White Space is Unnatural
Yigal Amir, the man who killed Israeli Prime Minister Rabin (Compendium #251), had been trying to kill him for two years. Because of effective use of White Space on three previous occasions, Amir was unable to get close enough to complete his attack. On the occasion that he was able to get close enough, it was due to the complete absence of White Space. Throughout the Compendium, you'll find cases where successful attackers got as close to their targets as you are to this book.
In Rabin's case, he was shot while leaving a public appearance (as were many protectees shot while leaving events). You've likely observed that things tend to fall apart at the end of events. It is not in the natural order to have things remain in the precise way we'd ideally want them to be throughout a public appearance. The natural order is for things to press in upon things, for people to continue to move forward toward a center of attention, and for order to unravel. Over time at a public event, people are inclined to encroach upon stanchions, ropes, and barricades. Temporary or part-time security personnel hired for an event will, in the natural order of things, lose their commitment to their role as the event winds up (or more accurately, unwinds). Accordingly, the wide path of white space that might have been afforded for arrivals is rarely as well maintained hours later when your protectee is departing.
So, since order that was established at the beginning of events often disintegrates by the end, our firm applies an important precept whenever possible: Public Entry, Non-public Departure. If one must enter through the main arrival area because the event requires public entry (for media or other reasons), then it's best to depart by a non-public route. Risk is enhanced as events end, because organizers and local security personnel typically think the job is done, and any semblance of crowd control, attentiveness, and even pride in the event is lost toward the end. Hence, departures are usually less orderly than arrivals. At the same time, an attacker waiting along the exit route has been afforded time to prepare, to see the car being put in place, to judge distances, to observe protective strategies, and to select a position. He might be afforded hours to plan, to prepare himself, to gain confidence. You can, however, take away every single advantage, including access to the protectee, simply by having the protectee depart through an alternate exit. The protectee gets other benefits, such as not waiting for the vehicle, not having to press through a crowd, not having to extend the public appearance, in effect, by continued conversations and encounters with other attendees who are waiting for their cars and making their way through the disorder that characterizes the end of events. A precept worth repeating: Public Entry, Non-public Departure.
Close But Not Too Close
Since we've written so much about the value of being close to the attacker, it may seem contradictory when we add the qualification "Not too close." When members of the general public are crammed up against protectors, just as when protectors are crammed up against protectees, it's not easy to act effectively. Appropriate White Space allows the protectee and protectors to walk freely within the field of space that's maintained. This enhances dignity and looks a lot better than pushing, shoving, and barking things like "Coming through!" But there is more than dignity and appearances at stake: If protectors don't have at least a little space between themselves and those in a position to attack, they can't see anything, and they don't have room to effectively use their arms and hands.
(c) Televista/Mexico
The Compendium has some instructive cases in which protectees being moved through crowds were killed even though they were literally surrounded by protectors and aides. Perhaps the most chilling such case is the assassination of Mexican Presidential Candidate Donaldo Colosio. While moving through the kind of enthusiastic crowd that politicians adore (and protectors abhor), protectors were present all around, but the people were so close that when an arm extended and placed a handgun against Colosio's head, it wasn't effectively noticed until it was fired.
Ropelines and Barricades
Ropelines and barricades can help to compel some white space where it might not otherwise exist. Appendix 1 has a letter that can be given to protectees to help them understand their role in their own safety. We'll note a few of the guidelines here. Though ropelines and barricades improve white space, if protectees reach over the barricade into the crowd they lose many of the advantages. Accordingly, the letter to the protectee advises:
When you are moving along a ropeline or barricade doing a press-the-flesh event, the first and most important step you can take is a step backwards. The best practice is standing back two or more feet from the ropeline/barricade so that people have to reach out far toward you in order to connect, and you have to reach out just a bit toward them -- if you choose to.
When you stand back two feet from the barricade, you'll profoundly improve the experience for yourself while also helping your protectors be more effective, less intrusive, and less obvious.
The candidate in the following photos does this very well, standing back a full two feet from the barricade.
Photo by Ron Murray, ImageActive
Standing in this way, you can choose whom you touch and how you touch. The idea is that you are far enough back that they actually cannot reach you at all unless you extend an arm or hand to them.
Many candidates unwisely stand right up against the barricade -- terrible because protectors have no space into which they can respond. In those poorly done situations, the ropeline or barricade disappears entirely -- and that's when you see protectors having to shove and be intrusive.
In the better situation, the ropeline or barricade should be clearly visible to you at all times, and you decide how close to the barricade you will be, not allowing members of the public or campaign staff to decide how close to the barricade you will be. By standing back two or more feet, you always have available a step forward to avoid falling if someone tugs you and gains some leverage over you. By standing back, you reduce the leverage people have; they are leaning way forward and they have poor footing, not you.
Photo by Ron Murray, ImageActive
This positioning is good.
Never reach into the crowd; never reach over the barricade.
In contrast with the protectee who is very good at standing back from ropelines and barricades, here's an example of the commonly seen mistake that's best to avoid: Reaching over the barricade.
Photo from AP Images
Photo by Jason Reed/Reuters TK
Instead of ever reaching over a ropeline/barricade, you want the whole hand-to-hand contact to happen on your side of the barricade, where you can decide who and how you touch, to whom you extend your hands. As important, when everything happens on your side of the barricade, your protectors can see and respond.
Another important guideline is to avoid full handshakes; it's best to just take hold for a second of the tips of fingers, like the protectee does in these photos:
Photo by TK
Photo by TK
This way, you can release easily and you are not giving a grip they can use to tug you toward them and get you off-balance. You'll also be able to connect with more people in the time available.
(Note: The letter in Appendix 1 has other information for protectees that is very valuable and important.)
ACE (Access, Concealment, Escape)
For close-quarter attacks to be successful, attackers want three specific advantages that can be described with the acronym ACE (Access, Concealment, and Escape).
Access
The attacker needs to be able to get close enough to launch an effective attack.
Concealment
The environment or situation must afford an assailant some concealment. This might be actual cover or concealment in the form of visual obstructions that make it difficult for protectors to see the attacker (a wall, a plant, people in a crowd). Or it might be concealing intent with behaviors that make it difficult for protectors to assess intent (wearing clothing or accessories that reduce
suspicion, holding a "prop" like a radio or clipboard, displaying a credential, etc.).
Escape
Though escape is not a requirement of attack (most close-quarter attackers in the U.S. did not want, plan, or expect to get away after their attacks), escape is nonetheless an issue that many attackers consider. Environments or situations that offer escape options are attractive to a larger pool of persons who might consider attack, so making escape less likely (and making it appear less likely) is an important aspect of effective protection.
Note on escape: We can say with certainty that all bank robbers wish to escape; otherwise, what's the point? We cannot say the same thing about all assassins. Some make no escape plans, while others hope to escape. Targets who have protectors with them offer a close-quarters attacker a fairly low likelihood of escape. Conversely, there are several cases of targets who did not have protectors present whose attackers wanted to escape and did (Solanis #9, Bardo #34, Cunanan #56, Palme #117, Hani #209, Stojicic #273, Lindh #392, van Gogh #406, for example). So it is not accurate to say close-quarters attackers never have an escape plan, or never try, or never care about escape. Either way, "No escape possible" can be an intimidating thought to add to an attacker's fear of failure. Protectors who project an aura of "you won't succeed here" can cause a would-be attacker to switch targets (such as Bremer switching from Nixon to Wallace).
When someone with sinister intent is present in an environment that offers Access, Concealment, and Escape, they hold the ACE, in effect, and it can trump all other cards.
Protectors can develop a sense for assessing every environment the same way an attacker might, measuring these three factors. This can become second nature, such that when the thought of ACE comes into your head, even for an instant, you listen. ACE is not a signal of danger but rather a signal of vulnerability. When you detect that vulnerability, there are usually simple precautions that can mitigate it, most notably: Move closer to your protectee, move closer to suspects, move between the protectee and people in the area, increase White Space, etc.
Protectors too can hold the ACE:
Access
Access to the protectee and/or to people who could launch an attack.
Cover
Resources and proximity that afford protectors the ability to cover the protectee in the event of attack.
Escape/Evacuation
An unblocked, fast way out.
Experienced protectors frequently take the temperature of each environment, assessing who holds the ACE: Does this environment help people conceal intent? Can one of these people get to my protectee? Can I? Does this environment and this moment offer an escape option for an attacker? Does it offer easy departure for us?
If you've ever seen a protected person during a public appearance and thought, "Anyone can walk right up to him," or "The guards aren't close enough," or "They don't look alert," or "They'd have no way out in an emergency," you were assessing who held the ACE.
TOP (Tactical Observation Post)
It is still hours from when Ronnie Kempler will appear on the TV news all over Israel. He has climbed onto a rooftop and is looking for the position that will give him the most direct view when Prime Minister Rabin traverses the plaza below. Kempler can see everything from up here, including dozens of security people, but he's fairly certain they haven't seen him. He doesn't want their attention -- not yet anyway.
Peering intently through the eyepiece, Kempler tracks each step the Prime Minister takes through the crowd below. Kempler patiently keeps him in view right up until two quick, fatal shots are fired into the Prime Minister.
But Ronnie Kempler was not the assassin. He was one of thousands of ordinary citizens who came to Tel Aviv that day to see Prime Minister Rabin speak at a rally. His initial plan was to take some interesting home video of his nation's famous leader, but he ended up also taking video of his nation's most famous assassin, Yigal Amir. It turns out that Kempler recorded Amir's waiting, stalking, approaching, Moment of Commitment, and his attack.
Amir was one among a crowd of thousands that could be seen from the rooftop, so why did Kempler, an accountant, successfully identify his pre-attack behaviors which many of the professional bodyguards missed? Kempler says he had "the feeling" that something bad was about to happen. His feeling -- his intuition -- was right.
Kempler saw aspects of Amir's behavior that Amir had been able to conceal from people on the ground. That's because Kempler had a vantage point others did not. He had what amounted to a Tactical Observation Post, what our firm calls "TOP."
Compendium cases that could have benefited from TOP: JFK #4, Wallace #13, Reagan #25, Marcos #79, Pope #105, Sadat #106, Galan #145, Gandhi #177, Seles #213, Colosio #229, Rabin #251, Djindjic #383, Park Chung Hee #470, for a few examples.
Photo from the Ronald Reagan Library
For an example, there was an excellent TOP post that could have been occupied during the Hinckley attack, directly above the crowd closest to the President (photo).
We know that attackers and would-be attackers often display observable pre-attack behaviors before their Moment of Commitment, even though they seek to conceal their intent. Though they are sensitive to being watched by security personnel around a public appearance site, they, like most people, are not sensitive to being observed from above. Accordingly, they might adjust a weapon under their clothing, or temporarily move to an area they believe is out of view, or pace back and forth, or check different exits around a hotel, looking for ways to encounter the target. The protector handling the TOP post is dedicated to observing all the people in the protectee's environment. The mission is in several ways similar to that of a counter-sniper, except that a protector on a TOP post need not be prepared to shoot at anyone, and need not even be armed. His responsibility is simply to watch for behaviors that arouse suspicion or concern, and communicate the details to protectors on the ground. It might be that the exit route is blocked by traffic, or that a crowd is forming around the corner. Or, as in the case of Amir, someone appears to be lying in wait. Whatever information the TOP protector provides can be assessed or addressed by those on the ground.
TOP protectors need radio communication, of course, and can also benefit from having binoculars, a digital video camera, and a laser rangefinder to determine distances (available for a few hundred dollars). A protector with a view from above can help those on the ground reach the Moment of Recognition sooner than they might have otherwise -- and even a second sooner can make the decisive difference to safety.
Briefing the TOP Agent
The most important message to give to a TOP agent is to "Communicate!" People at TOP posts are asked to report what they see without editing, without waiting for conclusive information, and without any concern about being wrong. Just as the people on the ground cannot see all that is seen from the Tactical Observation Post, the TOP agent cannot see from above all the pieces of the puzzle on the ground. It's the combination of the two vantage points that best serves safety.
TOP agents are ideally told: Report everything your intuition makes interesting to you, without regard to whether you see an attack panning out. If you make a report and it turns out there was no hazard (which is the expected norm), you have lost nothing and you've added a new distinction to your intuition, such that it might not sound the alarm again in a similar situation. Intuition is always learning, and though it may occasionally send a signal that turns out to be less than urgent, everything it communicates has meaning. When you get an intuitive signal, most of the work is already done -- your next job is to share what you observe or suspect with the protective team. Intuition will not waste your time; it is always in response to something, and always has your best interest at heart.
Ingmar Bergman said: "Imagine I throw a spear into the dark. That is my intuition. Then I have to send an expedition into the jungle to find the spear. That is my intellect." If assigned to a TOP responsibility, let the protective team on the ground, and not your intellect,
be the expedition that is sent into the jungle to find the spear.
Visible or Covert?
TOP posts can be manned covertly or overtly, and there are advantages and disadvantages to each. A protector taking the overt approach is clearly visible to members of the general public who happen to look up, and this can bring the benefit of deterrence. In the diary he kept while stalking President Nixon, attacker Arthur Bremer wrote about observing "SS men on the roof," a sight that contributed to his conclusion that the President was too well protected to attack that day. Bremer eventually abandoned President Nixon as a target and switched to presidential candidate George Wallace, whom he found to be less protected.
Another benefit of staffing Tactical Observation Posts is that if security personnel occupy the best high-ground positions, then those positions are denied to would-be attackers. No (known) case illustrates this better than an attack on the Queen of England during a 1981 visit to New Zealand (Compendium #481). Three teenagers led by 17-year-old Christopher Lewis reportedly took a rifle to the area where they knew the Queen would be walking. The teens had chosen an ideal firing position -- so ideal, in fact, that they found two policemen had chosen the exact same place from which to observe the event. The boys were able to sneak away, and Lewis had to settle for a much less effective firing position. As the Queen entered the target area, he fired a round at her, but the round fell short. (Police and security officers walking with her heard the shot, but dismissed it as a car backfiring.)
Proponents of staffing Tactical Observation Posts covertly make the point that would-be attackers might be less likely to conceal their intent if they don't know they are being watched from above. All things considered, it is probably best to take a combined approach when resources allow, staffing both covert and overt Tactical Observation Posts. Then, when either post sees someone of concern, the overt TOP agent can withdraw from view temporarily, and the covert TOP agent can watch intently for any behavior that might result from the subject's belief that he is not being watched.
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