Henry Knox

by Mark Puls

  Knox's personal finances, however, took a brighter turn when the long-overdue reimbursement for his Ticonderoga mission three years earlier was finally paid on April 6, 1779. He received $2,500, out of which he had to pay himself, his brother, and a servant. He had earned $3 a day for their grueling efforts to preserve the American cause.

  SEVEN

  FORTITUDE

  The American army stood better trained than ever. Grueling military drills by Baron von Steuben had transformed the enlisted ranks of soldiers, who could now perform complex, orchestrated battlefield maneuvers with discipline. And Knox's military academy had improved the Continental officers' understanding of tactics, strategy, and logistics. But the army was still too undermanned and short on provisions to launch an attack against the British fortifications in New York.

  Both Henry and William Knox were concerned that the interruption of business during the war would leave them penniless. William sailed to Europe that spring with plans to visit France and the Netherlands in order to make business connections to import goods to Boston.

  Henry's days were filled with a bewildering variety of responsibilities gearing up for the summer military campaign. He was filling requests for armament and munitions throughout the army, running an artillery corps consisting of forty-nine companies and 1,607 men. He also served on time-consuming court-martial boards, including the case against Benedict Arnold for accusations stemming from his command in Philadelphia. Citizens claimed Arnold ignored the civilian government and used his position to financially benefit himself. Arnold initially demanded a speedy trial but then delayed the hearings as he secretly withdrew his allegiance to the United States. Using the name of Gustavus, he sent a coded letter on Sunday, May 23, 1779, to Lord Clinton with detailed information about Washington's force and expressed his willingness to turn against the Continental army.

  With Arnold's information in hand, Clinton sent 6,000 soldiers up the Hudson River aboard 70 sailing vessels and 150 flat-bottomed boats on May 30. Two days later, the redcoats captured Stony Point and Verplanck's Point and threatened the camp of the main American army at West Point.

  Throughout the spring and early summer Lucy struggled with her second pregnancy, and gave birth to a daughter on July 2, 1779, in Pluckemin, New Jersey. The infant, whom Henry and Lucy named Julia, was not healthy, and died in infancy, leaving Lucy distraught and despondent. Henry was troubled that Lucy and his family struggled without him, and the realization of the enormous sacrifices that his family was making for the sake of the war became painfully apparent. Lucy decided that it was better if she returned to Boston, where she would be surrounded by friends. Henry wrote to her a few weeks later, alluding to his frustrations over his public duties and the war and expressing his deep desire to devote himself solely to his family: "I long with the utmost devotion for the arrival of that period when my Lucy and I shall be no more separated; when we shall sit down, free from the hurry, bustle and impertinence of the world, in some sequestered vale where the education of our children and the preparation on our part for a pure and more happy region, shall employ the principal part of our time in acts of love to men and worship to our Maker.“1

  Washington wrote a note of condolence to Lucy, and to Henry he inquired, "I wish you to make this an object of particular attention. I shall be glad to hear how Mrs. Knox is, to whom I beg my respectful compliments and best wishes for her health.“2

  Despite Knox's hope that the war would end soon, he continued to advise Washington to maintain a cautious defensive strategy while simultaneously making preparations for a joint campaign with the French fleet. Within weeks, however, these plans were disrupted. The French admiral did not want to navigate the difficult waters of New York Harbor and the Hudson, and instead sailed to Savannah to coordinate an attack with General Benjamin Lincoln against British forces occupying the city. Washington told Knox on November 12 to end any preparations for a joint campaign with the French fleet, and the army began to pack its bags to return to winter quarters in Morristown.

  The trial of Benedict Arnold resumed at Morristown two days before Christmas, and Knox returned to his judicial seat. The court-martial was delayed again as Arnold asked for officers to testify on his behalf who could not leave their posts. Like everybody else in the army, Knox had no inkling of Arnold's duplicity and remained sympathetic, believing the accusations would prove baseless. After several days of testimony, Knox and the board acquitted Arnold of the charge that he ordered Philadelphia stores shuttered while he made personal purchases and had slighted Pennsylvanians in appointing officers within the army, disregarding the authority of civilian leaders. But Knox and the board found him guilty of allowing a ship from a British port to dock in the United States and that Arnold used army wagons for personal business. Washington issued him a mild, halfhearted rebuke, calling his actions "peculiarly reprehensible." No other penalty was given.3

  Despite the leniency, Arnold would later say that he was embittered by the proceedings and the reprimand and thus felt fully justified to betray his colleagues as he felt betrayed by them.

  The winter of 1780 proved to be the most severe that anyone could remember, and was said to be the coldest of the eighteenth century. A three-day blizzard in January buried the Morristown camp under snow that piled six feet high. Henry's men had to dig the heavy iron guns out of the snow to prevent ice from corrupting the barrels. As many as twenty-eight snowstorms blanketed the camp that season. The previous winter at Valley Forge had been nearly unendurable, but this year proved to be even worse. Few supplies trickled in, and provisions became bogged down en route by impassable roads. A forty-head herd of cattle was driven through the drifts to reach camp in early January to save the men from starvation.

  Needing a victory to inspire more support, Washington planned a surprise attack of Staten Island in New York. Knox allotted the number of cannons needed for the mission, in which troops were ordered to drive 500 sleighs through deep snow in an attempt to take the British by surprise. Knox's provisions for the planned assault drew criticism from Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton, who did not hesitate to question the estimates of a superior. To Washington, Hamilton wrote on Friday, January 14, 1780: "It appears to me the quantity of ammunition proposed by General Knox for the artillery is inefficient. A larger consumption may be necessary—the stone house in which the enemy may attempt to defend themselves may be obstinate, and we should have it in our power by the severity and duration of our fire, to bring them to reason.“4 Hamilton's reference to the "stone house" was a clear allusion to the Chew House, where, in October 1777, Knox's artillery guns had failed to dislodge 200 British soldiers, causing a costly delay in the advance of Washington's army and contributing to the defeat at Germantown. This would not be the last time Hamilton would question Knox's judgment. Perhaps to be safe, Washington ordered Knox to send more artillery along with the mission, which ended in failure. The British, well entrenched when the Americans arrived and not surprised by troops, easily repulsed the attack.5

  American prospects for the war did not brighten with the spring of 1780. On May 12 in Charleston, South Carolina, British general Henry Clinton forced the surrender of General Lincoln, who turned over the American garrison and the city. It was the greatest defeat of the war, costing the United States 5,000 men, along with 400 guns and 6,000 muskets. The British were now un-opposed in South Carolina. Knox sent a consoling letter to his friend Lincoln just as he had sent condolences to Nathanael Greene after his demoralizing defeat at Fort Washington in November 1776. Knox expressed his steadfast faith in Lincoln at a time when his military reputation lay in ruins: "The great defense made by you and your garrison in field fortifications will confer on you and them the esteem and admiration of every sensible military man. I hope and believe that Congress will most unequivocally bestow that applause which you have so richly merited. No event, except the capture of Sir H. Clinton and his army, would give me more pleasure than to see you.“6 Lincoln seemed deeply m
oved by Knox's abiding confidence. At a later period, he wrote to Henry in terms of overflowing affection: "The first moment I had the happiness of being acquainted with you I conceived a high degree of friendship, which uniformly has increased as I became more intimate, until the present period. I consider the confidential manner in which we have indulged as one of the happy circumstances of my life, and in all events of grief or joy there is no man from whose friendship I should more readily expect the most cordial balsam, or whose bosom would more cheerfully expand in a participation of my happiness.“7

  On Tuesday, May 23, 1780, Knox began to voice doubts over the prospect of success against the British in New York City. To lay siege to the town, he believed the Continental army needed 28,000 men to overtake the 14,000 redcoats nestled behind defensive fortifications. He provided Washington with a detailed if somewhat cautious plan for a coordinated Franco-American assault that expressed his concerns. Because the value of the American dollar had depreciated so much, many merchants and farmers were unwilling to sell goods to the army. Knox explained that any summer military campaign would be doomed if the army's quartermaster and commissary departments were not put on solid financial footing by Congress: "Those are the main springs of an army, and unless they are in perfect order, every movement depending on them must be wrong and will in the end, produce destruction.“8

  Many of the troops that Knox saw at Morristown were gaunt and emaciated from months of malnourishment. Most went several days without meat, and officers such as Knox subsisted on bread and water to set an example. Despite the strict diet, however, Henry remained a heavy man. But the troops continued to die from disease or illness at an alarming rate, and Congress was unable to raise money for the army to relieve the suffering.

  During these lean times, Lucy was enduring another pregnancy. She gave birth to a son, Henry Jackson Knox, on Wednesday May 24, 1780. He was named after Henry's colleague and friend, Colonel Henry Jackson, commander of the Sixteenth Massachusetts infantry regiment.

  The following day, Knox was forced to be at camp as several soldiers revolted over the dire conditions in the army. The troops had not been paid in five months, and many feared that their depreciating wages would be worthless. Two Connecticut regiments paraded through the Morristown camp the evening of Thursday, May 25, with their arms shouldered and carrying their packs and accoutrements. A regiment of Pennsylvania soldiers appeared to surround the protesters, who chose to return to their barracks.

  Once again several members of Congress seemed to be losing faith in Washington and his circle of top advisors, including Knox and Greene. On June 13, delegates unanimously appointed Horatio Gates to head the southern department of the Continental army, adding that he needed to answer only to Congress and not to Washington.9

  Knox was frustrated with Congress's wavering faith in Washington and believed that the army lacked provisions rather than leadership. The need for flour to feed the starving soldiers was so great that Knox was sent to Trenton on an emergency mission to speed up the arrival of rations. He left camp on June 21 accompanied by twenty cavalry riders with a request for the head of the Pennsylvania government to supply him with 250 wagons. Within a few days, he had coordinated an express train of wagons carrying 2,213 barrels of flour to troops posted in New Jersey at Morristown, Springfield, and along the Hudson. The mission undoubtedly saved lives.

  Knox also tried to address the army's critical needs for weapons, which fell under his litany of responsibilities as the head of ordnance. He drafted an estimate for Congress laying out the military stores needed for America to join in a campaign with the French to liberate New York. The shortfalls were staggering. Just as several states had failed to meet their recruitment quotas, they had failed to send ordnance. According to Knox's estimates, the army could not join the French in a siege without another 8,649 barrels of powder, 21,182 ten-inch shells, 16,561 eighteen-inch shells, 54,151 eighteen-pound shots, and 59,679 twelve-pound shots.10 Washington placed so much faith in Knox's assessments that he admonished Congress in a letter on Tuesday, July 4, that the army would have to decline the opportunity of French help unless the shortfalls were corrected: "If we aim at an important object, adequate means ought to be employed or it would be unreasonable to undertake it; if the means cannot be furnished we must desist from the undertaking.“11

  On July 14, news arrived in camp that 5,100 French infantry troops aboard ten ships of war had recently arrived at Newport, Rhode Island, led by Lieutenant General Jean-Baptiste Donatien Comte de Rochambeau.

  Rochambeau disembarked and found, to his surprise, that the Newport streets were completely deserted and no delegation came to welcome him. Residents remained shuttered within their homes, uncertain if the impressive foreign fleet had come to conquer or to befriend them. The American general William Heath soon arrived to greet him.

  News of the arrival of French troops sent expectations for an American victory soaring throughout the continent once again. The landing of troops from the famed French army, however, was not the salvation that the Americans had hoped for. Many of the men were sick or injured from a long and unusually difficult voyage and would need weeks to recover. And the British sent troops to prevent Rochambeau from marching to meet Washington.

  When English ships of war appeared off the coast of New York City, state leaders became so alarmed that they demanded that Benedict Arnold be placed in the command of West Point. Arnold lobbied for the post as well, claiming that his leg wound from the Battle of Saratoga had left him unable again to take a field command.

  Arnold's motive was to use the fort of West Point as a bargaining chip with the British to boost his value. He could not wait long to make the jump to the British; an audit of his command was beginning to uncover evidence of fraud. Knox continued have full faith in Arnold's character, however, believing him to be an exemplary soldier, and fully supported Arnold's appointment to take over the most important post in America.

  As the summer wore on, it became more and more evident that not arms, nor powder, nor fresh recruits would arrive from the states in time to launch a siege of New York. Soon the French fleet would be forced to depart for warmer waters.

  By August, British expectations for conquering America began to rise. Arnold took over the command at West Point on Thursday, August 3, and continued to provide General Henry Clinton detailed reports of Washing-ton's movements. When the American army crossed the Hudson above New York to help defend the French force against a British attack, Arnold made certain that the patriots' maneuvers did not catch the British off guard. He promised to soon turn over West Point by leading its garrison of 3,000 men away from the fort.

  British hopes also rose with the news of the Lord Charles Cornwallis's victory over Horatio Gates's troops at Camden, South Carolina. Gates surprised his supporters in Congress by abandoning his troops in the heat of the fighting, grabbing the fastest horse he could find, and fleeing at full gallop. By nightfall, he had reached Charlotte, North Carolina, a full 60 miles away, and was 120 miles away from the battle within three days. Gates would never again pose a threat to Washington's command or his circle of advisors.

  Knox's place in the army was more secure than ever, however, not only because of Gates's actions but due to his own merits. He had become indispensable to the army and to Washington. He possessed a thorough and intricate knowledge of the army's bewildering inventory of weapons and armament along with the expertise to deal with contractors and find supply channels to get equipment into soldiers' hands. He had developed relationships with state leaders throughout the country. But what made Knox truly irreplaceable was that he combined this detailed knowledge with a strategic vision in which Washington placed a tremendous amount of faith.

  After a war council of generals on Wednesday, September 6, Knox advised Washington to send help to the South and to forget about a siege of New York until spring. Henry proposed a joint American-French expedition to liberate Charleston. If the British were allowed to contin
ue unopposed in Georgia and the Carolinas, the union might be irrevocably split, he wrote to Washington on September 9: "The full possession of those three states will confer immeasurable advantages on the enemy in the cause of the war and enable them to conquer the others. The principal inhabitants of spirit will be made prisoners, and the common people enjoying the sweets of ease, and commerce will be willing to remain under the British government even at the conclusion of peace, and will perhaps act of their own and refuse to return to the union.“12

  Knox broke with the majority of generals, who advised Washington against launching a southern expedition. They agreed, however, that any siege of New York should be postponed until the following year. Washington listened carefully, then passed on a summary of the war council opinions to Benedict Arnold, who continued to relay information to the British.

  Quartermaster Nathanael Greene wrote to Arnold that same week: "We are starving here for want of provisions. Our troops don't get one day's meat in four. This can't hold long, what is to become of us?“13 Through Arnold, the British had a full picture of the Continental army's shortcomings.

  Knox was asked by Washington to attend the summit with General Rochambeau in Hartford, Connecticut, along with the Marquis de Lafayette to discuss strategy. Alexander Hamilton, Washington's aide, also made the trip. They set out from Bergen County on Sunday, September 17, and arrived that Wednesday.

  Although aristocratic by birth, Rochambeau was well suited to work with commanders from a democratic society because of his congenial personality. He had been assigned to head the French army in America because of his military reputation rather than his impressive political connections. Knox was pleasantly surprised that Rochambeau brushed aside formalities and expressed a willingness to take orders from Washington.