America at War: Concise Histories of U.S. Military Conflicts From Lexingtonto Afghanistan

by Terence T. Finn

  Many senior Japanese commanders realized that the United States was economically much stronger than Japan. They believed, however, that Americans possessed little physical and spiritual toughness. If the Imperial Japanese Navy could destroy the Americans’ Pacific Fleet either at Pearl Harbor or in a subsequent battle at sea, the demoralized Americans, lacking the fiber of the samurai, would acquiesce to Japan’s territorial conquests. Rarely have the leaders of a country so miscalculated.

  Was it likely that Japan would defeat the United States?

  Not really. Japan might win occasional battles, which it did, but the island nation simply did not have the resources necessary to emerge victorious in a full-scale war with the United States. Neither in manufacturing nor in manpower could the empire match the capability of America. By mid-1944, American ships and aircraft were overwhelming their Japanese counterparts. What Japan did have, from the beginning of the conflict to its end, was determination and courage. But as long as the United States was willing to fight a long and costly war, Japan had little hope of winning. After the debacle at Pearl Harbor, the American people were willing to endure the hardship of war to see victory realized.

  Did America’s insistence on unconditional surrender prolong the conflict?

  Yes, it did. In Europe, America’s goal was not simply to defeat the German armed forces. It was the elimination of the Nazi regime. To be sure, such insistence stiffened Germany’s resistance. Had there been a willingness to strike a deal with Hitler, the fighting probably would have ended sooner and, consequently, with fewer casualties. But the war in Europe was not just a battle over national boundaries and political influence. It was a crusade, a campaign to rid the world of an evil that had infected continental Europe. In both 1940 and 1945, Germany would have been happy to negotiate a settlement that ended the fighting in the west, thus enabling the Germans to concentrate on their most hated enemy, the Soviets. Churchill and Roosevelt would have none of it. Their goal was to crush the Third Reich. Given what the Nazis had done and what they represented, this was entirely appropriate. If that meant additional lives lost, so be it.

  Similarly with the Japanese. After December 7, 1941, America’s goal was the unconditional surrender of Japan. Leaders in Tokyo—generals, admirals, and civilians—had embarked on a path of military conquest. In so doing, they had caused thousands and thousands to die. The United States went to war determined to eradicate those responsible. The goal was not a negotiated settlement that allowed those in power to remain. It was victory, total and clear-cut. As with Germany, this had the effect of making Japan fight harder. But in the Pacific as in Europe, the Second World War was a fight to the finish.

  Why did the Allies, principally Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, defeat Germany in the Second World War?

  The Allies triumphed for several reasons: (1) America’s “arsenal of democracy” produced first-rate weapons of war in quantities Nazi Germany could neither match nor imagine; (2) the British intelligence services were superb; (3) the extraordinary talents of scientists in both the United States and Britain led to technologies that made a difference on the battlefield; (4) Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, unlike Adolf Hitler, provided political leadership of the highest caliber; (5) Allied military commanders were a talented lot; (6) the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Army Air Forces were superior to the much vaunted Luftwaffe, which, from the vantage point of history, turns out to have been woefully inadequate; and (7) British, Soviet, and American soldiers—the Tommy, Ivan, and the GI—proved equal to the dangerous and difficult assignments they were given.

  There is an additional reason why the Allies were victorious, one perhaps more important than those mentioned above. In 1940, the Nazis had the resources to combat Britain and France and, with better leadership, could have challenged the United States. What they could not do was to fight all three nations and, at the same time, take on the USSR. By attacking Stalin’s Russia in June 1941, Hitler committed Germany to a struggle it could not win, especially given the willingness of the Soviet Union to endure casualties in numbers unacceptable to the people of Britain and the United States. When the Russians threw back the Germans at Stalingrad during the winter of 1942–1943 and later defeated the Nazis at Kursk in July 1943, in the largest tank battle ever fought, Herr Hitler and his Third Reich were doomed.

  How many American soldiers and sailors lost their lives in World War Two?

  U.S. military deaths during the Second World War numbered slightly more than 405,000. This is a small number (though no less regrettable) relative to the losses other nations sustained, as revealed in the following list. Losses shown cover military deaths only. Note the death toll for the Soviet Union.

  France—250,000

  Britain—240,000

  Poland—600,000

  Germany—3,250,000

  Italy—380,000

  Yugoslavia—300,000

  China—3,500,000

  Japan—1,700,000

  Soviet Union—8,700,000

  One notable feature of the Second World War was the large number of civilians killed. The years of conflict, 1939–1945, saw blood flow like rivers, a deluge from which noncombatants were not spared. Often civilian deaths were the result of bombardment. At other times, civilians were trapped in firefights between opposing ground forces. Sometimes, most often on the Eastern Front, they were simply murdered. In the nations listed above more than 37,000,000 civilians did not survive the ordeal of World War Two. Of this number 16,900,000 were inhabitants of the Soviet Union.

  Was it necessary for the United States to employ atomic bombs against Japan?

  By August 1945, Japan had been defeated. There was no way in which the island nation could have won the war. But Japan had not surrendered, nor did it seem inclined to do so. Her military leaders looked forward to an American invasion, for they intended to make the invaders pay such a price in blood that the American people would demand a negotiated end to the conflict.

  Admiral Nimitz thought an invasion was unnecessary. So did Curtis LeMay. The former believed U.S. submarines would deprive Japan of food and other essentials, thus causing the country to collapse. LeMay thought his B-29s would so pound the Japanese that the nation would cease to function. Both men probably were correct. If American submarines were to have continued to sink Japanese vessels, if the B-29s were to have mounted raid after raid, Japan would have been beaten into submission. But both endeavors would have required time. Most likely, the fighting would have continued into November or December, and even then the Japanese might not have given up. They were fanatical in the extreme, and with at least six hundred thousand soldiers in the Home Islands and five thousand kamikaze aircraft at the ready, they still might have dared the Americans to attempt an invasion.

  General MacArthur thought the landings were necessary. Air and sea power had not negated the need for army-led invasions of Europe, so he reasoned the same would be true for Japan. Only the seizure of the Home Islands by troops on the ground, declared the general, would secure the victory required.

  What the atomic explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki achieved were an early end to the war. The two bombs shocked the Japanese as no other action might have, including the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan. The bombs brought about the immediate surrender of Japan, and they did so before the Japanese people either were starved to death by American submarines or burned to death by LeMay’s B-29s. Moreover, they made certain that no invasion of Japan took place.

  Lives were saved by the two bombs. Fewer people died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki than would have been killed in the four to six months the war would have continued were atomic weapons not utilized. Not only would people have died in the Home Islands. They would have died in Manchuria, where the Russians and Japanese had begun combat operations. In Burma too they would have died, where British troops were fighting the Japanese. In Malaya as wel
l, where British and Indian soldiers were preparing an invasion, many, many people would have died. In China, were the struggle to have continued, the loss of life would have been enormous. The lives lost at Hiroshima and Nagasaki totaled approximately 140,000. It is more than likely that a greater number would have perished were the war not to have ended when it did.

  In addition to bringing the Second World War to a close, the dropping of two atomic bombs on cities in Japan conveyed a powerful message to future generations. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no one could have any doubt about what atomic warfare would bring. Ever since, that awareness has tempered the actions of national leaders as they contemplate dealing with their countries’ enemies. It has funneled strife away from a kind of warfare that, because of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no longer is unimaginable.

  8

  KOREA

  1950–1953

  The Korean War was fought for three years, one month, and two days, from June 25, 1950, to July 27, 1953. Losses in the conflict were high. American dead numbered 36,616. Nearly twice that number were wounded. More than 5,000 Americans were declared missing. Korean losses were much higher. At least 1 million people died. Loss of life among the Chinese also was substantial, though difficult to estimate precisely.

  How the war began can be traced to the defeat of Japan in 1945. Throughout its history the island nation had coveted its neighbor, finally annexing Korea as a colony in 1910. With the end of World War II the peninsula was divided arbitrarily along the 38th Parallel. To the north lay the Communist regime of Kim Il Sung, a totalitarian state established and supported by the Soviet Union. This Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was a disciplined, efficient society in which devotion to the nation and its leader outranked individual choice. To the south lay the Republic of Korea (RoK), a country recognized by the United Nations and led by Syngman Rhee, a fiery Korean nationalist educated in the United States. America backed Rhee’s regime as a bulwark against Communism, hoping that he might eventually improve the economic conditions of a people still suffering from years of harsh Japanese occupation.

  Kim Il Sung was ruthless, cruel, and ambitious. Syngman Rhee was corrupt, devious, and intolerant. Both men saw themselves as the legitimate ruler of the entire Korean peninsula. Each was intent on destroying the other.

  Kim Il Sung struck first. Early on Sunday morning, June 25, 1950, after a thunderous barrage of artillery, the North Korean army—some ninety thousand troops—crossed the border. Kim’s goal was a quick victory before assistance to Rhee could be rendered. A worker’s paradise would be imposed on a largely agrarian south. Well trained and well equipped, especially with Russian T-34 tanks, the North Koreans overwhelmed their outnumbered RoK counterparts, who, in most instances, fought poorly. What began as an assault soon became a rout. Seoul, South Korea’s capital, was captured in three days. Rhee’s army lacked competent generals. It also lacked heavy artillery and tanks, purposely so, for the United States feared that a well-armed Syngman Rhee would start World War III by attacking Stalin’s puppet regime in the north. To the contrary, as the North Koreans pushed farther south, Kim’s goal seemed within reach.

  By June 27, the Americans in Seoul had been evacuated. Most left by ship via Inchon, a port city just south of the capital, on the western coast of Korea. They sailed to Japan, from where U.S. Air Force planes soon flew missions in support of the disintegrating South Korean army. Leaders in Washington saw the North Korean attack as an assault on Western democracy orchestrated by the Soviet Union. The object, they believed, was either to test American resolve or to stretch American military resources, thereby making conquest in Europe much easier. So, as President Harry S. Truman was reviewing options, consideration was given to nuclear strikes on Soviet air bases in the northeast, where the border of Korea met that of Russia. The president chose a less drastic approach. He ordered U.S. ground troops into Korea.

  Truman’s decision was made easier by a United Nations resolution authorizing member states to provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. This passed the same day the Americans left Seoul and was made possible by the absence of the Soviet Union in the Security Council. Stalin’s regime was protesting the exclusion of the Chinese Communists from the U.N. Most Americans supported the presidential decision. Those that did saw the need to confront Communism when challenged. Those that did not thought that Korea simply did not matter. After all, had not Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a speech on January 12, 1950, excluded Korea from areas vital to American interests?

  The first American ground troops in Korea were a small combat team of 450 men. Named Task Force Smith, after its commander, the team arrived on the peninsula on July 1, 1950, and soon engaged the enemy. Task Force Smith has since become legendary, but for unhappy reasons. To the shock of many, the North Koreans quickly disposed of the Americans. Smith’s bazookas could not stop T-34 tanks. More important, his soldiers were not the equal of Kim Il Sung’s. With many casualties, the team withdrew, joining the RoK forces in full retreat. For the Americans the news would get worse before it got better. Additional U.S. troops were thrown into battle. These too failed to do well. One unit in particular, the army’s 24th Division, performed miserably, with its commander, a major general, allowing himself to be captured. The reality was that in 1950 the U.S. Army was hardly the armed force that had defeated Hitler’s army. American soldiers in the Far East were occupational troops, ill-suited for combat.

  As the situation in Korea deteriorated, the United States sent in more troops. Among the arrivals were U.S. marines and soldiers willing to fight. These were joined by a brigade of British troops. As other nations provided small, symbolic contingents, the U.S. effort became, and called itself, a United Nations command. Still, the bulk of the forces opposing the North Koreans were American, specifically the United States Eighth Army, led by Lieutenant General Walton Walker. He was an experienced combat commander, having been one of George Patton’s senior officers during World War II. By early August, Walker’s men had been pushed back to a small perimeter surrounding Pusan, a port at the southeastern top of the peninsula. Expulsion from Korea was a distinct possibility. For six weeks fierce fighting took place. Mindful of Walker’s call to “stand or die,” the Americans repulsed determined North Korean attacks. The perimeter held. Pounded by U.S. aircraft and U.S. artillery, the Communists were unable to reach the sea. There would be no Dunkirk in Korea.

  Despite the successful defense of the Pusan perimeter, the reputation of the American military had suffered. North Korea had defeated the U.S. Eighth Army though not destroyed it. Yet at the moment of greatest danger to Walton and his troops, the United States would conduct an audacious maneuver that would shatter the overextended North Korean forces, reminding the world of how capable America’s military was.

  The maneuver was an amphibious landing at Inchon, well up the western coast of Korea, deep behind enemy lines. Conceived by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of U.N. and U.S. troops, the operation was considered risky by the American Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C. Indeed, as British historian Max Hastings has pointed out, among U.S. amphibious specialists opposition to the venture was widespread. Yet the general prevailed. His reputation was such that the operation took place as planned. On September 15, 1950, U.S. marines and the army’s 7th Division landed at Inchon, carried there by an armada of 260 ships. Together, they constituted X Corps, a force MacArthur kept independent of Walker’s Eighth Army. The Inchon operation was a complete success. Hastings called the landings “MacArthur’s master stroke.” By September 27, Seoul had been retaken. In the south, the day after the landing, Walker’s army attacked. Now outnumbered, the North Koreans gave way. The Eighth Army advanced, linking up with the Inchon forces on September 26. Badly beaten, though still intact, Kim Il Sung’s army retreated, crossing back over the 38th Parallel, from where, four months before, it had started the war.

  Now came a decisive moment. Would
the U.N. forces cross the parallel seeking to destroy Kim’s army and with it his regime? The original purpose of the largely American effort had been met. The Republic of South Korea had been saved. Crossing the 38th meant expanding the war.

  MacArthur wanted to proceed north. He argued that if the North Korean forces were not destroyed they would be in a position to attack once again. Moreover, he believed the war to be a part of a Soviet-led Communist conspiracy to destroy the West, an assault on democracy that must be stopped.

  Syngman Rhee also wanted U.N. forces to cross the parallel. He viewed the conquest of North Korea as a means to unify the country under his control. Many people believed that Korea should be a single entity, though not everyone thought Rhee should be its ruler.

  America’s allies were torn. They worried about further casualties, but they worried more about the reaction of the Chinese government in Peking (now called Beijing), which had warned against an American “invasion” of North Korea. But the allies wanted to show support of the United States. In Europe and in the Pacific, they were dependent on America in countering the political and military threats posed by the Soviet Union. Abandoning the Americans in Korea was hardly the way to secure American backing elsewhere.

  At the time, MacArthur, his troops, the allies, Syngman Rhee, and the leaders in Washington were caught up in the euphoria occasioned by the success at Inchon. A great victory had been achieved. The North Koreans were in disarray. The war would soon be brought to a successful and definitive conclusion. The troops would be home by Christmas.