On occasion sniper teams carried M79 40-mm grenade launchers with high-explosive rounds for use at up to 400 meters and buckshot canisters for in-close combat. Experimental models of an over-and-under combination of the M16 and M79, known as the XM148 and later adopted as the M203, also became a popular weapon of the sniper team observers.
Two important factors influenced weapons selection by the sniper teams. In relatively static areas of operations with limited movement, the sniper teams could and did carry larger loads and maximum firepower. If accompanying units on patrol or long-term operations, they had to leave some items behind. The second factor that influenced backup weapon selection was compatibility of ammunition. The marksmen typically carried forty to eighty rounds of match ammunition for their sniper rifles, and the M40s, XM21s, and M14s were all capable of firing standard 7.62-mm rounds as well. The 5.56-mm ammunition for the M16 was lighter and easier to carry, but it could not be used in the sniper rifles.
Again, mission requirements and distances to be covered greatly influenced the amount of other munitions carried by sniper teams. Each man added two to four or more hand grenades and two or more claymore mines for defense. Each also carried several smoke grenades and star-cluster canisters along with a strobe light to mark their positions for supporting fires and for extraction. Some snipers even included CS and other types of tear gas canisters and white phosphorus (WP) grenades to their arsenal. In the event of compromise, the sniper team could move upwind, then pop the gas and WP behind them to mask their withdrawal and slow pursuit.
Intended primarily for cutting camouflage vegetation or opening rations, a variety of knives rounded out the list of sniper weapons. Because snipers worked at great distances from their targets—the greater the distance the better—the idea of their using knives in combat was neither popular nor practical.
Snipers attached to infantry platoons and companies usually relied on the radio communications organic to those units. At times security elements assigned to sniper teams carried radios to maintain contact with higher headquarters and air and artillery support units. In the extremely rare instances when sniper teams worked independently, they carried their own PRC-25 and its later replacement, the PRC-77. With their standard antennas, the twenty-two-pound radios provided communications over a range of eight to twelve kilometers. This distance could be doubled using various field-expedient antennas made with WD1 commo wire extended into overhanging tree limbs.
No Americans in Vietnam, including snipers, went anywhere without communications. The radio lifelines not only provided artillery and air support but could also call in extraction helicopters and maintain contact with nearby units to avoid friendly fire incidents.
Sniper team observers also frequently carried 20-power M49 spotting scopes along with a tripod. The scopes provided a wider field of vision and greater magnification than the rifle telescopes. Binoculars of various manufacture and magnification also added to the observation power of the sniper teams. Maps, sometimes supplemented by aerial photos, and a lensatic compass rounded out the sniper team’s working gear.
Other adjustments to the snipers’ operations involved clothing, supplies, and creature comforts. The first Marines in Vietnam arrived wearing olive drab cotton “utilities” while the early soldiers came wearing similar clothing known as “fatigues.” More suited to garrison and parade field activities than to jungle and rice paddy action, those uniforms quickly gave way to lightweight jungle uniforms that dried rapidly and withstood the rigors of long-term wear in the field.
The jungle uniforms had trousers with a cargo pocket on each thigh large enough to hold a map, a ration packet, or other cumbersome items; two hip pockets on the front; and a couple of traditional pockets over the buttocks. The leg openings had drawstrings that allowed blousing at the boot tops to prevent leeches and insects from crawling up the leg. The jungle uniform shirt, cut long to be worn outside the trousers, had four large pockets on its front. Each pocket on both shirt and trousers had a small, thread-reinforced hole at the bottom to allow water to drain after stream crossings or during monsoon rains. Tops of the shirt pockets slanted inward to further assist in shedding water.
After their introduction, the jungle uniforms went through several modifications, such as changes in pocket placement and the addition of draw tabs to shirts and trousers for tailoring their fit. The most practical modification was replacing the ordinary cotton material with a ripstop poplin that made the uniform much more durable. Because of the heat, humidity, and frequent downpours, most snipers, like their fellow infantrymen, wore no underwear beneath their jungle uniforms in order to reduce rashes, ringworm, and jungle rot.
For the snipers, the most significant problem with the uniform was that it came in only solid olive drab, a color that did not always blend in with the terrain. Some snipers procured various types of camouflage uniforms that ranged from Korean War—vintage green-and-black-spotted “leopard” fatigues to a variety of green-and-black irregularly striped “tiger” uniforms available from in-country manufacturers. Since those uniforms were generally made for the smaller-in-stature Vietnamese, snipers had to special-order larger uniforms.
Snipers sanitized their field uniforms by removing all emblems of rank, unit, name, or other identification. Beyond the “USMC” stenciled on Marine pockets or the “U.S. Army” sewed above them, sniper uniforms were bare of adornment, in part to support counterintelligence but mostly to prevent anything that might give away the sniper’s position.
The issue black leather boot common to the army and Marine Corps early in the war quickly gave way to a blackleather-bottom, olive-drab canvas-top jungle boot that came with drain holes along the sole to evacuate water. Some snipers and infantrymen wore their jungle boots without the heavy green issue socks.
Snipers of both services frequently camouflaged their skin with green and black grease sticks, and they sometimes added cloth and vegetation to their weapons and equipment. They did not, however, wear the “gillie suits” made of net, burlap, and artificial shredded garnish that have come to symbolize post-Vietnam snipers because those were not available in Vietnam.d Even if they had been, the weight and resultant discomfort from heat would have limited their use. Many snipers did carry a lightweight camouflage-pattern poncho liner to assist in their remaining unobserved in their “hides.” The poncho liner also came in handy as a blanket in the cooler night hours.
Headgear for the snipers also varied greatly. The most preferred hat was the circular-brimmed “floppie” or “boonie” hat that came in various shades of olive drab and camouflage patterns. In addition to providing reasonable protection from the sun and rain, the flexible brim assisted snipers in blending in with the environment and proved useful as a pad to hold hot weapon barrels. Snipers also wore various issue and nonissue soft caps as well as headbands made from the olive-drab triangle bandages found in standard-issue first aid packets. Tied bandanna-fashion around the forehead, the cloths kept perspiration out of the eyes and obscured light-colored skin.
Few snipers used the standard-issue steel helmets because of their weight and easily recognizable profile. The only times they were likely to wear them were on operations with regular infantry units or when they supported base camps or fire bases, especially those vulnerable to enemy mortar and rocket fire. In those cases the snipers also added flak vests to their uniforms.
To carry ammunition and supplies, snipers wore issue web gear, wide-woven canvas belts supported by canvas suspenders officially labeled “load-bearing equipment” (LBE). On the LBE, like other infantrymen, snipers attached canteens, ammo pouches, first aid packets, and a variety of other equipment according to unit policy and individual preference.
Although the web gear generally held everything necessary to sustain the sniper for brief periods, he often needed heavier equipment, creature comfort items, more rations, and additional water. Those he stowed in a rucksack suspended from shoulder straps on his back. The standard-issue canvas, mul
tiple-pocket, aluminum-frame rucksack came with a quick release on one of the straps so it could be quickly jettisoned during contact. Some snipers preferred the more compact tan rucksacks captured from the NVA while others constructed their own rucksacks using whatever was available, including issued and captured gear.
Water, the item most essential for sustained field operations, added the greatest weight to the sniper’s load. Snipers carried multiple plastic one- and two-quart canteens along with canvas-covered plastic bags that held up to five quarts. Although they also carried iodine and halazone tablets to purify water from streams in the field, they generally tried to carry sufficient water because the enemy often maintained observers at water sources.
Food for the snipers consisted of canned C rations and freeze-dried meals—known as “LURPs” in honor of the reconnaissance units for which they were originally fielded. However, because of the need to remain hidden to successfully engage targets and for their own security, most snipers ate little in the field. To light a heat tab or other combustible in order to warm their rations or to make a cup of coffee might compromise their position.
Along with the standard first aid kit, many snipers carried additional “pill packets” containing anything from basic anti-malaria tablets and vitamins to stimulants that helped them maintain alertness. As with many of their other supplies, the amount they carried depended on how closely they were working with other ground units. In their usual duty as attachments to infantry platoons or companies, the sniper teams looked to the unit medic or corpsman of their hosts to provide medical supplies.
Water, food, medical supplies, and other creature comfort items were carried to enable the sniper to transport his weapon and ammunition and to use his telescopic sight. Along with a few personal items, such as a toothbrush and toothpaste and an extra pair of socks, snipers sometimes carried an olive drab jungle sweater or undershirt in a plastic bag for the cooler evening hours at higher elevations.
Most snipers also maintained a “log” or a “kill sheet” detailing their observations and actions on each mission. The written accounts provided intelligence analysis of each mission as well as proof of each successful engagement. Some units, particularly in the Marine Corps, required the signature of an officer on each entry to verify a kill. This usually meant a direct contact with the dead enemy’s body. In instances where the approach to a distant kill might be too dangerous, long-range ground or air visual observation would suffice. In a few special cases, officers signed kill sheets on the basis of the sniper teams’ report when direct contact or observation was not possible.
The tools of the sniper’s trade varied greatly from unit to unit and from individual to individual. All were important, but the sniper’s arms and equipment merely delivered, protected, or sustained the individual marksman so that he could properly align the scoped rifle.
*The “8-power” scope actually produced a magnification of only 7.8.
†Match ammunition arrived in Vietnam packaged in paper boxes containing twenty rounds each. The white containers with red and blue markings were much more appropriate to the rifle range than to field use, where proper camouflage often meant survival.
‡The presence of the rifles is an example of the unofficial efforts by army ground units to field their own snipers early in the war. The exact source of the Winchester Model 70s in the 101st is unknown, but they probably came from the division’s prewar marksmanship team.
§Modifying rifles, scopes, and mounts was an unending process in both the Marine Corps and the army. Some modifications took place at the factories, others at Stateside armories; still others were made by the marksmanship training teams, unit armorers, and the shooters themselves.
‖Subsequent generations of Starlight models appeared in Vietnam near the end of the war along with much larger, higher-magnification models, but the AN/PVS-2 was the only night vision device commonly employed by snipers in the conflict. Starlight scopes were also widely used, unmounted, by the infantry to observe approaches to their nighttime defensive and ambush positions. By late 1969 the scopes were so plentiful that every American rifle platoon had at least one, and often two or more, in its inventory.
aDespite adaptations, neither the Winchester nor the Remington offered a stable enough platform or a satisfactory “sight line” to mount the relatively large, heavy Starlight scopes. Also, some snipers and Marine officials did not support pursuing an adequate mount because they believed that replacing the normal day-scope with a night-vision device under field conditions would decrease the accuracy of the weapon system.
bA combat veteran quickly learns the distinctive sound of each weapon, friendly and enemy, used on the battlefield. Even the newest arrivals in the combat zone, U.S. or North Vietnamese, could distinguish between an AK-47, SKS, M16, M14, and the bolt-action sniper rifles.
cAdditional information on the two-man team concept can be found in Chapter 11 “Training and Organization.”
dThe suits gained their names from Scottish hunting guides and gamekeepers known as “gillies” who used the camouflage covers to conduct game counts in their preserves and to watch for poachers. The first American use of the gillie suit is credited to Captain Jim Land, who used one made by his wife, Ellie, at the 1st Marine Brigade sniper school in Hawaii in 1961, but they were in common use on Soviet reconnaissance and sniper missions during World War II.
CHAPTER 11
Training and Organization
THE selection of personnel and the acquisition of weapons and equipment were key elements in the success of army and Marine snipers in Vietnam. However, quality men and material alone could not accomplish the mission of long-range shooting. Sniper candidates required specific training to master their rifles and the many other components of effective sniper operations.
Training, varying in time and content, began with the formal sniper schools, taught either at in-country training facilities or in the States. The objectives of the training were simple and specific. To successfully complete the course, each student had to develop the confidence, will, knowledge, and skills required to become an effective sniper. Along with those skills, he had to display the ability to apply, instinctively, correct procedures and techniques when functioning in combat as an individual and as a team member.
The learning process, however, did not end with completion of the formal schools. Snipers continued to add to their knowledge by gathering information and techniques from their teammates on the job and through their own personal experiences. Although refresher training courses—especially in marksmanship—became common in Vietnam, it was each mission that provided snipers, regardless of their time in the field and their number of personal kills, the opportunity to perfect their craft.
Marine sniper training during World War II had lasted five weeks, and in the 1960s most experienced shooters still believed that marksmen required at least three to five weeks of intensive day and night training to become proficient snipers. In fact, when the Marine Corps published FMFM 1–3B, “Sniping,” in 1969, it included a syllabus for sniper training consisting of more than 200 hours of formal classes and practical exercises.*
Unfortunately, because the Marines and the army arrived in Vietnam with no sniper capability, they had to train their marksmen in the midst of combat operations. Time to structure the in-country sniping schools according to peacetime training guidelines or requirements simply did not exist. Other factors, such as limited access to ranges—experienced by Captain Russell when establishing the 3rd Marine Division sniper school—also curtailed the length and content of training.
Because of range limitations, the 3rd Marine Division offered only three days of training in its initial classes. That became a week when facilities became available. Captain Land likewise used a five-to-seven-day training schedule for the initial sniper classes in the 1st Marine Division. The length of both in-country Marine sniper programs eventually extended to eighteen to twenty-one days.
The army’s snipe
r training in Vietnam also was brief when first established. When it began sniper evaluation in 1967, the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) provided to the infantry divisions and separate brigades guidance for training programs averaging forty-six hours in length. Two years later, when he founded the 9th Infantry Division’s sniper school, Major Willis Powell used the eighteen-day curriculum that he had developed at the USAMTU at Fort Benning.
Because of the limited time available, the initial, week-long sniper schools focused almost exclusively on marksmanship and the care of rifles and scopes. Subjects included telescope orientation, range estimation, target detection, zeroing, wind effects, and weapon maintenance. Once the students mastered those skills, they began live firing.
Despite the abbreviated schedule, most soldiers and Marines believed that the training provided sufficient practice for them to master the basics of long-range marksmanship. According to ACTIV surveys, about 85 percent of those trained for the army test expressed satisfaction with their instruction. Marines who went through the early sniper-training schools in both divisions expressed an even greater degree of approval of their training, frequently commenting positively on the skills and experience of their instructors. Ed Kugler, who joined the 4th Marine Regiment Sniper Platoon in March 1966, states, “My training was excellent. It was real, it was hard, but it was effective. No hype, just do it.”
Powell’s 9th Infantry Division students, as well as those in the Marine schools, recognized the experience of their instructors and respected their expertise. An article in the January–March 1969 issue of the 9th Division’s Octofoil quoted one of Powell’s early students: “ ’I couldn’t believe how great the NCOs were. They really know their business and treated us like professionals.’ ”
Inside the Crosshairs Page 17