Lazarus Rising

by John Howard

  Fox was a different kettle of fish. He was quite unsympathetic to the Americans. He even presumed to tell me that he thought that Australia would be mistaken if it joined a military invasion. I knew that George Bush had hoped to build a good relationship with his Mexican counterpart. They seemed to have a lot in common, given Fox’s business background. Fox was invited to address a joint sitting of congress, within months of his taking office. Iraq was an example of such gestures not being reciprocated. Fox’s attitude verged on the hostile.

  There was now only the remotest possibility of another SC resolution. Again writing in my diary of 12 March, I said: ‘That will make it hard and bitter in Australia. There will be legal debates and some in the parliamentary party may object if we finally decided to go it alone with the US and UK. So far the colleagues have been superb. Their loyalty, in trying times, has been remarkable. I have had some very dark moments before, but this is as hard as it gets.’

  Although the cabinet, most particularly my senior National Security Committee (NSC) colleagues, unconditionally supported our stance, I had been the driving force behind the firm support we had given to the Americans. Both the party and the public saw this as something to which I had given a deep personal commitment. Recognising this, I wrote the following in my diary, again on 12 March: ‘I think all of us realise that if this really does go “pear-shaped”, then that would be it for me. I should take the rap, for the sake of the party’s future.’ In thinking this I was not being unduly pessimistic, just utterly realistic. I had put everything on the line.

  Supporting George Bush over Iraq made the Australian public quite uneasy. If military action took place with Australians involved, and by then most Australians believed that that would be the case, and it was quick, with few casualties, then the public’s verdict would be accepting. On the other hand, if the invasion were protracted, with greater-than-expected casualties, then the public reaction would be hostile. Understandably, I would then wear the blame.

  Bush invited me to a meeting in the Azores on 16 March of leaders of those nations likely to contribute to the sharp end of the military operation. Given the travel involved, there was no point in my going and, in any event, I was needed at home. Crunch time had arrived. There was now no hope of another resolution, not even in the mild form tabled on 24 February, and the United States and Britain abandoned their SC push.

  Australia was to commit forces to battle without bipartisan support. I did not like that one bit, but had no alternative.

  I had contempt for Labor’s position. Beazley had backed our troop deployment in 1998. This time his party had effectively tied its future action to the whims of Jacques Chirac and Vladimir Putin. The irony of this, while repeatedly I was attacked for too closely following George Bush, never occurred to the opposition or indeed much of the Australian media.

  I was falsely accused of slavishly following the Americans because of my close personal friendship with the President. Yet from the stance taken by the Labor opposition, it was clear that the determinant of Labor’s position would ultimately be how France and Russia might vote in the Security Council on the further resolution sought by the Americans and the British, late in February 2003. Simon Crean said that if that resolution were carried, then his party would support Australia being involved alongside the Americans.

  The Labor Party, consciously or otherwise, had taken a decision, effectively, to outsource Australia’s foreign policy on Iraq to the Russians and the French, both of whom agreed Iraq had WMDs but were determined to exploit their power of veto in the UN Security Council for political advantage.

  Apparently it was wrong of me to base a decision to go into Iraq, partly at least, on the strength of our decades-old and crucially important American alliance, yet it was in order to allow the caprice of an SC vote by the Russians and the French to determine the policy of the Australian Labor Party.

  That further resolution sought by the Americans and the British failed to materialise, thanks to the unwillingness of the French and the Russians to support it. The other veto-wielding permanent member of the Security Council, China, would not have stood in the way of the resolution if the Russians and the French had waved it through. I had divined that from talking to Li Peng, the former premier, when he came to Australia in 2002.

  The political debate in Australia was not between the Coalition arguing that a military operation was justified against the Labor Party asserting that it could never be justified, but rather about the precise circumstances in which it would be justified.

  Indeed, Simon Crean, the Labor leader, made it clear on several occasions that if a further resolution of the Security Council were obtained, authorising the use of force, then the Labor Party would support Australia’s involvement. Typically, though, Labor said that it did not support the type of military involvement which the Government had in mind. On 15 January 2003, Crean even suggested there might be circumstances in which he would support military action, absent a further resolution of the Security Council. He said, ‘The UN could find itself in circumstances in which there is very strong support, based on the evidence that Saddam Hussein still has weapons, but a UN Security Council resolution can’t be passed because one of the permanent members vetoes it. In those circumstances, I’m saying that we should consider those facts at the time.’12

  Nor was the debate in Australia about whether or not Saddam Hussein possessed WMDs. The former prime minister, Kevin Rudd, then opposition spokesman on Foreign Affairs, famously said in an address to the State Zionist Council of Victoria on 15 October 2002 that it was ‘an empirical fact’ that Iraq had WMDs.13 Instead of relying on UN reports to this effect, Rudd pointed the doubters in the direction of a report of the Federation of American Scientists. This body was founded by scientists who had worked on the Manhattan Project to develop the first atomic bomb. Rudd said that they attested to what he asserted to be an unarguable fact. In that same speech he said it was also an empirical fact that Saddam was a mass murderer.

  When necessary, the ADF always displayed blunt professionalism, precisely what one should expect from Australian military commanders. A short while before the final decision was taken, the CDF, General Cosgrove, and the director of the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), Frank Lewinkamp, called on me in my Canberra office. For more than an hour they spelled out in much detail the possible conditions and dangers our forces might face in Iraq, including from chemical and biological weapons.

  They pulled no punches. They had charts, illustrations and graphs, and all that was necessary to drive home the fact that this would be a dangerous mission. They were coldly professional, and did not, in any way, gild the lily. They had served the men and women of the ADF extremely well. When the meeting finished, the man who, ultimately, would take the decision had been left in no doubt as to what was involved.

  Once it was clear that no further SC resolution would eventuate, only a matter of days would elapse before George Bush pushed the button on the invasion of Iraq. The military forces of America, Britain and Australia were in place. The men and women themselves were rearing to go. Thankfully, soldiers always are. They join armies largely in the hope of seeing active service.

  The legal advice given to the Government was that there was sufficient authority under earlier UN resolutions to justify action against Iraq. That advice was tabled in parliament.

  Michael Thawley kept me constantly informed of White House thinking on when and how hostilities would start. Bush decided to issue Saddam with an ultimatum on 17 March that called on Saddam and his sons to leave Iraq within 48 hours in the name of the Coalition of the Willing — the collective name to describe those supporting in different ways the US-led operation — otherwise military action would start at a time of the Coalition’s choosing. The President had been fully briefed on the domestic process I had to follow and, as a result, telephoned me twice in the days preceding the start of hostilities.

  Iraq rejected the ultimatum almost immediately
, and Bush felt quite at liberty to give the go-ahead forthwith, and even before the time set by the ultimatum had run out.

  The NSC had been meeting regularly on Iraq, but I wanted full cabinet endorsement of a final decision to commit to the invasion. I called that cabinet meeting on the evening of 17 March. George Bush had telephoned me earlier that day; it was the day of his ultimatum to Saddam. There was unanimous support for Australian forces joining the action. It was the only possible decision, given all that had gone before.

  I called a special joint party meeting to tell the two parliamentary parties of the decision. It came as no surprise to them, and there was no dissent. I then called a news conference to announce the decision to the Australian public. To complete the process I presented a resolution to the House of Representatives on 20 March seeking endorsement of the Government’s action. As already explained, this was not necessary, but we had nothing to fear from a parliamentary debate. The Australian people would have found it unacceptable if a debate in parliament had not taken place.

  In January 2003 a poll in Fairfax newspapers had shown that support for Australia joining an invasion of Iraq, without UN approval (meaning a new and specific resolution), stood at just 6 per cent. In the face of such widespread public hesitation, the unity of the Liberal and National parties, when it came to the crunch on Iraq, was quite remarkable. In the final vote every single person in the Liberal and National parties supported the Government’s position, as did the former National Party member and by then Independent, Bob Katter. The other two Independents, Peter Andren and Tony Windsor, voted with the Labor Party.

  Some colleagues were uneasy. Peter Lindsay was unhappy that there had not been another UN resolution. Judi Moylan worried about the humanitarian situation in Iraq. Alexander Downer listened to her concerns, and ensured that she participated in a delegation sent to the Middle East to assess humanitarian issues. I spent time talking to both of them. I was grateful that their loyalty to the Government and acceptance of its good faith took precedence over their individual concerns.

  During a cabinet meeting late in 2002, Warren Truss had said that some staunch National Party supporters were uneasy, and one of them had said to him, ‘Can’t we just this once not go along with the Americans?’ He sounded uneasy himself. This issue had stretched the loyalties of a great many people.

  I had asked a lot of them on this issue, and their steadfastness was moving. It was a splendid illustration of the camaraderie and sense of loyalty and cohesion which was a hallmark of our almost 12 years in government. When I wound up the parliamentary debate on the Iraq resolution on 20 March I expressed my profound gratitude to my colleagues for their forbearance and loyalty.

  On the day hostilities commenced, there was a special church service in the chapel of the Royal Military College Duntroon. We all prayed for the safe return of our men and women. That evening I addressed the nation to explain the Government’s decision. I repeated my earlier arguments about the danger posed by Iraq’s possession of WMDs, in particular that such weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists.

  I also stressed the alliance dimensions of our decision, in the following way:

  There’s also another reason and that is our close security alliance with the United States. The Americans have helped us in the past and the United States is very important to Australia’s long-term security. It is critical that we maintain the involvement of the United States in our own region, where, at present, there are real concerns about the dangerous behaviour of North Korea.

  The relationship between our two countries will grow more rather than less important as the years go by.

  A key element of our close friendship with the US and indeed with the British is our full and intimate sharing of intelligence material. In the difficult fight against the new menace of international terrorism there is nothing more crucial than timely and accurate intelligence. This is a priceless component of our relationship with our two very close allies.

  There is nothing comparable to be found in any other relationship — nothing more relevant indeed to the challenges of the contemporary world.

  In that address I asked for tolerance towards people of Arab descent and of the Islamic faith. I said, ‘Our argument is with Saddam Hussein’s regime. It is certainly not with Islam. Australians of an Arab background or of the Islamic faith are a treasured part of our community. Over the weeks ahead and beyond we should all extend to them the hand of Australian mateship.’

  Also, and mindful of the disgraceful treatment of many Australian soldiers when they returned from Vietnam, I said that those in the community who disagreed with my decision should vent their anger against me and the Government, not our soldiers.

  As events unfolded, Australian SAS were the first Coalition forces to cross the Iraqi border and engage the Iraqi Army. Press critics of the Government’s decision tried to make something of this, suggesting that our forces had jumped the gun. This was not the case. The SAS did not enter Iraq until after the Iraqis had rejected the Bush ultimatum.

  George Bush rang me again on Friday, 21 March for a general discussion and also to tell of a precision air strike which, he hoped, had taken out both Saddam and his two sons. The final result was not what he had hoped for. It was clear from this telephone talk that Bush felt a sense of relief that, for good or ill, things were at long last happening. He had known for some time that this day would come but he had patiently, and against the counsel of many in his Administration, sought additional SC cover for an invasion of Iraq. He had been right to do so.

  It was a Thursday in Australia when the invasion order was given, and Janette and I spent the following weekend in Canberra so I could be in constant touch with the ADF hierarchy. On Saturday evening Janette and I invited the CDF, General Peter Cosgrove, his vice-chief and the three service chiefs and their wives to the Lodge for dinner. Those five men were a deeply impressive group. They understood the inherent dangers in military action of any kind and they harboured no illusions about what may lie ahead. I felt a special bond with them. The Lodge dinner was a way of emphasising that.

  The sharp end of the military offensive against Iraq was both quick and effective. After rapid progress being made in the first 10 days, there was a hiatus while US forces secured over-extended supply lines and sandstorms restricted air operations. Critics in the United States lost no time alleging that Rumsfeld had not sent enough troops for the intensive phase of the attack. He immediately refuted this, and subsequent events, which saw the end of Saddam’s regime in a little over a month after the start of hostilities, vindicated Rumsfeld in relation to the attack itself. As later developments were to highlight, it was an entirely different matter when it came to the stabilisation of Iraq after Saddam had gone. It was there that the claim that the Pentagon had skimped on the number of troops committed to Iraq had more potency.

  There was euphoria at the sight of the pulling down of Saddam’s statue, thus symbolising the successful conclusion of the invasion phase. The ordinary people in that country were glad to see the back of him. Even in the blackest moments in the several years of chaos that predated the surge, there was no appetite for a return of the hated former dictator.

  The rapid conclusion of the assault against Saddam changed public opinion in Australia. On 26 March, Newspoll said that 50 per cent of Australians supported involvement in the war, up from 25 per cent only two weeks earlier. Similar movements occurred in both the United States and Britain.

  The SAS, as always, performed with much distinction, this time suppressing Scud missiles in the Western Desert. The Hornets flew the first RAAF combat missions since Vietnam and HMAS ANZAC provided shellfire cover for the Royal Marines when they assaulted the Al Faw Peninsula. The Australian contingent packed a real punch and was warmly welcomed by our allies.

  Their mission finished, the SAS returned in May 2003, and I welcomed them back at their home base at Swanbourne in Perth on 18 May, having the day before greeted the returning HM
AS ANZAC and Darwin. I had had the opportunity of seeing quite a number of our troops in Qatar, on the way back from my May visit to the United States and Britain. They had done a superb job. Likewise with the squadron of Hornets; I went to Tindal Air Base in the Northern Territory several days earlier, to welcome them home. I could tell from the comments of the pilots and others just how much they had savoured the experience.

  Although Australian forces were not part of the post-invasion stabilisation effort, significantly, in May 2004 Major General Jim Molan was appointed Chief of Operations in Iraq, directly answerable to General Casey, the US Commander. Molan oversaw a force of 300,000, including 150,000 Americans, through some of the bloodiest years of sectarian violence. His appointment said a lot about his professionalism as a soldier, as well as signalling the high regard in which the ADF was held.

  Although Kevin Rudd would, opportunistically, back away from his unqualified assertion that Saddam had WMDs, the truth was that both Kevin Rudd and Kim Beazley were rather restrained, early in 2003, in their criticism of my Government’s decision to go into Iraq. A careful analysis of their statements showed that if the post-invasion phase had gone better for the United States and her allies, neither of them would have had much difficulty in finding themselves supporting what the Government had done.