The Age of Global Warming: A History

by Rupert Darwall

  They believe that the northern countries should finally understand that today’s patterns of production and consumption, besides not being sustainable, are the principal cause of the threat facing the global eco-system, and that the northern states therefore have to accept substantial blame for environmental degradation in the poorer countries.[27]

  On the conference’s fourth day, Greenpeace and three other NGOs organised a press conference at Rocinha, home to a quarter of a million of Rio’s poorest people. The assistant editor of the British Medical Journal, Fiona Godlee, went with them. At a school, the NGOs outlined their plans to save the summit and the planet, with demands for legally binding cuts in greenhouse gas emissions and a reduction in the standard of living of the North.

  Sabarina Uega, who ran the Rocinha residents’ association, guided the visitors around over heaps of rubbish and open drains and answered journalists’ questions. What did the people of Rocinha want? Lack of clean water and decent sanitation was the biggest problem. Many children died; perhaps as many as one in five before the age of one. What did Sabarina think of all the money that had been spent on prettifying Rio for the conference? She smiled. ‘Just because we are poor it doesn’t mean we don’t want the city to be beautiful.’[28]

  Opposition from Third World countries meant the proposed convention on forests became a statement of principles. Similarly the legal status of the Earth Charter, envisaged by Strong as the keystone of the summit’s architecture, was downgraded to a non-binding ‘Rio Declaration’. Everyone had thought that the charter would be a namby-pamby, platitudinous statement, said Barbara Bramble of the National Wildlife Federation, the largest US environmental group. Instead it turned into a knockdown, drag-out fight between North and South. ‘They took a draft about ecologic philosophy and turned it into economic power politics.’[29]

  The Declaration pronounced a ‘new and equitable global partnership’, in which developed countries acknowledged their responsibility for the pressure their societies placed on the global environment (principle seven). Sustainable development required states to eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and ‘promote appropriate demographic policies’, in a coy reference to belief in the benefits of population control (principle eight). In the absence of scientific certainty, the precautionary principle should be applied to protect the environment (principle fifteen). Signatories declared themselves in favour of eradicating poverty – ‘an indispensable requirement for sustainable development’ (principle five) – and against war – ‘inherently destructive of sustainable development’ (principle twenty-four). The roles of women, youth, and indigenous people in sustainable development were all highlighted and the rights of oppressed peoples (the Palestinians) to have their environment recognised (principles twenty to twenty-three) asserted.

  Without a concrete plan of action, Strong believed the high sounding rhetoric in UN declarations would be just that. The purpose of Agenda Twenty-One was to avoid the Rio Declaration following the same fate.[30] ‘Humanity stands at a defining moment in history,’ the preamble to Agenda Twenty-One claimed. The world was confronted with a perpetuation of disparities within and between nations; a worsening of poverty, hunger, ill health and the continuing deterioration of ecosystems.[31] In reality, the world had already crossed a threshold into an era that saw the largest numbers of people lifted out of poverty in human history, an accomplishment that the doctrine of sustainable development denied was or could ever happen within an internationally liberal economic order. Described by Goldemberg as a naïve attempt by NGOs to reorganise the basis of the world economy, Agenda Twenty-One’s estimated cost of $600 billion a year, $125 billion of which was meant to come from developed countries, ensured its irrelevance.

  At the time, climate change was not the all-consuming issue at Rio. Twenty years later, Rio’s importance is defined by it. Without the summit, the convention would not have been brought into being so quickly – just four years after the alarm had been raised in 1988 – and possibly not at all. For European governments, the Convention’s teeth had been pulled with the removal of legally binding targets. Strong expressed extreme disappointment over this, but wrote that the convention marked an historic milestone in the development of international law. ‘It was clear from inception that it would involve some very fundamental changes in industrial civilisation.’[32]

  The convention did not change the basis of industrial civilisation. Its significance lay elsewhere. In Article Two, the international community accepted the central proposition of global warming by committing themselves to stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system.

  Rio therefore was a decisive event in the history of global warming. Even though the IPCC in its First Assessment Report two years earlier had returned an open verdict, the science had been settled by environment ministries and diplomats. Thus President Bush’s signing of the convention was more important than the convention’s omission of legally binding targets for emissions reductions. One hundred and ninety-three nations of the world, including the most powerful one, remain formally bound by international treaty to accept the view that man-made global warming is dangerous.

  Should President Bush have gone to Rio?

  As Clayton Yeutter describes it, the White House was in a no-win position. It was a matter of choosing the least damaging option.[33] On the other hand, John Sununu believes the decision was the single biggest mistake of Bush’s presidency. Until Sununu’s departure from the White House, Bush was all set to have given it a miss.[34]

  Suppose the conference had been held four years earlier, what might Bush’s predecessor have done? Ed Meese, who served Ronald Reagan in the White House and as chief of staff when he was governor of California, thinks that Reagan would have gone to Rio to explain why he wouldn’t sign the climate change convention. His record as governor showed he was keen on protecting the environment, but as president, he was wary of international conventions. He would have been very suspicious of the science on which the climate change convention was based, Meese told the author, and was opposed to ‘environmental extremism’ being used as a way of advancing the grasp of government.[35] If Reagan had been watching ABC’s This Week on the eve of Rio, he would have had confirmation of that fear. ‘The task of saving the Earth’s environment is going to become the central organising principle in the post-Cold War world,’ Al Gore told David Brinkley.[36]

  In negotiating and signing a climate change convention without legally binding commitments to cut carbon dioxide emissions, the Bush administration ended up where the American political system and public wanted to be. The convention was swiftly and overwhelmingly ratified by the Senate that autumn. If Bush had not signed it, his successor would have. If the Bush administration had not negotiated in good faith, the convention would have ended up with similar provisions to the Kyoto Protocol that Clinton signed but couldn’t get through the Senate. In retrospect, Bill Reilly, the most vocal supporter of targets and timetables within the administration, believes their removal had been the right call. The strong economy of the 1990s would have blown the emissions caps and any practical chance to stabilise carbon dioxide emissions.[37]

  Not that Bush got any credit from voters. A CBS News poll, released towards the end of the conference, found that only nine per cent of those surveyed expected the summit to produce substantial results to help solve the world’s environmental problems. Seventy per cent said the president had been insincere in his expression of support for environmental issues. Asked if protecting the environment was so important that requirements and standards should be set regardless of cost, sixty-seven per cent replied in the affirmative, an indicator of public sentiment at the time, but a meaningless guide to what voters would actually accept in the absence of a context or consequences to the question.[38]

  There was a further irony, perhaps the biggest o
f all. In Rio, Bush administration officials were deeply frustrated that they were playing defence, as if America was the dirty man of the world. Since the presidency of Teddy Roosevelt, when America became the first nation to pass laws to preserve its natural heritage, no country had done more to preserve its wildernesses, canyons and coastline. Post-war environmentalism was born in America. In the 1970s, its government imposed the most comprehensive environmental standards of any major economy. Yet America was put in the dock at Rio, as was President Bush, accused by Bill Clinton of being Rio’s lone holdout against environmental progress.[39] Demonstrating the political dexterity that Bush lacked, Clinton flipped the position that he wouldn’t sign an agreement that took risks with jobs and the economy, and turned it against him. ‘When you’re weak at home, it weakens you abroad,’ Clinton told a newspaper.[40]

  Clinton would bring those skills to the politics of global warming, matchlessly outclassing his predecessor in his political handling of the issue, but ending up precisely where Bush had left off in 1992.

  [1] Clayton Yeutter memorandum to author, 31st December 2010.

  [2] Steve Fainaru, ‘Rio becomes a City under siege as leaders meet at Summit’ in the Boston Globe, 11th June 1992.

  [3] Clayton Yeutter memorandum to author.

  [4] William Reilly interview with author, 21st December 2010, and William Reilly email to author, 23rd December 2010.

  [5] Dianne Dumanowski and John Mashek, ‘US is Isolated in Opposing Biodiversity Treaty’ in the Boston Globe, 9th June 1992.

  [6] David Lascelles, ‘Survey of the Earth Summit (10)’ in the Financial Times, 2nd June 1992.

  [7] Dianne Dumanoski, ‘US, in shift, Backs 2 keys points at Rio’ in the Boston Globe, 11th June 1992.

  [8] Michael Weisskopf, ‘“Outsider” EPS Chief being Tested’ in the Washington Post, 8th June 1992.

  [9] President George H.W. Bush, The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister John Major at Camp David, 7th June 1992, 1992 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Books I and II, p. 908.

  [10] Paul Hoversten, ‘Treaty for Rio eludes EPA chief’ in USA Today, 8th June 1992.

  [11] Dianne Dumanowski and John Mashek, ‘US is Isolated in Opposing Biodiversity Treaty’ in the Boston Globe, 9th June 1992.

  [12] William Long, ‘Brown finds Perfect Forum in Rio’ in the Los Angeles Times, 7th June 1992.

  [13] Susan Benesch, ‘Senators: Anti-US sentiment strong in Rio’ in the St Petersburg Times, 7th June 1992.

  [14] ‘Wirth: Bad PR taints US image’ in the Denver Post, 10th June 1992.

  [15] Ann Devroy, ‘White House scorns summit critics’ in the Washington Post, 10th June 1992.

  [16] Associated Press, ‘President tells Earth Summit: “I didn’t come here to apologise”’, 12th June 1992.

  [17] Eugene Robinson and Michael Weisskopf, ‘Bonn Pushes Tough Stand on Warming’ in the Washington Post, 9th June 1992.

  [18] Devroy, ‘White House scorns summit critics’ in the Washington Post, 10th June 1992.

  [19] Associated Press, ‘President tells Earth Summit: “I didn’t come here to apologise”’, 12th June 1992.

  [20] UNFCCC figures extracted from Time series – Annex I, Total CO2 Emissions without Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/time_series_annex_i/items/3814.php

  [21] ‘As Population Grows, People will live “Like Rats”, Cousteau says’ in the Los Angeles Times, 6th June 1992.

  [22] Joel Achenbach, ‘On the Fringe of Rio – Vikings, Vegetarians and Taoists at the Alternative Summit’ in the Washington Post, 4th June 1992.

  [23] Maurice Strong, Where on Earth are We Going? (2001), p. 231.

  [24] Achenbach, ‘On the Fringe of Rio – Vikings, Vegetarians and Taoists at the Alternative Summit’ in the Washington Post, 4th June 1992, and ‘Whalers backed’ in The Times, 4th June 1992.

  [25] Fiona Godlee, ‘Rio Diary: a fortnight at the earth summit’ in British Medical Journal Vol. 305 (11th July 1992), p. 103.

  [26] Financial Times, 6th June 1992.

  [27] Vaclav Havel, ‘Rio and the New Millennium’ in the New York Times, 3rd June 1992.

  [28] Godlee, ‘Rio Diary: a fortnight at the earth summit’ in British Medical Journal Vol. 305 (11th July 1992), p. 103.

  [29] ‘North and South Hold Environment Hostage’ in the Seattle Times, 3rd June 1992.

  [30] José Goldemberg interview with author, 31st January 2010.

  [31] United Nations, Agenda 21: Earth Summit – The United Nations Programme of Action from Rio (1993), para 1.1.

  [32] Strong, Where on Earth are We Going? (2001), p. 210.

  [33] Clayton Yeutter memorandum to author.

  [34] John H. Sununu, interview with author, 11th November 2010.

  [35] Ed Meese interview with author, 11th March 2010.

  [36] Associated Press, ‘US to Spend Extra to Save Forests’, 1st June 1992.

  [37] William Reilly interview with author.

  [38] John Holusha, ‘The Earth Summit Poll finds Scepticism in US about Earth Summit’ in the New York Times, 11th June 1992.

  [39] Gwen Ifill, ‘The Earth Summit: President, in Rio, defends his stand’ in the New York Times, 13th June 1992.

  [40] Mitchell Locin, ‘Clinton Downplays “Foreign Policy Vote” as a Factor’ in the Chicago Tribune, 19th June 1992.

  17

  Two Protocols

  If there is one person in the world who has the history, understanding and reputation to bring this all together, it is Al Gore.

  Michael Oppenheimer, Environmental Defence Fund, Kyoto, December 1997[1]

  Rio begat Kyoto.

  The Kyoto Protocol has not begotten a son, only a string of COPs – Conferences of the Parties – and MOPs – Meetings of the Parties. ‘Since 1991, legions of well-meaning diplomats, scientists, and environmentalists have undertaken excruciatingly complicated negotiations in what is essentially a political exercise that creates the illusion of mitigating climate change while actually accomplishing little more than raising public consciousness,’ Richard Benedick, who led the US team that negotiated the Montreal Protocol, has written.[2]

  What accounts for the success of the Montreal Protocol in eliminating CFC emissions and the failure of the Kyoto Protocol ten years later? Writing in 2003, Scott Barrett argued that the Kyoto Protocol was likely to fail because it did not solve the enforcement problem. Appeals to a state’s sense of its responsibilities, offers of assistance or threats of naming and shaming were, Barrett thought, inadequate substitutes for having a credible enforcement mechanism. Barrett would press negotiators on their hesitation to address the issue. ‘Always I received the same unsatisfying response: enforcement was something that was best addressed later.’[3] Although the Kyoto Protocol specified that the parties should agree a compliance regime at the first COP after Kyoto, it only came up for discussion at The Hague COP6 in November 2000. By then, it was too late.

  Unlike Kyoto, the Montreal Protocol has strong incentives for countries to join the Montreal regime and not to leave it. It provides the threat of trade sanctions on any goods produced using CFCs and other controlled substances by countries that had not ratified the protocol. Countries can be suspended if they have not complied with their obligations, freezing their rights and privileges.

  Why, then, didn’t the international community incorporate similar mechanisms being used to reverse stratospheric ozone depletion to the global warming treaties? Put another way, how was it that Presi
dent Reagan, allegedly a unilateralist who once said trees cause more pollution than automobiles, led the international community to agree an environmental treaty with teeth, whereas President Clinton and a vice president who had compared global warming to an ecological Kristallnacht signed a toothless protocol which he did not ask the Senate to ratify?[4]

  Robert Reinstein was alternate head alongside Benedick leading the US team that negotiated the Montreal Protocol and subsequently led the negotiations for the US on the climate change convention. In a 1992 paper, Reinstein highlighted differences in the nature and uses of the gases themselves and in the status of the science between ozone depletion and global warming. The initial international response to ozone depletion focused on eight synthetic gases that were manufactured for a limited range of specific applications, such as refrigerants and foam-blowing. Greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide occur naturally and are emitted mostly as by-products in processes that are basic to human survival. Whereas there were a limited number of chemical plants producing CFCs, every person who burns fossil fuels is a ‘producer’ of carbon dioxide and every farmer raising cattle or sheep is a ‘producer’ of methane.