Inside the Crosshairs

by Col. Michael Lee Lanning

  During the weeks before USARV forwarded the report, the Tet Offensive exploded all across South Vietnam in the enemy’s largest offensive to date. The official paper trail of “Sniper Operations and Equipment” stopped at the U.S. Army Pacific Command Headquarters in Hawaii despite the fact that the document’s distribution list indicated that copies went to various offices in the Department of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and every major U.S. Army command, school, and center, as well as the navy, air force, and Marine Corps. There is no evidence that any official action took place beyond the report’s delivery to Hawaii.

  Obviously, the Tet Offensive occupied the primary attention of all U.S. military commands for the next several months. Many of the participants in the sniper study either became casualties of the offensive or rotated to other assignments before additional action could take place. Those factors, combined with the fact that snipers had no senior ranking officer to champion their cause, resulted in the erosion of the foundation for precision shooting specialization that had been made during the ACTIV evaluation.

  Just as it seemed doomed to revert to its pre-ACTIV state, the army’s sniper program received the senior officer support that it needed to become a lasting part of combat operations. In February 1968, Major General Julian J. Ewell assumed command of the 9th Infantry Division, where he implemented a variety of different programs, among them the increased use of snipers. He later wrote in Sharpening the Combat Edge, “In the spring and summer of 1968 we were looking for ways to bring the enemy to battle on our terms and were willing to try anything within the limits of common sense and sound military judgment. To do this we adapted known tactical innovations to the unique [Mekong] delta environment, resulting in tactical innovations which proved highly successful.”

  Ewell increased the number of small-unit airmobile assaults and night operations. He also believed that his division’s area of operations in the relatively open delta region south of Saigon would prove to be excellent sniper country.

  Before his arrival in Vietnam, Ewell had already taken steps to establish a viable sniper program in the 9th Division by contacting the U.S. Army Marksmanship Training Unit (USAMTU) at Fort Benning, which had provided the ACTIV test with weapons and literature. The USAMTU was established in 1956 with the mission of improving the shooting skills of army riflemen. To do this the unit conducted marksmanship competitions and participated in worldwide matches. During the competitions the USAMTU staff was able to single out the army’s top shooters for assignment to Fort Benning for additional training. They would then return to their units to pass along their shooting abilities to other soldiers.

  At one time the USAMTU had attempted to establish a sniper-training course only to meet with resistance within the ranks. According to “The History of the U.S. Army Marksmanship Training Program” (published in November 1970), “The program was short-lived because of the lack of understanding and appreciation for the value of a sniper throughout the United States Army. In addition, the military attitude then envisioned any future conflict as a nuclear one with defeat or victory decided in hours.”

  In 1967, before departing for Vietnam, Ewell convinced the Department of the Army to direct the USAMTU to establish a sniper-training program. The USAMTU history explains, “The Vietnam War revived the need for snipers. Enemy forces demonstrated effective employment of snipers in varying tactical conditions. Attempts by U.S. Army elements to engage in countersniping activities were similar to attempts of previous wars: no special equipment or trained personnel and a lack of technique and doctrine for commanders at all levels. In 1968 the army decided to establish a school for snipers in Vietnam. The USAMTU was given the mission of writing the doctrine, furnishing the skilled marksmen and special equipment, and establishing a school in the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam.”

  The USAMTU reacted quickly to provide equipment, doctrine, and instructors for sniper training in Vietnam. Some members of the unit began working with the Army Weapons Command at Rock Island, Illinois, the Combat Development Command of the Fort Benning Infantry Agency, and the Limited Warfare Agency at Aberdeen, Maryland. Their objective was to develop and field sniper rifles, scopes, mounts, and other equipment; the result was the adoption of the XM-21, a modified M14, as the army’s basic sniper weapon.‖

  Meanwhile, other USAMTU members drafted copies of a sniper program of instruction. After all the modifications and rewrites were in, the Department of the Army published the program in October 1969 as Training Circular (TC) 23-14, “Sniper Training and Employment.”

  The most important aspect in meeting its mission of establishing a sniper school in Vietnam came with the reassignment of Major Willis L. Powell and eight noncommissioned officers from the USAMTU to the 9th Infantry Division in June 1968. Powell, a native of Guthrie, Oklahoma, had more than twenty years in the army and had advanced in rank to master sergeant before attending officer candidate school. Along with the experience of years of competition shooting at the national and international level, Powell had served a previous tour in Vietnam in 1963 and 1964 as an adviser to the ARVN.

  Powell and his sergeants immediately revamped the division’s M16 rifle training for new arrivals at Fire Base Bearcat, east of Saigon, and began training a few volunteers as snipers. Before Powell could make his school fully operational, the 9th Division headquarters turned Bearcat over to the Royal Thailand Army and moved south of Saigon to Dong Tam. There the instructors began construction of a 500-meter known-distance range while also accompanying patrols to learn the terrain and tactics of the Delta area of operations. According to an article in the division magazine, Octofoil, of January 1969, during their first month of operations the USAMTU instructors killed ten Vietcong at ranges in excess of 500 meters.

  Despite their individual successes, members of the marksmanship team found most commanders in the 9th Division too busy fighting the war to help establish a sniper school. Ewell, concerned about the slow progress of the program, recognized that its success depended on his personal intervention. In early August he assigned Brigadier General James S. Timothy the task of getting the sniper program off the ground. Ewell later wrote, “This gave it the needed boost.”

  Timothy, a West Point graduate and a decorated infantry veteran of World War II, had previously served in Vietnam as the commander of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and as commander of the II Corps Advisory Group. Before joining Ewell as his assistant division commander, Timothy served in the States as the assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning and had an appreciation for the USAMTU and of snipers in general.

  Powell, who served with Timothy at Fort Benning before their transfer to Vietnam, recalls, “General Ewell had a meeting with General Timothy and myself. He told Timothy to look over our shoulder to keep things progressing but more importantly to get whatever we needed to get the school going.”

  With Timothy’s support, the marksmanship team made rapid progress. Powell, bearing the title Commandant, Sniper School, 9th Infantry Division, extended the Dong Tam range to 700 meters, and, with Timothy’s backing, recruited volunteers from each infantry battalion for sniper training. After two and a half weeks of training, the school graduated its first snipers in November. On November 19, one of the newly trained marksman recorded the sniper school’s first official kill north of Binh Phuoc in Long An Province.

  In early December the second class graduated from the 9th Infantry sniper school. Over the next months Powell and his staff continued to train 9th Division snipers as well as those from other units in the southern part of South Vietnam, including riflemen from the 25th Infantry Division and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade.

  During that period other American units conducted limited sniper training based on the experience and facilities developed during the ACTIV tests. As the only official army sniper program in place, the 9th Division provided advice and assistance on a limited basis to the training conducted by other units.

  “Operational
Report of the 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969” (dated May 15, 1969) provides an excellent summary of sniper training to that time. According to the then-classified report, “A total of five classes were conducted and a sixth class began 27 April 1969. The outstanding results obtained by the 9th Infantry Division snipers have generated interest in the sniper training throughout USARV. As a result, the school has conducted training for snipers and cadre personnel from six U.S. divisions and one separate brigade. These cadre will form the nucleus for sniper-training schools in those units.”

  When Powell and his team completed their one-year tour of duty in Vietnam in June 1969, a second group of instructors from the USAMTU under the leadership of Major Gary R. Chittester took their places. Powell returned to Fort Benning and rejoined the USAMTU, where he assisted in the writing of TC 23-14.

  In early 1969, with the encouragement of General Ewell and the USAMTU commander, Colonel Robert F. Bayard, the Department of the Army agreed to send additional marksmanship teams to Vietnam to train snipers. The teams were to be trained at Fort Benning by Major Powell at the newly formed Sniper-Training Course.

  Each team consisted of a major, seven or eight NCOs, and a trained armorer. The first class of sniper instructors graduated from Powell’s school on December 19, 1969. Over the next year, teams from the USAMTU’s course established formal sniper training in Vietnam with the 101st Airborne Division, the 4th Infantry Division, and the 23rd (Americal) Infantry Division. Each of the schools, in a manner similar to that of the 9th Infantry, trained snipers from other commands as well as its own.

  The army’s sniper program in Vietnam was just accelerating when other events overtook it. Within weeks after Major Chittester’s team replaced Powell’s, the U.S. Army began withdrawing troops from Vietnam. President Richard Nixon had won the 1968 election with the promise to end the conflict “with honor.” The dwindling support of the American public for the war caused the president to order the U.S. military command in Vietnam to turn the fighting over to the South Vietnamese and to transfer units back to the States. Two of the 9th Infantry Division’s brigades were among the first withdrawn, leaving only its 3rd Brigade in Vietnam.

  The 9th Infantry Division sniper school graduated its last class on July 19, 1969. Chittester and his team then transferred to the 25th Infantry Division and continued to train snipers, including volunteers from the 9th Division’s 3rd Brigade, at a range they developed near Cu Chi.

  As more U.S. units withdrew from Vietnam, the schools trained fewer snipers. When the USAMTU teams completed their tours, they were not replaced. The last USAMTU team joined the 23rd (Americal) Infantry Division in early 1971 and returned home when the unit withdrew the following fall. During the summer of 1972, the final army snipers in Vietnam turned in their rifles and scopes when the last ground units of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade departed the war zone.

  *The others were the 25th Infantry Division, stationed in Hawaii, which soon followed the 173rd to Vietnam, and the 193rd Infantry Brigade, which remained in Panama for the entire war to provide security for the Panama Canal.

  †U.S. Army field and technical manuals are updated and republished every two to ten years, depending on changes and advances made in the particular field covered by a manual. A notation on the inside cover of each new issue states. “This manual supersedes [the name and date of the previous edition].” Between new editions, the army publishes updates with their effective dates and designates the changes as “C 1,” “C 2,” etc.

  ‡The USAMTU, like the prewar Marine marksmanship units, contained mostly competition shooters with extensive experience on the rifle range but little or none in sniper operations. Nevertheless, they possessed their service’s only real expertise in precision shooting, and it was from their skills that the army’s sniper program in Vietnam evolved.

  §Actually the 173rd’s area of operations differed little from adjacent commands. Reluctance to participate in the program probably resulted from antisniper bias on the part of the commander and his staff rather than the cited conditions.

  ‖Details are in Chapter 10 “Tools of the Trade: Arms and Equipment.”

  CHAPTER 8

  Snipers in Vietnam: Other U.S. and Allies

  AS in all wars, the infantry in Vietnam bore the brunt of hardships and casualties, and, therefore, “grunt” units were the ones most in need of sniper expertise. There were several obvious reasons for this. First, infantrymen had the most direct exposure to the enemy. Second, on-the-ground grunts were in position to spot isolated or small groups of enemy with little or no warning, opportunities that required instant action. Third, infantry units on patrol had only the amount of ammunition they could carry on their bodies; the more efficient its use, the longer they could maintain combat effectiveness.

  Americans were not alone in the fight against the North Vietnamese and their Vietcong subordinates. More than forty nations provided assistance to the Republic of Vietnam in its struggle against the Communists. That aid included educational, humanitarian, economic, and technical contributions. In addition to the United States, seven other countries provided direct military assistance. Known as the Free World Military Assistance Forces, they were: Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of China, and Spain.

  The United States, however, was the only player on the anti-Communist side to make significant use of snipers. And only the U.S. infantry units did that. By comparison, soldiers and Marines in armor, cavalry, and artillery units had little call for a sniper’s long-range, one-shot capability. While armor and cavalry units operated in close proximity to the enemy, they traveled in tracked vehicles that offered them protection from small arms fire, provided them with .50-caliber machine guns and large-caliber main guns, and carried for them cases of ammunition.

  Artillery batteries, usually operating from fixed positions in secured base camps, dealt with the enemy from afar, delivering their destructive power through coordinated trajectories. Even when the fighting shifted to close combat, the artillerymen had stores of ammunition at their disposal and their bases were mutually supporting.

  Even further removed from direct combat with the enemy and any need for snipers were most members of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force—except the few sailors who experienced ground combat in Vietnam as SEALs (Sea, Air, Land), small gunboat crews, and pilots providing close air support. The SEAL teams, however, operating primarily in the Mekong Delta region south of Saigon with missions of reconnaissance, prisoner snatching, and ambushing, did not require sniper expertise. At no time during the war did they officially include snipers in their organization.*

  Nor did they unofficially claim to do so. Gary Evans, who served in Vietnam with SEAL Team One in 1969, recalls that SEALs of the period were excellent marksmen but received neither sniper weapons nor special marksmanship training. Evans says that in the summer of 1969 he procured an MID with an M82 scope and taught himself to be a sniper. He notes, however, that his team’s missions did not really require a long-range marksman, and he is unaware of any other SEALs’ carrying special scoped rifles.

  Likewise, SEAL veteran of the same period Brian W. Curle concurs, “To the best of my knowledge, I am not aware that Seals used snipers per se in Vietnam.” Darryl Young, who served with Team One in 1970 and wrote The Element of Surprise about his experiences, supports the fact that no official SEAL snipers served in southeast Asia. According to Young, “During the time I was in SEAL Team One there were no SEAL snipers.”

  Besides the SEALs, a few sailors on gunboats operated on inland waterways and some navy pilots and aircrews engaged in close air support of ground units. Otherwise, navy personnel supported ground operations with large-caliber gunfire from distant offshore positions.

  Air force personnel also provided air support for infantry units, but most of their operations took place from high altitudes. While a few (and exceptional) airmen and sailors—specifically, those crewing small boats or g
uarding in-country airstrips—might have procured sniper weapons, no evidence suggests successful sniper engagements in either of those services.

  Even though the U.S. infantry found snipers to be an effective tool against the enemy, that was not the case for combat units from other countries—including South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese soldiers and marines, like their American counterparts, assumed the bulk of that country’s combat missions and casualties. Twelve army divisions consisting of 105 infantry battalions and one marine division of nine battalions composed the ground forces of the Republic of Vietnam. The South Vietnamese army, first organized in 1949, and its marine corps, founded in 1965, were armed primarily with weapons from the United States. During the early 1960s the South Vietnamese infantrymen carried M1 Garands. These were replaced by M14s in the mid-1960s. When the United States implemented “Vietnamization” in 1969 and American units began to withdraw, South Vietnamese soldiers and marines began to receive M16s as their basic rifle.

  Prior to the war, gun ownership, hunting, and shooting in general were limited to the small upper class of Vietnamese. Unsophisticated recruits and draftees from the countryside had no experience with firearms. Vietnamese city dwellers were also unfamiliar with weaponry, having seen rifles only in the hands of the military.

  Marksmanship can, of course, be taught regardless of a person’s previous experience, and many South Vietnamese soldiers and marines became adequate, if not expert, shots. Long-range, scoped marksmanship, however, was a skill that few South Vietnamese sought or acquired. Sniper training had no high-ranking advocate in the South Vietnamese military or government, and apparently it never received any great amount of consideration despite the results of the American long-range shooting programs. As a result of starting with such unskilled troops, the South Vietnamese army as a whole never reached the level of expertise to merit establishing its own sniper school. The available M1C and M1D rifles and scopes remained largely unused.