Britain Against Napoleon

by Roger Knight

  The prime minister’s 1801 memorandum constituted a formidable list of tasks which overlapped with the defensive strategy of the commander-in-chief, the duke of York. The country was to be divided into seventeen military districts, each commanded by a general, who was supported by subordinate generals; the senior generals were responsible to the duke. Each district had a staff of officers from the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General and the Commissariat departments. All units, whether regular, militia, yeomanry or volunteers, came under the command of the general commanding the district.12 The vital southern district, Kent with some of Sussex, was commanded by General Sir David Dundas, who gave up his post of quartermaster-general in March 1803. The duke of York and Dundas came to the conclusion that the most likely place for a French attack was on the east coast of Kent, rather than further south in Sussex, because of the east–west lie of the Downs, which would give British forces a natural defensive line. Canterbury, together with the nearby Boughton Hill, according to Dundas, was ‘the key of the country’, and he made Canterbury his headquarters.13

  In broad terms, this thinking matched the judgement of Admiral Lord Keith, commander-in-chief of the North Sea Fleet, who did well over many years in what was a complex defensive command that required cooperation with the army. The comprehensive memorandum written by Keith to the duke on 21 October 1803 reveals how much thought and observation had gone into detailed naval planning, taking into account the direction of the wind, the sailing capacity and draught of the French vessels, and height of the surf with onshore winds on the threatened beaches. Every possible landing place was itemized from Cornwall to Scotland, the threat to each of them varying with a particular wind direction, and he considered each of the French ports and their capacity and tidal range. Keith discounted the West Country because of the rough sea conditions and the Isle of Wight: ‘unless [the French] had the superiority by Sea, because it would not be easy to get off it to the Main, if we take the common precautions’. Concerning the shoreline of the Thames Estuary, it was ‘difficult to speak with certainty of the sands … Many of them are very little known; some of them are dry at low water and at an early time of the tide; but most of them can be crossed at High Water in Boats or small Vessels when the Weather is fine; but it requires skill for if the wind and tide are in contrary directions it must be hazardous …’ On balance, Keith argued, the attempt, if it came, would most likely be directed at beaches or bays in Kent or Sussex. In an easterly wind, for instance, the west side of Dungeness, with its steep shingle beaches, was ideal for landing troops from boats, or, with westerly winds, its east side or in Hythe Bay.14

  Detailed plans were drawn up in 1803 for encircling an invading French army. These over-elaborate plans involved trapping the invading army ‘in a net’ in the south-east of the country, held there by very large numbers of volunteers from the north, with many forces converging on London. The logistics of such plans were very ambitious.15 The principal planner was Colonel Alexander Hope, but the duke of York informally sent Lord Cornwallis details of the plans, who returned them with a blistering critique, and they were dropped.* The old general was critical of the current army command, remarking to his confidant, Lieutenant-General Ross, that Hope ‘appeared formerly to me to be a good-humoured pleasant fellow, and I was partial to him, but his presumption, and the nonsense he has written, have much altered my opinion’.16 A more public disagreement came from Colonel George Hanger, who published a revised version of his invasion warnings in 1804, again stressing that the likely choice of the French would be the Thames and the Essex coast, though he noted the improvements in the defences and militia to the east of London, as well as the building of many gunboats and small naval vessels suitable for the defence of the shallow rivers and creeks of Essex.17

  The first critical issue was how to concentrate enough men to oppose a landing. In the opinion of the duke of York, 2,000 soldiers rushing the French boats ‘in a contest of valour’, as opposed to one of military skill, were worth three times that number later on.18 However, rather than forming an extended line to attempt to contain the French as near the coast as possible, the duke’s strategy was to delay the invading force as much as possible on its advance upon London. Breastworks were to be rapidly dug on the hills around south London, on Blackheath, at Nunhead, Penge Common and Norwood.19 The outlying garrisons at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Yarmouth, Hull and Edinburgh were strongly defended and had the capacity to withstand a siege for several weeks. But the overwhelmingly critical issue was to ensure that Dover Castle was held against assault, for it was central to the defensive plan agreed between the duke of York and General Dundas.20 If Dundas’s troops should be beaten on the coast, he was to withdraw them not to London but to Dover. ‘In that strong position,’ commented Colonel Henry Bunbury, on Dundas’s staff in the Quartermaster-General’s Department, ‘he could have brought the enemy to bay’, to give time for London to throw up its defences. If Napoleon went straight for London, Dundas’s troops could then attack the French flank and its supply trains.21

  After the sudden declaration of war, re-enlistment of regular troops, militia, yeomanry and volunteers went ahead at full speed through the spring and summer of 1803 and 1804.22 Initiatives from different parts of the government caused some confusion: the secretary at war administered regiments that were enlisting regular soldiers, whereas the recruitment of both militia and volunteers came under the home secretary and the lords lieutenant of the counties.* Coordination of these efforts at local level, despite the involvement of the lords lieutenant, was not always effective. Justices of the peace, enforcing the militia ballot, had also to be mindful of the volunteers, which led to overlaps in enlistment between volunteers and militia. The duke of Richmond, lord lieutenant of Sussex, reported to the duke of York in August 1803: ‘Much of the confidence that the lower orders of the people used to place in their magistrates has been shaken.’23 Nevertheless, in fifteen counties, including Devon, the Isle of Wight, the Cinque Ports, Northumberland and Fife over 50 per cent of the male population, aged between seventeen and fifty-five, were wearing regular, militia, yeomanry or volunteer uniform. Kent and Sussex had 49 and 45 per cent respectively.24 Additionally, between March 1803 and January 1804 the ranks of regular soldiers were increased from 52,000 to over 94,000. The navy had only shrunk to some 70,000 men during the peace, and by the end of 1804 it was again approaching 100,000.25 Remarkably, by 1804 the two combined services totalled some 600,000 men, impressed, recruited or volunteered. The mobilization was to enlist between 11 and 14 per cent of the adult male population, about three times the ‘military participation ratio’ of France.26 Although this peak could not be maintained, it nevertheless created an impressive force, and remained so until 1807, when William Windham, as secretary of state for war in the Ministry of All the Talents, controversially abolished the volunteers. He withdrew government financial assistance and abolished their exemption from the ballot, planning to replace them with universal military training, though he departed from office before this could happen.27

  This rapid mobilization contrasted with the slow build-up from 1793 at the beginning of the French Revolutionary War, because well-tested mechanisms were now in place. The militia benefited most. Parliamentary Militia Acts passed in 1802 enabled 50,000 balloted men to be called up immediately, with an additional 25,000 to form the ‘supplementary’ militia.* So that each county fulfilled its quota, ballots and recruitment were supervised by a ‘lieutenancies’ command hierarchy based on the county, established by the 1803 Defence of the Realm Act. The lord lieutenant of the county was supported by deputy lieutenants who each controlled a ‘subdivision’; in turn ‘inspectors’ administered each hundred (the medieval subdivisions within each county); and under the inspectors were ‘superintendents’ who oversaw each parish.28 Counties were fined £10 per man missing if the quota was not met. Equipment, training and depots had to be arranged.

  This complex system worked well because it had the support of
the elites of the counties. The 1801 census and a new survey of counties had given the government a very clear idea of how many men aged between eighteen and forty-five were available, and thus liable for militia service. In Sussex, for instance, the figure in January 1803 was 7,889 men.29* Parish ballots began as soon as war was declared, and those whose name had been drawn and who were able to pay for a substitute began to look for candidates. Roman Catholics and Quakers were banned from serving in the militia, but if they were drawn in the ballot they had to pay a fine, which in effect paid for a substitute.30 As the pay of the militia was low, substitutes could charge a high fee and £40 was not unknown, but for periods they formed the majority in the militia ranks: of 26,000 men balloted between 1807 and 1808, only 3,129 served in person. Enterprising Scottish brokers advertised insurance against being called for service: for an annual premium of 10s.6d. a man could insure himself against the First Ballot, entitling the holder of the insurance to a sum to pay a substitute, should his name be drawn.31 However, later militia legislation, when Castlereagh was secretary of state for war after 1807, substitutes were not allowed.32 By July 1803 over 70,000 militiamen had been recruited, increasing to 85,000 by January 1804.33

  The militia undertook routine internal security chores such as guarding military installations, and, on occasion, played an important role in keeping civil order. The quartermaster-general ensured the regiments were never stationary, so that militiamen did not develop sympathies with the inhabitants of any particular locality in case they were called upon to keep the peace. Nor did they serve in the county where they were raised.34 The eight companies of the West Essex Militia battalion of 739 officers and men, for instance, were embodied at Chelmsford Barracks in April 1803, marched to Bradfield Camp in Essex for training and then to barracks at Harwich for the winter. In June 1804 the battalion was moved to Kent, where it camped at Sheerness; then to quarters at Rochester, Strood and Chatham; then, in 1805, to Portsmouth; then four companies embarked for the Isle of Wight, where they stayed until the summer of 1806, before the entire battalion moved inland.35 Similarly, the Sussex Militia, during 1807, was moved at three-month intervals from Newcastle to Sunderland, to Hull and finally to Woodbridge in Suffolk, where it wintered at the barracks. The visibility of the regiment was maintained by visits to many towns in the north-east: duties included help with regular army enlistment as well as guarding local garrisons. On one occasion they provided a guard for deserters who were being marched from Newcastle to Carlisle.36 In the warmer months, militia soldiers marched many hundreds of miles, and while they were not exposed to the dangers experienced by regular troops, and foreign service was avoided, they nevertheless had a strenuous war.*

  The volunteers, who were never likely to move far from their locality, came forward in vast numbers, prompted by the ‘Levy en Masse’ Act passed in July 1803, which threatened ‘to drill every able-bodied man whether he liked it or not’. (However, this Act was not to be enforced if sufficient volunteers were raised.37) A month later the ‘August allowances’ were promulgated, which laid down that volunteers were to be paid for twenty days’ service, provided that their unit agreed to march to anywhere in the country in the event of an invasion. During the previous war, the volunteers from the Isle of Purbeck had agreed only to defend within five miles; but in 1803 their colonel offered ‘the extent of the services to be in any part of Great Britain’.38 By December 1803, 380,193 volunteers had come forward, 3.6 per cent of the population. In total, the volunteer body comprised 604 troops of cavalry, 3,976 companies of infantry and 102 companies of artillery.39 The rapid response to the call to enlist in the volunteer regiments can also be seen as a move to evade more exacting militia service, for failing to join the volunteers left one open to the ballot.40 The duke of York organized inspecting field officers to supervise training; the same officers served as staff for brigades of volunteers.41 In October 1803 the king inspected a review of the London volunteer regiments in Hyde Park, over 12,000 strong, watched by a crowd estimated at 200,000. It was a day, the Gentleman’s Magazine enthused, ‘which afforded the most glorious sight we ever witnessed, without a single thing to excite the smallest regret’ – a reflection of the general reassurance that these displays provided for the public.42

  So rapid was the growth of the volunteer corps that it was some time before enough muskets and uniforms were available. In the first nine months of the war 103,572 pikes were issued to ensure that volunteers were not entirely empty-handed.43 The Ordnance could supply only 150,000 reserve weapons, many of which were of non-standard issue and worn out, having been purchased abroad.44 The home secretary, Charles Philip Yorke, in a confidential circular of October 1803 to all lords lieutenant of the maritime counties, advised that: ‘A good fowling-piece, with a bullet-mould properly adapted to it, a powder-flask and ball-bag, together with a dagger or bayonet contrived to screw on the muzzle upon occasion, will prove a very efficient equipment for brave and zealous men determined to defend their country.’45 Uniforms were another problem. General Henry Fox, inspector-general of recruiting, wrote to the adjutant-general, by now promoted Major General Calvert, noting that for the most part the volunteers were well clothed,

  but several want Great Coats and I am well informed by their Commanders that there are no possible means of obtaining a Fund sufficient to procure them … money has been thrown away in useless ornaments and appointments which might have procured comforts … I think that the Volunteers ought to be discouraged as much as possible in indulging in useless and ornamental dress …46

  Sartorial standards did not slip, however, and in addition to their allowances volunteers funded their own finery. In Yorkshire the Halifax Volunteers were resplendent in scarlet coats faced with black silk velvet and silver lace, and the Grenadier Company sported bearskins. Not to be outdone, the headgear of some London regiments was equally dashing: the Somerset Place Volunteers wore light infantry ‘Tarleton’ helmets. The Light Horse Volunteers of London and Westminster wore scarlet Hussar jackets.47 So did both the cavalry of the Dorset Volunteer Rangers and the county’s volunteer infantry, though their coats differed. The rich green jackets of the rangers clothed the aristocracy and landed gentry; painted by Thomas Beach, their confident faces and posture are still evident in the many portraits that survive today.48 Nor did the militia regiments go without finery. In 1808 the duke of Beaufort, colonel of the Royal Monmouth and Brecon Militia Regiment, ordered ‘that each officer will provide himself with a Vulture Feather of the length of eleven inches of a similar pattern to that now in the possession of Captain Bridgwater’.49

  In the counties the aristocracy and gentry took the lead in forming volunteer or yeomanry cavalry companies. In all, fifteen cavalry troops were formed in Sussex in 1803, three led by members of the aristocracy. The duke of Richmond at Goodwood had in 1797 set an example, as lord lieutenant, by raising the Sussex Yeomanry Horse Artillery, formed by prosperous farmers and tradesmen, consisting of 61 officers and men, two 3-pounder guns and two howitzers.50 In 1794 the duke had not hesitated to give his neighbour, Lord Egremont at Petworth, some advice on the question of the volunteers. Like Richmond, Egremont’s income was founded on coal, in his case yielding an enormous annual sum of £100,000 from an inheritance of mines in Cumberland. He was patron to many sculptors and artists, including Turner, and built up a renowned art collection, still to be seen at Petworth House today. With his 300 racehorses, Egremont was the most successful owner in the history of the Turf, winning the Derby and the Oaks five times. He provided horses, equipment and uniforms for the Petworth Yeomanry and was appointed colonel of the Sussex Regiment of Volunteers, but he protested to Richmond that a retired regular officer might be better equipped to command.* The duke disagreed: his advice to Egremont was that ‘to stand forth as Commander was of more consequence than any practical knowledge of the cavalry business’.51

  In spite of the impressive numbers of volunteers coming forward, the high targets set for the counties by g
overnment were rarely reached.52 A particular difficulty in Sussex was to find officers for the volunteer infantry, which lacked the social cachet of the cavalry. In 1803 Viscount Gage, who commanded the Yeomanry Cavalry at Firle, described the problem to the duke of Richmond:

  The difficulty in procuring any officers in the district (for proper officers are out of the question) your Grace can have no conception of, almost all the young men of prosperity and influence being engaged in Captain Shiffner’s or John Miller’s troop of Yeomanry and I am sorry to add that I perceive the prevailing opinion of those who have not yet entered into either that the Cavalry is a preferable service.53

  The social attractions of Captain George Shiffner’s cavalry troop at Lewes or that of Sir John Riggs Miller at Ringmer clearly outweighed the public duty of acting as an officer of the less prestigious volunteer infantry, such as, for instance, the South Lewes Volunteers, which was so short of officers that the duke of Richmond was forced to put forward Mr Wimble, an ironmonger, for a commission. The unfortunate tradesman was, however, rejected by the colonel, William Newton, as ‘not of sufficient property and situation in life to ensure subordination and good discipline’.54 Infantry and coastal artillery volunteers might find a former regular to command them. The South Pevensey Volunteers, for instance, had as their sergeant-major an ex-sergeant of fourteen years’ service in the 3rd Foot Guards; over 600 strong in 1803, they were likely to have been an impressive body of men.55 As this part of the south coast is sheltered from the prevalent south-westerly winds, it was felt to be particularly vulnerable to invasion.*