselves well. The entire island would have been taken by force had the war with Spain not come to a halt.

  This came about diplomatically. Spain authorized the French ambassador in Washington to strike a deal with the Americans. The government in Madrid had had enough: Spain’s warships had been destroyed and a Spanish army had been beaten. It was time to stop the killing. The ambassador secured an agreement to what is known as a protocol. Dated August 12, 1898, it set forth the basic terms for ending the conflict. Immediately, there would be an armistice. Cuba would become free and independent. Spain would cede Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States. (Guam had been captured on June 21 by sailors and marines of the cruiser Charleston as the ship escorted army transports to Manila.) American troops would occupy Manila while the disposition of the Philippines would be resolved in the course of negotiating a formal treaty of peace.

  The treaty was to be negotiated in Paris. Discussions began in the French capital in October and concluded on December 10. Tenets of the August 12 protocol were formalized in the treaty. Spain granted independence to Cuba and ceded Guam and Puerto Rico to the United States. Interestingly, Article X of the treaty stated that the inhabitants of the territories relinquished by Spain were to enjoy “the free exercise of their religion.”

  The treaty also called for the repatriation of Spanish troops and their families in Cuba, at the expense of the U.S. government. America honored the obligation. Aboard sixteen chartered vessels 22,864 men, women, and children were sent home to Spain, at a reported cost of $513,860.

  In Cuba, once the Spanish no longer were in control, the Americans worked hard to improve conditions for both Cubans and the U.S. soldiers on the island. Roads were built, hospitals established. A major effort was made to improve sanitation, which, under previous rulers, had been neglected. Hunger was also addressed. Among the first ships to arrive once the blockade was lifted was a vessel belonging to the American Red Cross. Aboard was the organization’s founder, Clara Barton, with a great deal of food that was given to Cuban civilians.

  Though no longer short of food, Shafter’s troops were not in good condition. Disease had struck V Corps and its commander pleaded with the secretary of war to order the soldiers home. In total, disease in Cuba killed 514 servicemen. The troops were transported to a hastily built camp at Montauk Point on Long Island. Once there, 257 additional men died of disease. As in the war with Mexico, enemy gunfire accounted for fewer deaths than disease.

  According to a report of the U.S. Army’s adjutant general, 345 soldiers were killed in action during the fighting with Spain. Yet 2,565 more died of disease, either in the United States or overseas. The then limitations of medical knowledge plus surprisingly unsanitary conditions in army camps caused the high loss of life. In addition to the war resulting in the deaths of 2,910 Americans, it saw 1,577 men wounded. Total U.S. casualties in the brief conflict numbered 4,487.

  Of these 4,487 only a few, 123, occurred in the Philippines. The reasons for such a low number there are twofold. First, except for Dewey’s naval battle, little fighting took place in the Philippines, at least initially. Second, the long sea voyage to and from the United States itself was beneficial to the health of the soldiers in transit.

  Once Commodore Dewey had defeated the Spanish squadron in Manila Bay, he informed the secretary of the navy in Washington that he had too few sailors to take control of the capital city. The secretary of the navy so informed the secretary of the army who, with the approval of President McKinley, promptly sent 10,850 troops to the Philippines. Commanded by Major General Wesley Merritt, these soldiers soon convinced the Spaniards to haul down the flag.

  Thus the future of Manila and the entire Philippine Archipelago were on the agenda in Paris once the negotiations between Spain and the United States began. Ultimately, President McKinley had to decide—or at least approve—the disposition of the city and the islands. He chose annexation. Agreeing to accept $20 million, Spain in turn transferred control of all of the Philippines to the United States.

  Most Americans were pleased by their new acquisition (although most of them probably could not identify its precise location). Not so pleased were the thirteen thousand Filipinos who had been in revolt against the Spanish. They had been excluded from participating in the capture of Manila and, once the Americans had occupied the city, had been told to stay out. To them, the Treaty of Paris simply replaced one set of imperial rulers with another.

  However, in administering the Philippines, the Americans were far different than the Spanish. The Americans strengthened native municipal governments. They established schools and reformed both the legal system and the tax code. They improved the Filipino police force and established the Philippine Scouts as an effective partner of the U.S. Army. As important, the Americans brought with them economic prosperity. The result of all this was to make American rule more than acceptable to many Filipinos, though not to all.

  Reinforcing this U.S. commitment to the Philippines was an increase in the number of American soldiers stationed there. As tension between the insurgents and U.S. troops grew, Merritt called for additional men. These soon arrived. When, in February 1899, war broke out between the insurgents and the U.S. army of occupation, the Americans were not outnumbered. Indeed, as this new war progressed—and it was a war—even more soldiers were sent. By the fall of 1899, the United States had 17,300 troops on the islands. By December of the next year that number had risen to 69,420.

  In battle against the insurgents the U.S. Army did well. They did so well that as a conventional fighting force, the Filipino Army of Liberation dissolved, becoming a guerilla force. Over time, however, it inflicted nearly 4,000 casualties on the Americans, of whom 1,004 were killed. But, once again, disease was a more powerful force. Cholera, typhus, smallpox, malaria, and typhoid fever caused more American deaths than did combat. The War Department later reported that 2,748 men died of disease in the Philippines.

  The number of Filipinos killed is uncertain, although casualties far exceeded those of the Americans. Some of those killed or wounded had been subjected to torture, which in the guerilla war made an appearance on both sides.

  The last year of the war—President Theodore Roosevelt declared it over in July 1902—saw mostly small-scale actions. Patrols were ambushed, villages overrun, and supply lines attacked. Ten to thirty soldiers might be involved in a firefight. This stage of the conflict was not unlike a later war, in Vietnam, though the outcome was far different. U.S. successes in battle and more peaceful American endeavors in governing the islands caused the insurrection to fade away.

  Many of the rebellious Filipinos simply gave up. Many of those then aided the Americans, as did many who were captured. Perhaps the most daring event of the war was the capture of Emilio Aguina
ldo, the leader of the insurgents. He was hiding out in the mountains of Luzon. When the Americans learned of his whereabouts, they hatched an audacious plan. Colonel Frederick Funston and several other officers posed as prisoners of Filipino soldiers allied with the Americans, who themselves were disguised as insurgents. They trekked to Aguinaldo’s mountain hideout and surprised the Filipino commander. According to David J. Sibley, one of but a few American historians of the war, the plan was “beyond daring. It was suicidal.” But it worked. Surprise was complete and Aguinaldo was taken prisoner. The capture took place on March 23, 1901. It was Aguinaldo’s birthday. Yet he was to have the last laugh, or more important, realize his dream of Philippine independence. In 1946, when the United States relinquished its claim to the archipelago, Aguinaldo, by then a very old man, was present at the ceremony.

  Might Spain, in 1898, have defeated the United States?

  The United States quickly and decisively defeated the army and navy of Spain. Could the outcome have been different? Could Spain have won?

  It seems unlikely. Her navy was no match for America’s. The U.S. ships were modern warships, well armed and well crewed. Spanish vessels were the opposite. Control of the sea was certain to fall to the Americans. This meant that the U.S. invasions of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines were not to be contested at sea. Only on land might the Spaniards have successfully confronted the invaders. Their best hope of victory was to have prevented the landings at Daiquiri and Siboney. When they failed to do so, the outcome no longer was in doubt. The American army, despite inadequacies, was not lacking in numbers or courage. Once ashore, it was intent on winning. And so it did. The Spanish might have fought on beyond the August 12 armistice, but the end result would have been the same.

  Might the second war, the war in the Philippines, have been avoided?

  Once Major General Wesley Merritt and his men took control of Manila, the future of the Philippines became an issue. Who was to govern the archipelago? When the United States decided on annexation, thereby becoming a colonial power, it not only had to put in place a civil administration, it also had to deal with thirteen thousand armed native insurgents who, naturally enough, were suspicious of American intentions. Given that the United States was not going to leave or prematurely grant independence to the island inhabitants, these insurgents were bound to resist, as they had done with the Spanish. War was inevitable. What is remarkable is not that armed conflict broke out, but that the Filipinos did so poorly. The U.S. Army fought well, and triumphed. In this little war—about which most Americans know little—the United States relatively easily subdued those who challenged its control.

  Who was responsible for the loss of the Maine?

  On January 25, 1898, the United States battleship Maine dropped anchor in the harbor of Havana. The ship was there to protect American interests and to remind the Spanish of America’s military might. Twenty days later, the warship blew up. The ship was a total loss. Of a 358-man crew, 253 men were killed. Americans everywhere were outraged, pointing the finger at Spain. “Remember the Maine!” became a battle cry as the United States went to war.

  The U.S. Navy immediately convened a court of inquiry to investigate the loss of the ship. Late in March 1898, it concluded that the Maine had been destroyed due to an explosion in an ammunition bunker. The cause of the explosion, the court reported, was a submerged mine situated near the bottom of the vessel. Who placed the device close to the ship was not addressed.

  Spain denied it had done so. Certainly, blowing up the Maine was not in the best interests of the Spanish. The ship’s destruction brought war with the United States much closer, a war—as we’ve seen—that Spain was unlikely to win.

  The one group to benefit from the destruction of the American warship was the Cuban insurgents. To rid the island of the Spanish required the intervention of the United States. What better way to achieve this than to do something guaranteed to inflame the American public. No Cuban, then or later, has said they planted the mine. But if the Spanish did not, who did? Assuming the Cuban insurgents were responsible is not a far-fetched proposition.

  However, it may be that a submerged mine did not cause the explosion.

  As with other warships of the day, the Maine was powered by steam generated by the burning of coal. Hence ships carried large quantities of the black fuel. The coal was stored in bunkers, compartments well below the main deck. On occasion, small fires spontaneously broke out in the coal bunkers. These would be detected and extinguished. What if, as many now believe, a fire had started in one of the battleship’s coal bunkers and, undetected, had spread to where the ammunition was stored? The result would have been a very destructive explosion. It is therefore quite possible that a small, onboard coal fire and not a mine brought about the loss of the battleship.

  In truth, we simply do not know with certainty what caused the explosion that doomed the Maine. It may have been a mine set in place by the Spanish, or by the Cubans. Or it may have been a fire in one of the ship’s coal bunkers.

  Why, for Americans, is the War with Spain worth recalling?

  The war itself was brief and won with relatively few casualties. True, men did die and the casualties of the two conflicts are not inconsequential. But the numbers are small and the sacrifice seems long forgotten. Yet the victories of 1898 and of 1902 had important consequences for the United States. Puerto Rico became an American responsibility (and is now a self-governing commonwealth associated with the United States). Guam and Wake, two islands in the Pacific, became American territories. But most important, the United States took control of the Philippines. This meant that America had to govern the archipelago, which, in the event, it did quite well. It also meant that the United States assumed responsibility for the defense of the islands. This required a navy, a rather large navy. With the Philippines as an American outpost, the United States was forced to become a Pacific power. No longer would the president and the military tilt toward Europe and Latin America. Now they would look west as well.

  6

  WORLD WAR I

  1914–1918

  In June 1914, a single act of political murder in Bosnia set in motion a sequence of events that resulted in a war in Europe, a war that soon reached far distant parts of the globe. The impact of this conflict would be devastating to both individuals and nations. More than eight million soldiers would lose their lives. They would die in mud, in the desert, on snow-covered mountains, and at sea. They even would die in the air. In France, 630,000 women would become widows. In Belgium, Serbia, Turkey, and elsewhere innocent civilians, including women and children, would perish, many of them simply executed. Countries too would die, and maps would need to be redrawn. The Austrian-Hungarian Empire of the Hapsburgs would disappear. The German Imperial State would collapse and its kaiser would move to Holland, emperor no longer. The Ottoman Empire, ruler of what is now Turkey and much of the Middle East, would share the fate of the Hapsburgs and cease to exist. The tsar and Romanov rule in Russia would come to a violent end, replaced by the Bolsheviks. America, late to the war, would emerge relatively unscathed, in better shape than all the nations that earlier had sent their young men to fight and die.

  The conflict of 1914–1918 was to be a milestone in human history. Nothing like it had ever occurred. Those who lived through it called it the Great War. Today, less aware of its impact, we refer to it simply as World War I.

  ***

  Archduke Franz Ferdinand was the heir to the throne of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. This was an empire that had seen better days. Comprised of many different nationalities—its subjects spoke twelve different languages—the Austrian-Hungarian state in 1914 was a ramshackle affair, conservative to the core, with an army that was large but not terribly effective. On June 28, their wedding anniversary, Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie were in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, which, though part of the empire, contained many Serbs. To the south and adjacent
to Bosnia was Serbia, an independent nation many of whose people, then, as now, were prone to violence. The Serbs detested the empire of Austria-Hungary, whose rulers reciprocated the feeling.

  Thus, no one was surprised when with the complicity of Serbia, a young Bosnian radical shot and killed the archduke and his wife. Correctly blaming Serbia, the empire, with Germany’s approval, declared war on its southern neighbor. That upset Russia, which, because of race and religion, considered itself the protector of Serbia. Russia mobilized its armed forces. That in turn alarmed Germany, which saw Russia and its vast number of men eligible for military service as a direct threat to its security. Germany then put its armed forces on notice, which in turn made the French extremely nervous. Forty years earlier, France had been invaded by Germany and, defeated in battle, had ceded to the victor the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. These the French considered theirs, and they hoped someday to regain them. When the German army mobilized, France naturally enough brought its own military to full alert.

  In 1914 most military experts believed that in any war the army that attacked first would win. Armies that found themselves on the defensive, these experts predicted, likely would lose. Once mobilization had been ordered, most generals, and certainly those of the kaiser, believed the war in effect had begun. Once Russia had ordered its army to get ready, German generals considered their country at war.

  Though formally at peace with one another, the nations comprising Europe in 1914 were highly distrustful of those countries they viewed as adversaries. Competing desires for empire, rivalry in trade and industry, different political traditions and forms of government, as well as armies and navies that planned for war all made Europe a tinderbox ready to explode. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand provided the spark. True, diplomacy could have doused the flame, but it didn’t. The result was that in August 1914, the world went to war, and the killing began.

 

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