Just two seconds

by Gavin De Becker; Thomas A. Taylor; Jeff Marquart

  One of the two bodyguards, Manfred, answers my question in the first sentence of his statement to the police: "I am a telecommunications worker. I have a side job for the private guard firm at the tennis grounds."

  The second bodyguard's name is Henry, and his police statement, too, begins with the wrong words: "My main job is as a loader at Hamburg harbor. I have a side job where I am in charge of security at the tennis grounds. At this tournament, my job was specifically to accompany and look after Monica Seles."

  Sadly, look "after" is precisely what they did.

  Seles had the expectation that the bodyguards assigned to her would be, in fact, bodyguards, professionals with some relevant training and experience. She could expect that they would have at least discussed the possibility of a safety hazard, maybe even discussed what they would do should one present itself.

  But none of that happened, and the promoters didn't tell her that the people they had assigned to guard her life were unqualified part-timers. She had to learn that when Gunter Parche plunged the knife into her back and then raised his arm to do it again.

  This is not a book about the lack of professionalism one can find among people claiming to be protectors -- that book would be much longer. For our purposes here, the Seles attack is an example of the most significant type of protector failure: Those cases in which protectors saw, identified, and were suspicious of the very person who launched the attack -- and yet did nothing effective to prevent the attack.

  Even without any relevant training, both Manfred and Henry had taken special notice of assailant Gunter Parche prior to the stabbing. Henry pegged the attacker quite accurately:

  "Call it a sixth sense or whatever, I cannot explain it, but I noticed the man. Something told me that something was not quite right with this man. He was swaying instead of walking. I cannot explain it in more detail. I just had an uneasy feeling when I saw the man. As I said, I cannot explain it in more detail."

  Though he clearly had a valid intuition about the assailant, his main message appears to be that he "cannot explain it."

  Rather than tell anyone about his concerns, Henry decided instead to put down the coffee cup he was holding (!) even though on a protective detail for the world's most controversial athlete, and stroll toward the suspicious man to do he didn't know what. Of course, he had taken only a few steps by the time the attack had started and finished.

  It is perhaps not fair to criticize Henry and Manfred, for they know not what they do. Rather, we'll let their inaction remind us that recognizing the best suspect in your environment is useful only if you eliminate the distance between you and that suspect -- right now.

  But who is a suspect? Someone whom you feel merits your attention, period. He or she needn't have shifty eyes, or reveal a gun, or look like an assassin (whatever look that might be). A suspect need only be a person who merits your attention. And the best suspect among the people present is the one who most merits your attention.

  You might choose that person on the basis of his behavior, actions, appearance, location, or on the basis of your intuition (which is usually the product of many valid perceptions). There may be no definable basis whatsoever -- but there is someone in every environment who, among the people present, is the best current candidate for your suspicion and attention.

  For some reason, suspicion has gotten a bad name; people even feel guilty about feeling it. But when we feel suspicious, it's not something unkind we're doing to someone, and it's not something we choose -- suspicion is something that chooses us. People don't feel guilty when curiosity arises, and suspicion is merely curiosity with an added intuitive instruction: "Keep watching." In fact, the Latin root of the word suspicion -- suspicere -- means simply "to watch."

  As protectors, though watching is a fine first step, it's the actual step you take in someone's direction that's important. President Kennedy once offered his opinion that assassination couldn't be prevented because "all anyone has to do is be willing to trade his life for the President's." While this comment has been much quoted, it is entirely wrong. First, few assassins have had to trade their lives for their target's life, and more importantly, assassination is prevented far more often than it succeeds. Many of the prevented attacks were stopped by the attacker being persuaded that he would not succeed if he attacked right Now. That persuasion is deterrence.

  If you've taken the best possible position relative to a suspect, and he then chooses to act violently toward your protectee, it's like the doorbell ringing at the precise time you're expecting a guest to arrive: You're not surprised, you're ready for it. Conversely, when the friend you haven't seen since college shows up unexpected, your Moment of Recognition is delayed.

  Why, after all, do TAD protectors prevail so often? Because they have a pre-established suspect and can do away with the time otherwise required to reach the Moment of Recognition. One might say the TAD exercise is unrealistic because the protector is able to focus on a specific suspect. In fact, however, protectors are often fortunate enough to identify people who concern them, specific suspects -- and then observe those people. Even if you create your suspects with little basis, they will help you stay connected to your mission. The truth that Suspects Exist Everywhere is easily remembered by its oh-so-relevant acronym: SEE.

  There is value in giving every person present the knowing eye because the currency of your attention communicates a discouraging message: "I know what you're up to." When you attentively observe a suspect who has sinister intent, your attention burns like fire in his mind: He doesn't know what you know or how you know it, but he imagines he's been found out, imagines that something has revealed him, that he has lost the element of surprise, that he has failed before he's even begun.

  Even a would-be attacker who has no intention of attacking today, whose only current intention is surveillance and fact-finding -- even he carries away a discouraging conclusion: "The security team is sharp." And the overly excited person who is there only to shake hands with his admired hero? He too receives the message of your knowing look, and behaves with more compliance than he might have otherwise.

  Deterrence is valuable because it influences the mindset of a would-be attacker, and SEE is valuable because it influences the mental readiness of the protector: Knowing there are good suspects right here right now can transform a merely competent protector into someone who always displays currency.

  We've seen that if you identify a suspect and you position your body and attention accordingly, your task is easier than the attacker's task. He has to perform a precision feat using fine motor skills under the worst possible conditions. You have to perform a fairly imprecise feat, using gross motor skills, and you will do so having already removed the most effective advantages an attacker can have: surprise and concealment. In this sense, concealment doesn't mean an actual obstacle that blocks your view -- concealment means the lack of suspicion that blocks an accurate view of an attacker.

  Most successful attackers were able to evade suspicion, thus retaining surprise and concealment. Your suspicion can pull off that concealment; once you SEE a person, you won't be surprised if he acts in precisely the way you anticipated he might. And once he knows you SEE him, a good part of his mental energy will be devoted to worry and uncertainty about being interfered with.

  Now, is it actually true that Suspects Exist Everywhere? It's true because we create them. We create them out of the raw material provided by the situation, out of their behavior, their appearance, out of choices they make as we observe them. At another time and place, this same person might not appear suspicious to us. And if absolutely nobody in view meets the threshold for our suspicion, then we must lower the threshold and try again. The goal is not to find excellent suspects -- but rather to find the best suspects among the people present.

  If you create a suspect and watch him, you are energetically communicating "I see you," and if you position yourself so that he is within arm's reach, then he's not likely to commit an att
ack. You both know he cannot succeed. In the event that he attacks, you've moved your Moment of Recognition to the earliest possible instant -- and you have also done something far more powerful: You have influenced his Moment of Commitment, delayed it, likely forever.

  You might be concerned that while focusing on a suspect who turns out not to be an attacker, you'll miss someone nearby who actually is an attacker. We now know, however, that if the attack comes from four people away, at least you are there in the moment, in the Now with the attacker. In other words, it's better to be off by four people, than to be off by four hours or four days, lost in thought. It's better to be near the wrong person and present (pre-sent), than to be directly next to the right person, yet a hundred miles away in thought.

  The fast response of Secret Service agent Dennis McCarthy during Hinckley's attack on President Reagan illustrates the value of SEE: Before the President arrived at the hotel that day, McCarthy had been called over to observe a man named Mickey Crowe who had shown up at many of Reagan's public appearances. McCarthy and another agent were suspicious of Crowe and took positions close to him so as to have advantage in the event he moved toward the President. McCarthy later reported: "We had no idea that the real problem, Hinckley, was standing only a few feet from Crowe at this time." The suspicion about Crowe helped focus McCarthy's mind, and helped him be present on the sidewalk that day. "As the shots rang out," McCarthy reported, "my reaction was more instinctive than conscious."

  McCarthy later theorized that his interest in Crowe might have had another benefit, discouraging Hinckley from shooting at Reagan as the President first arrived at the hotel: "Hinckley must have recognized us as Secret Service agents, and we were very close to him."

  Just as lay people might assume, protectors are responsible for observing people around their protectee. But observing is the secondary responsibility; the primary responsibility is to be in position to respond in the event of an attack. Observation occurs along the route, but effective response is the destination.

  Imagine being responsible for responding to any of, say, fifty people along what's about to be your protectee's foot-route. From this pool of candidates, rank the ones most likely to be attackers. Look at each one attentively and knowingly, without any concern that they'll feel self-conscious -- and in fact, with the specific wish that they feel self-conscious. Then choose the highest-ranking candidate and observe that person with the anticipation that he might make an alarming move. Get into position to respond in the event your best suspect acts. Statistically, it's highly unlikely that any of the people you ever select will be attackers, but your SEE-ing them will nonetheless have value, deterring unwanted behaviors other than attack.

  Also, the fact that a person you identify turns out not to be an attacker doesn't make your selection wrong. As we discussed in Chapter 3, you are not giving your mind an assignment it will quickly tire of (Look for Assassins), but rather an assignment that offers a frequent mental payoff: Identify suspects. The assignment is to see and register behaviors that are Pre-Incident INdicators (PINs) and to consider them valid and worthy of your attention without regard to whether or not they eventually escalate to attack. Here are just a few behavioral PINs, as examples:

  Hands out of view

  Positioning so as to intersect with the protectee

  Rigidly maintaining the same position

  Breathing erratically or holding the breath

  AMMO

  In our firm's academy, we teach protectors about subtle behaviors we've seen people display before they tried to jump up on a stage or make some other inappropriate approach to a protectee. In this training we call AMMO (for Audience Management, Monitoring, and Observation), we describe a number of stereotypical pre-incident behaviors:

  The Inspector displays a high level of interest in protectors, security personnel, and security procedures. When looked at directly, he quickly looks away. The Inspector behaves differently than most bystanders, who tend to be more interested in the show or event, and uninterested in security personnel and procedures.

  The Organizer constantly reaches into a bag, purse, or briefcase, seemingly rearranging items, or looking for something. An obvious concern is that this person will pull out a weapon, but it might also be a letter or package he wants to hand to your protectee. Whatever his purpose, his continued interest in the items he is carrying is the call for your attention.

  The Sweater appears hot, uncomfortable, and nervous. He might literally be sweating, as if under pressure or stress. The Sweater might show other signs of agitation and anxiety, constantly moving in his seat, shifting his weight from one foot to the other, unable to remain still. Basically, the person is uncomfortable in a situation in which most people appear happy.

  The Fashion Plate wears unusual clothes. Or he might wear clothes in an unusual manner, or wear clothes inappropriate to the weather or situation. The classic Fashion Plate is the person wearing an oversized heavy coat on a warm day.

  The attack on Philippine First Lady Imelda Marcos (Compendium Case #79) gives a good example of The Fashion Plate. The attacker stood in line with several award recipients who were about to walk across the stage. He wore black clothing while all the other award recipients wore white. When it was his turn to receive an award, he drew a large machete knife from the sleeve of his black coat and began swinging it wildly at Mrs. Marcos. (She received knife wounds requiring 70 stitches.) Many protectors were present. Had just one of them applied Suspects Exist Everywhere (in other words, been able to truly SEE), this attacker would have emerged as an obvious candidate. Had any protector taken one step toward the attacker and assumed a position of advantage prior to the attack, it could have been foiled, or even prevented outright through deterrence.

  (c) BBC Channel

  The attacker had intended his outfit to convey that he was a priest. Some of the protectors assumed precisely that, and followed the perhaps predictable inclination to be less concerned about a priest. Applying SEE, however, this individual would get more attention, not less -- in spite of, and even because of the fact that he was wearing a uniform.

  Attacker Arthur Bremer, who shot and paralyzed presidential candidate Governor George Wallace (Compendium Case #13), was also a Fashion Plate. By wearing many Wallace-for-President buttons, he hoped to be taken as an avid supporter, a ploy that likely worked on some of the people present.

  Presidential assassin Leon Czolgosz (Compendium Case #1394) was another Fashion Plate, wearing a handkerchief wrapped around his hand and wrist. It was concealing a handgun.

  The Traveler (also Known as Musical Chairs) moves all over the place at a public appearance, gradually repositioning closer to the protectee. At a venue with seating, this person switches seats often, getting closer to the stage with each move. The Traveler might also seek to test the limits of audience management or crowd control procedures. Most attendees accept the seat or position assigned to them. The Traveler persistently seeks a position that would provide advantage for an attacker.

  The Grouch, unlike most people out to catch a glimpse of a public figure, is aloof, seemingly uninterested, bored, or unhappy, and that's the call for attention. The Grouch can also be identified by the behavior of the people around him: It might not be clear why, but you'll see that the people nearby don't like him. Their body language, expressions, glances, exchange of comments with friends all reveal that they do not like this man -- and that is your PIN.

  The Joiner attempts to enter restricted areas by trying to make it appear he is with groups or people who are authorized. This person has arrived alone, but pretends to belong with others in order to get closer to the protectee. If passing through an access point, the Joiner is usually the last person in the group; he might gesture or otherwise imply that he is a member of the group without those people observing him do so. In a sense, attackers who pretend to be fans, or who join a receiving line apply a version of this strategy -- but the Joiner is more overt and brazen: He wants protectors
to think he is authorized to be going where he tries to go.

  Yigal Amir, assassin of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin (Compendium Case #251) provides an example of the Joiner. At some points, there were people around who assumed he was a member of the Prime Minister's entourage.

  (c) Channel 2, Isreal

  Amir, and the muzzle flash from his gun (Frame 4).

  A variation on this theme occurred during the 1996 attack on Liberian President Charles Taylor (Compendium case #535). By appearing to be part of the President's motorcade, the attackers drove into the grounds of the Executive Mansion.

  The Bluffer is a close cousin of the Joiner. Frequently seen attempting to breach security at events, the Bluffer enters with no credential other than a lot of bravado and bluster. The archetypal Bluffer is male, dressed in a navy blue suit (usually ill-fitting), with an American flag pin stuck in his left lapel. He approaches screeners looking either at his watch or at some fixed point on the other side of the checkpoint, never making eye contact with protectors. When asked for credentials, he keeps up the act, going through his papers and pockets, remarking that he had it just a minute ago. He might say he must have misplaced the credentials in his rush to get to the event, or might assure the protector that once he's allowed inside, he'll make sure someone at the appropriate level will come and let the protector know he had authorization to enter. Said one Secret Service Agent who had encountered Bluffers throughout his career, "I can think of no reason this approach is attempted so frequently -- other than its high success rate."

  The Secret Team is the opposite of the Joiner, involving two or more people who are working together, but pretend not to be. A Secret Team might try to conceal communications among its members by using hand signals, two-way radios, cellular phones, text-messaging devices, etc. Secret Team members might be observed making an exchange -- i.e., a man walks up to another, passes something, then moves on without speaking. Another example: You saw them interacting outside the venue or saw them arrive together, but they are now acting as if unconnected.