Ultimately, all sniper training, in-country and Stateside, followed basically the same program. Training began with an orientation on the sniper weapon system, its ammunition, and its care and maintenance. Following lectures and demonstrations the cadre moved the students to the firing range, an area that dominated the entire course. Other instruction included classes on techniques in camouflage and concealment, individual movement, escape and evasion, land navigation, communications, intelligence gathering and reporting, and air and artillery fire request and control.
Depending on time and available facilities, instructors modified or combined subjects, frequently teaching fieldcraft and other nonshooting skills to students awaiting their turn on the range. The concurrent instruction allowed everyone to maximize the limited number of training hours.
Regardless of hours available or content modification, marksmanship remained the focus of all the sniper-training courses. Other portions of the schools might be shortened or combined, but range firing remained a priority because many students, even though they had scored expert with their individual weapons, had little or no experience with scoped military weapons or firing at long-range targets.
The all-important marksmanship training began with the basics of sighting and aiming, trigger control, and sight adjustment in dry-fire mode. Only then did the students begin to place rounds downrange to learn how to zero—to adjust the weapon sights so the bullet struck where aimed—their weapon systems. Once satisfied with their zero, the student fired from both supported and unsupported prone, kneeling, and standing positions. Even though the prone position with the weapon supported by a bipod, sandbag, or other steadying device provided the most accuracy, snipers had to be able to fire quickly from unprepared positions as well. Students fired at targets at ranges of 150, 300, 600, and 900 meters.
Due to the lack of standard silhouette targets in Vietnam, both the Marines and the army used the expended canisters of 155-mm artillery rounds as targets. Mounted on short poles, the readily available canisters served as reasonable facsimiles of the body area of enemy targets, held up well in all types of weather and after repeated strikes, and they rewarded snipers with a satisfying ping when bullets struck the target.
Marine and army sniper schools included night training as part of their curriculum. Marine snipers received limited instruction on how to shoot under the artificial light provided by aerial flares and searchlights. Because of their greater use of the AN/PVS-2 Starlight scope with the XM21 weapon system, army sniper students spent more time shooting during hours of darkness.
During training the sniper cadre attempted to instill a hunter’s mind-set into the students and to prepare them for the extremely personal aspects of killing. Because of the sniper-selection process, most candidates arrived at their training prepared to pull the trigger. Many were veterans of extensive combat before volunteering for sniper school and had already developed mechanisms for dealing with killing. Instructors and students alike maintained the attitude that sniping, albeit more personal, was just one more method of killing the enemy. “A sniper feels nothing but the recoil,” became a common saying among the Vietnam marksmen.
While nonsnipers in Vietnam sometimes referred to the marksmen as “Murder, Inc.,” snipers, who understood their role in the conflict, on occasion promoted such attitudes. A sign at the 1st Marine Division sniper school, near Da Nang, proclaimed, “War Our Business, Death Our Only Product.”
Sniper training did not end with graduation from the schools; completion of the formal training merely signified the beginning of the sniper’s learning and perfecting of the skills of a superior marksman. New graduates returned to their units to continue their education by gleaning information from other veterans and by learning from their own firsthand experience. Each mission provided additional opportunities for improvement. All one had to do to add to his sniper skills was to survive.
The Marine Corps and the army in Vietnam did offer refresher courses that varied in depth. Some programs provided only unit armorers to maintain and adjust sniper weapon systems and shooting ranges for confirming zeroes; others provided full refresher training lasting as long as a week.
The 3rd Marine Division established the most lengthy and sophisticated of the programs on September 3, 1968. Division Order 1510.5, “Scout-Sniper Refresher Training Course,” provided information and instructions for a five-day program at Quang Tri. According to the order, the refresher training focused primarily on newly arriving snipers trained at Camp Pendleton before their deployment to Vietnam and on infantrymen serving in sniper platoons who had not undergone formal sniper training.
The refresher course included the same subjects contained in the basic schools: land navigation; communications procedures; and air, artillery, and medical evacuation support.† As with other sniper instruction, the curriculum emphasized range training with the rifle and scope system, and actual firing.
While their training shared similar objectives and used the same basic training schedules, the Marines and the army employed the sniper graduates in very different manners. Early draft copies of FMFM 1–3B, which contained what would become the official Marine sniper organization, were widely distributed shortly after the divisions organized their schools. The manual called for infantry regiment sniper platoons composed of a platoon commander, a platoon sergeant, a rifle team equipment repairman, and three sniper squads. Each squad consisted of a squad leader and five two-man sniper teams for a platoon total of one officer and thirty-five enlisted Marines.
The regimental sniper platoons were under the command and administrative control of the regiment’s headquarters company. Operational control remained directly under the regimental commander.
FMFM 1–3B also called for reconnaissance battalion sniper platoons, which were to operate with a similar but slightly smaller organization. Personnel included a platoon commander, a platoon sergeant, a rifle team equipment repairman, and four squads, each with a leader and three two-man teams. The thirty enlisted Marines and one officer served under the command and control of the reconnaissance battalion’s headquarters and supply company and the operational control of the battalion commander.
Responsibilities for personnel in the regimental and reconnaissance battalion sniper platoons were the same. The regiment or battalion commander, with the assistance of his operations officer, detached sniper teams to subordinate units. The sniper platoon commander provided input on these decisions and advised subordinate unit commanders on their employment. He remained responsible for the operational efficiency of his platoon, provided liaison for attached elements, and scheduled rotation of personnel to permit rifle rezeroing, training, and rest.
The sniper platoon sergeant assisted the platoon commander in coordinating the detachment of squads and teams to other units. He also was responsible for the discipline, training, and welfare of the platoon and for the care and condition of weapons and equipment. The rifle team equipment repairman assisted in the latter task while also ensuring the security of weapons and special equipment in rear areas.
Each squad leader carried out orders issued by the platoon commander and assumed the responsibility for the care and condition of his men and their weapons and equipment. When detached to other units in the regiment or recon battalion, the squad leader assisted the commander of the supported unit in the control of the sniper teams and made recommendations about their employment. He also provided liaison between the supported unit and his sniper platoon commander and frequently performed as a sniper on missions as a part of a team.
Team leaders reported to their squad leader and carried out his orders. Their responsibilities included the supervision of the second member of the team and the care of their weapons and equipment. The team leader performed the actual sniping while his spotter provided observation, adjustment, and security.
FMFM 1–3B provides a simple statement of sniper duty. According to the manual, “The primary mission of a sniper in combat is to suppor
t combat operations by delivering precision fire on selected targets from concealed positions.”
The two-man team represented the heart and soul of the sniper platoons. Capable of attachment to any size unit or of limited independent operations, the two-man team represented the basic operational sniper element. The platoon chain of command did its best to keep teams together for as long as possible because the longer the two men worked together, the more efficient they became.
The spotter or observer learned from the team leader in the never-ending training process. Often when a team leader completed his tour, the observer moved up to assume his duties and to take over the sniper rifle.
While the various manuals and manning documents spell out appropriate ranks for each of these positions, as with everything else that occurred in the Vietnam War, there were often variations and adaptations. A first or second lieutenant usually filled the authorized platoon commander position with a staff or gunnery sergeant as the senior NCO. Staff or “buck” sergeants led the squads with corporals as team leaders and lance corporals as their observers. Because of the importance of maintaining the sniper rifle systems, units made great efforts to keep the team equipment repairman position filled with a lance corporal or above to ensure a skill level that could master the care of the weapons.
In the absence of officers, senior sergeants often occupied the officer’s billet with Marines one or even two ranks below the authorized grade assuming the duties of squad and team leaders. Experience and expertise of individual snipers received more attention than rank in the teams, and it was not unusual for the senior ranking member to act as the observer while the junior person did the actual shooting. Again, on occasion some senior NCOs filled positions authorized for lower ranks in order to maximize the field time of the more proficient and experienced snipers.
The regimental and reconnaissance battalion organization allowed the sniper platoons’ employment as a unit, as squads, or as separate teams. For example, the entire regimental platoon might be attached to a subordinate battalion with squads or teams further detached to companies. In the recon battalion, the platoon might be attached to a recon company for a short time, but the general organization called for the attachment of one sniper squad per company. The organizational structure of the regimental and recon battalion sniper platoons also provided for attaching a squad or team to any size subordinate unit.
These attachments were usually for the duration of a mission or patrol that might last from a few days to a week. Most of the sniper platoons attempted to send the same squad and teams to the same subordinate units to increase an awareness of capabilities and to promote teamwork.
The organization of the Marine sniper platoons centered on the ability to assign a squad per battalion in the regiments and a squad per company in the reconnaissance battalion. This concept worked fine on paper but had its shortcomings in the reality of the combat zone. Rarely were the sniper platoons at full strength. Even when adequate personnel were assigned, some snipers would be unavailable for duty because of wounds, illness, rest and recreation leaves, and administrative matters. Also, because of the nature of sniping itself and the mental and physical diligence it required, snipers could not remain effective for extended periods of time and required time to rest and refit.
While their actual operational functions rarely matched the theoretical model, the Marines did have the advantage of having all their combat units assigned in the far northern quarter of South Vietnam, where they encountered fairly similar terrain.
Unlike the Marine Corps, which had a formal, approved organization for its sniper platoons, the army never authorized or adopted official units for its long-range marksmen in Vietnam. Army separate brigades and divisions served throughout South Vietnam from the Mekong Delta in the south to the DMZ in the north, and the terrain varied from flat, wet, rice paddies to thick jungle and mountains, which required differing tactics and methods of field operations. The differences in areas of responsibility did not readily lend themselves to consistent organization or employment of army snipers. As a result, each army division, separate brigade, and long-range reconnaissance company established its own sniper organization appropriate to location, situation, and overall command support of the concept.
Senior army commanders recognized the lack of consistency in sniper organization and in the spring of 1969 directed Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Fleming of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command to visit field units “to discuss sniper programs, policies, and utilization.” From April 6 to 10, Fleming talked with commanders, operations officers, and snipers in the XXIV Corps Headquarters, the 1st Brigade of the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division, and the 101st Airborne Division. Fleming also visited the 3rd Marine Division. Its Division Order 1510.5 on refresher training as well as other information on the Marine sniper organization and reporting procedures so impressed Fleming that he included copies as enclosures to his final report.
In his written findings, dated April 28, 1969, “Trip Report (33–69), Sniper Programs” (referred to below as Trip Report). Fleming detailed the current status of the army’s sniper efforts but noted that they “are still too new in the units visited to provide any definitive figures on results.” Fleming did find a “surprising consensus of opinion of all those personnel contacted” on sniper organization.
Fleming shared the consensus view that it was a mistake to allow “fragmentation into too many small specialized units within the division.” He recommended that sniper teams be assigned directly to the Ranger companies‡ and to each battalion reconnaissance platoon, and he advised assigning an additional team to each infantry platoon. According to Fleming, the direct assignment of snipers to units would provide the teamwork and support necessary to ensure their success. To provide flexibility, Fleming further recommended a sniper unit be formed at each brigade headquarters to be detached to subordinate battalions when needed.
Fleming’s ideas on sniper organization had merit, and had they been adopted they would certainly have contributed to the combat capabilities of field commands. Unfortunately, the combat units had neither the manpower nor the training capabilities—nor, in some cases, the desire—to train and maintain the number of snipers that Fleming proposed.
Much of their reluctance resulted from the fact that infantry units in Vietnam were never manned at full strength. Replacements arriving in-country often did not match rotations of tour completions. Casualties, illnesses, and R&Rs further reduced the numbers available for day-to-day duty. Men wounded or killed in firefights that took only a few minutes might not be replaced for days or weeks, and the replacements would likely be new in-country and inexperienced in combat. Many platoon leaders and company commanders resisted the loss of a single man from the field for a week or more of sniper training. They were even more concerned that the individual might not return to the unit upon completion of his schooling. Other commanders did not believe that snipers could be properly utilized in their area of operations because of the terrain and vegetation. Some leaders simply did not have any faith in the overall concept.
Only a few weeks after Fleming wrote his report, President Richard Nixon announced the first withdrawals of U.S. forces from Vietnam. With the focus more and more on reducing the number of soldiers in Vietnam, the army paid little additional attention to sniper organization and left it to individual commands to determine how and where to assign their long-range marksmen.
As a result, a great disparity occurred in the organization of snipers in army units serving in Vietnam. Some division and separate brigade commanders simply ignored the potential capability and made no effort to acquire snipers for their units. Within those same commands, however, some battalion and company commanders who did believe in the advantage of long-range shooting procured a few sniper weapons and fielded teams or individuals within rifle squads.
Most army divisions and separate brigades did not establish their own sniper schools and received allocations to those conducted by t
he Army Marksmanship Training Units teams, such as the one operated by the 9th Infantry Division and, later, the 25th Infantry Division. Upon completion of the training, individuals returned to their units and became the snipers for their squads or platoons in a manner similar to what was done during World War II with the special marksmen.
Changes in command of battalions and brigades usually occurred every six months and at times even more frequently. Emphasis on snipers changed as each new commander brought his own ideas and experience to the command. In many army units, the sniper became no more than an ordinary infantryman armed with a more sophisticated weapon than his fellow grunts.
As with all aspects of army sniper operations in Vietnam, the 9th Infantry Division led the way in establishing an organization for the special marksmen. A formerly classified report, “Sniper Training and Employment in the 9th Infantry Division,” written by Major Robert G. Hilchey, division assistant operations officer, provided the most official, specific, and detailed sniper organization for any army unit in Vietnam. According to Paragraph V of the July 15, 1969, report, “Six snipers are assigned to each battalion headquarters and headquarters company and four to each brigade headquarters. It is essential that sniper employment be planned at battalion level to insure command interest and optimum utilization. Sniper teams are normally composed of two snipers.”
Within weeks of the publication of Hilchey’s report, two of the three 9th Division brigades began to withdraw from the war zone. The remaining brigade, the 3rd, did use the sniper organization outlined in the report and continued to send volunteers to the sniper school after it moved to the 25th Infantry Division.
The organization of Marine snipers in Vietnam was more rigid and consistent than that of the army. Sniper platoons at regimental and reconnaissance battalion level worked well and provided excellent support to field operations. With their late start in sniper operations and the greater variety of terrain in their areas of operations, the army never reached anything near the level of the Marine Corps’s organizational expertise. Nevertheless, the army’s experience in sniper organization learned in Vietnam would leave a lasting impression and influence the service’s future marksmen.
Inside the Crosshairs Page 18