Engineers of Victory

by Paul Kennedy

  2. The syllabus, for any reader interested, is available at http://iss.yale.edu/grand-strategy-program.

  3. For some exceptions to this generalization, see many of the essays in W. Murray, M. Knox, and A. Bernstein, The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)—a very deliberate counterpoise to an older classic, E. M. Earle with G. A. Craig and F. Gilbert, eds., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), with its emphasis upon strategic writings and thought.

  4. See, respectively, G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); P. Padfield, Guns at Sea (London: Evelyn, 1973), ch. 10 and 11; J. C. Riley, International Government Finance and the Amsterdam Capital Market 1740–1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); P. M. Kennedy, “Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy 1870–1914,” English Historical Review 86, no. 341 (1972): 728–52.

  5. These operational directives are most sensibly summarized by State Department historian Herbert Feis in Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 105–8.

  6. The best way to test this remark is to examine four of the most useful histories of the Second World War that I quote repeatedly in my own text and check their descriptions (or lack of mention) of such jigsaw puzzle pieces as the Merlin-powered P-51 Mustang, the cavity magnetron, the Hedgehog, and Hobart’s Funnies. See B. Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (New York: Viking, 1990); R. Overy, Why the Allies Won (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995); W. Murray and A. R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (London: Cassell’s, 1970). Another useful point of comparison would be with two recent and much acclaimed works on World War II. The first is Ian Kershaw’s Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World 1940–41 (London: Penguin, 2007), a wonderful read, though deliberately constructed as a set of top-down stories—see ch. 2, “Hitler Decides to Attack the Soviet Union,” ch. 7, “Roosevelt Decides to Wage Undeclared War,” and so on. The second is Andrew Roberts’s gripping book Masters and Commanders: How Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall and Alanbrooke Won the War in the West (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2008), which to an amazing extent can be seen as the top-level complement to the middle-level thrust of my book.

  CHAPTER ONE: HOW TO GET CONVOYS SAFELY ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

  1. B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (London: Cassell’s, 1970), 316–17. For Alanbrooke’s comments on the travel delays, see the pertinent pages in his War Diaries, 1939–1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, ed. Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001).

  2. Liddell Hart, History, 386. The actual math calculations from Liddell Hart’s figures would suggest that Doenitz possessed 204 operational submarines (out of a total of 366) by the end of 1942, but the difference is insignificant. Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz was of course the remarkable C in C of the German submarine arm, then the Kriegsmarine itself. There have been so many books written on this campaign over the past sixty years that it is difficult to know which ones to list. Readers might begin with Marc Milner’s fine summary, Battle of the Atlantic (Stroud, UK: Tempus, 2005), and take things from there, that is, from his brief bibliography on 265–67. The U.K. official history is S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939–1945, 3 vols. (London: HMSO, 1954–61). The U.S. official history is S. E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, 15 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947–62), vols. 1 and 10 being those most relevant, because they are specifically on the Battle of the Atlantic. Milner’s additional value is that he brings in the increasingly important role of the Royal Canadian Navy and Air Force. There are useful Navy Records Society volumes by the late David Syrett and by Eric Grove and a great amount of further information in the many publications of the German Military History Research Office.

  3. The quote is from Roskill, War at Sea, 2:367.

  4. For the general strategic theory here, see John Winton, Convoy: The Defence of Sea Trade, 1890–1990 (London: Michael Joseph, 1983); S. W. Roskill, The Strategy of Sea Power (London: Collins, 1962); and Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Collins, 1962).

  5. A.R. Millet and W. Murray, Military Effectiveness (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1989).

  6. The most available tables are in Roskill, War at Sea, vol. 3, part II, various appendices, where the naval war as a whole is summed up.

  7. The fall of France? Perhaps, but only for the French. Stalingrad? Perhaps, though the German army was advancing eastward again in the spring of 1943. Midway? But it marked the limit of Japan’s expansion in the Central Pacific, not the start of Nimitz’s great counteroffensive, which was well over a year away.

  8. There are lots of fine works on the critical months of the Battle of the Atlantic, including Roskill, War at Sea; Milner, Battle of the Atlantic; and Correlli Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1991). But perhaps the most remarkable of them all is German historian (and former naval officer) Juergen Rohwer’s The Critical Convoy Battles of 1943 (London: Ian Allen, 1977), a feat of historical reconstruction. Also very impressive: Martin Middlebrook, Convoy (London: William Morrow, 1986).

  9. Rohwer, Critical Convoy Battles, 55.

  10. Ibid., 211, for technical data on the U-boat types.

  11. Barnett, Engage the Enemy, 599.

  12. On this theme more generally, see D. Howse, Radar at Sea: The Royal Navy in the Second World War (London: Macmillan, 1993), an impeccable study; Sir Arthur Hezlet, The Electron and Sea Power (London: Stein and Day, 1976); and the excellent study (one of many by the same author) by G. Hartcup, The Effect of Science on the Second World War (Basingstoke: St. Martin’s, 2000), especially ch. 3–4.

  13. Rohwer, Critical Convoy Battles, 113.

  14. Ibid., 121.

  15. For Alanbrooke’s many concerns in this critical period, see his War Diaries, ca. 330–425.

  16. See, for example, Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton’s analysis in the final chapter of his book Crisis Convoy: The Story of HX 231 (London: P. Davies, 1974), “Why Did the Germans Lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the Spring of 1943?” which feints and ducks around that very question. Gretton is by no means the only author to do so, and he is someone who witnessed and played a major role in the turn of the tide.

  17. Roskill, War at Sea, vol. 2, map 38 (opposite p. 365).

  18. Milner, Battle of the Atlantic, 127.

  19. See again Roskill’s War at Sea, vol. 2, ch. 5, and the scatter-map of the lost merchantmen of Convoy PQ 17, opposite p. 141.

  20. Barnett, Engage the Enemy, 600.

  21. Assessing the significance of HX 231’s contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic is something of a puzzle. Roskill, in War at Sea, vol. 2, does not mention it at all. Perhaps this is what prompted its escort commander, Peter Gretton, to write Crisis Convoy, a self-important work, though with some interesting tidbits on morale and training, plus details of what the merchantmen were carrying, the number of tankers, and so on. Milner, Battle of the Atlantic, gives this clash a mere sentence on p. 158, mentioning Doenitz’s disappointment that only six ships were lost from the convoy. R. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 2nd ed. (London: Pimlico, 2006), 69, writes, “Convoy HX 231 from Newfoundland fought its way through four days of gale-force winds against a pack of seventeen submarines. Four U-boats were sunk for almost no loss.” But Roskill’s fastidious compilation of German U-boat losses (Appendix J, p. 470) shows only two U-boats sunk in the North Atlantic in these days.

  22. Gretton, P. Crisis Convoy: The Story of the HX 231 (London: Naval Institute Press, 1974), 157.

  23. Ibid., 173.

  24. The wa
rships’ performances—and group photos of the remarkably young commanders of each vessel—are in Sir Peter Gretton’s Convoy Escort Commander (London: Cassell, 1964); the narrative is on 149–62.

  25. Barnett, Engage the Enemy, 610.

  26. For Doenitz’s political character, see P. Padfield, Doenitz: The Last Fuehrer (New York: Harper and Row, 1984). For his mid-May report to Hitler, see Liddell Hart, History, 389–90. For his assessment of the role of Allied airpower in blunting the attacks upon convoys HX 239 and SC 130, see Barnett, Engage the Enemy, 611.

  27. K. Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959), 326.

  28. Bomber Harris’s dismissive memo is recorded in M. E. Howard, Grand Strategy (London: HMSO, 1972), 4:21, while Doenitz’s sober assessment is reprinted in Barnett, Engage the Enemy, 611. The dismal story on the British side has been recently confirmed by the research of Duncan Redford in “Inter- and Intra-Service Rivalries in the Battle of the Atlantic,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 6 (Dec. 2009): 899–928. Gretton’s amazing claims about his personal air-sea cooperation experiences are in his introduction to R. Seth, The Fiercest Battle: The Story of North Atlantic Convoy ONS 5, 22nd April–7th May 1943 (London: Hutchinson, 1961), 14–15. Gretton also reports that the Liverpool Tactical School had “joint classes” for Royal Navy and Coastal Command officers, which would be quite remarkable.

  29. Also known, under another code name, as the Mark 24 mine. See “Mark 24 Mine,” Wikipedia, http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_24_Mine; Kathleen Williams, “See Fido Run: A Tale of the First Anti-U-boat Acoustic Torpedo,” paper presented at the U.S. Naval Academy Naval History Symposium, 2009.

  30. H. P. Willmott, The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), 266–267.

  31. For illustrations of a depth charge crew at work, see Roskill, War at Sea, vol. 3, part I, opposite p. 257; on improved sonar, see Hartcup, Effect of Science, 60–69.

  32. Hartcup, Effect of Science, 72–74. There is a photo of a Hedgehog as illustration 9.

  33. G. Pawle, The Secret War 1939–1945 (London: White Lion Press, 1956), ch. 12. However, as a fine corrective to the “British eccentrics” interpretation of how the war was won, see D. Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World War (London: Allen Lane, 2011), and my discussion in “Reflections” at the end of this book.

  34. Rohwer, Critical Convoy Battles, 198. Hartcup, Effect of Science, 47–49, explains how it works.

  35. For the best, brief summary, see Hartcup, Effect of Science, 24–31.

  36. Liddell Hart, History, 389.

  37. E. G. Bowen, Radar Days (Bristol: Adam Hilger, 1987), ch. 9–12, explains the technology, and his role in the transfer to the Rad Lab. John Burchard’s Q.E.D: M.I.T. in World War II (New York: Wiley, 1948) observes that “the British achievement of the cavity magnetron was perhaps the most important single contribution to technical development of the first years of the war” (219). See also Howse, Radar at Sea, 67–68, 156.

  38. There is a photo of a Leigh Light in Barnett, Engage the Enemy, between 588 and 589. Earlier, on 258–59, he details the interminable delays. In general Barnett is very critical of the shortcomings of British industry and authorities to get the right weapons to the fronts. My own feeling is that the beleaguered island state performed rather well in the strained circumstances of total war, a view now much reinforced by Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine.

  39. Barnett, Engage the Enemy, 609. There is a balanced (actually, rather cool) assessment of Ultra’s contribution to the Allies’ overall victory in Hartcup, Effect of Science, ch. 5. Rohwer, Critical Convoy Battles, 229–44, explains naval code breaking. The founding father of code-breaking history, David Kahn, also is cautious about ascribing too much importance to Ultra or indeed other deciphering systems; see his “Intelligence in World War II: A Survey,” Journal of Intelligence History 1, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 1–20.

  40. Herbert E. Werner, Iron Coffins: A Personal Account of the German U-boat Battles of World War II (London: Arthur Barker, 1969), is a grim and fascinating account, with rather wonderful illustrations, and possibly was the inspiration for the great movie Das Boot.

  41. Roskill, War at Sea, vol. 3, part 1, ch. 2–3; Morison, History, has a great spreadsheet map of the U-boat kills in the Bay of Biscay, 10:97. The glider bombs are discussed in Milner’s fine Battle of the Atlantic, 193–94.

  42. On the Polish Mosquitos (and other nationalities in the squadrons), see Milner, Battle of the Atlantic, 189.

  43. Barnett, Engage the Enemy, 606.

  44. Most of the more detailed accounts of the Battle of the Atlantic mention Walker’s role—how could they not?—but great data, including the quotation, can also be found at an individual website, captainwalker.info/

  45. Barnett, Engage the Enemy, 605; more generally on operations research, see Hartcup, Effect of Science, ch. 6.

  46. Roskill, War at Sea, vol. 3, part 1, p. 395; and Morison, History, vol. 10, ch. 8.

  47. Werner, Iron Coffins, 213, recounts he and fellow commanders received the orders to attack the D-Day craft “with the final objective of destroying enemy ships by ramming.” See also Morison, History, 10:324–25, on the massive Allied naval and aerial screen (and the loss of Pink).

  48. This final period of the struggle is covered well in Roskill, War at Sea, vol. 3, parts 1 and 2, and in Barnett, Engage the Enemy, 852–58; Milner, Battle of the Atlantic, ch. 9, shows how tough those later battles were.

  49. Willmott, Great Crusade, 273. Ellis, Brute Force, 160–61, also makes a strong case for numbers and production ultimately being key.

  CHAPTER TWO: HOW TO WIN COMMAND OF THE AIR

  1. E. Bendiger, The Fall of Fortresses (New York: Putnam, 1980); quotes are from 219–21.

  2. Ibid., 236, 225.

  3. The literature here is vast. B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (London: Cassell’s, 1970), ch. 23, and R. Overy, Why the Allies Won (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995), ch. 4, provide succinct single-chapter overviews. I found M. Hastings, Bomber Command (London: Michael Joseph, 1979) perhaps the single best volume, very critical but also discriminating. The four-volume British official history by C. Webster and N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany (London: HMSO, 1961), is a model of its kind.

  4. N. Longmate, The Bombers: The RAF Offensive Against Germany 1939–1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1983), 298.

  5. W. Murray and A. R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 317; also, more generally, see J. Terraine, The Right of the Line (London: Pen and Sword, 2010), which examines the RAF’s role in the European war from beginning to end.

  6. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 147; Hastings, Bomber Command, 318; Longmate, The Bombers.

  7. I. F. Clarke, Voice Prophesying War 1763–1984 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966).

  8. See A. Gollin, No Longer an Island: Britain and the Wright Brothers 1902–1909 (London: Heinemann, 1984), especially the later chapters. For Amery’s 1904 contention, see Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy 1870–1945: Eight Studies (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), 47.

  9. See Overy’s classic comparative analysis The Air War 1939–1945 (London: Europa, 1980). There are fabulous photographs in R. Higham, Air Power: A Concise History (Yuma, KS: Sunflower Press, 1984).

  10. Compare, for example, the hugely critical accounts by Longmate in The Bombers and by Bendiger, Fall of Fortresses, with that by a staunch defender of RAF Bomber Command’s policies, Dudley Saward, in Victory Denied: The Rise of Air Power and the Defeat of Germany 1920–1945 (London: Buchan and Enright, 1985). Saward is also the author of the authorized biography of Bomber Harris, whose own account, Bomber Offensive (London: Collins, 1947) was published very shortly after the war and well captures his own strong opinions.

  11. Quoted from Longmate, The Bombers, 21–22, though the italics are mine. Cha
pter 1 of Hastings’s Bomber Command has a fine, brief survey of the RAF between 1917 and 1940, and vol. 1 of Webster and Frankland’s Strategic Air Offensive is invaluable.

  12. On the theories of air warfare, see ch. 20 in E. M. Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); on Trenchard, see Hastings, Bomber Command, ch. 1. Much of my analysis here derives from Tami Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

  13. Trenchard’s remarkable statement, and the equally remarkable replies of the chief of the Imperial General Staff and the First Sea Lord, are extensively quoted in Longmate, The Bombers, 43–47.

  14. U. Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics 1932–1939 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1980). The Baldwin quotation is in Hastings, Bomber Command, 50.

  15. B. Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom (London: HMSO, 1957), sets the larger scene, as does Overy, Air War, ch. 2.

  16. W. Murray, Luftwaffe (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1985), 43–61, is superb here.

  17. See Collier, Defence, and T. C. G. Jones, The Battle of Britain (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

  18. See Robert Wohl, A Passion for Wings: Aviation and the Western Imagination 1908–1918 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).

  19. Liddell Hart, History, 91.

  20. For the best brief account, see G. Hartcup’s superb The Effect of Science on the Second World War (London: Macmillan, 2000), ch. 2–3.

  21. Quoted in B. Schwarz, “Black Saturday,” Atlantic, April 2008, 85, which is a review of Peter Stansky’s The First Day of the Blitz (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).