America at War: Concise Histories of U.S. Military Conflicts From Lexingtonto Afghanistan

by Terence T. Finn

  Not surprisingly the Taliban enjoyed little support outside their own country. However, one nation aided the fanatics. Pakistan supplied the Taliban with weapons and financial aid. Other entities also supporting the Taliban were wealthy Islamic extremists. One of these was an individual who would play a key role in American military history.

  His name was Osama Bin Laden.

  Bin Laden was a Saudi who loathed the United States. The founder of the terrorist group al-Qaeda, Bin Laden dedicated his life—and his fortune—to killing Americans. Their coarse behavior and presence in the Middle East, as well as their support of Israel, made them, Bin Laden believed, enemies of Islam.

  In 1992 al-Qaeda conducted its first operation against the United States, a bombing of a hotel in Yemen that on occasion housed American troops. Ten months later, in February 1993, one of its disciples attempted to bring down the World Trade Center in New York by exploding a bomb that killed six people and injured more than a thousand. More successful, at least judging by the number of dead, was the subsequent attack upon the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, which killed 224 individuals, not all of them Americans. And in October 2000, Bin Laden’s group struck an American naval vessel, the USS Cole, in the harbor of Aden, in Yemen. Seventeen sailors were killed.

  By then, U.S. intelligence was aware of Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization. In response to the earlier attacks, the United States, at the direction of President Bill Clinton, had conducted a missile strike against an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. But this attack, and what Bin Laden had so far done, were but minor preludes to what would follow.

  At 8:42 A.M. on September 11, 2001, a commercial airliner, hijacked by al-Qaeda operatives, deliberately flew into the north tower of New York’s World Trade Center. On board the American Airlines Boeing 767 were ninety-two individuals, including the hijackers. Eighteen minutes later, a second plane flew into the south tower. The two crashes soon brought down the Twin Towers and, in total, caused the death of 2,752 people. But al-Qaeda was not finished. At 9:43 A.M. another hijacked airliner, again in kamikaze style, struck the Pentagon, home to America’s military, located across the Potomac River from Washington, D.C. A fourth airliner, United Airlines flight 93 heading for San Francisco, also was hijacked. But its passengers, aware of what had occurred in New York and Washington, stormed the hijackers. This caused the plane to crash in a field southeast of Pittsburgh. Most likely, the plane was targeting the White House or the Capitol. All aboard were killed.

  September 11, 2001, became, as December 7, 1941, was, a date that for the United States will live in infamy.

  Al-Qaeda seemed to have triumphed. It successfully struck the American homeland. And by destroying the World Trade Center and damaging the Pentagon, al-Qaeda had hit two major symbols of American power. While most people around the world were appalled by the events of September 11, many in Islamic countries rejoiced. They believed that the United States and its citizens had gotten what they deserved.

  Most certainly, Bin Laden believed that. In 1998 he had published an edict that called on Muslims everywhere to kill Americans wherever and whenever possible. For the al-Qaeda leader, September 11, 2001, was a great victory. He had planned and executed a mighty blow against the infidels.

  America’s response was swift. Within two weeks U.S. Special Forces and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel landed in Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda was based and where its leader lived, courtesy of the Taliban. Arming Afghans opposed to the Taliban and simply bribing others, these U.S. forces and their Afghan allies, augmented by high-tech American air assets, overthrew the Taliban, killing many and causing Bin Laden and his people to retreat into the caves of Tora Bora in the mountains that line Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan. Despite extensive efforts to find him, efforts that included B-52 air strikes, Bin Laden escaped. He took up residence in Pakistan, from where, often with the complicity of Pakistanis, he would remain for more than ten more years, plotting to kill Americans.

  In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush vowed that the United States would bring the al-Qaeda leader to justice. Vast American resources, both human and financial, were allocated to this task. For many years, Osama Bin Laden survived, managing his cohorts, hoping to repeat the success of September 11. The latter he was unable to achieve, though not for lack of effort.

  Then, on the night of May 2, 2011, U.S. Navy commandos raided a compound in Abbottabad, a town in Pakistan that is home to that nation’s military academy. American intelligence officials suspected the compound to be housing Osama Bin Laden. Their suspicions proved correct. He was there. The Americans shot him dead and took his body with them as they departed. Shortly thereafter, his remains, having been placed aboard an American warship, were deposited into the sea.

  The raid was daring in the extreme, especially given that the Pakistanis were not told of the incursion. This time it was Americans who rejoiced.

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  While the Taliban was overthrown in 2001, they had not been eliminated. Many found sanctuary in Pakistan. They would hide—and thrive—in the country’s western mountains. Known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, these were lands in which Pakistani control was limited. Other Taliban dispersed to the Afghan countryside. There, by coercion or camaraderie, they would rally Afghans to their cause and become a threat to the government that had replaced them.

  This government was led by Hamid Karzai. He enjoyed the strong support of the United States and many in Afghanistan as well, including regional warlords whom he constantly would need either to appease or intimidate, or simply bribe.

  For Karzai, governing Afghanistan was not possible without massive aid from external sources. This meant primarily the United States, although other nations were called upon to contribute. The United States, in particular its secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, did not believe in “nation building,” the phrase that came into use to describe the efforts required to transform Afghanistan into a modern state, one capable of delivering services and security to its citizens. Rumsfeld argued that rebuilding Afghanistan would require huge sums of money (and he was correct) and that it simply was not the task of the United States to construct a nation in Southeast Asia. That responsibility, he believed, belonged to the Afghans themselves.

  The result was that, at least initially, America exercised in Afghanistan what scholar Seth G. Jones called “a light footprint.” Withdrawals from the U.S. Treasury for the Karzai government were limited, as was assistance from the Pentagon. While eight thousand American soldiers were stationed in Afghanistan in 2002, their role was limited. They were there to kill al-Qaeda operatives and, if necessary, to do the same to the Taliban. They were not there to rebuild the country.

  Assisting these troops were soldiers from Britain, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and other countries. They belonged to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, together with forces from other countries as well as the United States, comprised the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Why NATO? Because one of its members, the United States of America, had been attacked. Article V of the treaty states that an attack against one of its member states shall be considered an attack on them all.

  The problem was that while the British, Dutch, and Canadians were willing to fight, and did, several other NATO states—Germany and Italy among them—refused to place their soldiers in harm’s way. They were unwilling to incur casualties for the sake of Afghanistan. This made ISAF less effective than it might have been.

  There was another problem as well. The focus of American leaders, both in the military and at the White House, was shifting. In Washington, Iraq was claiming center stage. Interest in Afghanistan waned as that in Iraq increased. In his fine book In the Graveyard of Empires, Professor Seth G. Jones quotes Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “It is simply a matter of resources, of capacity. In Afghanistan, we do w
hat we can. In Iraq, we do what we must.”

  By 2005, the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated. While there had been successes—schools had been built, elections had been held—the failure of the Karzai government to provide security and services to much of the population led to the resurgence of the Taliban. Many people outside Kabul had little use for the central government. They saw it as incompetent and corrupt.

  One sign of how bad things had become was the departure from Afghanistan of the French organization Doctors Without Borders. Held in high esteem throughout the world, it had served in Afghanistan for more than twenty years. When four of its workers were shot in the head, the group concluded that Afghanistan was no longer a safe place to provide medical services.

  In opposing the Karzai government and the ISAF, the Taliban were ruthless. They kidnapped journalists, threatened schoolteachers, killed civilian aid workers, and assassinated government officials. Confronted by such tactics, American-led forces and their Afghan cohorts were overmatched. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Afghan army and the national police force. Each of these organizations was too small, ill-equipped, and poorly trained. In 2005 and 2006 neither could function effectively.

  Recognizing that a fundamental change in America’s approach to Afghanistan was necessary, the Bush administration acted. It began to send large numbers of troops to Afghanistan. So did its successor. In March 2008, President Barack Obama ordered twenty-two thousand additional soldiers to be deployed. Late in 2009, he directed that a “surge” in troops take place, which caused thirty thousand more troops to arrive in Afghanistan. By October 2011, after ten years of fighting, the number of U.S. troops in the country had reached ninety-eight thousand.

  As commander in chief of the armed forces (a role given to the president by Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution), President Obama did more than increase troop levels. He fired the troops’ commanding officer, General David McKiernan. Advised by the secretary of defense, Robert Gates, Obama believed the general’s tactics would not lead to success. McKiernan focused on killing the enemy. Gates wanted a more counterinsurgency effort that aimed at protecting Afghan citizens. The approach was advocated by McKiernan’s successor, General Stanley A. McChrystal (who himself was sacked when his indiscreet remarks to a popular newspaper were made public). McKiernan’s relief highlighted a fundamental issue confronting the American military in Afghanistan. Should the emphasis be on safeguarding the people of Afghanistan or should the Americans concentrate on taking the fight to the Taliban and al-Qaeda?

  Both groups were aided greatly by their ability to use eastern Pakistan as a safe haven. Al-Qaeda operatives would cross over into Afghanistan to strike at their foes, then retreat back into their camps in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. At times, the Pakistanis assisted the Americans in locating and killing al-Qaeda personnel. Particularly effective in this effort were American unmanned aerial vehicles. The United States employed these lethal devices often, over the public objections of Pakistani leaders. At other times, these leaders, especially those in Pakistan’s intelligence service, would provide support to al-Qaeda and to the Taliban. Pakistan’s goal was to have a friendly regime along its eastern border. These leaders saw no conflict in helping both sides.

  In addition to raising troop levels in Afghanistan, Presidents Bush and Obama increased financial aid. Rejecting the notion that nation building was not an American role, the United States began an effort to rebuild that country. The funding allocated to Afghanistan was substantial. By 2010, it added up to $18.8 billion, with most of that coming in the later years. By 2011, the monthly expenditure was $320 million.

  What was this money spent on? The answer is roads, schools, hospitals, generating plants, agricultural assistance, and other worthwhile endeavors. Although large sums evaporated due to waste and fraud, many projects were deemed successful. For example, according to the Washington Post of June 9, 2011, 680 schools were constructed or repaired. And these, no doubt, were open to females.

  Despite some successes, failures in the reconstruction effort were numerous. For example, an American-led project to upgrade southern Afghanistan’s Kajaki hydroelectric plant went awry, with some $260 million expended. A project to upgrade a power plant in Kabul also failed, as the plant remained largely idle after the United States invested approximately $300 million. But the most compelling example of the difficulty the United States faced in building a modern Afghan state centered on road construction, something an infrastructure-poor Afghanistan desperately needed. Over a period of several years, the United States directed vast sums of money into the building of roads. Yet, as the Wall Street Journal reported, roads indeed were built, but they cost more than they should have and covered far fewer miles than planned. “You can find programs and projects that have been successful,” said Kai Eider, a Norwegian diplomat running U.N. activities in Afghanistan for a time, “but for me it is quite obvious that huge amounts of money have been misspent.” The newspaper pointed out one such example: a typical gravel road in Afghanistan was supposed to have cost some $290,000 per mile. Yet for every mile constructed, America’s Afghanistan Strategic Roads Project spent $2.8 million.

  Another example of the failures the United States experienced in its nonmilitary efforts in Afghanistan dealt with the effort to build a consulate in the northern region of the country. This time, it was the Washington Post that reported the story. The consulate was to be constructed in the town of Masar-e Sharif. Yet, after spending some $80 million, the project was abandoned. The reason given was security concerns. With U.S. troops leaving the country and Afghan national forces unequal to their task, it became too dangerous for U.S. officials to work there.

  The huge expense incurred to aid Afghanistan troubled many in the United States. Concerned with their own country’s fiscal well-being, they were troubled by the mismatch at home between revenues and expenditures. Concerns increased during 2010 and 2011, becoming a factor in Washington’s decision making. Of greater significance, however, was the number of casualties the war was causing. As of July 2013, 2,236 U.S. soldiers had been killed in Afghanistan. More than 12,000 had been wounded.

  The cost to Americans of their Afghan endeavor, both financial and in lives lost, was such that opposition to the war became substantial. Aware of these concerns, believing al-Qaeda had been neutralized, and anxious to redirect U.S. resources to the home front, President Obama announced a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. By the summer of 2012, thirty-three thousand men and women were to be withdrawn. That would leave sixty-eight thousand troops in country. Their departure would continue during 2014, so that, by that year or the following, America’s military presence in Afghanistan would be minimal. “America,” said the president, “it is time to focus on nation-building at home.”

  When the U.S. troops are home and the ISAF is disbanded, will the effort, again one that has consumed American dollars and American lives, have been worth it? Many will say no. Others will answer in the positive, pointing to the damage done to al-Qaeda and to the progress made in improving the daily life of ordinary Afghans.

  The key issue is whether the progress will be sustainable once the Americans have left. That depends on whether the Karzai government and its successors can survive without having U.S. troops on the ground. That, in turn, depends on the capability of the new American-trained Afghan National Army. Will it fill the vacuum created when Uncle Sam’s soldiers no longer are present? Perhaps it will, but maintaining this army is estimated to require approximately $4 billion each year, money the Afghan government does not have.

  Even if it did, the Afghan central governments are not likely to make Afghanistan a place where its citizens are safe and free, and where the progress made so far can continue. A culture of corruption—so prevalent in Afghanistan—will remain as will the pull of tribal loyalties. Assassinations and rebellion, moreover, are part of the country’s
political traditions, and there is no reason to believe they have been forsaken. Add to these the tenacity of the Taliban and future prospects become rather bleak.

  In the days of its empire, the British tried and failed in Afghanistan. Much later, so did the Soviets. Regrettably, America is likely to follow their examples.

  Was America’s entry into Afghanistan necessary?

  Yes, it was. Bin Laden and al-Qaeda had declared war on the United States and its citizens. They intended to bring great harm to Americans, and had done so already. President Bush’s response was swift and effective. He ordered CIA personnel and U.S. Special Forces to enter Afghanistan and destroy al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts. They arrived shortly after September 11, 2001, and, with great skill, toppled the Taliban and sent Bin Laden fleeing into Pakistan.

  How did the CIA and Special Forces defeat their enemy?

  Instead of employing massive conventional forces, as the Russians had done, the United States mounted a military campaign featuring small detachments of U.S. Special Forces and CIA operatives, armed with AK-47 assault rifles, medical supplies, sophisticated communications gear, and, according to MHQ journal, “three large boxes whose contents tipped the scales at 45 pounds: the weight of three million dollars in $100 bills.” These units—there were only seven of them—allied with Afghans opposed to the Taliban and went into battle. Employing both modern weapons and some not so modern (horse cavalry), they defeated their foe, though not without the assistance of considerable American airpower. The campaign lasted just twenty-seven days, from October 19, 2001, to November 14. 2001. No Americans were killed. Taliban and al-Qaeda deaths were in the thousands.